Israel's security policy has been influenced by a deep sense of regional isolation, vulnerability and asymmetry in terms of small territorial size, limited population, lack of strategic depth, diplomatic weaknesses, limited strategic and economic assets, involvement of superpowers in the region and history of wars with its Arab neighbours in 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973. ^[1] In 1967 war, the acquisition of new territories, around 88,000 sq. km. comprising of Sinai Peninsula, Golan Heights, Gaza Strip and West Bank including East Jerusalem, introduced the term "Occupied territories”. Israel's hold over the entire Mandate Palestine made Palestinians its administrative responsibility, either as citizens or residents. ^[2]

Following the 1979 Camp David Accords, Israel returned the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt but retained control over the Golan Heights and Palestinian territories i.e. Gaza Strip and West Bank including East Jerusalem. The 1993 Oslo Accords established the Palestinian Authority (PA) for interim self-government, with plans for permanent status talks over borders, refugees and Jerusalem. However, Israel’s settlement expansion, violent attacks by Palestinian outfits, and the 2000-2005 Al Aqsa Intifada undermined peace efforts. Despite Israel’s 2005 withdrawal from Gaza, it maintained overall control while continuing with settlement construction in West Bank and East Jerusalem. The split in Palestinian governance i.e. West Bank under Fatah led PA and Gaza Strip under Hamas since 2007 further complicated peace talks.

For Israel, the control over occupied Palestinian territories accentuated Israel’s existential predicament. The state’s three prime goals i.e. preserving Jewish identity and statehood; preserving its democratic political system and upholding the territorial extent by occupation on Palestinian territories are incompatible. Israel has to give up one of these three goals in order to sustain the other two goals. The dual stress on upholding it as a Jewish-democratic state while occupying the Palestinian territories has led to a bunker mentality characterized by extreme defensiveness and self-justification or self-righteous intolerance of criticism. ^[3] Bunker Mentality has ensued aggressive ethnic nationalism prioritizing the interests of Jewish citizens; paralyzing the political system and polarization increasing the space for religious parties with narrow agenda to occupy a substantial share causing unstable coalition governments with rampant incidents of infighting. The state witnessed five elections between April 2019 and November 2022. The ethno-centric tendencies have led to rightward tilt in politics and society which is manifested in terms of greater popularity of revisionist and conservative parties such as Likud; Religious Zionism; Shas and United Torah Judaism (UTJ).

Dilemma for Israel

Israel’s war in Gaza Strip to destroy Hamas’ military and governance capabilities and rescuing the hostages has long-term implications on its occupation policy. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF)’s prolonged occupation over Gaza Strip would intensify international and regional criticism and contribute to steady increase in military casualties, economic pressures, military costs, and logistical concerns to govern over a large and hostile population. Therefore, the dilemmas for Israel are how to carry out temporary control in Gaza Strip after dismantling Hamas’ military and governance capabilities; governance and security responsibilities after IDF’s departure and framing a realistic plan about Gaza Strip’s future that deters any new threat to its security interests. ^[4] From Israel’s perspective, the three options for post-war Gaza include, firstly, re-establishing the Palestinian Authority (PA) government; secondly, erecting security arrangement with forces from Arab states stationed in Gaza and thirdly, evacuating the civilian population from Gaza to Egypt and other states and preserving overall security control by IDF.

For Israel, importing PA to Gaza Strip or delegating security responsibility to “pragmatic” Arab states are inadequate in terms of strategic implications; long-term feasibility and deterrence or change in mind-set within the Palestinian population. Israel fears that both options would necessitate long extended combat with consistent rise in IDF deaths; increase risk to open a second front in the northern frontier; ensure long-term humanitarian responsibility; intensify anti-Israel public narrative; possible presence of Hamas supporters in governing bodies and solidify international support to set up PA government to facilitate the statehood process. Both options do not offer any long-term value and it could turn into strategic liability in few years. The option to import PA to Gaza is seen as most risky; uniting both territories under single political and administrative control and “entail an unprecedented victory for the Palestinian national movement”. ^[5]

In the initial months of the war, Israel's political and security strategies, driven by a right-wing discourse, focussed on creating conditions for evacuating the Gaza Strip's civilian population to the Sinai Peninsula and re-establishing security control through military bases and checkpoints, while preventing their return. The targeting of land to force population transfers under the guise of temporary wartime measures was internalised by the IDF and political leadership. The prospect of re-occupying Gaza Strip and thinning the Palestinian population enjoy broad support among the religious and ultra-nationalist segment of Israeli society aggrieved by the 2005 withdrawal, seen as abandonment of a sliver of the ‘biblical homeland’. Pro-Netanyahu and far right wing mouth pieces often inculpate the 2005 disengagement from the strip as the root cause of the current crisis. ^[6]

