The Indian presidency of the G20 has taken cognizance of the challenge of achieving just and equitable growth for all the peoples of the world in a sustainable, holistic, responsible, and inclusive manner. It is founded on the philosophy of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam- the world is one family. Accordingly, its motto is One Earth, One family, One future. It seeks to address challenges in a uniquely Indian way of living in harmony with the surroundings.^[1]

India’s G-20 priorities for the Sherpa Track have been identified as:

• Green development, climate finance and LiFE (lifestyle for environment)
• Accelerated, inclusive and resilient growth
• Accelerating progress on Sustainable Development Goals
• Technological transformation and digital public infrastructure
• Multilateral institutions for the 21st century
• Women-led development^[2]

India’s G20 priorities for the Finance Track have been identifies as:

• Global economy and risks
• Strengthening Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs)
• Managing global debt vulnerabilities,
• Financing climate action and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and
• Building resilient, inclusive and sustainable cities of tomorrow^[3]

The G20 has not been a subject of wide public debate in India. Some research institutions dealing with issues of international economics such as the ICRIER and RIS have been engaged with theG20 process by organizing pre-Summit meetings which deliberated on the macro-economic and other issues on the G20 agenda and provided inputs to government for the Summit. This time round, with India’s presidency of the G20, there is a flurry of writings in the public domain on the G20. The discussions fall into two main categories. First, there are those that make specific suggestions regarding what India could attempt to achieve in particular areas under the consideration of the G20 such as digital economy, cyberspace, climate action, global health, agriculture etc. ^[4] These are attempts to make the G20 more action and result oriented. Second, there are several prominent voices making the case for India using its G20 moment to take a lead on issues of the Global South or represent its interests in the forum. ^[5] They are referring to a shift in priorities of the G20.

There are, however, some structural issues that the Indian presidency will need to address while attempting to achieve these objectives. One the one hand, G20 will need to be pushed to overcome the inertia that has plagued it; while on the other, India needs put inplace arrangements that will make the G20 more representative of the Global South.

Addressing Inertia

The G20 has transcended substantially from its initial focus on macroeconomic issues to deal with the financial crisis of 2008. The Summit meetings of the G20 since then have signified a “post-Washington Consensus”.^[6] Thus, critiques of neoliberal order such as dangers of opening up capital accounts and of soft currency pegs and fixed-rate regimes, as well as more contemporary and pressing issues such as energy security, combating terrorist financing, development and aid programmes, migration and remittances, fiscal policy, social safety nets and reform of the Bretton Woods Institutions have all come on to the agenda of the G20 through the years of financial crisis. Since then, the agenda has expanded progressively to include issues beyond financial stability and economic growth, including climate change and sustainable development, women’s empowerment, digitalisation and the future of work.^[7] Most of the new agenda items have some relationship to the macroeconomic and finance issues.

The G20 can be credited with some early successes in steering the world out of the financial crisis and brokering a deal on global tax governance “resulting in the adoption of automatic exchange of account information and the base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) initiative, furthering a more adequate taxation of multinational companies according to the principle that taxes have to be paid where revenue has actually been generated.”^[8] In the area of agriculture, the establishment of the Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS) has been a beneficial though not a transformative step. However, on most other issues, important incremental steps have been taken but they have not resulted in the mitigation of the challenges. For instance, it has been pointed out that in response to COVID-related challenges, no concrete steps were taken to expand international health cooperation, lift export restrictions on critical medicines, medical supplies, and basic foodstuffs, end the disruption of supply chains, avoiding use of intellectual property to interfere with fast disbursement of relevant medicines etc.^[9] Similarly, on issues of labour, trade, development and environment, only basic statements get adopted, that remain non-binding and suggesting no measures for action. To serve as a vanguard on these issues, the G20 needs to be decisive, adopt some hard decisions, and ensure the setting up of mechanisms to address these complex challenges that are clearly not amenable to one-step resolution.

