Chairman of the State Administration Council (SAC) of Myanmar, Min Aung Hlain conducted ‘an official goodwill visit’^[1] to Russia, accompanied by other members of SAC and senior officials of Myanmar. On March 4, 2025, Russian President Vladimir Putin held talks at Kremlin with the Chairman of SAC, Min Aung Hlain. The fourth visit conducted by Min Aung Hlain, since he seized power in 2021, deepened the diplomatic and strategic partnership between the two nations. The recent visit marked the first official meeting between the Chairman of the State Administration Council (SAC) and the Russian President, although the two leaders had previously met on the sidelines of the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok in September 2022.^[2]

Backdrop of the Visit

As, February 18, 2025, marked 77 years of formal diplomatic relations between Myanmar and Russia, the visit held immense significance. The strength of Myanmar-Russia bilateral relations is evident in the fact that Russia was the only major power to acknowledge the Tatmadaw’s 2021 takeover^[3] and remains the sole nation to have extended a presidential invitation to Min Aung Hlain. Whereas Myanmar has expressed support for Russia’s special operation against Ukraine, making it the only member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to take such a stance.^[4]

Estranged and penalized with international sanctions, both Russia and Myanmar have been actively exploring ways to strengthen their security and economic ties, particularly since the coup of February 2021 in Myanmar. The 2021 coup in Myanmar elicited international condemnation and faced harsh reactions from the international community. Under such backdrop, Russian Deputy Defence Minister Colonel General Alexander Fomin attended the 76th anniversary of Armed Forces Day in Naypyitaw and met with the Chairman of SAC.^[5] This showcased the Russian willingness to further strengthen diplomatic ties with Myanmar and how they viewed the 2021 coup.^[6]

Since the coup of 2021, Myanmar-Russia bilateral cooperation has gained significant momentum in sectors such as defence, energy, and trade. In defence cooperation, Russia has emerged as a key provider of military assistance to Myanmar. Post coup, Chairman of SAC, Min Aung Hlaing, has made three visits to Russia, brokering deals for modern Russian-made jet fighters, helicopters, and military equipment.^[7] As per a 2023 UN report, entities within the Russian Federation, including state-owned entities, have shipped at least USD 406 million of arms, raw materials, and associated supplies to the Myanmar military, since the coup.^[8]

The cooperation is not limited to defence, on the front of energy Myanmar has partnered with Russia’s state-owned energy giant Rosatom to develop hydro, wind, and nuclear power.^[9] Negotiations with Russia were already in place for the construction of a small-scale nuclear reactor in Myanmar, prior to the latest visit by the Chairman of SAC, Min Aung Hlaing. In February 2023, Russia and Myanmar signed an Intergovernmental Agreement on cooperation in the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, and a modern Information Centre on Atomic Technologies was opened in Yangon.^[10] The agreement was followed by the signing of a MoU, in October 2023, assessing the requirements for the development of nuclear infrastructure in Myanmar to be carried out in accordance with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and identifying key areas of focus for the advancement of a small modular reactor project.^[11] Furthermore, considering supply concerns and rising prices of oil, Myanmar planned to import crude oil from Russia. This led to a sudden spike in imports of Russian crude oil, as between March and June 2023, Russian oil exports to Myanmar jumped from almost nothing to 8.36 million barrels of oil.^[12] Now these imports of oil from Russia have matured well as in 2024, Russia supplied over 90 percent of oil to Myanmar.^[13]

On the front of economic ties, both the nations have initiated to conduct regular talks and exchange high-level business delegations, to promote the trade and investment ties. In the first half of 2023, trade between Russia and Myanmar totalled about $200 million,^[14] increased by approximately 40 percent. Moreover, in 2023, the Bank of Russia and the Central Bank of Myanmar developed cooperation in establishing an independent bilateral financial and transaction infrastructure.^[15] To enhance the economic relations, both countries collaboratively established the Myanmar-Russia Inter-Governmental Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation and the fifth meeting of the commission took place on February 24, 2025, in Myanmar.^[16]

Since the coup, the Myanmar-Russia mutual cooperation in various sectors has ideally flourished and is set to transpire further. The visit carried out by the Chairman of SAC, Min Aung Hlaing, strengthened and diversified the proliferating Myanmar-Russia ties.

