The phase of intense politico-diplomatic relationship between India and China got over in May 2020, having lasted nearly thirty years plus. Of the guiding mantras of diplomacy and deterrence, the former was centre-stage, and the latter was underplayed, lest the ‘improving’ relations signified by multiple Agreements get affected. In hindsight, the diplomatic push for betterment of relations with China would have been the right policy if the reciprocity had been in full measure, in deed. It has become evident that the Agreements became steps towards allowing opportune time for China to rise politically, economically, militarily and technologically to undertake next steps on the border. In the interregnum, the PLA kept at developing military usage infrastructure aggressively right upto and along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), while on the Indian side, the progress was tardy.

China’s geopolitical aims and global ambitions see it as the most pre-eminent power in Asia and eventually, the world, with assured political influence among larger comity of nations through trade, commerce, and infrastructural development. China is assuring for itself dominant status on its territorial periphery by economic relationships, defence networks, diplomatic and cultural influence. China hence employed coercion and inducements to shape the region to better accommodate Chinese leadership.

China confronted the most contested strategic geography of any major power in the world, be East or South China Seas or the Himalayan region. To reach the pinnacle of its dream, China did not want persistent security challenges along its territorial periphery, and the maritime frontier. If regional primacy was considered the springboard to global ambition, it had to work on multi-front with the South East Asian Nations, create dependencies, before vigorously unveiling and pursuing its South China Sea ambitions of securing the Nine-dash line and the two Island chains.

India has been deemed as a geopolitical competitor for China in Asia, despite the economic, military, and technological asymmetry in China’s favour. India has focussed on steady growth, exhibited tremendous growth potential and political stability. India is a credible military power and a challenge in the geostrategic peninsular location at the head of all-important Indian Ocean. India obviously has to be distracted from the growth path and embroiled in a web of inimical peacetime activities, economic dependencies and by creating relationships with South Asian nations.

Having succeeded in some measure in South China Sea, China turned to another inimical territory – the Himalayan Frontier. India had never accepted the so-called unilaterally defined, legally flawed 1959 actual ground position line proposed by Premier Chou En Lai. India formally accepted the concept of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in 1993 in the Agreement to Maintain Peace and Tranquillity with China. Shivshankar Menon has written in his book Choices: Inside the Making of India’s Foreign Policy that the LAC was “described only in general terms on maps not to scale” by the Chinese. It had soon become apparent that LAC did not imply a singular LINE acceptable to both nations, and hence was incurably faulty as a concept. China retained the Damocles Sword of a deliberately ambiguous, unresolved border.

Events that followed clearly revealed that the Chinese have deliberately ensured that the ill-defined nature of the LAC to retain leverage over India, to undertake premeditated aggression and transgressions at regular intervals with well-planned psychological campaign. Chinese belligerence had been steadily rising over a period of time, testing waters by altering the status quo by increasingly varied toolkit, by what it now terms as ‘non-war military activities,’ well short of direct use of military force, to avoid escalation. The scale, the spread and the meticulousness of the belligerent happenings of 2020 in Eastern Ladakh, were incomparable to any of the previous decades, along the entire northern border.

China had often stated that "we cannot lose a single inch of the lands we inherited from our ancestors," and seeks to safeguard Chinese sovereignty and keep the peace at the same time. What PLA had not probably anticipated was the robust and strong response by the Indian Armed Forces, on establishing an eye-ball confrontation at all locations transgressed and the ferociousness and tenacity of Indian soldier at Galwan on 15 June 2020, without even using firearms. In an exemplary mobilisation the Army and the Air Force picked the gauntlet, brought in a strong force to Eastern Ladakh and indeed all along the Northern Border, accepted the challenge and prepared even for escalation.

The Situation Currently and the Future

On a visit to Inner Mongolia in June 2023, President Xi Jinping called on China’s border troops to forge a “wall of steel” along country’s frontiers by enhancing their capabilities in border defence and control. President Xi’s praised China’s progress in border defence work since 2012, stating PLA troops have effectively safeguarded China’s sovereignty, security, and development interest. These have larger Indian context; China has no significant ‘border defence’ related issues with any other country!

Four years after the eventful May-June 2020, there is a changed character of the border with differing buffer-lands (moratorium on patrolling), creating a kind of belt of actual control in Eastern Ladakh. It can be inferred that the push for patrolling moratoriums along LAC in Aksai Chin, is a deliberate design of PLA, as it suits PLA to avoids patrol-clashes, chanced fisticuffs and stand-offs, which had become a regular feature and problematic for them for over a decade. Evidently, Chinese had conceived and to an extent executed a strategic game plan for the entire Eastern Ladakh border, to deny patrolling in Aksai Chin.

