The African continent grapples with numerous challenges, including political instability, economic challenges, and social unrest. Conflicts over resources, ethnic tensions, and governance issues exacerbate inequalities across the continent. In such a scenario, the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) brokered between Somaliland and Ethiopia has ignited a political storm in the Horn of Africa.

January 1, 2025 marks the anniversary of the MoU signed between the land-locked nation of Ethiopia, and the self-declared Republic of Somaliland. The MoU, signed between the President of Somaliland, Muse Bihi Abdi, and Ethiopian Prime Minister Dr. Abiy Ahmed Ali on January 1, 2024, ensured Ethiopia's access to the sea, reciprocated by formal recognition of the Republic of Somaliland.^[1] The 20 km sea access to the Ethiopian Naval Forces, leased for a period of 50 years, at the Red Sea port of Berbera is of great significance for Ethiopia as it satisfies the land locked nation’s ambitions to access the Red Sea. Berbera port is a critical, and strategically located, port in Somaliland. On the other hand, Somaliland, the breakaway region of Somalia, gains the much-anticipated international recognition as a sovereign nation. Moreover, Ethiopia will share military and intelligence experience with Somaliland.^[2]

The signing of the MoU has unquestionably impacted the status quo in the rather turbulent region. The implication and repercussions of the MoU have not only spilled across the region, but have also attracted global powers towards the Red Sea. This article aims to evaluate the far-reaching consequences of the MoU in the region.

Background

The primary backdrop to the MoU is twofolds. Firstly, is the Ethiopia’s quest to gain access to the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, which is quintessential for the landlocked nation’s growth, development and future. Ethiopia's longstanding need for the access to sea has been bourgeoning ever since Eritrea's gained independence in 1993. The sea access would not only serve as a vital gateway for Ethiopia to boost its trade capabilities but would also mark a crucial step towards reducing the nation’s dependency on other countries for maritime transit.^[3] Prior to the MoU being signed, Ethiopia’s access to the sea was only through the Port of Djibouti. Ethiopia had earlier pursued access to the Port of Berbera and Port of Sudan, in 2005, as alternative routes to sea access.^[4] Although the ventures made by Ethiopia did not allow it to form alternative routes, the quest for a formidable sea access remained unresolved. Regaining a presence in the Red Sea would benefit Ethiopian commercial interests and revive Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy’s political legacy, which has been tainted by his handling of conflict in Tigray.^[5]

The second key backdrop is the pursuit of Somaliland, a breakaway region of Somalia, to be a sovereign nation. The question of sovereignty has proliferated since May 1991, when the representatives of the Somaliland reasserted Somaliland’s sovereignty based on the borders established on the 1960 Act of Union. The African Union (AU), a prominent regional multilateral, sent a fact-finding mission to understand the case of Somaliland and concluded that “the fact that the ‘union between Somaliland and Somalia was never ratified’ and also malfunctioned when it went into action from 1960-1990, makes Somaliland’s search for recognition historically unique and self-justified in African political history”.^[6]

The observations and recommendations made by the AU fact finding mission in 2005, are referred as substantial legal determinations justifying Somaliland’s independent legal status.^[7] Since 1991, Somaliland, has had a history of peace, has a functioning government, conducted more than seven democratic elections, and cultivated a strong culture of democracy and stability – an achievement unparalleled to other countries in the Horn of Africa.^[8] Yet the territory remains unrecognized by the AU and many other countries.

With MoU being signed and agreed upon, Ethiopia has become the first country in Africa and second country in the world (after Taiwan) to recognise Somaliland as a sovereign nation. Considering the current geopolitics to be under unprecedented adversity, crisis of Somaliland has regional and global implications.

