This article analyses how the use of Oreshnik missile by Russia is an event significant enough for us to take note and relate the same in our scenario.

Oreshnik Makes a Debut

On 21 Nov 2024, the news breaking headlines all over was the first ever use of Oreshnik missile by Russia.^[1] What is so special about Oreshnik?

Oreshnik is an Intermediate Range ballistic Missile (IRBM) with a range of 2500 (some open sources have reported 4000-6000 km).^[2] Here is a quick take on what makes this missile unique?

What Makes Oreshnik Unique?

1. Speed.

Normally the weapons flying at speeds in excess of five times the speed of sound (referred to as 1 Mac or 343 m/s) qualify to be hypersonic weapons. This speed comes out to be 1715 m/s. With reference to this, a missile like Oreshnik with speed in excess of 10 Mach is way above. In fact, it lies in the high hypersonic zone (10-25Mach). Oreshenic actually does 10-11 Mac in its terminal phase which refers to a whopping 12,300-13475 km/h.^[3]

2. Un-stopability as a Function of Speed

Simply stated, hypersonic weapons in general and Oreshnik (far beyond the threshold) will be unstoppable by conventional air defence weapons. Why? Because most of the conventional air defence weapons require a finite time to do the following before the response to the threat can be mounted:-

• Detection of the incoming threat by the early warning sensors and its designation as hostile, which in such war-torn scenario will be done in real time.
• Designation of the target from the early warning sensors to the fire-control sensors (in this case the missile guidance radars).
• Assuming that the systems are at high state-of-readiness, the launch of interceptor missiles in minimum system launch time.
• Conduct of the air defence battle which will involve successive punishment of the threat with fire shifting seamlessly from weapon-to-weapon till the threat is destroyed.

Even if this time is compressed to system limit, it will still remain a few fleeting minutes and seconds. This is far in excess to respond to weapons like Oreshnik that are closing in at Mach 10-11. That is un-stopability.

3. Unprecedented Precision, Unpredictability and Kill Capability

That the Oreshnik has unprecedented precision, unpredictability and kill capability will become evident as a typical launch sequence of the missile is unfolded. The same has been attempted:-

• Oreshnik missile is carried by a 12x12 Transporter, Erector Launcher (TEL) providing it quick mobility in a shoot-n-scoot requirement.
• In most of the other missiles in the class (Patriot, THAAD, Prithvi etc.) the missile is ejected out of the Silo/TEL when the boost rocket fires at the launch point. This creates a huge heat signature which becomes a tell-tale for the launch point. In Oreshnik it is not so. The missile is ejected out of the TEL using compressed gas and small explosive. Once cleared of the TEL/launch point, the first-stage boost motor fires and starts boosting the missile on its course. Thus the launch point does not have the typical heat-signature as in case of other missiles. This makes the launch point/moment calculation that much more difficult.
• Another distinct thing about Oreshnik is typical flight trajectory. Conventional ballistic missiles follow a defined parabolic trajectory divided into three phases; namely, the 1. Launch 2. Midcourse Phase and 3. Terminal Phase. Very simply, the launch phase is the powered phase in which the missile is boosted in single/multiple stage rocket motors to its peak velocity, the midcourse phase is the unpowered flight of the missile in the outer atmosphere and the terminal phase is the one when the missiles re-enters the atmosphere and heads for its intended target. All through its parabolic trajectory, the missile is guided by the laws of gravitational force and hence prediction of its location at any point in time is essentially an arithmetic exercise. In Oreshnik, things are different.
• Oreshnik’s typical flight path is a skewed parabola with a high vertex and a steep down side.
• Two solid-fuelled rocket motors propel the missile in two stages of 60 and 120 seconds respectively to the apex of this parabola. The missile at this time is already hypersonic and is in the region of 7-8 Mac having dropped both the rocket stages. From this point downwards the missile comes streaming down not unpowered like a typical ballistic missile but with tremendous force and velocity that reaches 10-11 Mac at terminal end.
• The last/terminal stage as stated is also called the Post Boost Vehicle (PBV) or the Bus. It is crafted to be highly lethal and capable of doing catastrophic damage. Here is how:-
• The PBV is configured into a combination of 6 warheads. Each of these can have six more sub-munitions totalling 36 sub-munitions.
• Each warhead is aerodynamically designed to take on manoeuvres in the hypersonic domain. This design is especially configured for precision and accuracy. In the front of each vehicle there is a fuse to detonate the warhead. Just behind is a contact sensor for arming the fusing mechanism. Behind this sits the warhead (conventional mono /fragmented or nuclear). At the base of PBV are the two spin thrust nozzles that are driven by a spin gas generator. It is this arrangement that makes the PBV into a self-manoeuvring vehicle. The guidance system is driven by the Russian GLONASS (Global Navigation Satellite System) with a back-up on the GPS.
4. Kill Capability

The re-entry vehicle of Orshenik that carries the final punch has six MIRVs each of which has its own separate engine. MIRV is the acronym that stands for Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle each of which can be programmed to hit a separate target.

