Introduction

The Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) 2016 was unveiled by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in March this year incorporating most of the recommendations of the Committee of Experts (CoE) constituted by MoD for ‘Amendment to DPP-2013 Including Formulation of Policy Framework’. Efforts to indigenize defence procurement have been made by the MoD for more than two decades now but have yielded limited benefits as echoed in India’s enormous defence import budget. The preceding DPPs issued since 2002 are testimony to the fact that mere issue of a new DPP cannot guarantee success. India still imports 70 percent of its arms requirement and has the dubious distinction of being the World’s top arms importer (SIPRI report, 2015).

DPP 2016 is distinct in one important aspect from earlier versions wherein continuity of tenure and nurturing of human resources has been emphasized for the first time in the Project Management Units (PMU). An earnest implementation of this suggestion across the Acquisition process will be a game changer for achieving the ‘Make Defence Equipment in India (MDEI)’ program and will require laying out a detailed roadmap and action plan. In absence of a definite strategy, the proposal to consolidate the knowledge of human resources may remain in paper, severely impacting success of MDEI program. While sufficient energy and resources have been expended to constantly revise the DPP and generate expediency, transparency and probity in defence procurement, the subject of dealing effectively with lack of insufficient domain knowledge of personnel involved in procurement process has not been addressed. This paper attempts to deal with the issue.

In his paper ‘Operationalising DPP 2013’, Air Vice Marshal Manmohan Bahadur has said, “There is a major issue of non-availability of resident expertise in the acquisition process amongst the designated personnel, both civil and military. In the military there is no systematic cadre management of such human resource, thus, more often than not, an officer gets posted to the acquisition branch from any place, may be from a field area, without knowing anything about the intricacies of procurement. A similar situation is prevalent in the MoD, where inter-ministerial transfers are governed by career progression imperatives rather than by the yardstick of domain expertise”¹.

Given that the provision of logistics support for our armed forces typically represents well in excess of 50 per cent of the defence budget, the relative absence of skilled human resources in defence procurement, ruefully highlights the lack of Human Resources Development (HRD) culture in the country. Will DPP 2016 achieve self-reliance in the defence sector by improving the defence acquisition process? Well it can, if the available skilled human resources are reorganized and the execution of task of consolidation of human skills in defence procurement which has not yet begun in earnest is given highest priority.

What can be done differently by the government this time to achieve the aim of DPP 2016? This paper attempts to present a framework for realizing indigenization by reorganizing, redirecting and rationalizing the existing trained and motivated human resources in the defence services and MoD without raising any new establishments. The paper draws wisdom, expertise and contents heavily from the CoE report and DPP 2016. What has been added is a practicing defence logistician’s perspective and suggestions that will enable actual implementation of the intentions of the committee and DPP 2016 for realizing the MDEI program. To begin, let us dwell into the aim of DPP and the MDEI framework as elucidated in DPP 2016 and CoE report to understand the magnitude and complexity of task envisaged for the Human Resources (HR) involved in the process.

AIM of DPP 2016

The primary aim of DPP is to provide requisite defence materiel to the armed forces in the desired quantities in desired time frame to enable them to perform their tasks efficiently. However, it must also pursue the long term goals of self-reliance in design, development and production of equipment required for defence to provide strategic depth. The procedure should embody the key ingredients of a fair, transparent, efficient and accountable system. It should build and foster trust among its constituents².

A MDEI policy for the defence sector should ideally aim to reverse the current imbalance between the import of defence materiel and its indigenous manufacture without adversely affecting the requirements, capability and preparedness of the user. Since all the indigenous capacity cannot be built overnight, a graduated approach needs to be taken starting with a conscious shift in favour of the Make in India category and significant increase in the indigenous content. At the same time to ensure that ‘Make in India’ concept does not become just ‘assemble in India’, it is necessary to develop the capability for design and development and capacities for manufacturing, as well as the ability to service, maintain and upgrade a given system.