Aftermath of MoU

The MoU, between governments of Ethiopia and Somaliland, has shaken up the regional dynamics and attracted significant regional and international attention. The MoU was condemned globally. The United States (US) stated that it recognises Somalia within its 1960 borders, which include Somaliland, and called on all parties to resolve their issues through dialogue.^[9] Similarly, UK also supported the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia.^[10] China too supported Somalia in safeguarding national unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity.^[11] Further, regional multilateral forums like the EU, Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and Arab League have also made appeals to Ethiopia not to proceed with the deal.^[12]

Somalia had a harsh reaction towards the MoU. On January 6, 2024, a few days after the signing of the MoU, Somalian President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud signed a law nullifying the MoU, illustrating Somalia’s commitment to safeguard its unity, sovereignty & territorial integrity under international law.^[13] Further, the MoU strained the diplomatic ties between Somalia and Ethiopia.

Shortly after the agreement was reached, Somalia’s government issued a statement declaring the deal null and void because of its alleged violation of Somalia's territorial integrity and unity.^[14] Later, on April 4, 2024, Somalia expelled the Ethiopian ambassador to Somalia, and ordered the closure of two consulates, accusing Ethiopia of infringing on Somalian sovereignty and internal affairs.^[15] This was not the first instance where Somalia had asked a senior Ethiopian diplomate to depart from Ethiopian embassy in Somalia. On October 29, 2024, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Somalia expelled Mr. Ali Mohamed Adan (Ali Garre) serving as Counselor II at the Embassy of Ethiopia in Somalia.^[16] The deteriorating diplomatic ties are perceived to be due to the signing of MoU between Ethiopia and Somaliland.

The volatile diplomatic relations between Ethiopia and Somalia, paved way for Egypt to further cement their position in the region. As, Egypt delivered its first military aid to Somalia in more than four decades in August 2024.^[17] Egypt has also sent 10,000 troops to Somalia as part of a peacekeeping mission, among which 5,000 will join AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) while the remaining troops will join separately, to counter the terror acts of Al-Shabaab. Furthermore, in October 2024, Egypt formed an axis^[18] against Ethiopia, aligning with Eritrea and Somalia which escalated the regional insecurities at.

The uncertainty and the growing involvement of external actors in Horn of Africa are deemed as a national threat for Egypt,^[19] this is also due to the ongoing tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia. Dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia, nations that are among the largest military and economic powers on the African continent, on water sharing has been bourgeoning for years. This is primarily over the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) hydro dam on the headwaters of the Nile River.

Another prominent external actor, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), endowed with considerable resources and significant regional influence, also plays pivotal role in fostering regional integration within the Horn of Africa. Especially through investments in the modernisation of the Red sea Port of Berbera (located in Somaliland). In 2018, a tripartite agreement was signed between Ethiopia, DP World, a UAE based company, and the Somaliland Port Authority, which provided DP World with a 51 percent stake, Somaliland with 30 percent stake and Ethiopia with 19 percent stake, in the Berbera Port.^[20] Although Ethiopia did not meet the expectation and had to forgo its stake in June 2022.^[21] Although UAE affirmed to share close and distinguished ties with both Somalia and Ethiopia.

Turkey also aimed to harness influence in the region. In 2017, Turkey set up its biggest overseas military base in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, increasing Turkish presence in the Horn of Africa country.^[22] Post the Signing of MoU, in February 2024, Turkey reaffirmed its long-standing security partnership with Somalia and signed the Defence and Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement. Under the agreement, Turkey would assist Somalia in developing its capacity and capabilities to combat illegal and irregular activities in its territorial waters.^[23] Later, in July 2024, Turkey sent naval support, in form of an exploration vessel, off the coast of Somalia.^[24] Although, Turkey has maintained a neutral stance throughout the volatile regional dynamics. Turkey shares cordial ties with both Ethiopia and Somalia, therefore, at the request of Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, Turkey initiated mediation between Ethiopia and Somalia.