Enhancing Inclusivity

The G20 is club of a small number of countries, though together they represent a substantial share world GDP, trade and population. The G20 has often been seen as a group of self-appointed leaders among the well-to-do economies of the world.^[10] In fact, in its early years, it was regarded as a “hegemonising” and “incorporationist” forum that merely incorporated the larger economies and legitimised the hegemony of the G7 or the United States. ^[11] To the credit of the G20, it has evolved from this early characterisation to now having representation from some smaller special invitee countries each year, as well as participation of a large number of international organisations. Further, adding to its depth, it has also established working groups of transnational actors of the G20 countries such as the B20 (business), C20 (civil society), L20 (labour), W20 (women), Y20 (the youth), T20 (think tanks) and S20 (science) who provide inputs on a variety of issues to the leaders.

However, a vast majority of smaller countries remain outside the ambit of the G20. It is not that the G20 has completely ignored the interests of these countries. For instance, during the Indonesian presidency of the G20, the meeting of the Development Ministers affirmed that the G20 need to focus on the development of Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and Least Developed Countries (LDCs). Again, the Trade, Investment and Energy Ministers Meeting pledged its support to the LDCs in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals. Moreover, the G20 Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) deferred debts of the LDCs to the tune of $12.9 billion and the Multilateral Development Banks provided $100 billion to the DSSI countries. However, it has been contended that it is possible that the G20 countries, through their control over national, regional and multilateral development banks “can eclipse the voices of non-G20 member countries”.^[12]While such fears persist, it will not be possible for India or indeed any other G20 country to represent the Global South.

A formal increase in the membership of the G20 to make it representative of the wider international community will be contrary to the very purpose of the establishment of an informal club of large and influential economies to deal with pressing issues of the day. Moreover, it is also likely to render it inefficient, quite like the “whole of the world” United Nations. However, it is important to develop a mechanism whereby countries that are representatives of different interest groups will be permanently placed in G20 discussions. If the inputs from these smaller southern nations find a way into the Leaders’ Declaration or the Action Plans, the legitimacy of the G0 will be greatly enhanced.

At the recently concluded Bali Summit of the G20, Prime Minister Narendra Modi stated the India’s forthcoming presidency of the G20 will be inclusive, ambitious, decisive and action oriented. In order to be so, India’s presidency will need to seek tangible outcomes on the many issues that are on the agenda of the Finance track and the Sherpa track as well as those being highlighted by the various engagement groups. It will also need to make G20 more inclusive. The need of the hour therefore is that:

• There must be at least one verifiable measure adopted on every issue under the consideration during successive rounds of G20 to be followed up by the relevant international organization or the G20 itself.
• There needs to be a standing mechanism through which non-G20 countries of the Global South can engage with the G20.

The Indian presidency must address these structural issues that have dogged the G20 in order to make the G20 a vibrant multilateral forum. It can then go on building a consensus

Formulating a “Delhi Consensus”

The idea of reformed multilateralism has already been articulated by the top leadership of India. It has thus far been extended to the realms of the reform of the United Nations and upgrading the multilateral counter-terrorism architecture. Speaking in the United Nations (UN) Security Council, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar emphasised the need for a ‘New Orientation for a Reformed Multilateral System’ (NORMS) beginning with a UN that reflects the contemporary world in terms of “economic prosperity, technology capabilities, political influence and developmental progress”.^[13] On terrorism, the need for a check on terror financing and state culpability, for integrity and transparency of counter terrorism mechanisms, for uniform standards for sanctioning and prosecuting terrorists and finally for preventing misuse of new technologies by terrorists have been outlined.^[14]

Along similar lines, writing on the cusp of India taking over the presidency of G20, Prime Minister Narendra Modi articulated a visionary thought of the G20 taking the world beyond its present mindset of confrontation and competition between ideas, ideologies and identities to “catalyse a fundamental mindset shift, to benefit humanity as a whole”.^[15]

As a step forward, the G20 could adopt a “Delhi Consensus” that derives enlightened ideas from the Indic and other cultural traditions around the world. Some elements of the “Delhi Consensus” could be:

• Making institutions of global governance inclusive by giving a voice to all peoples of the world.
• Engendering a respect for environment and sustainability in all actions
• Inculcating a spirit of renunciation and service to humanity in all future initiatives
• Transcending geopolitical rivalries to counter the menace of terrorism
• Invoking religion to play a positive and constructive role in national and international arenas
• Restricting use of technology for harmful ends and ensuring its service in furthering the well-being of all

Addressing structural issues and adopting a “Delhi Consensus” will go a long way not only reinvigorating the G20 but also in heralding a new world order.