Even if the warhead section does not have the explosive, the kinetic energy of a 1.3 Ton MIRV stage at 10-11 Mach will have an effect akin to a nuclear strike. The same was visible at Dnipro where it was reported that the explosions were unusual and the secondary explosions triggered by MIRVs went on for three hours.^[4]

5. Unpredictability

Missiles like Oreshnik are all-the-way powered. They have the capability to follow a manoeuvrable trajectory at hypersonic speed. This makes tracking and prediction of impact point very difficult and adds greatly to the unpredictability factor of the missile.

6. Capability to keep large swaths of area under threat

Six (or 36 sub-munitions) MIRVs capable of manoeuvring at 10-11 Mach in an unpredictable manner can keep huge swaths of area under threat. This is so because targets can be switched in real time. This forces the defender to deploy air defence resources on a large footprint of the defended area which can be instantly threatened by missiles like Oreshnik.

So much for the Oreshnik.

Why Ukraine is Defenceless against Missiles Like Oreshnik?

This poser can be best answered by first stating what is required to kill missiles like Oreshnik and then checking out if these are held by Ukraine on its own or through its allies.

1. Sensors – Building a Global Look- See Capability

No amount of ground sensors will be able to detect the type of threat posed by Oreshnik class of missiles. Even if some detection is possible it is likely to be in the terminal stage of the missile path.

What is required is to build a global look-see capability in the area of interest by using a series of space-based satellites. These could be placed in Low Earth Orbits (LEO), Medium Earth Orbits (MEOs) in the Geo-synchronous orbits providing low latency and very high accuracy of detection. The satellite-based surveillance needs to be augmented by HAPS or High-Altitude Pseudo Satellite (HAPS) platforms.

HAPS would consist of solar-powered long endurance vehicles placed in the stratosphere at some 20 km above the earth’s surface tasked for keeping a watch over the area of interest.

HAPS provide a link between the satellites on top and other surveillance resources below them. These could include high altitude long-endurance (HALE) drones (flying over 60,000 ft with endurance over 32 h) or medium altitude long endurance (MALE) drones (altitude window 10000-30000 ft and endurance between 24-48 hrs).^[5] This surveillance grid is to be meshed with ground, air and sea based sensors.

Such a ‘cylindrical construct’ of a surveillance grid is required to create the type of capability to instantaneously detect the launch of hypersonic weapons. To create it is a hugely tall order since it will not only demand a deployment of a multitude of sensors, it would also demand communications inter-connectivity and control across the cylindrical spectrum.

Another impediment to detecting the hypersonic threat using the conventional RF based sensors is the fact that the plasma sheath that is formed all around the hypersonic vehicle makes detection difficult on two counts; 1. It attenuates the RF energy (sensor waves incident on the vehicle) , 2 . It impacts the phase and amplitude (signature) of the radar waves thus degrading their capability (read accuracy) to detect the hypersonic missiles.

2. Shooter - Building an Instant Kill Capability

Killing a hypersonic weapon roughly amounts to hitting a bullet with a bullet. This can be achieved if the threat is killed instantly on detection with a speed of light. Five countermeasures are maturing in this field. These are briefly enumerated:-

• High power lasers

These can disable hypersonic weapons with a direct hit of highly concentrated, powerful, coherent and penetrative laser waves. These will be able to disrupt high speed air flows (boundary layers) around the hypersonic weapons thus crippling them. These can also dazzle (blind) the navigational /control sensors thus making the threat rudderless.

• Electronic Warfare (EW) kill means

EW weapons aim to interfere with the satellite imaging and navigational controls of the threat vehicle. This could be through various types of interfering/misguiding/spoofing signals sending fake/corrupted GNSS signals to the vehicle, intending to send it astray or make it impotent.

• High power microwave weapons

These weapons create beams of electromagnetic energy over a broad spectrum of radio and microwave frequencies. Electronic beams are accelerated to high voltages (200KV++) and currents (>100K amperes) and directed on the target in short powerful impulses. These cause adiabatic burn of various electric and electromagnetic components forcing the threat vehicle for an instant burn out.

• Charged Particle Beam Weapons

These weapons accelerate sufficient quantities of sub-atomic particles to the speed of light. Once that this speed the beam achieves super-high penetrative capabilities. This when fired in short pulses on the target vehicle ends up in instant and catastrophic destruction of the vehicle integrity.

• Cyber based weapons

Such weapons execute targeted cyber-attacks which may involve distributed denial of service (DDOS) or attack on software that controls systems on board such as flight controls or navigation controls by confusing/overloading corrupted data leading to critical disruptions/shutdown etc.