The mediation by Turkey resulted in the signing of Ankara Declaration, on December 11, 2024, between Ethiopia and Somalia.^[25] The declaration is expected to have a positive effect towards regional peace and stability. The positive ripples of declaration are already in action, as Ethiopia defence minister visited Somalia on January 2, 2025 which was followed by the visit of Somalian President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud on January 11, 2025. The visit by Somali President resulted in agreement, of the restoration of diplomatic representation in their respective capitals after a year of severed ties, between both Somalia and Ethiopia.^[26] Further, signing of the declaration led to legitimisation of the participation of Ethiopian troops in the upcoming African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), in Somalia, which were earlier set to be expelled by Somalia.^[27] Through the AU peace keeping mission Ethiopia has played a significant role in fighting Al-Shabaab in Somalia. Moreover, regarding sea access to Ethiopia the declaration stated that both Ethiopia and Somalia “acknowledged the potentially diverse benefits that could be derived from Ethiopia’s assured access to and from the sea, whilst respecting the territorial integrity of the of Somalia.”^[28] Even, UAE has welcomed the Ankara declaration, seeking a reinforced stability and constructive cooperation in the Horn of Africa region.^[29]

Irrespective of these positive developments, achieved by Ankara Declaration, the path towards regional peace remains uncertain, particularly considering the implications of the MoU between Ethiopia and Somaliland for other global powers.

Implications

The aftermath of the MoU crafted a turbulent way forward for the regional security and stability of the Horn of Africa. Particularly, for US the stakes are high as region holds significant security concerns. Trump, during his first term of presidency, ordered the Pentagon to pull US forces from Somalia, in 2022 President Biden reversed the orders and directed US forces back to Somalia.^[30] The presence of US forces was to counter the rise of terrorist group Al-Shabab. Further in February 2024, a month after the MoU between Ethiopia and Somaliland, US agreed to construct up to five military bases for the Somalia National Army (SNA) Danab Brigade, with a worth over $100 million.^[31]

Concurrently, US has reportedly expressed interest in using Somaliland’s Berbera port and airfield as a base for the purposes of countering al-Shabaab.^[32] Somaliland government have portrayed their willingness to host a US military base in the strategic coastal city of Berbera, seeking to strengthen ties with US.^[33] Although US recognises Somalia within its 1960 borders, but partnering with Somaliland could secure a vital foothold to protect key maritime routes along the Gulf of Aden – a critical artery for global trade and energy supplies. This collaboration would also enable the U.S. to diversify its regional presence, reducing its reliance on the overcrowded military hub of Djibouti while fostering stability and economic growth in an underrepresented yet strategically significant area.

With Donald Trump set to return to the US presidency, a shift in US policy towards the Horn of Africa, particularly Somaliland, is anticipated. Despite Trump’s ideation to decrease the US military presence, there is strong possibility of the Trump administration to increase influence in the region in order to counter the strengthening Chinese dominance. Under these circumstances, it is speculated that US might recognise the sovereign nation of Somaliland, as recommended under the Project 2025 Mandate for Leadership.^[34]

Moreover Somaliland, despite being an unrecognized de facto state, has maintained political stability, adopted democratic system of governance, and held regular elections adjoined with peaceful transfer of power. Most recently, in November 2024, Somaliland concluded its fourth presidential election with opposition leader, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi Cirro, of Waddani Party winning the elections. A region marred by authoritarianism and political instability; Somaliland provides an assured steadiness for US.

Although Somaliland's commitment to the West, and especially Taiwan, may come under strain due to China's likely renewed attempt to engage with Somaliland through economic and financial incentives in exchange for subscribing to “One China” policy.^[35] This challenge is further underscored as President Cirro expressed interest in establishing relations with Beijing, instead of Taipei, and China's determination to undermine the incoming Trump administration in this geopolitically and strategically critical region.

Conclusion

The Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU, a landmark agreement, has left an indelible mark on the geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa. While it has provided Ethiopia with much-needed access to the Red Sea and offered Somaliland a step closer to international recognition, the agreement has simultaneously deepened regional tensions and invited global scrutiny. The ensuing diplomatic rifts, particularly between Ethiopia and Somalia, highlighted the fragility of alliances in a region marred by historical grievances and contested sovereignties. The MoU continues to trigger cornerstone of rising insecurities in the region, even after a year.

