It was in the post-1962 period that the shape of India’s indigenous system of national defence began shaping-up – at the intervention of Communist China. That was when after centuries of strategic quarantine from real-politics, free India’s idealist–optimist leaders had the chance to discern the role of military institution in upholding the nation’s sovereignty. Even then, that was but a rather distasted revelation to the policy-makers who for most all of their public and private lives had been staunchly devoted to the guidance of Satyagrahi, Gandhian and Nehruvian philosophies – with some misplaced smugness.

Ingrained culture, however, takes hard to shed; it floats just below the surface, only to flex banal hopes and misread forewarning signatures in favour of wishful romantism. Thus, while the foundations of the nation’s military power had been relatively better appreciated after the 1962 debacle - as in case of defence research, defence production, quality control, War Book provisions and so on – the polity’s strategic culture remained captive to aversion of harnessing the military institution at the apex level of state security. And when there was no choice but to mobilise the military, that recourse was adopted rather reluctantly, only to be terminated at the first signs of success - much to the relief of the adversary.^[1] On the other end, as for the military’s post-independence adherence to its traditional ways of service life, successive governments had continued to uphold the special military-exclusive provisions.

Political mismanagement of the nation’s military institution found another facet in the post-1990 period when India had to concede to a fiscal emergency. Since then, the budgetary support to war waging assets have stagnated more or less. But that is not unusual, even most powerful nations go through such cycles with respect to time. What is astounding in India’s case is that the budgetary cuts had been applied arbitrarily, without due consultations with military professionals that could have mitigated the ill-effects of the drastic reduction in defence allocations. In the instance, the military’s operational balance was disturbed, particularly in terms of weapons and war-like equipment, ammunition and training. ^[2]

The military is yet to recover from that handicap.

A Refreshing Approach to Military Security

In the recent years the government has apparently realised the salience of military prowess in buttressing the cause of the nation’s overall security and sovereignty. Thus, we witness many encouraging turns in the political management of the nation’s military as well as its other defence-dedicated institutions.^[3] These turns are indicative of a refreshing focus among the apex level defence policy-makers on matters of national defence in the present era of unrestrained rivalries. However, such signs of mature realism continue to waver off and on with glimpses of misdirected hubris raised by generally well-meaning but ill-informed power-groups of nationalist hawks. That kind of fervour, borne out of shallow appreciation of matters military, need to be restrained. As the new government settles down, it is time to revisit some of such fundamental mis-conceptions among the polity. India does not have the liberty of insubstantial experimentations with her rigorously mandated military.

The discussion here is purported at certain fundamentals of military culture, spirit and organisational structure which elevate a military institution to be the ultimate guarantor of the nation’s sovereignty. These are the values moored at long-established covenants and are to be honoured in a constitutionally mandated, disciplined and responsible political-military dispensation. Here, we are not talking of the military look-alike bands of rumbustious, unaccountable pretenders or the so called ‘parallel armies’.

The Mission Ahead

In its latest dispensation, the government, in its quest for Viksit Bharat, should be bracing-up for the strategic contestations that inevitably lie ahead. It may therefore, continue to dedicate to the state’s eternally ordained covenant towards its soldiery, that is to equip them to fulfil their excruciating mandate, while giving them the best chance to triumph in their excruciating mission, and that with least of casualties.

In this context, the defence policy makers have to blend the eye-catching articles of modernisation schemes with the professionally adjudged hard realities of the nation’s military security. To wit, that reality points out that while the threat of war-like conflicts with our ever-hostile neighbours would keep hovering for years and decades with occasional flare-up to serious tactical actions, the rigorous toils of close-quarter fighting would remain as routine blood-letting events. Consequently, the nation’s defence policy makers should be gearing-up to perform the complex task of fusing our hoary military culture with the realities of modern battlefields. Superfluities of hubristic notions cannot find space in that endeavour.

That stated, accelerated progress over the Government’s previous tenure’s landmark defence modernisation and restructuring initiatives should be the main objective of the forthcoming governance. In view of the positivity of recently articulated initiatives towards that objective, that matter needs to be dwelled over a longer term.

Leaving out the bench-marked and well appreciated functions of the government’s policies towards the regular features of military management, the focus of discussion here is on certain unrequited propositions which call for right-orientation. These are as discussed below.