The unequivocal emphasis placed by the government on ‘Make in India’ concept, brings the defence sector at the cusp of an unprecedented opportunity for the Indian defence industry and the international players in the field. India’s rise as an economic power, her requirements of defence preparedness and her vibrant industrial base has the potential to convert ‘Make Defence Equipment in India (MDEI)’ program into a reality with its spin off in other sectors as well. The responsibility to enable and strengthen this process and help create an eco-system where design, R&D, manufacturing, maintenance, upgrade and export capabilities thrive, lies on the shoulders of HR under MoD. However it must be noted that the military and civil acquisition cultures are different as they are associated with non-profit and profit-related objectives respectively which represent a significant management challenge to balance. A successful resolution of this conflict is the key to indigenization and delivery of logistics support over the many decades after the platform or equipment has been successfully introduced into service.

Critical Tasks Envisaged Under DPP 2016 and CoE Report

The DPP has a clear objective to create conditions conducive for the private industry to take an active role in MDEI program, to enhance the potential of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) in indigenization and broaden the defence Research & Development (R&D) base of the country. It goes into details to the extent of outlining processes for setting up of test facilities for qualification of defence equipment (in the interim recommending use of Test facilities of Quality Assurance (QA) organisations and Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) by private industry), user trial evaluation for equipment and systems developed by private industry, incentives for the private defence industry for enhancing R & D spend and exports promotion and skill development at all levels.

Single Window Approval for Vendors. One of the problems faced by the private industry, particularly the MSMEs, is the absence of a one stop shop for information and facilitation in MoD. The creation of industry facilitation desk will give the prospective participants adequate support to review and enhance their capabilities in areas of their competence, if necessary by forging collaborations with foreign Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs). The ‘single window system’ will help the aspiring vendors in clearance of project proposals to meet the regulatory and compliance requirements. This would be done by maintaining two way communications with private industry through regular interaction, information exchange and facilitation in areas of licensing, test facilities and discharge of offsets. A routine matter like delay in payment for invoices rendered can become an extremely frustrating exercise and can be particularly debilitating for MSMEs.

Facilitating Use of Trial Venues of Defence Services. The area of field evaluation trials has been identified as one of the most critical delay factors in the acquisition chain in DPP 2016. At present, services and DRDO have complete control on the trial avenues with no obligation to private industry. Formal procedure and processes need to be put in place to facilitate the private industry in this respect, on payment basis. A vibrant Defence Industrial Base must necessarily include large, medium and small scale industry enabling utilisation as well as consolidation of the national manufacturing base. Fostering a constructive, long term partnership is a strategic imperative to minimise dependence on foreign vendors. Larger and sustained production volume of any system leads to optimisation of cost as well as improved production efficiency. The MoD departments or any integrator for that matter must work together to achieve the MDEI objective.

Vendor Selection. Transparent selection procedures would be set in place for selecting strategic and development partners. Participating industrial entities thereafter need to be integrated into a system which requires long term relationships (defence materiel life span can last 30 to 40 years) for maintenance, repair, overhaul, product support, upgrades and follow on purchases. A robust vendor rating system needs to be put in place and frequent changes in vendors discouraged since the order quantities are limited and there being only one buyer, the induction of a new vendor in an established supply chain can only be done at the cost of the one already within it. Time is also expended in certifying new vendors and undertaking quality checks of their products.

Accessibility of Acquisition Departments in High Security Zones. The Committee of Experts (CoE) highlighted another genuine difficulty of the industry in accessing the various offices in MoD, being located in a defence security zone. Personnel in the organisation work cheek and jowl with colleagues who deal with very sensitive matters and the mindset is one of secrecy and great caution. This ‘sense’ percolates to the procurement personnel who are wary of meeting with people ‘outside the system’. A change in the location where vendors don’t feel harassed to obtain security clearance to interact with officials will send a clear message about the government’s honest intentions as well as actions to implement MDEI program. The vendors are least enthused to visit even lower formations and units due to high handed attitude displayed at the gates for security checks. There is a requirement to sensitize governance to such an extent that vendors feel welcome and not dependent upon its largesse. After all it’s a mutually beneficial contract, business and partnership. This is not to say that security procedures and probity would be given the go by.

