With a shared fragile border stretching over 900 kilometres, Iran and Afghanistan have historically maintained complex ties characterized by shifting political landscapes, and regional and national interests. However, the Taliban takeover of Kabul in August 2021 has posed new challenges to their relationship amidst a rise in regional security issues. The decision by Iran to construct a border wall with Afghanistan reflects not only concerns over cross-border violence, smuggling, and economic difficulties but also the need to address territorial claims posed by the Taliban.
Therefore, this article will highlight the national as well as regional complexities that have led Iran to strengthen security measures along the border with Afghanistan.
Afghanistan—an important eastern neighbour of Iran is an integral part of the latter’s Look East Policy, which aims to strengthen economic and energy ties with major Asian nations such as India and China to promote regional stability in Central and South Asia. [1] Since 2005, an Eurasian approach in Iran’s foreign policy priorities enabled them to adopt a Look East doctrine, that paved the way for increased cooperation with China and Russia in the economic, technological, and military fields. [2] This doctrine largely fulfill Iran’s desire to establish itself as an independent regional power, while helping to shape a post-Western, multilateral economic and security order in Eurasia. [3] Afghanistan fits into the framework of Iran’s larger regional economic interests since the former serves as a market for Iranian goods and a transit route to larger markets in Central and South Asia. [4] Moreover, Tehran’s desire to utilize Afghanistan as a transit country for Iranian energy and other exports complements India’s view of Afghanistan as a gateway to Central Asia. [5] Since the Taliban came to power for a second term in 2021, Iran’s relations with the new regime in Kabul operated largely on the same issues/concerns that dominated the bilateral relations between the two countries. Despite differences over several issues, the two nations do not fail to realize their geostrategic importance amid changing geopolitical scenarios leading both sides to attach the significance towards increasing engagement.
However, the shared frontier between Iran and Afghanistan has remained fragile for several decades with frequent conflicts at the borders primarily due to the movement of migrants from Afghanistan, and the rise in human and drug trafficking (opium and heroin) along with other security issues. Due to Iran’s geography as a bridge between Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, trafficking into Iran from Afghanistan and through Iran to the Arabian Peninsula and the southern Mediterranean region is a regular phenomenon. [6] In addition to drug trafficking, the Islamic Republic of Iran is also facing emerging trends of illicit production and trafficking of Amphetamine-Type Stimulants (ATS) which is a form of synthetic drug. [7] Considering the dangers associated with illegal migration and trafficking, Iran from time to time has gone in for enhancing counter-narcotics and border management measures and capabilities through national, regional, and international initiatives. [8] Therefore, the recent decision taken by Iran to fence the border with Afghanistan is not the country’s first attempt to seal the boundary with the latter but a continuation of earlier efforts to fence the border.
Apart from the movement of people and drugs, the distribution of the Helmand River water is another important issue causing frequent fissures at the Iran-Afghanistan border. The Sistan basin which is an inland endorheic basin (its water accumulates in a lake and doesn’t drop into the sea) that encompasses the outlet of the Helmand River, is the only densely populated area on the border between Iran and Afghanistan and has great strategic importance. [9] The Helmand River starts from the Hindu Kush mountain range collecting water from melting snow and rainwater, whose basin extends over more than one-third of Afghanistan’s landmass is a source of drinking water for the Afghan people, also helping them irrigate the farmlands through a network of canals and waterways. [10] In addition, the river is of great significance for Iran because the farmers in Sistan-Balochistan province, a dry region receiving little rainfall, rely on the Helmand waters to cultivate their crops. [11] Adequate sharing of water between the two countries has time and again caused friction in the relations between the two countries. Therefore, along with the migration and other security-related issues, the water issue adds to the list of problems between both nations. The fragility along the Iran-Afghanistan porous border for decades has been responded to by Iran time and again with attempts to construct border walls with Afghanistan. The recent decision taken by Iranian authorities is a continuation of such efforts.
