Unanticipated but the Taliban have completed their three years in power in Afghanistan since the United States' chaotic withdrawal in August 2021, ending twenty years of conflict in the country. After grand celebrations marked at Kabul’s former US airbase, the question looms over the future of Afghanistan where the current ruling administration appears less negotiable and unchangeable at some point. The following article will assess the last three years of the Taliban administration, evaluating if the regime has evolved since it came to power for the second time in 2021.

Introduction

On 14 August, the Taliban’s interim regime celebrated the third anniversary of the takeover of Kabul at Bagram, ^[1] the former US airbase in Afghanistan, through a military parade, showcased Soviet-era tanks and artillery pieces including some of the military hardware abandoned by U.S. and NATO-led forces like helicopters, Humvees, and tanks. ^[2] Senior Taliban officials such as Acting Defence Minister Mullah Yaqoob and Acting Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani were present at the event while Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada was not seen at the parade. ^[3] It was witnessed that the Taliban Prime Minister Mohammad Hassan Akhund praised the Taliban authorities' victory over the "Western occupiers" on the occasion. ^[4]

The visuals from the celebrations at Bagram by the Taliban not only illustrated the current socio-political scenario but also reminded the public of the last twenty years of conflict and the Taliban’s resistance against the U.S.-led NATO intervention in Afghanistan. The parade displayed yellow jerry cans, which were often used to carry homemade bombs by the Taliban to fight against the international forces, including US-made armoured personnel carriers, helicopters, and fighter aircraft—all of which flew over the Bagram base—which had a history of imprisoning many of the Taliban fighters. ^[5] Meanwhile, the crowd that gathered to celebrate the occasion was seen raising the Taliban flag alongside the uniformed soldiers who also carried the Emirates’ white flag. ^[6] Simultaneously, a section of the Taliban leadership’s policies on women and their role in public space also got reflected after visuals from the celebration showed the absence of the country’s women folk from anniversary festivities. It has been reported by several newspapers that journalists (especially women) from several international media houses like The Associated Press, Agence French-Presse, and Reuters were restricted from attending and reporting about the event. Such an activity highlights two important aspects—a section of the Taliban’s reservations against women appearing in public and also the presence of foreign media in Afghanistan. ^[7] Surprisingly, considering the current state of affairs in Afghanistan, the regime's expanding foreign relations was exhibited during the occasion with the presence of an international audience that included Chinese and Iranian diplomats, according to several newspapers. ^[8] The Taliban officials agreed to the presence of several foreign diplomats but refrained from sharing any further details about them. ^[9] All in all the celebration at Bagram airbase on the occasion of Taliban’s three years in power portrayed their current domestic and foreign policy priorities.

Assessing the Taliban’s Last Three Years in Power: A Brief Overview

Amidst the Taliban’s Selective Engagement and Calculative Isolationism policy, they completed three years in power since 2021. Despite earlier speculations of the regime lacking the foresight to rule the country; the Taliban has been holding on to power without a constitution in place, devoid of the presence of any other political party and with minimal or no visible internal resistance against the Taliban at the moment. Meanwhile, the new Taliban regime has received some appreciation from regional countries regarding the former’s bilateral outreaches and economic engagements. The Taliban administration in the past three years has collaborated with countries from the region—significantly with China, and the Central Asian Republics on the economic front; while with its western neighbour Iran and long-term ally Pakistan, the relationship has been under strain over issues of domestic and strategic concerns. However, India’s engagement with the Taliban-led administration has been primarily driven by providing humanitarian assistance to the people of Afghanistan. Despite its expanding engagements, the Taliban regime is yet to get recognised as the legitimate government in Afghanistan. ^[10]

The revival of the Taliban in Afghanistan has been a matter of concern for a section of Afghans residing inside the country considering the regime’s harsh attitude towards the urban Afghan women whose role in public space has considerably decreased. The urban Afghan women in the last twenty years were raised in an environment where they enjoyed socio-economic rights and participated in the country’s political affairs. With the Taliban takeover the female population of Afghanistan comprising 49.5% of the total, is experiencing subjugation, and their freedom and choices, appear to be at the mercy of the Taliban regime. ^[11] As soon as the Taliban came to power in August 2021, the regime dismantled the Ministry of Women's Affairs and replaced it with the Ministry for Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice which holds a history of issuing some of the most brutal laws against Afghan women and men (like morality laws, dress code and gender segregation) during the Taliban’s first regime (1996-2001). ^[12] Many of the current administrations’ orders and restrictions are reminiscent of the Taliban’s first rule when its brutal regime deprived Afghans of their most basic rights. ^[13] One of their most repressive restriction on women started with the regime shutting down schools for girls starting from beyond the 6th grade.