Data Sharing. The scope and magnitude of tasks envisaged under the DPP is vast and complex. The Indian private industry’s participation in defence sector is in its early stages and it needs time to understand, assess, make a suitable business case and respond to meet the specific capability requirement of the services. It is therefore considered essential that the requirements of specific equipment, system and platforms or their upgrades are shared with the industry at stages of preparation of the Technology Perspective Capability Roadmap (TPCR), development of Services Qualitative Requirements (SQRs) and fielding the five year Services Capital Acquisition Plans (SCAP). The private sector has to be accorded a level playing field and a data centre must be established under the aegis of ‘digital India’ manned by dedicated and responsible staff. Such a data centre would cater to the needs of all the stake holders and provide a digital meeting place which by itself is a herculean task but needs to be attended to expeditiously. The procurement procedure must reduce bottlenecks and time lines. Data on concepts such as Life Cycle Costing (LCC) and Performance Based Logistics (PBL), under which the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) is paid to provide an outcome such as the operational availability of a particular platform or piece of equipment, need to be shared.

A Case for Formation of an Acquisition Department (AD) for Defence Procurement in MoD

One primary impediment to implementation of DPP in the past has been deficiency in domain knowledge of personnel dealing in defence procurement. It is a truism that the officials, whether they are in Ministry of Defence (MoD) or in Services HQ, are not trained to deal with the intricacies of defence procurement. Their expertise is built only through their own adaptability in related appointments³.

In the existing system the personnel learn the nuances of defence procurement on the job after being posted there. The postings are generally for a period of three to four years and thereafter a replacement is posted in who may also be alien to the procurement procedures at the center. The learning and experience gained by the outgoing person gets dissipated immediately as he is mostly sent to perform an entirely different task. Frequent rotation of personnel causes frequent snapping of links and inadequate maintenance of historical database leading to difficulty in benchmarking of costs that is vital for procurement of equipment. Due to lack of continuity, policies and guidelines are being regularly altered on the basis of individual assessments of the nation’s need for armed forces⁴. The procurement projects also keep getting varying degree of importance that ultimately causes either delays or a dead end. We have right people available but their placement has been flawed.

Therefore, it is recommended that the organisation provides opportunity to manpower gaining experience and interest in procurement departments to continue working there and not dissipate this advantage to meet other perceived and superficial requirements of tenure and rank based posting policies. A competent team will gain in confidence. Once a base is created, the many tasks envisaged under DPP 2016 like applying single window clearance concepts in defence procurement can begin. The knowledgeable team will effectively handle the Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM) and industry bodies by virtue of domain knowledge resulting in transparency and probity in defence procurement.

In USA, through the ‘Congress mandate’, the government maintains a base level of 1,45,000 skilled work force for dealing with the defence deals and the UK has 6000 personnel trained for procurement. In the absence of an exclusive defence acquisition organisation in India, a number of committees on acquisition reforms as well as the CoE have recommended establishment of similar procurement organisations. However, in the Indian context, even permanency in postings policy has not been successful as experienced from the performance of the DRDO, Defence Public Sector Units (DPSUs) and the Armed Forces Civilian Employees (AFCE) who number over 12,000 under the office of the Joint Secretary (E/CAO), MoD.