The recent decision by Iran’s envoy to Afghanistan, Kazemi Qomi, regarding the latter’s commitment to completing the construction of the border wall is intended not only to enhance border security between the two countries but also to end the Taliban’s territorial claims, which were the result of Iran’s earlier miscalculation. [12] After the approval from the Supreme National Security Council, the Iranian ambassador said that construction of the border wall with Afghanistan and Pakistan has already started. [13] Iran and Afghanistan which share a border of 920 kilometers long, running from the tripoint of Turkmenistan in the North to the tripoint with Pakistan in the South serves as a crucial transit point for different types of migration. [14] The northeastern Central Khorasan province, as well as North and South Khorasan, are the top destinations for irregular flow of migration activities from Afghanistan. [15] For decades the two countries have been exploring the effectiveness of border control mechanisms and are involved in managing and securing the border.
With the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan, there have been reports of ongoing skirmishes at the Iran-Afghanistan border and the loss of life of several Iranian border guards and Taliban fighters. In April this year, Iran’s Interior Ministry announced that the government would provide the armed forces with three billion euros to secure parts of this border with Afghanistan over the next three years. [16] The project will be implemented in the northeastern region, including the provinces of Mazandaran, Golestan, Razavi Khorasan, South Khorasan, and Semnan which will involve the construction of four-meter-high concrete walls, installation of barbed wire and fences, and, the construction of a road within the next three years. [17] Although the construction of the Iran-Afghanistan border wall began under the previous government in Iran, its completion is assured since the initial decision was made by Iran's Supreme National Security Council and approved by the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. In this context, the army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), overseen by the Supreme Leader as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, are the main workforce behind the project. [18]
The construction of the border wall between Iran and Afghanistan is a response to several strategic issues between them. There are three core issues identified as strategically important to Iran in its decision to reinforce its border with Afghanistan. The issue of the flow of Afghan migrants to Iran since the fall of the Republican government in Afghanistan and the Taliban coming back to power in Afghanistan; the issue of trafficking and the rise in security threats from ISKP in the region. Apart from strategic concerns, Iran is also facing pressure at the domestic level after public dissatisfaction over the increasing scarcity of resources, decrease in job opportunities, and rising unemployment because of the huge influx of refugees and migrants from Afghanistan. The immigration of Afghans to Iran continued after the Taliban took over Kabul in August 2021 and in April 2022, Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian said one million more Afghans had entered Iran since the Taliban took power, bringing Iran’s official number of refugees and economic migrants to five million. [19] Moreover, public opinion has gone against sheltering Afghan refugees after Iran saw an increase in the flow of illegal drugs from Afghanistan into Iran’s markets which has caused serious concern for the Iranian State. [20] Further, there is a growing concern about the movement/ crossing of Taliban and Daesh fighters to Iran among Afghan immigrants including recruitment of immigrants by the Islamic State Khorasan-Province (ISKP) from inside Iran. [21] Keeping in mind the deteriorating economic situation in Iran, the growing number of illegal immigrants lacking a stable income are more prone to get recruited by non-state actors who promise them and their families decent salaries. [22] Meanwhile, the fear related to the presence of ISKP in Iran has intensified after the latter claimed responsibility for conducting two massive blasts in the city of Kerman on the day of the commemoration of Qasem Soleimani that killed almost 100 people and injured 284 people including children. [23], [24] Such attacks by ISKP have prompted calls in Iran to securitize its eastern border with Afghanistan and to engage with the Taliban on the issue of counter-terrorism, overlooking domestic criticism surrounding Shi’a Iran’s relationship with the fundamentalist Sunni Taliban. [25] Therefore, it can be observed from the above discussion that despite ideological disagreements with the Taliban, [26] Iran’s response in dealing with insecurities emanating from its eastern border encapsulates its decision to construct the border wall with Afghanistan.