Israeli lawmakers frequently invoke the term “second Nakba” to threaten Arab citizens of Israel and Palestinians. This rhetoric reflects the growing acceptance of the 1947-48 expulsion of Palestinians as part of Israel's nationalist struggle. The term “Nakba” has been normalized by Israeli political figures to rally support from ultra-nationalist and conservative voters who advocate complete capitulation through settlement expansion, further suppression of Arab citizens' political rights, and restrictions on Palestinian movement, land, and water rights. This discourse underscores anxieties over demographic changes and a desire to preserve Israeli political and economic dominance in the occupied territories. ^[7]

Egypt Factor

There are however, tactical difficulties for Israel to execute its displacement policy. Abdel Fattah el-Sisi government rejected Israel’s demands to accommodate Palestinian refugees or assume Egyptian security role in the post-war scenario. Cairo fears any displacement proposition could ignite socio-political tensions in the Sinai peninsula already troubled by tribal militias and radical groups which could spill over into Egypt; destabilising effects on the post-1979 diplomatic and security understanding with Israel in case of escalation; law and order costs and worry about debilitating Palestinian national life, existence and the morale for statehood. ^[8] Israel’s longstanding refusal to recognize the right of return for 1948 and 1967 refugees is viewed as a precedent for its current displacement strategy, aimed at creating hostile conditions to force relocation.

Egypt's struggling economy, marked by high inflation, currency devaluation, massive public debt, and unemployment, will face additional stress from the potential influx of Palestinian refugees. ^[9] It needs to be seen whether economic considerations could actually propel Al Sisi government to accept a limited number of Palestinian refugees in lieu of international assistance packages; debt relief or cancellation; military & economic aid commitments by the US, western powers and softening criticism of human rights issues. In case Cairo moves in such direction, the entry and numbers of Palestinian refugees into Sinai Peninsula could be used as leverage to strike deals with the western powers and reinforce regime stability. Egypt, despite threatening Israel over about redlines following raids on Rafah and IDF takeover of Rafah and Philadelphi corridors has preserved bilateral relations. Egypt’s role will remain crucial in any future ceasefire deal. In the post-war scenario, Cairo’s engagement with Tel Aviv would intensify to manage the borders with Gaza Strip, consolidate Palestinian governance machinery and coordinate against common security concerns.

US Factor

Besides Egypt, the US policy objectives could impede Israel’s long-term goals in Gaza Strip. Washington DC has avoided supporting civilian population transfers, instead pushing for safe corridors and humanitarian pauses. The five principles guiding US approach in post-conflict Gaza include no forcible displacement; no reoccupation; no siege or blockade; no reduction in territory and no use of Gaza Strip as a platform for terrorism. ^[10] However, the US commitment to supporting Israel’s efforts to destroy Hamas while protecting civilians remains contradictory. President Joe Biden on 18 November 2023 stressed that Gaza Strip and West Bank should be reunited under a single governance structure, “ultimately under a revitalized Palestinian Authority”. ^[11] Biden’s stance may be seen as empty rhetoric to placate his critics domestically; shift the narrative on US’ support for Israel’s actions to questions over post-war scenario and damage control its relationship with Arab states. From Palestinian peoples’ perspective, a “revitalized” PA would mean a more representative authority enjoying popular legitimacy with new elections and ideas to move forward the peace process. Israel benefitting from the political division in West Bank and Gaza Strip and sustenance of a weak PA with poor political legitimacy want the ‘revitalized’ Palestinian governing body to remain subservient that overlooks settlement expansion and encroachment of land and religious sites in the West Bank. Israel working with the US and Gulf States could ‘appoint’ Palestinian leaders of their choosing to lead a pliable PA to essentially manage the occupation and dissipate the national struggle.