A beginning has been made to address the personnel management issues in DPP 2016 wherein MoD has to establish Project Management Units (PMU) that will be headed by two star rank officers or equivalent and staffed appropriately with professionals having adequate knowledge and experience on projects under ‘Make’ procedure. The Head, under each service headquarter, will have a tenure of three years and the staff positioned in PMUs shall have longer tenures to ensure continuity during execution of projects. The PMUs can also hire expert practitioners from domains such as finance, legal and technology, from public and private sectors. This is the most radical step taken by the government wherein availability and need for consolidation of in-house expertise has been acknowledged and that should lead to formation of an Acquisition Department in the process. To overcome the skill deficit the CoE also made recommendations for setting up a defence manufacturing sector skill council, initiating a joint MoD and industry sponsored internship programme, a university programme for military engineering, skill development through the offset route and setting up of tool rooms around defence industry clusters for India.

The constitution of the Defence Acquisition Wing and decision making Boards which resulted out of earlier DPP revisions reflected a deep desire to bring about greater synergy in procurement but have been unable to reduce imports by India. Even the CoE’s belief that greater integration of Services within the MoD has taken place after the series of initiatives taken as a result of the recommendations of the Group of Ministers in 2002 is factually an over assessment. The best and oldest democracies in the world have retained firm civilian control over their armed forces not by isolating them but by integrating them within the central edifice of government and involving them in national security decision making process. The feedback from the Services and industry reflects that the overall procurement process from RFP to Signing of Contract is still very prolonged, owing to impediments attributable to delays in technical and field evaluation, resolution of complaints and rigidity of adherence to SQRs. The process delays deprive the Services from acquiring the envisaged capability as per schedule and also enhance the risk to the industry in terms of cost of maintaining idle capacity and manpower. On the positive side, the industry remains very enthusiastic about their participation in defence sector given the preferred categorisation in favour of Buy (Indian) and Buy & Make (Indian).

The AD may establish an Integrated Acquisition Management (IAM) model that involves taking a holistic systems approach of equipment management from “womb to tomb”. IAM includes integration at the inter services and national level. IAM guides in developing material and a support strategy that optimizes functional support, leverages existing resources, and guides the system engineering process to quantify and lower life cycle cost and decrease the logistics foot prints, making the system easier to support.

The statement made by General V P Malik during Kargil war that ‘’we will fight with whatever we have’’ summarizes the logistics preparedness and extent of IAM existing in our armed forces. In absence of IAM, in a case, Oxygen-cum-Communication Masks worn below the helmet by the pilots of the Air Force and Army Aviation were procured independently by the two Services. The Army procured the Mask ex-import at four times the cost at which it was procured by the Air Force indigenously. Similarly, Sniper Rifle for Special Forces was obtained by the Army and Air Force independently, which resulted in avoidable excess expenditure"⁵. In 2003, the Army took almost a year to evaluate Underwater Diving Equipment while the same had been acquired by the Navy much earlier in 1999⁶. Such dichotomies are a result of lack of a central authority that coordinates the activities of various entities making up an acquisition and supply network leading to a situation whereby each is responsible for arranging and managing a contract in isolation.

Only a dedicated, empowered and exclusive Acquisition Department can understand the nuances of procurement process in Defence as highlighted in the preceding paragraphs. However, the establishment of a new framework for Acquisition Department as recommended by the CoE may take long time and efforts and success still may remain elusive. In the Indian work culture context, it is considered that creation of a new specialized Defence Acquisition structure in MoD may not give desirable benefits and we may end up with creating another set up for parking additional idle HR. A study of existing structures in other countries would be certainly beneficial but we will have to design our own distinctive AD organisation by reconfiguring the existing human resources through an internal mechanism. When the AD is staffed with experienced and willing people available in-house the organisation will be bestowed with the benefits of experience gained by them during line function.

