A New Leader on the Stage

Trump’s second Presidency of the US (2.0) is just a few days away. The change seems potentially disruptive, for which the world is bracing up. Interestingly, Newsweek, on 14 September 2024, published a list of words that most and least describe Trump. ^[1] This was based on a survey conducted by YouGov, after the 10 September, 2024 Presidential debate. Describing his personality traits, 54% of respondents perceived him as being `Rude', 46% as `Reckless', 45% as `Tough', and 42% as `Bold and Patriotic’, followed closely by a perception of him being `ambitious', `weird'. `phony' and `confused.’ Only 9% considered him to be cautious. There were other similar `one-word' impressions during his first Presidency, published by ABC News,^[2] and other journals. That, however, is not relevant except for an understanding that dealing with him, for anyone, is going to be unpredictable and out of the ordinary!

The forthcoming transition also comes in an environment of `reemergence of mistrust,’ at least in public opinion. This is caused by the perception of the US role in the developments in Bangladesh, adversely impacting India’s security environment. Concerns also prevail over the growing interference of some US agencies in India’s domestic politics and internal security.

Compounding the situation further are the likely Trump administration policies related to imposing additional tariffs, likely to impact India’s nearly $ 76 billion exports to the US; ^[3] deporting unauthorized migrants (the third largest number estimated to be from India; ^[4] future policies over H1B visas (amidst divided opinion within the Republican Party); and more.

It is with this backdrop that we endeavour to visualise future portents of India-US relations, during Trump’s second Presidency, particularly in the field of defence and security, considered to be the vital central pillar.

Recapitulating Trump 1.0

India- US relations, have remained on an even keel and transitioned smoothly across administrations for over two decades, with bipartisan consensus on the strategic significance and mutual relevance of this relationship.

The efforts at deepening defence engagement initiated during the waning years of Obama 2.0 Presidency, designating India a Major Defence Partner (MDP), concluding the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), the first of the foundational agreements, and initiating the flagship Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) were sustained, and in fact intensified during Trump 1.0.

With a clear intent to counter the China threat, President Trump, in 2017 enunciated the Indo-Pacific Strategy, aimed at promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific region. It was meant to be a counter-narrative to a potential Sinocentric regional order. The `Asia- Pacific’ region was rechristened as the `Indo- Pacific;’ and the US Pacific Command (USPACOM), was renamed the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. It was a recognition of the contiguity between the Indian and the Pacific Oceans and the significance of India’s role in maintaining regional security. These developments led to the resurrection of QUAD, and India shedding its inhibitions to join it.

With this geostrategic backdrop, the remaining foundational agreements: the Communication Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA); Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (for geospatial cooperation) (BECA); the Industrial Security Annex (ISA) to General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA-2002), were concluded. India was accorded the Strategic Trade Authorisation (STA) Status – 1, despite not being a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). India, on its part, revised its Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP-2020) to substantially address certain procurement-related concerns.

It was under President Trump, that the Ministerial level 2+2 dialogue, bringing together the External Affairs and Defence Ministers of India and their US counterparts was instituted in 2018. This happened amidst the shadow of fairly intense trade and CAATSA-related discord prevailing then, resulting in the inaugural dialogue being postponed twice. The ultimate positive outcome was largely Defence and security agenda-driven. ^[5] So also has been the case for subsequent 2+2 dialogues. During this period, the US Congress also approved the National Defence Authorization Act-2019 (NDAA-19) providing room for a waiver to punitive sanctions under Section 231 of "Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act" or CAATSA, for India’s procurement of S-400 Air Defence Systems from Russia. This was aimed at deepening Strategic engagement.

During his presidency, in 2020, the two sides finalized the acquisition of 24 Lockheed Martin-Sikorsky MH-60 Romeo (Seahawk) Multi-Role Helicopters (MRH) for the Indian Navy and six additional AH-64E Apache helicopters for the Indian Army. India’s engagement with US Central and Africa Commands was formalised and Naval Liaison Officers (LOs) were exchanged, with an Indian LO being positioned in Bahrain and a US Navy LO at the Information Fusion Centre (IFC) in Gurugram. A new bilateral tri-service exercise, `Tiger Triumph’ was instituted in 2019 and the cooperation between the Defence Innovation Unit (DIU) on the US side and the Defence Innovation Organisation (DIO) on the Indian side was established. Since then, it has matured substantially into India – US Defence Acceleration Eco-System (INDUS-X).

The Biden Phase

During the Biden administration, while the positive trend of defence cooperation has remained, there has been a distinct shift from the Pentagon-led engagement to the State Department-steered relationship. The relevance of defence cooperation shifted from being considered the `vital central pillar' to being considered an `overburdened (over-emphasised)' pillar. An endeavour was made to diversify and broad base engagement in fields beyond defence.