Efforts like Ankara Declaration offer glimpses of hope for reconciliation. However, the intricate issues of territorial integrity, foreign interests, and regional rivalries present formidable obstacles. The declaration, has led to ease some frictions in Ethiopia-Somalia ties and, is received well by the current US administration, under Biden, and by China.^[36] Still, the region’s stabilizing efforts face uncertainty with the potential policy shifts under a Trump administration. Along with that, Ankara Declaration marks a shift for Somalia away from the regional axis of Egypt and Eritrea.

Somaliland is located, on Gulf of Aden, covering the entrance of Bab al-Mandeb, a chokepoint used by one-third of global trade.^[37] The geostrategic location, not only caters to the geopolitical rivalries, but also tempts the global powers, like India, that are less active in region to play a key role.^[38]

In such a context, the involvement of global powers, each pursuing its strategic objectives, will likely compound the region’s complexities and undermine the path to lasting peace.

Endnotes

^[1] Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Corporation. January 3, 2024. The Republic of Somaliland Government signs Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia for Seaport Access in Exchange for International Recognition. Republic of Somaliland. Accessed on November 19, 2024.
https://mfa.govsomaliland.org/article/immediate-release-republic-somaliland-government-signs-memor
^[2] Mohammed, Ahmed. January 2024. Ethiopia -Somaliland Deal Fetches Bonanza to Economic Dev't. Ethiopia Broadcasting Corporation. Accessed on January 3, 2025.
https://ebc.et/english/newsdetails.aspx?newsid=5269
^[3] Wasike, Andrew. January 5, 2024. Why Ethiopia’s quest for Red Sea access has sparked regional controversy. Explainer. Anadolu Ajansi. Accessed on January 2, 2025.
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/analysis/explainer-why-ethiopia-s-quest-for-red-sea-access-has-sparked-regional-controversy/3101100
^[4] Sudan Tribune. December 26, 2005. Ethiopia to use Port Berbera, Port Sudan. Accessed on January 2, 2025
https://sudantribune.com/article13823/
^[5] Webb. Maxwell. February 22, 2204. What the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal means for Washington’s strategy in the Red Sea. Atlantic Council. Accessed on January 2, 2025.
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/what-the-ethiopia-somaliland-deal-means-for-washingtons-strategy-in-the-red-sea/
^[6] African Union. 2005. AU Fact Finding Mission to Somaliland (30 April to 4 May 2005). Part V, Point 8. Observation and Recommendations. AU Archives. Accessed on January 2, 2025.
https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/PDFFiles/au-fact-finding-mission-to-somaliland-30-april-to-4-may-2005.pdf
^[7] Hersi, F. Mohamed. January 2024. Ethiopia-Somaliland Deal: Somaliland’s Pathway to International Recognition. Academy for Peace and Development. Accessed on January 2, 2025.
https://apd-somaliland.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Ethiopia_Somaliland-Deal_-Pathway-to-International-Recogniation_APD.pdf
^[8] Hersi, F. Mohamed. December 2023. Ethiopia’s Quest for Access to the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden: Historical Precedents and Contemporary Implications. Accessed on January 2, 2025.
https://apd-somaliland.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Ethiopias-Quest-for-Access-to-the-Red-Sea-and-the-Gulf-of-Aden_Final-1.pdf
^[9] Ali, Faisal. January 6, 2024. Somalia ‘nullifies’ port agreement between Ethiopia and Somaliland. The Guardian. Accessed on January 3, 2024.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/06/somalia-nullifies-port-agreement-between-ethiopia-and-somaliland
^[10] UK in Somalia. January 5, 2024. X. Accessed on January 3, 2025.
https://x.com/UKinSomalia/status/1743001930010439769
^[11] Regular Press Conference. January 11, 2024. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning’s Regular Press Conference on January 11, 2024. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. People’s Republic of China. Accessed on January 3, 2025.
