Air Defence Command (ADC) is going to be a reality sooner than later. This article looks at certain salient points related to the ADC and lays out certain imperatives that lie ahead for the decision-makers to make ADC a success.
The decision to create the ADC is a decision of national importance. The success or failure in implementing this decision will decide how effectively the country as a whole will be able put together its cumulative air defence capability in countering the overall air threat from our potential adversaries in any future war.
Such are the stakes for making a success of this decision.
Following points are statedin relation to the overall configuration of ADC:-
Paradoxically, while the most fundamental and the bottom line requirement for the ADC is INTEGRATION, not everything requires to be integrated. In fact, it is most critical to understand, what needs to be integrated and what must remain as ‘distinct verticals’under the ADC banner. This will be explained further.
In order to evolve an answer to this poser step-by-step, following points are made:-
While the weapon verticals must be retained as explained above what then needs to be integrated? The answer is Battle Management and Control System (BMC2).
This requirement has evolved over time and needs to be understood in the right perspective. Following points are made2:-
That much for the centrality of the ADCRS
It can now be appreciated why ADCRS is central to the air defence battle. In essence because of the following:-
It is this ADCRS capability which NEEDS TO BE INTEGRATED seamlessly. This is PRIORITY 1 task of the AD Command. This integration means the following:-
So much for what needs to be integrated and what must become the priority 1 task for the ADC.
Besides the ADCRS, there are some other areas which require to be integrated under the overall air defence banner. These are briefly enumerated:-
In air defence parlance, intelligence relates to the assessment of the air threat from the potential adversary. In generic terms air threat will relate to the total cumulative capability of the adversary to cause damage/destruction to our assets and war-waging potential towards achieving his overall aim of the war.
Air threat assessment is a very complex and a dynamic exercise since the variables are many and the overall throughput keeps varying in quantum and quality. For this very reason, air threat is always assessed in quantitative (implying numbers) and qualitative (implying technological prowess) terms. Both change significantly in quick time frame.
Currently, there are several intelligence agencies (details classified) that put out versions of air threat from time to time. Some of these versions from different verticals are at slight variance at times. ADC must provide an institutional platform that should put out one version of the air threat as a base reference document for all. It should be the charter of the ADC to seek and collate inputs from multiple agencies and put out an analysed statement of air threat.
It is this one document which must become the basis of all planning and policy makingand must drive all actions aimed tobuild air defence capability.
Taking the air threat as a base reference, ADC must lay down a clear policy and a time-bound programme for capability development of the nation’s air defence capability. This policy must be all encompassing and must take into its fold, all dimensions of the air defence capability be it sensors (radars and associated support structures) shooters ( weapons-aircrafts, guns, SAMs, ship-based air defence resources, munitions of all types) and the BMC2 systems (ADCRS elements- communication equipment, media, software tools etc.).
The policy must lay down, how the capability will be made upover time. What will be procured for which Service? What will be interse priorities driving the sequence of procurement? Is there a need for emergency procurement of some resources? Which way the R&D must proceed to provide the forces what they would need in times to come? What are the niche areas of technology that must be addressed here and now? In sum, this policy that must betime-valid for 10-15 years must be re-visited and tweaked (read up-dated) from time to time and must lay down a clear way-ahead for the build-up of the nation’s air defence capability.
While the ADC must be nodal to the budget allocation for air defence out of the total kitty, the inter se priority defined by it in the capability development plan must drive the sub-allocation of the said budget to individual Service. It is hoped that in doing so, the erstwhile inter-Service biases, turf-wars, unfair share etc. (sic) will become a history.
Keeping in mind the fast pace of the development of technology, it is not possible for the entire force to remain state-of-the-art. In fact, it is a common guideline that in any force package, the state-of-the-art inventory remains just about 30%, another 40% which is short of the state-of-the-art can be called current, while the balance 30% is at various stages of vintage and obsolescence. Percentages may vary slightly, force-to-force.
Since air defence weapons are extremely cost-intensive (and hence low-population), every effort is required to sustain the ageing inventory. The activities which drive this effort are many -mid-life upgrades, time-driven weapon overhauls, life-extension of SAMs (through selective testing and certifications) and cannibalisation (fait accompli activity to keep a part of the weapon system alive).
ADC must lay down, sustenance guidelines for the Services. In addition the sustenance activities need to be monitored very closely to ensure that no weapon or a support system dies an untimely death, upgrades and overhauls are picked upin time and successors are inducted before the predecessors (original or upgraded) fade away.
This is a huge responsibility which must become the Charter of ADC.
If air defenders have to fight a joint battle with their capability verticals integrated for a maximum effect, they need to train cohesively, jointly and in integrated manner. This is not to mean that the Service training establishment be all amalgamated into a minced meat, what is required is to optimise the overall training effort by cutting out duplications.
Explaining further, while the Service based training establishments must retain their specific core-competencies; ADC must lay down how duplications will be cut down and how the tri-Service joint training will be conducted? This content and methodology must be laid out for each training year and monitored closely.
This strategy will not only usher in high training levels on a common threshold but also throw up many voids on year-to-year which the ADC must take it upon itself to address on priority.
Once it is possible to get the training on a common threshold, it will become possible to put down a common regime of inspections to check out the skill levels and war-preparedness of the entire air defence force of the nation.
It will indeed be a big aim achieved, and will also be unprecedented, if all the air defenders belonging to the three services can be put on one common inspection regime. This is however easier said than done.
As has been explained earlier, while the battle management and control of the air defence battle need to be fully integrated, each Service must retain its core-competency for the execution of the air defence its specific medium of land, sea and air under the ADC control. In this context, the following points are made:-
As and when theTheatre Commands come up ADC will be integrated with them.
To ensure this, there will be a requirement of ADC-specific staff to be placed under the Theatre Commander as rep of ADC. Keeping in mind the flexible nature of the air assets, it will be prudent to allocate certain core-assets to each Theatre Command ab initio while the balance allotment could be flexible and driven by dynamic battle situation at a point in time.
The allocation of GBADWS will however be driven by the criticalassets to be protected and the inter-se priority of the same. This deployment once initially made, will not be static. In fact, there will be many instances of re-allocation or attachments/detachments as the battle flows. Of course, unlike the air assets for which the allocations/reallocations can be real-time, for GBADWS, the aspect of time and space will have to kept in mind.
The conduct of air defence battle has its own characteristic signatures. The nuances of this battle demand that while some aspects of it need to be integrated as one binding glue, the others must be retained as specific core competencies much like the colours of the VOIBGYOR or the arms of the Trishul, - ‘distinct yet one’, ‘diverse-yet-united’.
ADC is a step in the right direction. If correctly developed, it can become a great integrator of the national air defence capability; true to the dictum – one and one eleven.
(The paper is the author’s individual scholastic articulation. The author certifies that the article/paper is original in content, unpublished and it has not been submitted for publication/web upload elsewhere, and that the facts and figures quoted are duly referenced, as needed, and are believed to be correct). (The paper does not necessarily represent the organisational stance... More >>
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