The emphasis shifted to `Defence Industrial Cooperation,’ with a road map finalized in June 2023; and to cooperation in emerging technologies, beyond the domain of defence. The two sides operationalised the `Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET) in January 2023, raising the level of engagement to respective NSAs. This initiative entails cooperation in diverse areas of AI, Space, semiconductors, quantum computing, 5G/6G, biotechnology, digital connectivity, digital public infrastructure, critical materials, and rare earth processing technologies. This has enabled nearly US $ 3 billion in investments in India by the US industry, primarily in the field of semiconductors. It has also created opportunities for Indian startups in the Space sector, and provided a market for Indian MSMEs exporting components and spares to US Defence Primes, to the extent of 50% of India’s defence exports. On the flip side, however, the focus on core defence technology cooperation and capability development has diluted. Defence cooperation is no longer seen to be the vital `spinal cord' of relationship. The reliance today seems to be on high technology – high-value trade, entering large size Indian markets and making supply chains resilient.

These arrangements have their advantage but are unlikely to have the strategic heft or motivation to lower ITAR and licensing barriers to support India’s capability development aspirations or to contemplate, in future, a possible `AUKUS- level’ convergence.

Across Transition

During the period 2025 and beyond, the momentum (and optics) of Defence trade will be maintained by deliveries of platforms whose contracts have already been concluded. 15 MH 60R helicopters (out of a total of 24 contracted) for the Indian Navy and six Apache helicopters for the Indian Army will be delivered, in execution of contracts concluded in 2020, during Trump 1.0. Another $3.5 bn contract was concluded with the US Government in October 2024 for the procurement of 31 MQ-9B armed High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS). The deliveries, likely to be spread over the next four to six years, will happen under the next administration's watch.

There is, however, exasperation over the inordinate delay in the supply of GE 404 engines, impacting India's LCA Mk 1A programme. HAL has also indicated that the deal for the co-production of F-414 engines is postponed, at least till mid-2025.^[6] This will adversely impact India’s LCA Mk II programme. The prevailing perception of distrust has resulted in motives being ascribed to this delay, even though these may be a result of supply chain disruptions. There are voices within India counselling exploration of alternatives for aero engines and for future generation fighter programmes, doubting reliability.

Added to this are the apprehensions of analysts, on both sides, of a probable Trump-Xi `deal’ on one hand and the implications of a thaw in India-China security and economic relations. How far these scenarios play out, is a matter of speculation, but these do remain factors in calculation.

Maintaining Course

There is a need for both sides to remind themselves of the strategic underpinnings of this partnership, mindful of the convergence of long-term interests in maintaining a stable, coercion-free, and open Indo-Pacific. Recognising mutual dependence, both sides need to pace ahead as `Partners.’

A strong India, having geopolitical congruence with the US, building defence capability at its own cost (not a burdening ally!), capable of withstanding external challenges, contributes significantly to regional security. It is the only country in the region possessing the capability to counter China’s efforts to create an uncontested, unipolar, Sino-Centric Asia by displacing the US from the region. India, however, being a `stand-alone’ power (not being an ally of any country out of its own choice) calibrates its neighbourhood relations with pragmatism. While it voluntarily shoulders responsibility for the security of the Indian Ocean region and holds, in-situ, substantial force levels deployed in PLA’s Western Theatre Command, it would not like to become a frontline state in the US-China conflict, without adequate guarantees. Towards that end, it expects support in building `its own capability’ across multiple domains. The imperative for India to develop a `qualitative military edge,’ of its own, has become more pronounced with growing instability in South Asia, particularly across its Eastern borders. Need arising, India will fight with `its own boots on the ground.' Any suggestions comparing India to Ukraine or Taiwan, intimidated by a stronger adversary (or collusion of adversaries) are ill-founded.

Doubts are often expressed on the US side over India's role in Taiwan or any other Western Pacific-related contingency. Concerns are also voiced over India's `measured approach' to dealing with China, its reservations over the militarization of Quad and over India's Russia connection, particularly in the field of Defence. Certain US-based analysts also caution against India emerging as another potential- competitor (like China), challenging US interests. ^[7]

On the Indian side, there is a perception of inadequate US sensitivity, in fact of involvement in activities that undermine India’s security interests in South Asia. A sudden withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 and the regime change in neighbouring Bangladesh, in August 2024 are cases in point. Concerns also prevail over continued reluctance on the US side to share any meaningful defence technology or to partner in India's strategic capability development programmes. Even in critical sales, despite the avowed spirit of going beyond a buyer-seller relationship, a commercially predominant approach persists. Looming threats of secondary sanctions and disruption of critical supply chains, also keep apprehensions of Indian defence planners alive.

Transparently stating mutual apprehensions and addressing these, to the extent possible, is a measure of the maturity of this relationship. Being transactional, in the interest of respective national interests should also be acceptable to both sides.

India, besides the `burden sharing' in the Indian Ocean and the continental domain provides a large pool of technically qualified and talented human resources to revolutionise advancements in critical and emerging technologies, to bridge the gap with other competitors, in a telescoped time frame. The current programmes under INDUS-X provide opportunities for the identification of such talent. India also offers a large size market with immense potential in civil and military space. India looks at its US relationship with a desire to transform and modernise itself to become a prosperous and secure country, in a stable South Asian neighbourhood.