Take 1: ‘Indigenisation’ of Military Culture

Indigenisation of the native military traditions and practices had actually begun from within the military institution after the Independence in 1947. The beginning was made with change-overs of insignias, badges, uniforms, words of command, rations etc. With due wisdom, many of the core military values, drills and procedures imbibed from the colonial era had been preserved, these being dedicated to instilling among the soldiery the best of the eternal attributes of orthodox military professionalism. Truly, that wisdom has helped free India reorient from her unsavory record of past many centuries of military failures, in spite of her soldiery’s extreme valour and sacrifices, that had in the first place led to India’s centuries of enslavement.

Many of the intrinsic strengths of our soldierly mannerisms are originated from the British Indian Army and stand duly customised over the centuries to the native conditions. Examples are: absence of political, ethnic, cultural and linguistic biases, ingrained sanctification of command and accountability, unrequited loyalty to regimental colours and war cries, adoration of the tedious codes of military conduct and dress regulations, relentless sanctions of military laws, fervour of drills, parades and pageantry, and customs of motivational slogans, orderly room and mess etiquettes, and so on. These mannerisms are key determinants in spiritual and psychological conditioning of the soldiery that instills them with the ability to stand up to extreme dangers and deprivations, even choose death, in their observance of their grim mandate, even if that runs contrary to natural human instincts.

Therefore, some recent rumblings among certain hard-liner factions unfamiliar with the matters military, on the pretext of superfluous ‘nationalism’, to ‘indigenise’ the Indian military need to be cut at its roots. Equally necessary is to prevent few of those misguided elements from within the military ranks who concede to such superfluity either due to foolish innocence or petty gratification.^[4] For the military to shoulder extra-ordinary responsibilities in defending the nation that no other institution is conditioned to shoulder, it is best for the state to continue to shield it from exuberant socio-political influences, and consultative exceptions apart, uphold its manners of performing duties in its own extra-ordinary ways. That should be a fundamental consideration for the incumbent government as it gears-up to fortify the nation’s military prowess in tune with its global aspirations. Policy-promulgations related to application of the Defence Service Regulations, sanctification of military authority and chain of command, management of defence estates and cantonments, recruitment and terms of service, etc. have to be considered from that angle.

War is a business of blood and gore and its after-effects on the nation are unremitted. It is best for the government to continue to let the die-hard professionals handle the spiritual, cultural and temporal aspects of that business in their own time-tested manners.

Take 2: Learning from the Agnipath Scheme

Agnipath Scheme of recruitment into the military forces had been necessitated mainly by unavoidable fiscal limitations – besides, of course, certain associated objectives.^[5] True to its tradition of retrieving itself from emergencies, the military institution has done its best to make the Scheme work. However, having experienced the results, it is clear that with the volunteers of modest quality, distracted motivations and diluted levels of training and conditioning, there is no way that the Agniveers would be able to stand up to the rigours of modern high-risk, high-technology battlefields that our two powerful enemies are geared-up to unleash, and relied upon to beat them back. Similarly, neither would they be able to match the skill-sets and experience needed to inter-operate with India’s much advanced military partners.

It is said that the Agnipath scheme aimed at generating funds for India’s over-due military modernisation.^[6] That is a valid quest. But whereas the military’s mandate is to uphold the nation’s sovereignty against organised armed aggression of the ultimate kind, the caveat of saving defence expenditure cannot but come way down in priority. In similar vein, better alternatives have to be found to keep the military young, technically competent etc. In any case, young citizen’s desire of donning the uniform, finding them employment or instilling discipline into the society cannot be the military’s burden to carry – a military which is yet see ‘peace’ since many decades past, with no hope seeing that in the foreseeable future.