3. Battle Management System

The BMC2 system is essentially the most complex of the three capabilities for it not only have to fuse and optimise an entire array of surveillance system, it also has to direct the kill response to the detected vehicle almost instantly. Further details are beyond space constraint.

A Look at the Ukrainian Air Defence Arsenal

Having had a sense on what sort of a capability is called for in countering a threat like the Oreshnik, here is a brief look at the air defence capability of Ukraine.

Ukraine’s ground based air defences (GBAD) basically span the conventional weapon spectrum, i.e. weapons with vintage from the early sixties to early 2000s. A brief summary:-^[6]

Short Range Air Defence Guns

Plenty of these exist both in the towed, as well as, self-propelled mode. Oerlikon 35 mm Skyshield, RIM 7 Sea sparrow, Bofors 40 mm L 70, Russian series of guns ZU 23-2, KS 30, AZP 60, ZSU 23-4B1, etc. These gun with an effective range envelop of 2.5- 5 km and their fire control radars looking out to 12-18 km have no chance of detecting leave aside killing a threat zooming in at 12,3000kmph.

VSHORADS (MANPADS)

Ukraine has a large inventory of MANPADS - Strela 2, Strela 3, Igla 1, Chiron, Mistral, Marlet, Stinger (US) Star Streak SAMs from UK and similar weapons from Germany, Denmark, Lithuania and Netherlands.^[7],^[8]. These weapons with a range and reach limitations of a few km (4-7km) are in no consideration here.

Short Range Missiles (SRSAMs)

Again predominantly Russian ( USSR - vintage), Strela 10M, 9K33 OSA-AK, Pechora, S125 Newa, Crotale R 440 all in the range bracket of 10-30km. These vintage systems can neither track nor kill a Oreshnik class of missile.

Medium Range SAMs

The systems include the 2K12 Kub, BukM1, MIM 23 Hawk, NADAMs ex US, IRIS-T, Pantsir S1, MIM104 Patriot etc. Though the fire arm comprising of these SAMs extends upto 80-100 km, these vintage systems are incapable to take on the type of threat posed by hypersonic missiles.

Long Range Anti-Missile Systems

Finally there are in the Ukrainian arsenal some long range anti-ballistic missile defence systems such as S 75 Dvina, S-200, S-300 PMU, S-300 PS, SAM-T, Aster 30 etc. While their operational ranges may extend to 300-400km, the long range surveillance radars (LRSRs) and missile guiding multi-function radars (MFRs) are not capable to track and destroy targets of the Oreshnik variety.

Aid from US and Europe

What could be expected by Ukraine from US and Europe as regards countering the Oreshnik threat? Sadly nothing much, as both US and Europe are just about putting together the wherewithal to counter hypersonic threats. The means are not yet fully matured on the home turf, leave aside sending them to the foreign shores. Here is a very brief capture of the status:-

• US

As regards detection of hypersonic threats, various projects and programmes are afoot to build the global look-see capability. In the series of building space-based sensors, the US project named Overhead Persistent Infrared Missile Warning Satellite System (OPIR) is putting in place the satellites in the LEO. In Feb 2024 the US Missile Development Agency (MDA) in collaboration with their Space Development Agency (SDA) have launched six satellites in LEO two of which are prototypes for the programme named Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS) under the MDA.^[9] To build the holistic surveillance grid, these satellites are systematically being linked to HAPs, ground-based and sea-based maritime radars and other sensor resources in the manner explained above.

As to the kill, work is on to build counter-hypersonic weapons in the multiple verticals of soft kill domain as enumerated (further details not covered). For kinetic kill, a programme under the name Regional Glide phase Weapon System (RGPWS) a hit-to-kill weapon called the Glide-Phase interceptor (GPI) aimed to kill the hypersonic glide vehicle is under development and testing.^[10] Keeping in mind the growing priority of hypersonic threat. the earlier PDC of RGPWS is being preponed from its earlier schedule of 2030.

• Europe

Even in Europe the work on building counter-hypersonic capability is essentially a work in progress. In 2019, the European Council launched a Programme named TWISTER (Timely Warning and Interpretation with Space based Theatre Surveillance) basically to build a space-based surveillance capability which will be further paired with soft and kinetic kill weaponry.

It thus becomes clear why Oreshnik type of threat cannot be countered by Ukraine at this point of time.

Relating it to Indian scenario

What about us? The answer is one to take pride in. We are well on our way.

What Threats We Face?