We do have formal institutions of training for workforce at induction level and throughout their career, which have trained people with requisite skills in diverse fields of technology, trial procedures, commercial negotiations and legal issues in contractual matters, estimation of costs, financing structures, project management and data analysis. But frequent rotation of personnel in Departments of MoD disrupts continuity and communications required for nurturing specialization in procurement. What is required is an empowered and skilled HR group that would take informed decisions. In the existing set up a temporary executive doesn’t feel comfortable to even take decisions on even minor deviations from SQRs at technical or field evaluation stages, thus setting the acquisition clock back by many years. This leads to an oft repeated criticism that such entities work in their own silos, leading to conflicts and delays. In absence of continuity of personnel in acquisition departments in MoD, many decisions have at times adversely impacted defence procurement. Last year the MoD had to retract one of its orders on revision of financial powers when the procurement became extremely difficult even for routine supplies. According to MoD spokesperson, “This was required in view of the demand of the services for restoring inherent powers since it was creating problems in their day-to-day functioning and showing up in low expenditure trend.”⁷

Roadmap for Inducting Skilled Human Resources in Acquisition Department

The importance of human resources in the defence procurement has been adequately covered in the CoE report, according to which defence production process must be built on robust full spectrum capable human resources ranging from the research to the operation level. From the inputs it is apparent that India at present does not have a structured framework and a robust system to prepare its human resources (HR) to address all issues connected with building and sustaining defence systems⁸.

Actually, the impasse of non-availability of trained manpower is quite easy to fix as MoD personnel are experienced and well motivated to learn new skills. Once a person gets posted to a procurement related appointment he/she acquires adequate on the job training and experience. What is lacking is consolidation of the domain knowledge and work experience gained in the procurement function due to posting out of staff after a limited tenure based on a rigid belief that rotation of personnel is necessary for career progression and service requirement even at the cost of the primary task for which he is employed.

The CoE has stressed on requirement of a greater convergence between the departments in MoD that can be achieved by consolidating and enhancing the existing capacities and core competencies of HR available under the Departments of Defence (DoD). The procurement executive tasked to execute MDEI, in an efficient and timely manner, must have in house professional expertise in provisioning and procurement disciplines, comprehend complex procedures, work in harmony, and have continuity of tenure and the ability to obtain outside professional advice when needed. He should be subjected to capability assessments from time to time.

There is deficiency in core domain knowledge because no one organisation or person ever has taken a long term ownership in MoD and the defence sector. But who is going to be responsible for taking the ownership for execution? Raksha Mantri (RM)? Yes, but thereafter who else in a frequently rotational appointments policy. Whenever a new RM takes over the ownership, he may not find a competent team to support him. By the time he gets a fair understanding of the organisation someone else in his team may be changing places because similar transition is happening in the lower hierarchy! There is utmost need of listing and addressing the HR issues, where the real bottlenecks and red tape occurs.

To implement the suggestion an institutional mechanism will have to be created under the top leadership to curb the home biases and turf wars. A reliable team under the RM may be formed for implementation of the new Human Resource (HR) policy to achieve the aims of DPP 2016. The Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) Headquarter (HQ) can be the nodal agency. HQ IDS is the nominated nodal agency for jointmanship in MoD which integrates policy, doctrine, war fighting and procurement. It is an institutional framework for higher defence management and functions as principal arm and secretariat to the Chiefs of Staff committee and has also been involved in discussions to simplify the acquisition process.

Sufficient organisational structure exists in IDS but it too lacks the domain knowledge in procurement due the similar constraints of continuity, lack of attitude for collaborative functioning and authority that has stymied the implementation of DPP. A competent team when formed can establish a cell for imparting education and training in defense procurement. Similar model will have to be replicated by each service HQ for meeting their requirements. The team will be focused on directing and regulating the placement of right people for the right job. A domain knowledge qualified, confident and strong team can bring in the benefits of synergy between multiple agencies involved in defence procurement. It would be sad if we become slaves to the procedures and systems to the extent that indigenization and DPP 2016 become casualties.

However it must be realized that one of the causes outlined in most case studies is the pitfall in implementation process. Poor implementation has always been the bane of Indian Administration and if we are able to overcome this drawback with requisite determination and honesty of purpose, there could be a ray of hope for the services⁹. Indians have not been found wanting in promulgating perfect policies. Very often, new policies get made the moment a new Commander is appointed but implementation has always been tardy. That’s because execution is a different ball game and requires in depth understanding of policies, domain knowledge and whole hearted participation from people. Unless people are well trained and confident, even good policies will not produce the desired results.