The term ‘ultimately’ could either indicate continued Israeli military control for the time being or rallying Arab states to manage security in Gaza Strip. It nevertheless reflects the discord in the US and Israeli approach and methods on who will govern Gaza in ‘day after scenario’. President Joe Biden intends to ensure a ceasefire, even if temporary prior to the November 2024 elections. The US proposal espouses hostage-prisoner swap and short-term ceasefire in the first phase; permanent end to hostilities and full withdrawal of Israeli forces in the second phase and reconstruction in the third phase. The ceasefire negotiations are currently ongoing facing two key obstacles i.e. firstly, Netanyahu government’s insistence to maintain troops in the Philadephi Corridor buffer zone between southern Gaza and Egypt and secondly, names of specific individuals to be included in hostage and prisoner exchange. ^[12]

Israel’s policy of displacing Palestinians and exerting direct control has low acceptability in both the US and the receiving country, Egypt. In this context, Israel’s hopes to gain certain territorial concessions that would invariably alter Gaza Strip’s borders and size. The security buffer zone from the north to the south on the Palestinian side of the border would further squeeze the Palestinian population in the 365 sq. kms. patch of land about 40 kms long and between 3 km and 12 km wide. ^[13] The US has rejected any permanent reduction in Gaza Strip’s territorial size but supports a temporary buffer zone especially to allow displaced Israelis to return to border communities. Biden administration’s post war plan encompasses PA rule in Gaza Strip; re-starting the peace process; security guarantees and normalization deal with Saudi Arabia for Israel. ^[14] There may be a rethinking in Israel’s policy from total destruction of Hamas to more realistic goals such as arresting Hamas leaders by host countries for international trial, deporting Palestinian fighters including Yahwa Sinwar out of Gaza Strip in exchange for a full ceasefire and erecting security buffer. ^[15] However, Israel’s internal political divide makes any attempt at concessions highly difficult.

Netanyahu Factor

Despite his rhetoric of destroying Hamas, Prime Minister Netanyahu has politically benefited from group’ actions in the past to assert his position, posture himself as ‘Mr. Security’, divert attention from pressing domestic issues and stall the peace process. The Israeli Prime Minister since his return to office in 2009 adopted a controversial political choice i.e. to preserve Hamas’ governing role in the Gaza Strip. Israeli government despite regular rounds of fighting allowed Hamas to entrench its rule in Gaza Strip employing the ‘mowing the grass’ tactic with the limited goal of restoring deterrence. The government since 2014 Operation Protective Edge largely tolerated the sporadic attacks from incendiary balloons and rocket fire from Gaza Strip.

Netanyahu’s policy of ‘divide and rule’ was based on preserving Hamas’ governance and military capabilities; carrying limited assault to restore deterrence and facilitating the group’s financial well-being through Qatar to sustain disunity with Fatah-led PA. Israeli government indirectly aided the group after halt in funding for electricity by Mahmoud Abbas government in 2017. The policy to perpetuate rift between Hamas in Gaza Strip and PA in West Bank helped Israel preserve the diplomatic paralysis and deflect international pressure to move forward with the peace process under the pretext that Mahmoud Abbas government does not represent all Palestinians. ^[16] In March 2011, Prime Minister Netanyahu threatened PA to choose between “peace with Israel and peace with Hamas” ^[17] and he emphasized that reconciliation would make peace much harder to achieve with Israel in October 2017. ^[18] The Prime Minister speaking at a Likud meeting in March 2019 stated, “Whoever opposes a Palestinian state must support delivery of funds to Gaza because maintaining separation between the PA in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza will prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state” ^[19] Israel therefore profited from sustaining Hamas’ political control in Gaza Strip and weakening the legitimacy of the PA.

The 7 October attack exposed the failure of Netanyahu’s policy to ‘tame the group’ raising questions about whether any investigation into security lapses will also examine the Prime Minister’s long-term policy of sustaining the group. The complete destruction of Hamas could damage Netanyahu’s political career and in case he manages to save himself from political attacks and the promised investigation, the group could be allowed to survive to sabotage the peace process. Despite the on-going ‘war on terror’, as long as Netanyahu remains in power, he will ensure that the Hamas regime does not collapse completely.

In the post war scenario, Israel would intend to work with a subservient PA in West Bank and Gaza with reduced size while maintaining overall security responsibility with US military and financial support. International calls for a two-state solution have gained momentum following Israel's assault on Gaza Strip. Netanyahu, however, has rejected the creation of a Palestinian state that could "threaten" Israel, emphasizing that Palestinians can govern themselves but without the power to endanger the Jewish state. It essentially indicates the intentions to preserve the security role and manage the occupation. The current government will likely intensify disinformation efforts to deflect pressure ignoring the reality that the occupation is unsustainable and Israel’s long-term security as Jewish democratic state is contingent on resolving the Palestinian issue.