We face a realistic and a fast-maturing hypersonic threat from China. Some salient points:-^[11]

• China has an established capability in both verticals of the hypersonic ladder; the Hypersonic Cruise Missiles (HCM) which are all-the-way powered and Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV) - the Oreshnik type, though not matched in capability.
• Way back in 2017, China launched an HGV DFZF on board DF 17 MRBM. Following this in Aug 2018, it launched an HCM named Starry Sky 2 that flew for 10min and achieved 5.5-6 Mac. In Sep 2028, three HGVs were launched on board (DF 18 1S, 2S and 3S).
• The next major event was reported in Jul Aug 2021 when China launched an HGV on board DF 27 (Long March) IRBM, that one which carried the lunar probe. This HGV encircled the South Pole, ushering an all new threat to US from south. Towards the end-game, the HGV launched a kind of air to air missile (satellite killer may be) this was something unprecedented.
• And now in Nov 2024, China has revealed its new hypersonic weapons GDF 600; an HGV capable of doing Mac7 with multi-target kinetic and electronic strike capability including the EMP pulse attack capability.
• So much for the threat. Some have argued that it is not for tomorrow. The question is not of tomorrow or day after it is of capability for which intent can arise anytime.

Building Counter Hypersonic Capability

• India has made steady progress on all the three verticals of building the hypersonic capability, viz, - detection, kill and BMC2.
• Towards building a global look-see capability, we took our baby steps way back in early 2000s. This matured in forming the Integrated Space Cell in 2010 which as a nodal agency provided the security oversight between the space-based military and civil hardware systems.^[12]
• These initial efforts got a shot in the arm with the setting up of Defence Space Agency (DSA) in 2019.^[13] This integrated tri-service body has been driving our efforts both in space warfare, as well as, space-based intelligence stations.
• Nodal to building the space-based surveillance capability has been the Space-Based Surveillance (SBS) Programme which has evolved over time. Some details:-
• In phase 1 of SBS launched in 2001, four satellites were launched. These included the Cartosat 2S and 2B earth observation satellites in sun-synchronous orbit, EROS 2 Earth Observation Satellite sourced from Israel and the indigenous RISAT 2 Radar imaging satellites (RISATs) for precise all-weather surveillance using the synthetic aperture radar.
• In phase 2 of the SBS, six more satellites were deployed in 2013. These included the Cartosat 2C, 2D, 3A, 3B, RISAT 2A and Microsat TD
• And now on 12 Oct 2024, the Govt has approved the deployment of 52 satellites in the geosynchronous equatorial orbit (GEO) in next 5 years with a total capital outlay of 27000 Crs. 21 of these satellites will be by deployed by ISRO while the balance 31 will be deployed by private agencies.

The SBS satellites duly linked and co-ordinated downwards with the cylindrical construct of surveillance will serve as our eyes and ears to detect the hypersonic threat.

As to the kill systems, work is going on in all the verticals of soft kill systems, namely laser, high power microwave and charged particle beam systems. Laser weapons are nearing reality while the other two are some distant away. Most of the details in this area are in the classified domain hence not covered.

As regards the hard kill systems, open sources announced in Dec 2024 that an anti-hypersonic interceptor Missile AD: AH is planned to be developed in Phase 3 of the Indian Ballistic Missile Programme codenamed Programme AD.^[14] The Phase 1 of this programme developed the BMD capability to deal with threat missiles up to 2000 km range while Phase 2 enhanced this capability to counter threat missiles up to 5000 km range.

It will thus be seen that India is mindful of the threats it faces and is gearing up steadily to counter them in time.

Endnotes

^[1] “Russia has used its hypersonic Oreshnik missile for the first time,” at www.apnews.com. Accessed on 16 Dec 2024.
^[2] “Oreshnic hypersonic missile,” at Aitelly.youtube.com. Accessed on 20 Dec 2024.
^[3] Hypersonic weapons-an analysis, “at www.vifindia.org. Accessed on 20 Dec 2024.
^[4] “What we know- Russia’s Oreshnik Missile, “at ww.bbc.com. Accessed on 20 Dec 2024.
^[5] ibid
^[6] Ukraine Air Defence Force,” at www.en.m.wikipedia.org. Accessed on 20 Dec 2024.
^[7] “What are the MANPADS that the west is sending to Ukraine?” at www.thehindu.com. Accessed on 10 Jan 2023.
^[8] “List of equipment of the armed forces of Ukraine,” at www.en.m.wikipedia.org. Accessed on 10 Jan 2025
^[9] “Countering the hypersonic weapons,” at www.euro-sd.com. Accessed on 12 Jan 2024.
^[10] “Glide phase interceptor,” at www.nortropgrumman.com. Accessed on 12 Jan 2025.
^[11] “Making a sense of Chinese hypersonic threat..” at www.vifindia.org. Accessed on 13 Jan 2025.
^[12] “An overview of Indian space sector 2010,” at www.sac.gov.in. Accessed on 13Jan 2025.
^[13] “Defence Space Agency..” at www.government.economictimes.indiatimes.com. Accessed on 14 Jan 2025.
^[14] “DRDO unveils wind tunnel models of Advanced hypersonic missiles,” at www.idrw.org. Accessed on 14 Jan 2025.

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