Nurturing Human Resources for Acquisition

The existing acquisition structure involving Service HQs, Acquisition, Technical and Financial Managers all working under the Director General Acquisition where the final decision is taken in a hierarchical manner having defined roles for the Defence Secretary, RM and the Cabinet Committee on Security at the apex, is fine as on now. However what is required is strengthening the organisations by inducting the heads in the aforesaid structure from in-house HR. Care should be taken to ensure that enough talent is nurtured in a healthy HR environment in MoD departments. This should be possible by inviting people to join the AD organisation and giving them continuity of tenures to develop domain knowledge in their field of specialization. Availability of empowered HR can also be accomplished by organisations when they are given a measure of autonomy and flexibility to devise their own procedures for activities that would enable them to better perform their allocated functions. Both the Departments of Atomic Energy and Space have benefited immensely from such dispensations.

In place of the multiple systems that exist today, MoD may plan to standardise on a single best of each solution (best of breed) HR platform. "Best of Breed" is the strategy of selecting the best product of each type (and integrating them yourself), rather than selecting one large integrated solution from a single vendor. A single platform that natively integrates various HR application processes and data virtually eliminates the need for manual and costly systems integration as the processes and underlying technology are pre-integrated to help in better internal and inter departmental talent mobility, improved ability to quickly respond to changing business needs and better workforce alignment to overall strategy.

In the existing system the people appointed for working in the acquisition directorates are put through some training as soon as they assume their appointment. The learning centers like Defence Services Staff College (DSSC), College of Defence Management (CDM) and National Defence College (NDC) too could introduce the subject of capital acquisition in their curriculum. Each Department under MoD also has their respective Material Management Institutes, imparting exhaustive training on Acquisition process. But the knowledge and experience dissipates as soon due to frequent rotation of personnel on the job. Precious time is lost in the process and the acquisition cycle gets sluggish or collapses.

The CoE expects that when Indian National Defence University (INDU) becomes functional, training and research will get requisite attention. The INDU proposal is meant to augment existing military education and provide the intellectual underpinnings for ‘jointness’ among the Departments of MoD and that requires new ways of thinking and building networks of trust that reach across narrow bureaucratic and service silos. The draft bill for the proposed INDU has been recently placed in the public domain. While the intent to seek comments is a good sign, the draft bill is a stark illustration of deeper infirmities in thinking about both national security and higher education¹⁰. Unless we focus on core issues we are likely to get overwhelmed by peripheral issues like what kind of campus or infrastructure would it entail or who would be the president of the university or what would be the share of the MoD Departments in the organisational structure¹¹?

To create an institute of ‘national importance’ the government should invite the few who by interest and hard work develop some understanding of Acquisition process but may have been posted out as if to emphasise that expertise is a dangerous thing. INDU must make conscious efforts to learn about best practices in professional military education from other countries. Unless these steps are taken, the INDU will become another costly retirement home and another babudom masquerading as deep thinking, which would defeat the entire purpose of this endeavor¹².

Change in Mindset

The CoE report reflects a need for mindset change in MoD to bring transparency in defence procurement process, a critical component of Defence Logistics. ‘Logistics’ embraces a significantly broad spectrum of acquisition, support and disposal challenges besides the storage and physical movement of material (and its associated information)¹³.

It is important to understand the mindset of people who form the backbone of an organisation. In India older and more senior people expect their juniors to show deference in body language in allowing their superiors to initiate discussions and in listening attentively without interruption or revealing any sign of impatience. Indians, among themselves, are incredibly conscious of their social status and would have fought off very stiff competition to get there¹⁴. These constraints aggravated by Alice in Wonderland prioritization, make it difficult for the Indian system to advance more than a handful of policy priorities in parallel. Risk aversion is a guiding principle. By adopting best management practices developed in the west while keeping the Indian sensibilities in mind a beginning can be made.