Meanwhile, apart from security, there lies another angle to Iran’s closure of the border with Afghanistan which is the Taliban’s territorial claims inside Iran which has been the result of the former’s miscalculation in terms of demarcating its geographical boundary. The misstep in the demarcation of the boundary on the part of Iran goes back to 1992 when the country built a 30-kilometer-long wall along the border in Sistan and Balochistan province. According to a report published by DW News, “the wall was not constructed exactly along the borderline with Afghanistan but erected within Iranian territory, leaving almost 2,000 hectares of farmland on the other side, thereby allowing Iranian farmers to pass through the wall to get into their fields.” [27] It is often said that the rise of sporadic attacks between Iran and Afghanistan’s border security forces is the consequence of unclear demarcation of the Iranian border that contributed to the Taliban’s lacking a proper understanding of border boundaries and rules vis-à-vis the Iranian state. [28] The problem related to the proper boundary on the side of Iran has confused the Taliban who after coming to power in 2021 sees the wall as the actual border between the two countries and is therefore involved in creating difficulties for the Iranian framers who work on those farmlands. There are reports that the farmers who work in their fields on the other side of the wall are repeatedly attacked and beaten, and their machines are confiscated by Taliban border security forces, creating havoc for the farmers on the Iranian side. [29] The wall which is neither a border wall nor a security wall has become a safety hazard for the Iranian authorities.[30] Considering their miscalculation and the rising insecurity alongside the frontier, it is significant for Iran to reinforce its border with Afghanistan.
In conclusion, Iran's decision to construct a border wall with Afghanistan reflects a multifaceted approach to addressing security, migration, regional stability, and solving previous boundary errors. Moreover, Iran aims to enhance its border security amid rising concerns over cross-border insurgency and illegal activities. This initiative not only underscores Iran's commitment to protecting its sovereignty but also highlights the complex dynamics where domestic concerns intersect geopolitical interests and humanitarian crisis issues. As Iran navigates these challenges, the effectiveness of the border wall in fostering security and stability will depend on cooperation and dialogue with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Finally, the construction of the wall shall strengthen Iran's defence against potential threats from insurgency and also smuggling, while at the same time addressing the complexities related to cross-border territorial claims posed by the Taliban.
[1] https://www.freiheit.org/germany/iran-afghanistan-relations-geostrategic-importance-afghanistan
[2] https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/the-origins-and-foundations-of-irans-look-east-policy/
[3] https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09700161.2024.2369392
[4] https://www.stimson.org/wp-content/files/file-attachments/Engaging_Iran_on_Afghanistan_1.pdf
[5] https://www.mei.edu/publications/iran-taliban-ties-pragmatism-over-ideology
[6] https://www.fmreview.org/hosseini/
[7] https://www.unodc.org/islamicrepublicofiran/drug-trafficking-and-border-control.html
[8] Ibid
[9] https://iranicaonline.org/articles/boundaries-iii
[10] https://www.trtworld.com/asia/whats-behind-the-afghanistan-iran-border-clashes-13430707
[11] Ibid
[12] https://www.newarab.com/news/how-irans-miscalculation-bolstered-talibans-land-claims
[13] https://en.irna.ir/news/85591357/Iran-determined-to-complete-border-wall-with-Afghanistan-Pakistan
[14] https://www.researchgate.net/publication/381994987_IRAN-AFGHANISTAN_BORDER_MANAGEMENT
[15] https://www.dw.com/en/iran-hopes-to-boost-security-with-afghan-border-wall/a-69076374
[16] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202404277449
[17] https://caspiannews.com/news-detail/iran-starts-sealing-borders-with-afghanistan-2024-5-1-3/
[18] https://manaramagazine.org/2024/09/iran-afghanistan-relations-under-irans-new-president/
[19] https://www.vifindia.org/article/2023/december/28/the-deportation-of-the-afghan-refugees-from-iran
[20] https://www.e-ir.info/2022/08/23/iran-and-afghanistan-growing-tensions-after-the-return-of-the-taliban/#google_vignette
[21] https://manaramagazine.org/2024/09/iran-afghanistan-relations-under-irans-new-president/
[22] Ibid
[23] https://eurasianet.org/iran-attack-signals-growing-central-asian-role-in-iskps-external-ops
[24] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-vows-revenge-after-biggest-attack-since-1979-revolution-2024-01-04/
[25] https://www.mei.edu/publications/iran-taliban-ties-pragmatism-over-ideology
[26] Ibid
[27] https://www.dw.com/en/iran-hopes-to-boost-security-with-afghan-border-wall/a-69076374
[28] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/30/what-caused-deadly-afghan-iran-border-clashes-what-happens-next
[29] https://www.dw.com/en/iran-hopes-to-boost-security-with-afghan-border-wall/a-69076374
[30] Ibid
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