https://www.mfa.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xw/fyrbt/lxjzh/202405/t20240530_11347677.html
^[12] Ali, Faisal. January 6, 2024. Somalia ‘nullifies’ port agreement between Ethiopia and Somaliland. The Guardian. Accessed on January 3, 2025.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/06/somalia-nullifies-port-agreement-between-ethiopia-and-somaliland
^[13] Sheikh, Abdi. January 7, 2024. Somalia president signs law nullifying Ethiopia-Somaliland port deal. Reuters. Accessed on January 2, 2025.
https://www.reuters.com/markets/somalia-president-signs-law-nullifying-ethiopia-somaliland-port-deal-2024-01-07/
^[14] Maruf, Harun. January 3, 2024. As Somalis Protest, Ethiopia Defends Sea Access Deal With Somaliland. Voice of America. Accessed on January 2, 2025.
https://www.voanews.com/a/as-somalis-protest-ethiopia-defends-sea-access-deal-with-somaliland/7425480.html
^[15] Yibeltal, Kalkidan & Kupemba, N. Danai. April 4, 2024. Somalia expels Ethiopian ambassador amid row over Somaliland port deal. BBC. Accessed on November 13, 2024.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68734631
^[16] Press Statement. October 29, 2024. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Somalia has taken firm measures to safeguard national interests and uphold international diplomatic standards. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Federal Republic of Somalia. Accessed on November 13, 2024.
https://web.mfa.gov.so/press-statement-the-ministry-of-foreign-affairs-and-international-cooperation-of-somalia-has-taken-firm-measures-to-safeguard-national-interests-and-uphold-international-diplomatic-standards/
^[17] Sheikh, Abdi & Paravicini, Giulia. August 29, 2024. Egypt sends arms to Somalia following security deal, sources say. Reuters. Accessed on January 3, 2025.
https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/egypt-sends-arms-somalia-following-security-pact-sources-say-2024-08-28/
^[18] Bekit, Teklemariam. October 10, 2024. Eritrea, Egypt and Somalia cement 'axis against Ethiopia'. BBC. Accessed on January 3, 2025.
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cdje7pkv1zxo
^[19] Ali, M. Abdolgader. August 27, 2024. Why Egypt is wading into Somalia and Ethiopia's dispute. The New Arab. Accessed on January 6, 2025.
https://www.newarab.com/analysis/why-egypt-wading-somalia-and-ethiopias-dispute
^[20] Addis Standard. January 25, 2024. Ethiopia welcomes DP World’s desire to jointly enhance Berbera Port, will negotiate terms of cooperation. Accessed on January 3, 2025.
https://addisstandard.com/news-ethiopia-welcomes-dp-worlds-desire-to-jointly-enhance-berbera-port-will-negotiate-terms-of-cooperation/
^[21] Horn of Africa Studies Unit. February 1, 2024. The Ethiopia-Somaliland Berbera Port Deal: A New Horn of Africa Hotspot. EPC. Accessed on January 3, 2025.
https://epc.ae/en/details/brief/the-ethiopia-somaliland-berbera-port-deal-a-new-horn-of-africa-hotspot
^[22] News. October 1, 2017. Turkey sets up largest overseas army base in Somalia. Aljazeera. Accessed on January 6, 2025.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/1/turkey-sets-up-largest-overseas-army-base-in-somalia
^[23] Webb. Maxwell. October 2, 2024. Nine months later: The regional implications of the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU. Atlantic Council. Accessed on January 3, 2025.
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/nine-months-later-the-regional-implications-of-the-ethiopia-somaliland-mou/
^[24] Reuters. July 20, 2024. Turkey to send navy to Somalia after agreeing oil and gas search. Accessed on January 3, 2025.
https://www.reuters.com/world/turkey-send-navy-somalia-after-agreeing-oil-gas-search-2024-07-19/
^[25] Press and Information. December 2024. Ankara Declaration by the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Federal Republic of Somalia facilitiated by the Republic of Türkiye. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed on January 3, 2025.