Indians tolerate corrupt individuals rather than correct them and anticipate out of turn rewards¹⁵. The work environment in the government organisations discourages people to take initiative and just by being compliant one can continue to earn his salary and promotion due to which ownership of tasks and lack of expertise in job have become the main casualties. Due to our historical practice of the caste system that believes that all men are not equal a stigma is attached to chores like cleaning and low wage jobs. Focusing on HR in Defence Logistics, the committee emphasized that an environment should be built in which decisions can be taken with courage. Courageous acts are based on trust, and over the years trust has taken a beating. It is only with trust that results will be achieved. It is necessary to address the dilemma of those who are trained and prepared to take decisions in the overall interests of the defence preparedness of the country, but who would not be prepared to do so in an atmosphere vitiated by allegations of corruption wherein everyone in the hierarchy is looked at with suspicion. Measures of confidence building need to be institutionalized. The CoE underlines the need to alter the management structures of organisations under DoD, imbibing a ‘hand holding and nurturing’ DNA for procurement executive rather than a ‘hands off’ approach where meetings with industry personnel are looked upon with suspicion.

Importance of Research

The Cambridge dictionary defines research as ‘a detailed study of a subject, especially in order to discover (new) information or reach a (new) understanding’. There is a requirement for all the faculties involved from existing institutions and think tanks to interact and conduct seminars regularly on Acquisition policy. Our think tanks and research institutes like Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA), United Services Institute (USI), Centers for Air Power, Land, Maritime and Joint Studies (CAPS, CLAWS, NMF, CENJOWS) are involved in developing curriculum and undertaking case studies on policy analysis but very few researchers are working on historical and contemporary issues to improve the acquisition system. Also most researchers have little or limited line exposure to this complex activity which limits their work.

Utilization of Skilled Personnel Seeking Premature Release from Service into Acquisition Department

In March last year, answering a query raised in the Rajya Sabha, Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar said that the armed forces faced a shortage of over 11,000 officers. One primary reason of shortage is due to the fact that a large number of officers are seeking pre mature release from the services. For over three years now, one officer from India's defence forces has quit each day¹⁶.

Career growth means different things to different people. For some, promotion within the organisation means much, for others it may mean accepting a new assignment elsewhere or achieving the larger goal in life, like fulfilling family objectives. For them career mobility is not always about moving up and are happy with their current position and may deliberately forego promotions to meet personal needs¹⁷. A large number of service personnel seek premature release from the services at a very young age to meet their family commitments that can’t be fulfilled due to frequent postings to distant and difficult places and also because of its strict hierarchical and pyramidal structure. Most possess vast experience and welcome assignments of responsibility, but at their place of convenience and excel in them. Conscious of their self respect, they put in extra effort to ensure that no fingers are ever raised at their commitment and dedication. They bring with them tremendous knowledge and experience required by the organisation. The AD must tap and invite such people having rich experience in the acquisition process and who would like to continue in the job. Besides reducing attrition in the services, this will encourage people to follow their interests and take advantage of the growing opportunities in the acquisition process and thus contribute meaningfully for the growth of the defence services.

Integrated Human Resources System (IHRS) for the MoD

It is fair to assume that in the acquisition process dealing with a range of diverse and complex issues the decision making must be based on performance and measurable outcomes and not on beliefs, opinions, or arbitrary preferences. In the defence services, the personnel biases are removed by virtue of well established embedded training program and most men are motivated, knowledgeable and disciplined. The need of the hour is to ensure that these well trained personnel are integrated with an efficient acquisition system for battle readiness and economy of effort and that can be achieved by an Integrated Acquisition and Human Resources System (IAHRS).

Skill, knowledge, abilities and experience are only useful when right man is positioned at the right place. Best of IAM practices will not be executed if HR is not competent. IHRS will look for versatile talent to groom leadership potential. It is the man behind the machine who will play the dominant role in any future battle and integrate IAM with IHRS, when he is well trained, motivated and nurtured. The concept of ‘Management of Defence by Committees’ has to be dropped.