However, there have been reports on secret underground schools for girls operating in Kabul and other provinces of Afghanistan including in rural areas, with the help of NGOs founded by exiled Afghan women’s rights activists and education campaigners currently residing outside Afghanistan. ^[14] Moreover, some level of understanding between teachers and warlords including some local Taliban commanders are helping these secret schools to operate in Afghanistan. ^[15] The presence of secret schools for women is enough to highlight that despite some of the Taliban leadership claiming that the group is divided on opinions related to girl’s education, the Emir’s dictates cannot be challenged. Despite grave concerns regarding the rights of women in Afghanistan, the irony lies in the fact that “there are undoubtedly major differences between Afghan women in rural areas who appreciate the end of the war since 2021, and educated women in Kabul who, under the previous Republican regime, benefited from new opportunities.” ^[16]

Apart from the issue of women's rights, forming an inclusive government in Afghanistan has been another concern for countries that are expanding bilateral engagements with the Taliban regime. ^[17] The inclusion of Afghans from across different groups (based on ethnicity, religion, and religious or political ideologies) in the government is of paramount importance considering that it is not just a routine diplomatic intervention after the end of any conflict, but also “vital in the peacebuilding process, as it can resolve grievances produced by exclusion and prevent the re-emergence of future violence” in Afghanistan. ^[18] Since the Taliban came back to power, there have been reports from international bodies like Amnesty International and the Human Rights Watch regarding the regime’s discriminatory practices towards ethnic minorities, favouring mostly the Pashtuns (those who support the Taliban) in the country. According to the Amnesty International Report, “people from Hazara, Uzbek, Turkmen, and Tajik ethnic groups faced growing marginalization and forced eviction from their homes and land…The Taliban settled disputes over land and livestock in favour of the Kuchi communities, who are ethnically Pashtun, and forced the local Hazara communities to pay compensation for cases related to missing livestock dating back over 20 years.” ^[19] Apart from ethnic minorities, it is reported that the Taliban’s attitude towards former Republican officials, Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) personnel, journalists, civil society activists, and women activists remains harsh and extremely repressive. In a report released by Human Rights Watch in 2024, “Taliban forces carried out revenge killings and enforced disappearances of former government officials and security force personnel.” ^[20] The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) in 2023 published a report highlighting the Human rights violations against former government officials and ANDSF members. ^[21] According to the report, “at least 800 human rights violations against former government officials and ANDSF members took place between August 2021 and June 2023. ^[22] In addition, the report also claimed that “at least 218 extrajudicial killings of former government officials and ANDSF members since the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan…The most targeted groups affiliated with the former government were ANA members, Afghan National Police, National Directorate of Security officials, and Afghan Local Police.” ^[23] UN Human Rights chief Volker Türk criticized the Taliban’s repressive policies and said that “targeting of former officials despite the announcement by the Taliban of a ‘general amnesty’ for all, is a betrayal of the people’s trust.” ^[24]

Though the Taliban has tried defending such activities by its local commanders and foot soldiers as ‘personal enmity and revenge’, ^[25] the present human rights situation resembles the atrocities that became rampant soon after the interim government was established in Afghanistan after the US intervention in 2001. In one of the reports by the Human Rights Watch (HRW), “War crimes against Taliban prisoners occurred after 2001, even with those who offered to lay down arms and recognize the US backed interim government…Former Vice President, Abdul Rashid Dostum’s forces massacred as many as 2,000 Taliban prisoners who were captured or had surrendered outside Kunduz after 2001.” ^[26] Therefore, history seems to be repeating in Afghanistan and the ruling regime of the country is again trying to silence anyone who is opposing the government and its oppressive policies. A political situation so complex will find it difficult to transform into an all-inclusive regime despite there being few non-Pashtun and non-Taliban members in the current interim government in Afghanistan. ^[27] Considering these internal developments in Afghanistan, in September 2023 during the “Kazan Declaration of the Moscow Format Consultations on Afghanistan”, regional countries who participated in the event expressed no optimism and stated that “there had been no progress in forming a truly inclusive government in Afghanistan, reflecting the interests of all ethnopolitical groups of the country.” ^[28]

Has the Taliban 2.0 evolved since its return to power?

Since the Taliban returned to power in 2021 the parameters used to compare the current regime from its first term (1996-2001) have only led to conflictual and diverse opinions on the Taliban among the Afghans as well as the international community. Unlike the Taliban’s first regime, where countries (excluding Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and UAE), neither recognized the regime nor were they interested in expanding diplomatic relations with the then Taliban government. ^[29] After the Taliban captured Kabul for the second time in 2021, there are differences in approaches between regional countries and global powers in their interactions with the Taliban interim administration. Countries around the globe are divided into two groups discussing the Taliban administration in Afghanistan where one group is led by Western powers like the United States and its allies, and the other is led by regional countries like China, Russia, and Iran. ^[30] There is a need to find a balance between the agendas of Western states, many of which demand that the Taliban should adhere to international standards on human rights before engaging at length with them; while the primary concern of regional countries is to stabilize and securitize Afghanistan. ^[31]

On the domestic front, this Taliban regime is no way better than its earlier form in terms of its discriminatory treatment towards the country’s women folk (urban educated women in particular). It appears that the regime has failed to realize that its non-negotiable approach toward women's rights in the country will have dire consequences for the regime in the future, despite the latter expanding its bilateral relations with several countries across various domains.