Correlating the 1959 Line with the transgressions of 2020, PLA has held on or created buffers along the watershed of River Shyok along Aksai Chin, Pangong Tso and River Indus (Kailash Range)! Similar attempts later to occupy passes or infringe the watershed, on the Northern borders of Tibet with Uttrakhand, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh, were stoically denied by the Indian Army, with its forceful occupation and preparation of a protective grid. In the interim to arrive at this current situation, 21 rounds of Corps Commander Level Talks, 15 rounds of diplomatic WMCC and many a meeting at Ministerial levels have been held. In contemplation, many issues have become evident and candid.

• The border has got nearly fixated to who is where is basis, with Indian Army in mistrust of PLA’s intentions, occupying defensively the forward-most tier along the complete watershed, placement of acclimatised reserves in proximity and creating infrastructure at a feverish pace. China on the other hands has much enhanced its military infrastructure in South Xinjiang (Aksai Chin) and in Tibet. China hence retains a posture that is construed in India of threat in near permanence, an analysis that must not be soft-pedalled or downplayed.
• The existing situation along the borders does not indicate war clouds, quite on the contrary! India and China are both in a socio-developmental mode, and would like to avoid wars. China well understands that despite its advantageous military and technological asymmetry, wars of the force-on-force kind are messy affairs, with no guarantee of any favourable end-state, and even chance of likelihood of loss of face.
• In an article recently, Hu Shisheng, Director, Institute of South Asian Studies, of the think tank CICIR of the Chinese Ministry of State Security wrote that “Sino-Indian relations are set to evolve into a state of “cold hostility” and “non-violent, non-cooperative” coexistence.” These words from an official establishment have an ominous ring, yet indicate avoidance of escalation and violent war. That it must not be taken as gospel, is a given!
• Diplomatic/ political initiatives, as have been currently argued by many an analyst, to redo the existing Agreements pertaining to the border, must remember the Chinese formulation of "we cannot lose a single inch of the lands we inherited from our ancestors," and the Chinese President’s constant exhortation to PLA to ‘dare to win.’ Chinese are yet way away from their so-called 1959 Line, and that PLA is yet obviously ‘dissatisfied’ with the current state of the border, as is evident by attempted probing along the border, between 2020 and 2024.
• Despite tensions along the borders, India has strong trade relationships with China with $118.4 as the two-way trade in 2023-24. It is not paradoxical, the US and EU continue to trade with Russia despite the Russian-Ukraine war, as do Japan and China, Taiwan and China and the Philippines and China. It is historically also proven economic interdependence is no cure for national security concerns. Political scientist John Mearsheimer had stated that, “nations that depend on others for critical economic supplies will fear cutoff or blackmail in time of crisis or war.” Chinese economic authoritarian statecraft is well chronicled and is often clearly intimated through a set of punishments, a kind of weaponisation of the economy and trade. Though deliberate efforts have been initiated in India, it is not easy to delink from China, which is the world’s second largest economy, global leadership in green and new energy technology and products (renewables), world’s largest trading nation and has significant control of global supply chains. Accepting the need of creating resilience against trade dependencies, Niti Aayog is currently studying to develop a comprehensive action plan to bridge the trade deficit over time and align trading strategies with emerging geopolitical situation and potential risks to safeguard supply chains.

It is evident therefore, between China and India there may be intensifying trade in the overall atmosphere, anxiety, hostility and distrust. Indeed politico-diplomatic interaction at global fora/ multilaterals/ minilaterals like the Russia, India, China (RIC), Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and BRICS, under the rubric of strategic autonomy in foreign policy, will continue. It becomes imperative for India to ensure that:

• Politico-diplomatic initiatives as and when progressed, must be mindful of Chinese ambitions, which envision India as a geopolitical challenger in Asia, and attempt to retard Indian growth. The challenges posed by China may well emanate from its proxy Pakistan. However, in the confused global environment, open and established channels of communication with China at all levels, be it political, diplomatic, economic and trade and military will be advantageous.
• Military power must be aimed at creation of the precise capabilities to achieve desired outcomes and effects in all specific domains and dimensions. Clear intimation of National Will and delineation of the specific capabilities, is imperative to prevent war, present credible deterrence and ensure a robust response to threats. This must include border management and strong denial, and to be prepared for escalation, if ever happens. Agreements of the past have not been successful in warding off Chinese belligerence; hence their reliability quotient should remain in question. Any future Agreement must not be detrimental to the border guarding forces in their task!
• India must obtain technological advantage from China in trade relationships like in green energy, to reduce carbon intensity and enhance cumulative electric power from renewables as in 2030 targets. Trade is a two-way traffic not only economically, but for China also to assure the global trade partners of its reliability. Economic interaction with India is as important to Chinese State, in its attempt to address its internal social and economic woes, and to thwart global trade push back.
• Chinese strong attempts to make inroads in South Asia, and attempts to ‘purchase influence,’ must be contested with focussed mutuality and socio-cultural relationships with the neighbours.

(The paper is the author’s individual scholastic articulation. The author certifies that the article/paper is original in content, unpublished and it has not been submitted for publication/web upload elsewhere, and that the facts and figures quoted are duly referenced, as needed, and are believed to be correct). (The paper does not necessarily represent the organisational stance... More >>

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