The Russia-Ukraine conflict has markedly altered the state of relations between Japan and Russia. Though many analysts see the start date of the conflict with annexation of Crimea in 2014, it was only with the Russian special military operation in February 2022, that Japan-Russia relations took a serious nosedive. The developments of March 2014 had prompted largely symbolic sanctions from Japan and did not hinder Tokyo to pursue better relations with Moscow. Roughly a year before in April 2013, the late PM Shinzo Abe became the first Japanese leader in a decade to officially visit Russia and he would go on to meet President Putin nearly 27 times. At the time, Japan’s failure to sign a formal peace treaty with Russia was seen as one of the biggest failures for Japanese foreign policy. Abe saw the pressing need to involve Russia in containing China, Japan’s prime security challenge. Abe reversed the earlier policy aphorism of resisting economic cooperation and holding off Japanese investments as reward for resolution of territorial dispute to using them as incentives to draw Russian interest to move forward on actual dispute resolution.

Abe continuously attended the Eastern Economic Forum from 2016 onwards till his resignation. He understood the Russian need to secure diversified investment in its Far East and it would become the outline for his eight-point cooperation plan proposed during the Sochi Summit in May 2016. The Eight-Point Cooperation Plan covered over 60 projects from energy sector, tourism, transfer of cutting-edge Japanese technologies to the industrialisation of the Russian Far East. Originally planning for US$ 9 billion of investments, by December 2016 the economic plan brought in agreements only worth US$ 2.6 billion of Japanese public and private investments. Many of these agreements were essentially non-binding memorandums of understanding (MoUs), underlying the uncertainty associated with Russia’s investment climate for Japanese companies. Nevertheless, there was success on the strategic front with Japan starting its fifth 2+2 dialogue format of foreign and defense ministerial consultation with Russia at the time. It would be held regularly from 2017-2019.

Putin visited Japan in December 2016 for another bilateral meeting and reiterated the 1956 Japan-Soviet Union joint declaration on resolving the territorial dispute. During the 1956 peace talks between Japan and the Soviet Union, the Soviet side had proposed that among the disputed islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and the Habomai islets (called the Northern Territories by Japan and Southern Kuril Islands by Russia), Shikotan and Habomai, be returned to Japan upon the conclusion of the peace treaty. At the time, due to US pressure, Japan changed course and blocked the deal. The larger Kuril Islands running from Kamchatka Peninsula, Russia, to Hokkaido, Japan, separate the Sea of Okhotsk and Pacific Ocean. They are key to Russian Pacific naval presence and have assumed more salience due to the opening of the Northern Sea Route which is a cornerstone of Russian Arctic Strategy. The Southern Kurils allow strategic surveillance of Russian submarines transiting via the La Perouse Strait. The fishing and resource industry in the Kuril Islands is also a vital part of Russian economy. Thus, Etorofu and Kunashiri comprising of more than 93 percent of the disputed territory are non-negotiable for Russia.

Despite the ongoing friendly talks, Russia deployed the ‘Bastion missile system’ on Etorofu Island and the ‘Bal missile system’ on Kunashiri Island in 2016. In the 2018 Annual News Conference, Putin’s remarks were foreboding when he raised concerns regarding “the deployment of the US missile defense system in Japan and the possibility of deploying American troops and military infrastructure on the (disputed) islands should they be transferred to Japan”.^[1] The expiration of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019 and the announcement of the Pacific Deterrence Initiative in 2020 that proposed the stationing of US land-based missiles in the Indo-Pacific would make all those concerns valid. Even though the Russian militarization in the larger Kurils is not primarily directed against Japan, Russia poses an increasing security dilemma for Japan as Russian military buildup has brought about an intensification of military drills, not the least, increasing joint drills with China. The scrambling of Japanese fighter jets to counter Russian military activities (along with those of China) fatigues the already overstretched Japan’s Self Defense Forces.