The efforts by international bodies like the United Nations (UN) in bringing the Taliban to the table to discuss the future governance in Afghanistan have also not yielded much benefit in the past three years after the Taliban leadership appeared less compromising in terms of women's rights which became visible during the First and the Second round of UN-led Doha Talks on Afghanistan. However, the Taliban’s participation at the third round of UN-led Doha talks on Afghanistan in June 2024 came after the UN prioritized the Taliban’s concerns of being the only legitimate governing body from Afghanistan by delimiting participation of ex-republican officials from the previous government and civil society activists to represent Afghanistan. ^[32] Their attendance at the meeting is enough to understand that the Taliban is interested in joining the international community and engaging with them. They are not much in support of maintaining complete isolationism unlike when it came to power last in 1996 and can be seen as adopting a new approach vis-à-vis engaging with the international community. Despite the Taliban’s precondition to exclude the women from participating in the event, there have been reports of a side event organized with five Afghan women and two men, mostly residing inside Afghanistan on the second day of the Doha meeting. ^[33] However such initiatives do not imply an evolvement in the Taliban’s mindset on women if one takes into consideration the Emir’s numerous gender-biased decrees on women's representation in Afghanistan’s public sphere. ^[34]

Conclusion

Regarding the scope of the Taliban’s improvement in the past 20 years, there appears both a grim picture that should not be ignored and some moderation in matters related to economic expansionism. Beyond the Taliban’s efforts to transform Afghanistan from an aid-based economy to a trade-based economy, the regime's policies at the societal and political level are quite similar to the Taliban's first rule in Afghanistan. In this context, it is essential for regional countries and the international community to encourage the Taliban regime to prioritize domestic needs and address the concerns of the Afghan people. Gaining the support of their own people is crucial for the Taliban regime if it intends to sustain its authority/base in Afghanistan.

References

^[1] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/8/14/taliban-celebrates-three-years-of-return-to-power-in-afghanistan
^[2] https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/taliban-celebrating-years-power-theyre-talking-afghans-112824058
^[3] https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-taliban-takeover-anniversary/33078345.html
^[4] https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/the-taliban-are-celebrating-3-years-in-power-but-theyre-not-talking-about-afghans/articleshow/112525579.cms?from=mdr
^[5] https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/taliban-celebrate-3-years-since-afghanistan-takeover-with-military-show-101723627272771.html
^[6] https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-taliban-three-years-anniversary-68f5bc4a3cdd9d07dcecd5d6d391df5c
^[7] https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/taliban-celebrating-years-power-theyre-talking-afghans-112824058
^[8] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/8/14/taliban-celebrates-three-years-of-return-to-power-in-afghanistan
^[9] https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/the-taliban-are-celebrating-3-years-in-power-but-theyre-not-talking-about-afghans/articleshow/112525579.cms?from=mdr
^[10] https://www.vifindia.org/article/2024/januray/30/Taliban-Interim-Administration-A-Review-of-its-Regional-Engagements-in-2023
^[11] https://thefridaytimes.com/20-Aug-2024/the-taliban-s-third-anniversary
^[12] https://www.rferl.org/a/draconian-decrees-taliban-restrictions-afghanistan/32547882.html
^[13] Ibid
^[14] https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-secret-schools-girls-education-taliban/32740641.html
^[15] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/taliban-girls-school-ban-afghanistan-1000-days-underground-schools/
^[16] https://nationalinterest.org/feature/inside-taliban%E2%80%99s-afghanistan-212361?page=0%2C1
^[17] https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/05/talibans-attacks-diversity-undermine-afghanistans-stability
^[18] https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2024/2/17/the-inclusive-afghan-government-afghans-do-not-want
^[19] https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-asia/afghanistan/report-afghanistan/
^[20] https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/afghanistan-0
^[21] file:///C:/Users/angan/Downloads/a_barrier_to_securing_peace_aug_2023_english_.pdf
^[22] Ibid
^[23] Ibid
^[24] https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/08/1139962#
^[25] https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/08/22/no-end-taliban-revenge-killings-afghanistan
^[26] https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/07/06/how-us-funded-abuses-led-failure-afghanistan
^[27] https://talibantracker.mei.edu/english/taliban/taliban-leadership-tracker
^[28] https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1906997/
^[29] https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/337-talibans-neighbourhood-regional-diplomacy-afghanistan
^[30] https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/07/whats-next-uns-doha-process-afghanistan
^[31] Ibid
^[32] https://www.voanews.com/a/taliban-agree-to-attend-un-hosted-3rd-doha-meeting-on-afghanistan-/7657895.html
^[33]> https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/07/whats-next-uns-doha-process-afghanistan
^[34] https://www.unwomen.org/en/articles/faqs/faqs-afghan-women-three-years-after-the-taliban-takeover

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