Endnites

^[1]Logo and Theme, https://www.g20.org/en/g20-india-2023/logo-theme/, accessed on 20 December 2022.
^[2]Ministry of External Affairs, G20 and India’s Presidency, PIB Mumbai, 10 December 2022, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1882356#, accessed on 20 December 2022.
^[3]Ministry of Finance, India hosts the 1st G20 Finance and Central Bank Deputies (FCBD) meeting under the G20 India Presidency in Bengaluru, Karnataka, PIB Delhi, 14 December 2022, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1883538, accessed on 20 December 2022.
^[4]For instance see Ajay Chibber, View: At G20, India should shake IMF, World Bank et al out of their lethargy into financing green initiatives, The Economic Times, 4 December 2022, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/opinion/et-commentary/view-at-g20-india-should-shake-imf-world-bank-et-al-out-of-their-lethargy-into-financing-green-initiatives/articleshow/95985267.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst, accessed on 6 December 2022. Also see JhanviTripathi, India’s G20 Agenda: Integrating digital economy and value chains, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/indias-g20-agenda-integrating-digital-economy-and-value-chains-2/, accessed on 6 December 2022.
^[5] For instance see Sujan R. Chinoy, G20 presidency: An opportunity for India to assume leadership of the Global South, The Indian Express, 17 November 2022. Also see, GulshanSachdeva, G20 Presidency:A big narrative articulating global South’s priorities is essential, 5 December 2022, https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/opinion/g20-presidency-a-big-narrative-articulating-global-souths-priorities-is-crucial-9649671.html, accessed on 6 December 2022.
^[6]Mark Beeson and Stephen Bell, The G-20 and International Economic Governance: Hegemony, Collectivism, or Both?”,GlobalGovernance, 15 (2009), pp.67-86, pp.78-79.
^[7]Axel Berger, Andrew F Cooper & Sven Grimm, A decade of G20 summitry: Assessing the benefits, limitations and future of global club governance in turbulent times, South African Journal of International Affairs, 26:4, 2019, 493-504, DOI: 10.1080/10220461.2019.170588
^[8]Dries Lesage, From Washington to Hangzhou: Does the G20 Live up to its Potential?, StudiaDiplomatica , Vol. 68, No. 3, The Future of the Gx System and Global Governance, 2017, pp. 65-78,https://www.jstor.org/stable/26531657, accessed on 14 November 2022.
^[9]Tom Bernes, COVID-19: The Failure of G20, in Tom Bernes et.al, Challenges of Global Governance Amid the COVID-19 Pandemic, Council on Foreign Relations, May 2020, https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/challenges-of-global-governance-amid-the-covid-19-pandemic.pdf, accessed on 14 November 2022.
^[10]Steven Slaughter, The Power of G20: The Politics of Legitimacy in Global Governance, Routledge: Oxon, 2020, ttps://www.researchgate.net/publication/337611446_The, accessed on 16 November 2022.
^[11]Mark Beeson and Stephen Bell, n.5, p.72.
^[12]Nancy Alexander, Dr. Heike Löschmann and WaleriaSchuele, Power and legitimacy of the G20 in a multilateral governance system, 5 December 2016, https://www.boell.de/en/2016/12/05/power-and-legitimacy-g20-multilateral-governance-system, accessed on 11 November 2022.
^[13]Statement by External Affairs Minister at the UNSC Open Debate on ‘Maintenance of International Peace and Security: New Orientation for Reformed Multilateralism’, 14 December 2022, https://pminewyork.gov.in/IndiaatUNSC?id=NDg4NQ, accessed on 27 December 2022.
^[14]Statement of External Affairs Minister, UNSC Briefing: Global Counter terrorism Approach:
Challenges and Way Forward, 15 December 2022.https://pminewyork.gov.in/IndiaatUNSC?id=NDg4OA, accessed on 27 December, 2022
^[15]https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/narendra-modi-indias-g20-agenda-will-be-inclusive-ambitious-action-oriented-and-decisive/article66205332.ece, accessed on 27 December 2022.

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