The following recommendations are made to invigorate the India-US Defence and security partnership under the new administration:

1. Designate Defence, Security and emerging technologies partnership as critical areas of bilateral relationship. Insulate these, to the extent possible, from differences in other fields. The span of India-US cooperation is too vast to be balanced in totality, within existing capacities.
2. In the current age of technology proliferation, the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and the US licensing norms seem overly restrictive. These need to be reviewed (at least in implementation) to maintain strategic partnerships and safeguard commercial interests. This can be done responsibly.
3. Defence Industrial Cooperation and the iCET are still at a nascent stage. These need to be deepened to add `ballast' to the relationship. High technology- high-value trade is integral to a strategic partnership. This should, however, complement (not overshadow) India's capability development programmes. Plugging in Indian innovators and MSMEs with US Defence primes, supporting Defence exports and robust supply chains must serve mutual interests.
4. Notwithstanding national-level cooperation in iCET, the Indian Ministry of Defence and the US Department of Defence must retain their focus on DTTI for Defence related capability development and regular engagement. The benefits achieved from a decade-long DTTI engagement must not be frittered away. This initiative has been a `silent but strong enabler.'
5. The relevance of the recently concluded Security of Supply Agreement (SOSA) can best be demonstrated by the US side expediting the supply of GE- 404 engines for India's LCA Mk 1 programme, and by India showing its understanding of the supply chain disruptions. The Reciprocal Defence Procurement Agreement (RDP) be negotiated mindful of each other's interests- from commercial as well as strategic perspectives.
6. Long-established military exercises (Ex Malabar – since 1992 and Ex Yudh Abhyas since 2002) need to be reoriented from their legacy themes to make these more contemporary. The focus of Army exercises must shift from high-altitude warfare, counter-terrorist operations or UN Peacekeeping themes to developing capabilities for the technology-enabled multidomain warfare environment. Overall emphasis must now be on augmenting Electronic, Cyber, Space and cognitive domain warfare capabilities, and on incorporating unmanned and autonomous systems. This would reinvigorate the spirit of engagement and make the armed forces future-ready.
7. Dual use application of emerging technologies for bridging the capability gap with adversaries through asymmetric means needs to be explored. India’s capabilities in the domain of Space, in both, the public and private sectors, present an opportunity to exponentially enhance capabilities for space-based satellite communications, surveillance and precision targeting. Matched with India’s capability in Missiles and rockets this can be a great force multiplier.

Finally, it should be a matter of concern for the Defence planners on both sides that despite long years of close Defence partnership, India and the US are yet to create a single programme symbolizing deep technological and strategic convergence. The Challenge of overcoming this inertia and dispelling the perception of this relationship not being `deep- enough’ should add vigour to our mutual efforts.

It would also be in our mutual interest to maintain the course of strategic partnership, making a clear distinction between core areas of engagement and peripheral issues of `democratic space.’ These need to be distanced to keep pace with changing global and regional realities.

Endnotes

^[1] Clark Sophie. Chart Shows Words That Most and Least Describe Donald Trump, According to Poll. Newsweek. September 14, 2024. https://www.newsweek.com/chart-shows-words-that-most-least-describe-donald-trump-according-poll-1953815. Accessed December 20, 2024.
^[2] ABC News. September 30, 2017. 10 most common words Americans use to describe Trump (POLL). https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/incompetent-strong-egotistical-words-people-describe-trump/story?id=50178088. Accessed December 20, 2024.
^[3] Chitravanshi Ruchika. In 2023, bilateral trade between India and the US reached $117.8 billion, with New Delhi importing goods worth $42 billion and exporting $75.8 billion. Business Standard. January 01, 2025. https://www.business-standard.com/economy/news/india-can-use-retaliatory-measures-against-us-in-case-of-trade-war-ris-124123100655_1.html. Accessed January 01, 2025.
^[4] PTI. Indians form third largest illegal immigrant population in US: Pew Research. Business Standard. November 22, 2023. https://www.business-standard.com/india-news/indians-form-third-largest-illegal-immigrant-population-in-us-pew-research-123112200468_1.html. Accessed January 01, 2025.
^[5] Joint Statement on the Inaugural India-U. S 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue. Ministry of External Affairs. September 06, 2018. https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/30358/joint+statement+on+the+inaugural+indiaus+2432+ministerial+dialogue. Accessed December 26, 2024.
^[6] Patel Raghav. HAL Confirms F-414 Engine Deal for Tejas Mk2 Postponed to Mid-2025 But Reassures on 80% ToT, Quality and Timely Delivery. Defence. In. November 10, 2024. https://defence.in/threads/hal-confirms-f-414-engine-deal-for-tejas-mk2-postponed-to-mid-2025-but-reassures-on-80-tot-quality-and-timely-delivery.11196/. Accessed December 27, 2024.
^[7] Chatterjee Miller Manjari. India Will Carve Its Own Path. Foreign Affairs. December 11, 2024. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/india/india-will-carve-its-own-path. Accessed December 27, 2024.

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