Kurram, a strategically located district in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan, has garnered significant media attention in recent months, though unfortunately, not for the right reasons. The year 2024 remained yet another violent year for the Kurram Valley, claiming arguably more than 200 lives in the district of Kurram which witnessed significant conflict over the past few decades. While the new year began with a sense of hope for the residents of the Kurram district, it appeared that the optimism faded sooner rather than later. At the beginning of this year, a fragile peace accord was signed, with representatives from the warring Alizai and Bagan tribes entering into a 14-point agreement for resolving the ongoing cycles of violence. However, the outcome of this agreement has been largely unproductive. Reportedly, more than 100 villages in both upper and lower Kurram, including the district headquarters of Parachinar, have been under siege time and again for over last four months due to the closure of the main Thal-Parachinar Road, a crucial route linking Kurram to the rest of Pakistan.

The Kurram region which is administratively divided into three tehsils: Upper Kurram, Central Kurram and Lower Kurram, was a part of the erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which was historically governed under a separate administrative framework until its merger with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province after the twenty-fifth amendment to the constitution of Pakistan in 2018. This mountainous region, situated in the northwestern part of the country shares a lengthy border with Afghanistan's Khost, Paktia, Logar, and Nangarhar (Tora Bora) provinces, making it one of the most geostrategic spaces in the region. Moreover, the district’s main town Parachinar is located just 100 km away from the Afghan capital Kabul. Within Pakistan, Kurram borders Kohat to the southeast, North Waziristan to the south, and the Khyber and Orakzai districts to the east – an area which is home to various Pashtun tribes, including the Turis (the largest tribal group in Kurram which is almost entirely Shia), Bangash (both Shia and Sunnis), and Zaimushat, Mangal, Jandran, Akhroti, Muqbal, Masuzai, Jaji, Parachamkani etc. who are primarily Sunnis. Kurram's complex sectarian makeup is characterized by ethnic and religious diversity where around 83% of the population in Upper Kurram is Shia, while Lower Kurram centered around Sadda has a Shia-Sunni ratio of 35%-65%. On the other hand, Central Kurram which is the largest tehsil is predominantly inhabited by the Sunni tribes of Parachamkani, Masozai, Alisherzai and Zaimushat. However, this ethno-sectarian mix has contributed to both the region's diversity and its susceptibility to conflict and instability.

While many analysts believe that the conflict in Kurram is primarily driven by sectarian or religious factors, researchers argue that sectarian clashes intensify when land is involved, sparking a destructive cycle of violence and counter-violence. In Kurram, conflicts over land, forests, water sources, and mountainous terrain often fuel tensions more intensely than religious issues, such as incidents during religious events (for instance: processions or blasphemy accusations). Disputes over ownership of communal land between rival tribes frequently escalated into sectarian tensions during sit-ins and protests in the district's towns, further complicating an already complex situation. Consequently, many view these sectarian conflicts as a continuation or manifestation of longstanding resource-based tribal rivalries.

However, historically, for almost a century, Sunni and Shia communities in Kurram coexisted peacefully, with only occasional conflicts occurred over land, forests, water resources, and religious events. Nevertheless, local elders and experts note that this balance began to transform significantly in 1979, a critical year in both regional and global geopolitics, especially with the soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the Islamic revolution in Iran. As a result, Kurram's demographic and sectarian balance shifted dramatically in the 1980s, with the arrival of Sunni Afghan refugees and the formation of anti-Soviet Mujahideen groups backed by Pakistan, the United States, and several other countries who started taking shelter in the region. Iran-Saudi Arabia proxy war (where both the countries supported their respective sectarian groups) especially in the north western part of Pakistan and the rise of Gen. Zia ul Haq who promoted Sunni Islamisation in the political scene of Pakistan had further added to the situation. Thereafter, from the 1980s onwards sectarian strife has become a common occurrence in Kurram. Furthermore, the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal, which plunged Afghanistan into civil war and eventually led to the rise of the Afghan Taliban, had profound consequences for Pakistan’s Kurram district, which was already beset by sectarian tensions. The 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan precipitated further instability in the region with Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters sought refuge in Kurram. However, the Shia population in the region refused to offer sanctuary to them, which exacerbated tensions and led to further conflict.