For years, possibly decades, till comprehensive military modernisation makes it even thinkable to adopt to short-term hired manpower, India’s national security would have to depend on its celebrated soldierly spirit - that has been compensating for material shortcomings in all wars, skirmishes, border stand-offs, counter-insurgencies, even disaster management operations – to deliver against practically unsurmountable odds. Imbibing that kind of sacrificial warrior spirit needs long years of continuity - in engagement on varied roles, training exercises and nurturing of the regimental bonding of ‘Naam, Namak and Nishan’ - to instil. When its soldiers’ quality is its main weapon, the military manpower cannot be suited for ‘hire and fire’ ploys; the bonds of camaraderie have to be life-long, letting brothers-in-arms out to pasture is anathema to them.^[7] Upholders of our national defence may take cue from the disastrous experiences of the Americans in Afghanistan and that of the Russians in Ukraine.

In satiating their wants, enemies do not empathise with, but are bound to exploit to the hilt, the adversary’s budgetary and other limitations.^[8] The incumbent government, accordingly, may list its national priorities. Sustenance of the nation’s military prowess according to the exigencies of national defence against two innately inimical, powerful and relentlessly aggressive enemies operating in close conjunction should be high on that list.

The Agnipath scheme, even with some of its notable advantages, need not be turned into self-immolation. Reportedly well sensitised over the issue, our policy-makers should recuse from the temptation of achieving ‘national defence on discount’, and apply corrective options in a comprehensive, inclusive manner. Thankfully, the new government is stated to have accorded priority considerations to this aspect. It will do well to honour the lessons in mind.

Take 3: Civil-Military Inter-dependency

An efficient way to optimise the nation’s defence-specific technological, industrial, infrastructural and fiscal capacities is to enforce dual-use civil-military inter-dependency. Indeed, there is much scope for better cost-effective civil-military integration in the fields of transportation, warehousing, energy supply, research and production, disposition of central and state police forces etc. To that end, there is a necessity for various agencies within and outside the state structure to recuse from their pacifist inclinations. More importantly, the hoary principle of military accountability, particularly over military-dedicated organisations (Defence Research & Development Organisation, Defence Estates, Military Engineering Services, Defence PSUs etc.), which has been diluted over the years on the pretext of ‘civilian-isation’ and ‘departmental autonomy’, needs to be restored, strengthened in fact.

Time has also come to formalise the so far tentative civil-military integration among the academic, research and experimentation, and managerial establishments, with assignment of due responsibilities and accountabilities.

Take 4: Sustaining Military Modernisation

The process of military modernisation needs decades of sustained progress, during which the project goals are liable to be subjected to occasional deviations due to the varying dynamics of geo-politics and technology options. Military projects also have to be tested and validated under varying operational conditions when need for some changes and deviations are expected to come-up. In that process, charting a more or less steady course of developments, including stable and assured fiscal support, have to be ensured to keep the projects on track. That is necessary to avoid landing-up with high cost but outdated war wherewithal. The current system of administrative and fiscal management of modernisation projects needs to be accordingly upgraded even further, with more decisive participation of military professionals.

Take 5: Balancing Defence Modernisation with Time and Fiscal Support

Presently, the defence modernisation projects are just at the preparatory stages. Once these get going, the next step would be to induct the state-of-the-art upgrades across our huge defence establishment. The processes of defence technological capacity building, the time needed for induction of newly developed defence inventories, training, deployment, gaining operational expertise, and systemic integration of modern capabilities across the services and arms would need a long time to accomplish. Time is also needed to build up own standards of science education and research, high-technology expertise and a corresponding manufacturing backbone - particularly when advanced countries do not share their advanced designs and algorithms. All added, the results of our defence modernisation could need two to three decades to match-up with our intended goals of military empowerment. Even bulk fiscal allocations can compress that time gap only to some extent.

That is a long time to keep the cause of national defence in a state of vulnerability against our aggressive and ambitious enemies. When it takes many years for an allocation to morph into war-material, assurances of ‘adequate flow of funds when needed’ is not of much relevance; continuously accelerating progress with respect to ‘time’ is the key. We therefore need to find more innovative approaches to accelerate defence modernisation – even if that means certain discreet compromises with the so called ‘good practices’. ^[9]

Further, it will be wise to cover the gestation period for defence modernisation by enhanced budgeting for such operational logistic projects/schemes that are within own extant capacities to produce. Build-up of operational, mobility and logistic infrastructure – transportation, movement, training, deployment, ammunition storage, camouflage and deception, field billeting, and so on – are some examples of ‘within-indigenous-capacity’ build-up that would eventually get dove-tailed into the cutting-edge military capabilities as defence modernisation begins to fructify. Similarly, using this gestation period to make up the military’s substantial deficiencies of basic, indigenously produced, in-service weaponry and equipment would create an optimised setting for eventual operationalisation of the fruits of military modernisation.