Outcomes of the Visit

Chairman of SAC, Min Aung Hlaing, accompanied by his delegation, arrived in Moscow on March 3, 2025. The following day, he held official talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin. On March 5, 2025, Myanmar’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, U Than Swe, met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to advance diplomatic discussions. During the visit, Myanmar and Russia signed ten agreements to cooperate in various sectors, including trade, banking, mining, information technology, tourism, and energy.^[17] Whereas, during a weeklong visit to Russia and Belarus, the Chairman of SAC, collectively signed 24 memoranda of understanding on cooperation in various sectors.^[18]

Energy has emerged as a strategic area of bilateral cooperation. Hence, among the various agreements signed, the most prominent was the intergovernmental agreement on the construction of a low-capacity nuclear power plant. The agreement is expected to provide Myanmar with affordable and environmentally friendly energy which gives an impetus to Myanmar’s economy and employment,^[19] with the nuclear plant having a capacity of around 100 megawatts.^[20] Further, to enhance capabilities of skilled labour in Myanmar, joint projects in advanced technologies are being implemented, one of them being a ground-based earth remote sensing complex launched in Myanmar with Russian assistance. Moreover, a joint statement was signed between the Ministry of Economic Development of Russia and the Ministry of Investment and Foreign Economic Relations of Myanmar on the promotion and protection of Russian investments in Myanmar.^[21]

A MoU was also signed between the State Corporation for Space Activities Roscosmos and the Ministry of Science and Technology of Myanmar. The MoU aimed to assist Myanmar in the exploration and use of outer space for various purposes.^[22] Russia has also offered to share information captured by its reconnaissance satellites with Myanmar for military purposes.^[23]

Prior to this visit, in February 2025 Russian Minister of Economic Development Maxim Reshetnikov and Myanmar's Minister for Investment and Foreign Economic Relations Kan Zaw signed a memorandum on investment cooperation to initiate the Dawei Special Economic Zone (SEZ) project, including the construction of a port and an oil refinery.^[24] Although no final decision on the construction of the refinery was concluded, and it was stated that the Russian companies ‘are still studying the economics of such a project,’ as ‘it is very complicated from the point of view of economic feasibility’.^[25] Among the various agreements, signed during the visit, the much anticipated direction to the stalled Dawei Special Economic Zone (SEZ) project in southern Myanmar’s Tanintharyi region did not figure. Delayed since 2013, Russia plans to establish high-tech industrial areas, transport hubs, IT and export processing zones in the area, of 196 square km, as a part of the Dawei Special Economic Zone (SEZ) project, in the Tanintharyi region.

As the talk with Russian President Putin concluded it was reassured that ‘the agreements reached during this visit will further promote Russia-Myanmar partnership across all areas.’^[26] Furthermore, the Chairman of SAC, Min Aung Hlaing, was invited for the 80th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War on May 9, 2025, whereby a contingent of Myanmar’s Armed Forces will join Russian military personnel in the ceremonial parade on Red Square.^[27]

Whereas Chairman of SAC, Min Aung Hlaing, during his meeting with Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin proposed to establish two consulates general in Russia, St. Petersburg and Novosibirsk, and extended a request to open a Consulate General of the Russian Federation in Mandalay, Myanmar.^[28]

The visit led to reactions from the opposition to the SAC regime in Myanmar. As Nay Phone Latt spokesperson of the National Unity Government (NUG) stated ‘the military leader is in desperate need of international recognition and willing to trade the country’s resources in exchange.’^[29] Further, in the talks between the Chairman of SAC and the Russian President, he expressed that such a meeting is ‘not merely a diplomatic engagement—it is a clear and deliberate act of support for a regime accused of genocide’ and the meeting ‘further demonstrates Russia’s willingness to provide political legitimacy and strategic backing to an illegitimate and brutal military dictatorship.’^[30]

Conclusion

Recent developments in Myanmar suggest that the SAC is facing significant challenges in maintaining control, as various Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) are reportedly exerting influence over more than half of the country. The SAC regime has lost large swathes of territory around the country’s periphery, including control of two regional military commands, in the north and west of the country. Further, the Myanmar economic situation is also not in good shape as 35 percent of the population lives in poverty with more than 3.5 million people have been displaced.^[31]Additionally, the SAC regime is facing declining loyalty among its soldiers, with some ground forces reportedly aligning themselves with resistance groups opposing the regime.^[32] To make matters worse, rising corruption^[33]among the senior officials creates another obstacle for the SAC regime to sustain itself.