Unfortunately, the violent clashes between the Shia and the Sunnis that occurred in 1982, 1986, and throughout the 1990s led to hundreds of deaths on both sides and the displacement of Shia families from Sadda to Parachinar. In a similar vein, numerous Sunni tribes have been displaced from Upper Kurram as a result of the ongoing violence since 2007. Unfortunately, the Pakistani government has been unsuccessful in rehabilitating these displaced populations within their original villages, thus fueling prevailing grievances and intensifying existing tensions. Moreover, despite introducing different mechanisms (The Murree Agreement signed in 2008), the Pakistani government has largely failed to implement an effective land policy to address land-related disputes throughout Kurram. The Boundary Commission of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) government, established in 2023, has collaborated with tribal elders to address land disputes; although its recommendations are yet to be fully enacted.

It is to be noted that the crisis is further heightened by the growing involvement of the predominantly Sunni extremist groups like the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in the region. Since the emergence of TTP, the Shia leaders started claiming that the former sought to take control of Parachinar, citing their refusal to let militants use the area as a staging ground for attacks on the then-resident US forces in Afghanistan. It also resulted in significant demographic changes, which had implications for the local power dynamics. Since that time, road blockades connecting Parachinar to the rest of Pakistan also became increasingly prevalent, resulting in considerable hardship for the local population of Parachinar and surrounding areas. This situation forced residents to seek for alternative routes, including traveling through Afghanistan to their home country (which is risky as well as time consuming).

The rise of Daesh or Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) further deteriorated the security situation in the region. Repeated attacks against the Shia’s started taking place specifically from 2014 onwards. Moreover, after the fall of the republican government in Kabul in mid-2021 and the capturing of power by the Afghan Taliban, the frequency of these attacks had risen significantly, resulting in Central and Lower Kurram emerging as prominent hotspots for violence attributed to both TTP and the ISKP. In general, both the Shia and the Sunni communities accused the other of provoking violence, sheltering militant groups like the TTP, ISKP and the Iran backed Zainabiyoun Brigade (accused of giving shelter by the Shia groups), storing heavy weaponry, and receiving assistance from foreign states, particularly Iran and Afghanistan. The Sunni groups are alleged to have strong connections with the Afghan Taliban, while the Shia militant groups are considered to maintain friendly relations with Iran. In a way, these regional proxies have further exacerbated the already intricate and multifaceted situation. Thus, the Kurram region has evolved into both a focal point and a consequence of the complex geopolitics of South and West Asia.

In addition, the erstwhile FATA region had long been burdened by the legacy of poor governance, political marginalization, and underdevelopment, as it remained outside the jurisdiction of Pakistan's Courts for several decades with no legislation passed by the national parliament being applicable within its boundaries. Until very recently, the region was governed under the harsh framework of the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), a draconian colonial-era law that imposed stringent measures on governance and justice. However, the integration of FATA into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province in 2018 as a part of the FATA reform process also proved largely unsuccessful, as the local administrative system (especially in Kurram) lacked the necessary resources and infrastructure to accommodate such a significant transition within a short period of time. The absence of a robust government presence, coupled with a slow and convoluted reform process, has exacerbated the hardships faced by the local population while the competition over the scarce resources intensified. The government's inability to fulfill its commitments made during the merger process to address the region's socio-economic complexities—especially in terms of extending legal rights, access to resources and employment—is likely to sustain and perpetuate tensions, particularly along tribal and sectarian lines. Moreover, this vulnerability has been exploited by both internal and external actors to advance their respective agendas, thereby aggravating the complexity of the situation.

It is argued that in this kind of a scenario, in order to resolve the conflict, the devolution of power to the local administration is essential. Furthermore, local authorities, including the district administration and police force, should be reinforced through the allocation of adequate resources to these institutions, enabling them to effectively carry out their responsibilities unbiased and maintain law and order. In addition, the newly proposed land commission, initiated by the state, should be tasked with addressing and resolving all land-related disputes within the region. Moreover, the legitimacy of the Jirgas, probably the most significant conflict resolution mechanism existed in the region for centuries, is equally critical for the effective implementation of their decisions. If a decision is obtained through bribery or coerced agreements, particularly by state influence, the Jirga loses its legitimacy, thereby undermining its authority and capacity to enforce its rulings. Unfortunately, this seems to have transpired in recent times amidst the ongoing conflict surrounding Kurram.

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