The Integrated Human Resource System (IHRS) includes functions of Human Resource Management (HRM) and Human Resource Development (HRD). The HRM includes traditional functions of personnel and administration such as personnel data file, job evaluation, compensation, benefits, security, safety and health. It also has an important focus on recruitment, staffing, performance appraisal, promotions and training. The aim of HRD on the other hand is to create a climate that enables every person to discover, develop and use his or her capabilities to the fullest extent in order to further both individual and organisational goals. It includes, planning of organisational structures to respond to strategic imperatives, building of organisational culture and monitoring of personnel attitudes and developing inter personnel communication and participation of individuals in management. HRD goes much beyond the Personnel function, which is usually confined to job administration like postings. Due to changing values emphasis has shifted to trust, openness and exploration which are looked after by HRD. HRD tries to find out the strengths existing in an organisation, and then consolidates and strengthens them. HRD places premium on the dignity and the potential of the people and is the answer to problems of waning loyalty and declining commitment.

The culmination of all HRD effort is to foster a climate conducive to self- development. One of the benefits that could be expected is to get people off their defensive postures, to be less uptight and more open to criticism because they have arrived at an honest estimation of their self through introspection. Of course it doesn’t mean that HRD is superior because it is proactive, and Personnel function is inferior being reactive. Both are complementary to each other. HRD’s role will be to create an environment that facilitates idea generation and execution. It should harness the individual’s brilliance within the organisational framework, or else he will move out to start his own venture as supported from the fact that a large number of skilled personnel are seeking premature release from the defence services.

Conclusion

A promising course of action for realizing the MDEI program and ‘self-reliance’ in defence industry which doesn’t even require any additional spending or raising of a new establishment has been suggested here based on the expertise and long work experience in the logistics field in defence services. The paper brings out a comprehensive road map that recommends a complete understanding of the aim and critical tasks envisaged under DPP 2016, formation of an Acquisition Department and inducting skilled and motivated human resources in the Department by first identifying, nurturing and integrating the available personnel in the MoD.

The recent policies of the government like Make in India, Skill India and Digital India are good initiatives to create a defence industrial base that India can be proud of. However it will require a shift in the organisational culture and reorientation to work which cannot be achieved without an empowered, skilled and confident human resources. Only an experienced, motivated and regulated team can understand and resolve the nuances of defence procurement and the much-touted offsets policy. Indigenization can get wings when the importance of domain knowledge in acquisition process is recognized and human resources are nurtured.

Endnotes:

1. AVM Manmohan Bahadur, Operationalising DPP 2013
2. Chapter 1, DPP 2016
3. Gen N C Vij, Unravelling DPP 2013
4. Brig Vinod Anand, in his paper, Private Sector as Partner in Attaining Self-Reliance
5. Lt Gen (Dr) V K Saxena, DPP 2016- An Enabler not a Show Stopper
6. Brig Vinod Anand, Integrating the Indian Military:Retrospect and Prospect, Journal of Defence Studies, IDSA
7. The Indian Express 25 December 2015
8. Para 6.4.02 of Committee of Experts report for Amendment To DPP-2013 Including Formulation of Policy Framework
9. Gen N C Vij, Unravelling DPP 2013
10. Devesh Kapur and Anit Mukherjee in an article on INDU in “The Hindu”
11. Arjun Subramanium in his article ‘A place of study for India’s scholar-soldiers”
12. Ibid ix
13. Defence logistics: an important research field in need of researchers; Article in International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management · March 2013
14. Charles Ashcroft, Air and Naval Adviser UK
15. Live Mint article, 14 October 2016
16. Yogesh Kumar, News Information Service, Times of India, 12 Aug 2015
17. Lt Col Yogesh Nair, USI Journal, Vol CXL, No 582, 2010.