Final Take 6: Reconciliation of Military’s Political Mandate with Allocation of Resources

The nation’s political aspirations need to be reconciled with allocation of corresponding fiscal and technological resources for national defence. Presently, there is a gaping mismatch here, and that leads to impractical expectations from the military.

Some aspects of reconciliation between the mandate and resources are: -

• Need for legislative and procedural strengthening of the armed forces’ Territorial as well as the Reserve Force components - to further the cause of cost-effective national defence.
• Build-up of the ability to project influence beyond own borders/coastlines in order to cushion inimical manoeuvres against India’s national security.
• Enhancement of productivity of the Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO) by the means of more intimate user-participation and control at the decision and execution levels. Another call is to offer specifically attractive partnerships to marshal the competences of the academia and defence manufacturers at-large.
• There is a need to demonstrate the hoary principle of ‘military necessity’ by grant of exceptional dispensations from procedural, fiscal, technical, industrial and acquisitional conditionalities.

Till the above listed reconciliations can be secured against funding or technological constraints, it would be a sensible call to wisdom to ‘lie low, bide your time’!

In Sum

India has already suffered the consequences of seven decades of affliction with a flawed approach to national defence. The forces’ long and widespread operational deployments, their huge deficiencies of war-like inventories and the dwindling defence budgets have, to a considerable extent, compromised the nation’s state of defence preparedness. As a result, the nation remains dangerously exposed to the machinations of our sworn enemies who lurk around looking for opportunities to strike hard. Meanwhile, enemies have already succeeded in keeping India on her toes while using every trick to tie her down to the confines of a localised existence.

India’s military prowess is well below the standards needed of a rising power. Decades of budgetary starvation cannot be compensated just by the quick-fixes of the Agnipath scheme or the assurances of across-the-counter release of tons of ‘money when needed’. More tedious options have to be adopted. Slack, brisk and intense periods of defence modernisation need to be rationalised with stimulating, time-regulated fiscal provisions.

But more than anything else, India’s native military spirit needs to be nurtured. All our curative ventures like cultural indigenisation, Agnipath, resource allocation, budgetary provisions, sectoral inter-dependency and organisational restructure must keep upholding that spirit.

References

^[1] Disengagement from operations in 1948, 1965, 1971, even 1999, took place before the culminating point of war had been reached. Even in disaster-relief operations, local officials often seek relief from the military’s lead role as soon as the emergency is controlled.
^[2] Kargil, Operation Parakram and Mumbai attack were some manifestations of our military debility.
^[3] Presently, this focus is reflected in higher military participation in defence decision making, various levels of defence planning and execution, ceremonials and adulatory references to the soldiery, some superfluity notwithstanding.
There also the increasing accountability of the defence-dedicated undertakings.
^[4] Attempts to ‘democratise’ military laws ‘to uphold human rights’ and the charade of ‘pajama -Kurta’ (also sartorial import!) in messes are some examples of that disorientation.
^[5] Agnipath Yojna – MyGov.in, 14 June 2022; The Hindu, Playing with Fire, 17 June 2022.
^[6] Defence Ministry press releases and statements on Agniveer scheme, the latest one of 24 March 2024.
^[7] Soldiers stake their lives in retrieving their killed and wounded comrades; superannuated locals line up to offer snacks and banter to moving columns of their regiments. That is the bonding.
^[8] IDSA reports on Defence Budget (the latest is of 16 February 2024), which roll out various statistics and percentages do not impress powerful aggressors.
^[9]Though China is the designated ‘fall guy’, most countries, even the advanced ones, many times adopt surreptitious methods to gain access to frontier technology. The adage is that ‘everything is fair in preservation of national security’.

(The paper is the author’s individual scholastic articulation. The author certifies that the article/paper is original in content, unpublished and it has not been submitted for publication/web upload elsewhere, and that the facts and figures quoted are duly referenced, as needed, and are believed to be correct). (The paper does not necessarily represent the organisational stance... More >>