Such state of affairs poses a challenge for fresh investments and creates apprehensions among the investors. This can be observed with the reaction towards the proposed construction of a low-capacity nuclear power plant, as it is being debated that ‘there have been four such agreements (on nuclear energy) before, and none have been implemented,’ even though ‘the junta is facing acute energy shortages, but the regime has neither the security over its territory, the skilled manpower, or finances for even a small modular reactor.’^[34]

With bourgeoning internal conflict, the SAC regime requires both security and diplomatic support, which needs to be balanced well. With China being Myanmar’s largest trading partner and a significant investor in the country’s infrastructure,^[35] a visit to Russia strengthens the grounds for diversification within Myanmar’s limited foreign partners.

An official ‘goodwill visit’ to Russia followed by a visit to Belarus by the Chairman of SAC, Min Aung Hlaing, underscores Myanmar’s security and economic needs, along with the strategic imperative to mitigate its diplomatic isolation, by strengthening economic and security ties with Russia.

These objectives are the key catalysts in the growing strategic convergence between Russia and Myanmar. Both nations have consistently taken measures to deepen their already significant economic and military cooperation and are now looking to diversify this cooperation to various other sectors, most primarily to the energy sector, while actively supporting their respective foreign policy postures. Hence, till SAC continues to govern Myanmar, relations with Russia are envisaged to reach greater heights.