China-Russia joint military exercises especially those involving the Pacific (including areas near Japan) and the Arctic are essentially bilateral, indicating the emphasis on strategic coordination and demonstration of their military capabilities. 2021 marked a new escalation with the first joint patrol whereby the Russian and Chinese ships circumnavigated the Japanese main islands together. The Joint Sea naval series in 2014 and 2015 earlier had seen exercises in East China Sea and the Sea of Japan. During the Quad summit hosted by Japan in 2022, six Russian and Chinese strategic bombers flew close to the Japanese archipelago, signalling a strategic message to Tokyo. The Diplomatic Bluebook of Japan in both 2023 and 2024 noted that “The fact that the militaries of China and Russia continue to engage in joint activities with increasing frequency in the vicinity of Japan should be closely monitored with serious concern from the perspective of Japan’s security. ^[2]” Both China and Russia have noted with strong criticism NATO’ overreach into Indo-Pacific and growing US security engagement with its allies be it Japan, South Korea, Philippines or Australia. Though the 2021 NATO Summit Communique formally referenced China as a systemic challenge, the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept noted “the deepening strategic partnership between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation and their mutually reinforcing attempts to undercut the rules-based international order run counter to our values and interests”. ^[3]

Barring three telephone summit talks, under Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga and Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, the last being just a week before the start of the Russian military operation in 2022, there has been a considerable decline in top-leader diplomacy. Unlike 2014, in 2022, Japanese response to the Russian military operation in Ukraine went in tandem with the US and EU. On 21 March 2022, Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced halting of talks with Japan altogether about concluding a peace treaty. Japan imposed comprehensive sanctions on Russia, including freezing assets of Russian banks, prohibiting new investments, and banning exports of luxury goods, machinery, and semiconductors. The continued disruption of supply chains, humanitarian reasons, risk of US sanctions, international criticism of Russia, and reputational risks led many Japanese companies to withdraw or reassess investments in Russia. Some companies, however, remain undecided, balancing economic interests with sanctions compliance. Western sanctions also put pressure on Japan to diversify its energy imports, yet Russia remained Japan’s third largest source of LNG behind Australia and Malaysia. Japan has continued to maintain its stakes in the Sakhalin-2 and Arctic LNG 2 project.

As Japan assumed G7 Presidency in 2023, in March, Prime Minister Kishida made a (first) visit to Ukraine embodying Japan’s changed approach from Abe’s time and a recognition of the convergence between the security of Europe and the Indo-Pacific. The Ukraine conflict also brought significant reassessment of Japan’s security posture in December 2022 with the release of updated National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and Defense Buildup Program. 2023 saw updating of Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation. Japan also partially revised the implementation guidelines for the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology in December 2023 to provide non-lethal aid to Ukraine. Commitment was made to increase defence spending to 2% of GDP by 2027, including development of counterstrike capabilities. There was strong emphasis on strengthening collective security frameworks and expanding defence cooperation with various countries during this time. The rapprochement between Japan and South Korea was most noteworthy for regional security, including their growing trilateral strategic cooperation with the US.

The Japan-Russia relationship is likely to remain irreconcilable till the resolution of Ukraine conflict. Though US President-elect Donald J. Trump had constantly made mention of ending Ukraine conflict in his election campaign, how his administration will execute that remains unclear. Further, growing military cooperation between Russia and North Korea have given life to Japan’s worst fears with potential for transfer of nuclear or ballistic missile-related technology from Russia to North Korea. Abe’s strategy to use closer ties with Russia as a counterbalance to China is now fundamentally incompatible to the changed regional dynamics as Russia and China deepen their political and military partnership. Even then energy cooperation may prevent the relationship from going into a true freefall.

Endnotes

^[1] Vladimir Putin’s annual news conference, December 20, 2018, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/59455
^[2] Japan Diplomatic Bluebook 2023, Section 6, Russia and Belarus, Central Asia and the Caucasus, https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2023/pdf/pdfs/2-6.pdf
^[3] NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf

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