https://www.mfa.gov.tr/etiyopya-federal-demokratik-cumhuriyeti-ve-somali-federal-cumhuriyeti-nin-ankara-bildirisi.en.mfa#:~:text=Hassan%20Sheikh%20Mohamud%2C%20President%20of,a%20frank%20and%20constructive%20discussion.
^[26] Ali, Faisal. January 12, 2025. Somalia and Ethiopia agree to restore diplomatic ties after year-long rift. Guardian. Accessed on January 13, 2025.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jan/12/somalia-and-ethiopia-agree-to-restore-diplomatic-ties-after-year-long-rift
^[27] Maruf, Harun. June 3, 2024. Somalia wants all Ethiopian troops to leave by December. Voice of America. Accessed on January 5, 2025.
https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-wants-all-ethiopian-troops-to-leave-by-december/7641135.html
^[28] Press and Information. December 2024. Ankara Declaration by the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Federal Republic of Somalia facilitated by the Republic of Türkiye. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed on January 3, 2025.
https://www.mfa.gov.tr/etiyopya-federal-demokratik-cumhuriyeti-ve-somali-federal-cumhuriyeti-nin-ankara-bildirisi.en.mfa#:~:text=Hassan%20Sheikh%20Mohamud%2C%20President%20of,a%20frank%20and%20constructive%20discussion.
^[29] News. December 12, 2024. UAE Welcomes Agreement between Somalia and Ethiopia. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. UAE. Accessed on January 3, 2025.
https://www.mofa.gov.ae/en/mediahub/news/2024/12/12/12-12-2024-uae-ethiopia
^[30] Vandiver, John. December 30, 2024. US military presence in Somalia likely to be scrutinized by incoming Trump administration. Stars and Stripes. Accessed on January 3. 2025.
https://www.stripes.com/theaters/africa/2024-12-30/africom-trump-somalia-16322045.html
^[31] Press Release. February 16, 2024. United States Increases Security Assistance through Construction of SNA Bases. U.S. Embassy Somalia. Accessed on January 4, 2025.
https://so.usembassy.gov/united-states-increases-security-assistance-through-construction-of-sna-bases/
^[32] Webb. Maxwell. February 22, 2204. What the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal means for Washington’s strategy in the Red Sea. Atlantic Council. Accessed on January 2, 2025.
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/what-the-ethiopia-somaliland-deal-means-for-washingtons-strategy-in-the-red-sea/
^[33] Joseph, David. December 22, 2024. Somaliland Ready to Offer U.S. Military Base in Strategic Coast of Berbera. Horn Observer. Accessed on January 4, 2025.
https://hornobserver.com/articles/3081/Somaliland-Ready-to-Offer-US-Military-Base-in-Strategic-Coast-of-Berbera
^[34] Groves, S. & Dans, P. 2024. Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise. The Heritage Foundation. Section 2: The Common Defence. Chapter VI: Department of State. Page 186. Accessed on January 5, 2024.
https://static.project2025.org/2025_MandateForLeadership_FULL.pdf
^[35] Ylonen, Alexis. November 25, 2024. Somaliland: A Change of Leadership in the Context of Regional Developments and its Quest for Recognition. ISPI. Accessed on January 5, 2025.
https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/somaliland-a-change-of-leadership-in-the-context-of-regional-developments-and-its-quest-for-recognition-192234
^[36] Press Statement. December 12, 2024. The United States Welcomes the Ankara Declaration by Ethiopia and Somalia. News & Events. US Embassy in Ethiopia. Accessed on January 5, 2025.
https://et.usembassy.gov/the-united-states-welcomes-the-ankara-declaration-by-ethiopia-and-somalia/
^[37] Bhattacharya, Samir. January 25, 2024. Understanding Ethiopia’s port deal with Somaliland and its geopolitical implications. ORF. Accessed on January 5, 2025.
https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/understanding-ethiopia-s-port-deal-with-somaliland-and-its-geopolitical-implications#:~:text=The%20agreement%20will%20certainly%20benefit,a%20major%20economic%20turning%20point.
^[38] Real Voice of India. September 13, 2024. India’s nexus with the Republic of Somaliland. Accessed on January 5, 2025.
https://english.revoi.in/indias-nexus-with-the-republic-of-somaliland/

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