Endnotes

^[1] The Global New Light of Myanmar. March 1, 2025. Information Team, State Administrative Council. https://www.gnlm.com.mm/1-march-2025/#article-title
^[2] Strangio, Sebastian. March 05, 2025. In Moscow Meeting, Myanmar Junta Chief Praises ‘King’ Putin. The Diplomat.https://thediplomat.com/2025/03/in-moscow-meeting-myanmar-junta-chief-praises-king-putin/
^[3] Storey, Ian. November 30, 2023. Myanmar-Russia Relations Since the Coup: An Ever-Tighter Embrace. Fulcrum. https://fulcrum.sg/myanmar-russia-relations-since-the-coup-an-ever-tighter-embrace/
^[4] Lintner, Bertill. August 14, 2024. Ties Between Warmongering Regimes in Myanmar, Russia as Cozy as Ever. The Irrawaddy. https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/guest-column/ties-between-warmongering-regimes-in-myanmar-russia-as-cozy-as-ever.html
^[5] Nikkei Assia. March 27, 2021. Myanmar junta holds military parade with Russian attendance. https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Myanmar-Crisis/Myanmar-junta-holds-military-parade-with-Russian-attendance
^[6] Storey, Ian. November 30, 2023. Myanmar-Russia Relations Since the Coup: An Ever-Tighter Embrace. Fulcrum. https://fulcrum.sg/myanmar-russia-relations-since-the-coup-an-ever-tighter-embrace/
^[7] Strangio, Sebastian. March 03, 2025. Myanmar Junta Chief to Meet with Vladimir Putin on Russia Trip. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2025/03/myanmar-junta-chief-to-meet-with-vladimir-putin-on-russia-trip/
^[8] OHCHR. May 17, 2023. The Billion Dollar Death Trade: The International Arms Networks that Enable Human Rights Violations in Myanmar. Human Rights Council. Fifty-third session. 19 June–14 July 2023. https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/myanmar/crp-sr-myanmar-2023-05-17.pdf
^[9] Storey, Ian. November 30, 2023. Myanmar-Russia Relations Since the Coup: An Ever-Tighter Embrace. Fulcrum. https://fulcrum.sg/myanmar-russia-relations-since-the-coup-an-ever-tighter-embrace/
^[10] News. September 13, 2023. Press release on the upcoming visit to Russia by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Myanmar Than Swe. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. https://mid.ru/en/maps/mm/1904262/
^[11] World Nuclear News. October 11, 2023. Myanmar and Russia sign nuclear infrastructure MoU. https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Myanmar-and-Russia-sign-nuclear-infrastructure-MoU
^[12] ibid.
^[13] Transcripts. March 4, 2025. Statements following Russian-Myanmar talks. Events. President of Russia. The Kremlin, Moscow.http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/76404
^[14] News. September 13, 2023. Press release on the upcoming visit to Russia by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Myanmar Than Swe. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. https://mid.ru/en/maps/mm/1904262/
^[15] ibid.
^[16] Events. February 25, 2025. Myanmar, Russia conclude 5th Intergovernmental Trade & Economic Meeting. Directorate of Investment and Company Administration (DICA). https://www.dica.gov.mm/37632/
^[17] Zan, H. Hein. March 7, 2025. Planeload of Cronies Accompany Myanmar Junta Boss on Russia Trip. The Irrawaddy. https://www.irrawaddy.com/business/planeload-of-cronies-accompany-myanmar-junta-boss-on-russia-trip.html
^[18] The Irrawaddy. March 12, 2025. Myanmar Junta Boss Returns to China’s Embrace After Russia Trip. https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/myanmar-china-watch/myanmar-junta-boss-returns-to-chinas-embrace-after-russia-trip.html
^[19] Transcripts. March 4, 2025. Statements following Russian-Myanmar talks. Events. President of Russia. The Kremlin, Moscow. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/76404
^[20] Soldatkin, Vladimir & Osborn, Andrew. March 4, 2025. Putin extols 'elephant diplomacy' with Myanmar in talks with junta chief. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-greets-myanmars-junta-chief-moscow-2025-03-04/
^[21] Transcripts. March 4, 2025. Statements following Russian-Myanmar talks. Events. President of Russia. The Kremlin, Moscow. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/76404
^[22] ibid.
^[23] The Irrawaddy. March 5, 2025. Eight Takeaways from Myanmar Junta Chief’s Meeting with Putin. https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/eight-takeaways-from-myanmar-junta-chiefs-meeting-with-putin.html
^[24] Reuters. February 23, 2025. Russia signs memorandum to build port, oil refinery in Myanmar. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-signs-memorandum-build-port-oil-refinery-myanmar-2025-02-23/
^[25] Interfax. February 24, 2025. Russia to implement projects to build oil refinery, port, coal TPP in Myanmar - Russian minister. https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/109951/
^[26] ibid.
^[27] ibid.
^[28] Government House, Moscow. March 4, 2025. Mikhail Mishustin meets with Chairman of the State Administration Council, Prime Minister of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar Min Aung Hlaing. News. The Russian Government. http://government.ru/en/news/54409/
^[29] Peck, Grant & David, Rising. March 5, 2025. The head of Myanmar’s military government visits Russia for cooperation talks with Putin. AP News. https://apnews.com/article/min-aung-hlaing-myanmar-junta-russia-putin-d1700f85a360632bcfb0b0f0c3edff55
^[30] Strangio, Sebastian. March 5, 2025. In Moscow Meeting, Myanmar Junta Chief Praises ‘King’ Putin. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2025/03/in-moscow-meeting-myanmar-junta-chief-praises-king-putin/
^[31] Selth, Andrew. January 29, 2025. Myanmar’s “failed junta” turns four. The Interpreter, Lowy Institute. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/myanmar-s-failed-junta-turns-four
^[32] Kyed, M. Helene. May 10, 2024. Defection and revolution in Myanmar. New Mandala.
https://www.newmandala.org/defection-and-revolution-in-myanmar/
^[33] The Irrawaddy. October 11, 2023. Two Myanmar Junta Generals at Center of Corruption Scandal Jailed for Life. https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/two-myanmar-junta-generals-at-center-of-corruption-scandal-jailed-for-life.html
^[34] Walker, Tommy. March 13, 2025. Myanmar's junta turns to Russia for support in civil war. DW. https://www.dw.com/en/myanmars-junta-turns-to-russia-for-support-in-civil-war/a-71891413
^[35] Walker, Tommy. March 13, 2025. Myanmar's junta turns to Russia for support in civil war. DW. https://www.dw.com/en/myanmars-junta-turns-to-russia-for-support-in-civil-war/a-71891413

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