References

^[1] Yoav Ben-Horin and Barry Posen, “Israel’s Strategic Doctrine”, RAND Corporation, 1981, Accessed https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2007/R2845.pdf
^[2] P. R. Kumaraswamy, The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Ringside View, Routledge: London, 2023..
^[3] R. R. Krebs, “Israel’s Bunker Mentality: How the Occupation is Destroying the Nation”, Foreign Affairs, 90 (6), 2011, pp. 1-9, Accessed https:// www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2011-11-01/israels-bunkermentality.
^[4] Anshel Pfeffer, “What Is Israel’s Endgame in Gaza? These Are the Three Key Dilemmas”, Haaretz, October 30, 2023, Accessed https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-10-30/ty-article-magazine/.premium/what-is-israels-endgame-in-gaza-these-are-the-three-key-dilemmas/0000018b-8080-d4ba-a3ab-9a8d90aa0000
^[5] Yuval Abraham, “Expel all Palestinians from Gaza, recommends Israeli gov't ministry”, 972 mag, October 30, 2023, Accessed https://www.972mag.com/intelligence-ministry-gaza-population-transfer/
^[6] The Economist, “Israel’s four unpalatable options for Gaza’s long-term future”, The Economist, October 19, 2023, Accessed https://www.economist.com/briefing/2023/10/19/israels-four-unpalatable-options-for-gazas-long-term-future
^[7] Jonathan Cook, “Israel calls the Nakba a lie. So why do its leaders threaten a second one?”, Middle East Eye, June 14, 2022, Accessed https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/israel-palestine-nakba-leaders-call-lie-threaten-second-why
^[8] Yasmeen Serhan, “Why Gazans Fear Permanent Displacement in Egypt”, Time, November 2, 2023, Accessed https://time.com/6330904/palestinians-gaza-fear-permanent-expulsion/
^[9] Imad K. Harb, “Egypt Muddles Through the Crisis in Gaza”, Arab Center Washington DC, December 6, 2023, Accessed https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/egypt-muddles-through-the-crisis-in-gaza/
^[10] The White House, “Remarks by Vice President Harris on the Conflict Between Israel and Hamas”, The White House, December 2, 2023, Accessed https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/12/02/remarks-by-vice-president-harris-on-the-conflict-between-israel-and-hamas/
^[11] Reuters, “Palestinian Authority should govern Gaza and West Bank, Biden says”, Reuters, November 19, 2023, Accessed https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/biden-says-palestinian-authority-should-ultimately-govern-gaza-west-bank-2023-11-18/
^[12] Reuters, “Why the Philadelphi corridor is a focus of the Israel-Gaza ceasefire deal”, Reuters, September 7, 2024, Accessed https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/gazas-philadelphi-corridor-its-importance-ceasefire-talks-2024-09-06/
^[13] Jacob Magid, “Israel said to tell neighbors and US of plans to create Gaza buffer zone after war”, The Times of Israel, December 2, 2023, Accessed Israel said to tell neighbors and US of plans to create Gaza buffer zone after war | The Times of Israel
^[14] David S. Cloud and Anat Peled, “Netanyahu outlines postwar Gaza plan that Palestinians say means occupation”, Wall Street Journal, February 23, 2024, Accessed https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/netanyahu-presents-blueprint-for-postwar-gaza-with-free-rein-for-israeli-military-36b1d53c
^[15] Samia Nakhoul, Ahmed Mohamed Hassan and Jonathan Saul, Israel tells Arab states it wants buffer zone in post-war Gaza”, Reuters, December 2, 2023, Accessed https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-informs-arab-states-it-wants-buffer-zone-post-war-gaza-sources-2023-12-01/
^[16] Adam Raz, “A Brief History of the Netanyahu-Hamas Alliance”, Haaretz, October 20, 2023, Accessed A Brief History of the Netanyahu-Hamas Alliance - Israel News - Haaretz.com
^[17] The Jerusalem Post, “PM: Palestinian Authority must choose between peace with Israel, Hamas”, The Jerusalem Post, March 22, 2011, Accessed PM: Palestinian Authority must choose between peace with Israel, Hamas - The Jerusalem Post (jpost.com)
^[18] The Times of Israel, “PM: Israel to oppose Palestinian unity gov't unless Hamas disarms, stops terror”, The Times of Israel, October 12, 2017, Accessed PM: Israel to oppose Palestinian unity gov't unless Hamas disarms, stops terror | The Times of Israel
^[19] Lahav Harkov, “Netanyahu: Money to Hamas part of strategy to keep Palestinians divided”, The Jerusalem Post, March 12, 2019, Accessed Netanyahu: Money to Hamas part of strategy to keep Palestinians divided - The Jerusalem Post (jpost.com)

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