Pakistan’s diplomatic plate is full. The skill of its leadership and diplomats is being tested as they negotiate an unfolding regional situation. There are at least four key external issues that require immediate attention: to keep the Indo-Pak peace initiative on track in the wake of the terrorist attack on the Pathankot air base; the Afghan peace talks; the break-down in relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran that could have sectarian implications in Pakistan and making sure that the ‘all-weather’ friend China does not get too disillusioned with the Punjab versus other provinces bickering on the $46 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.

Of these, the Saudi-Iran tensions are clearly the most perilous for Pakistan, due to both their domestic and external ramifications. Pakistan must reconcile an established, though dependent, relationship with Saudi Arabia with a potential Saudi-initiated anti-Shia alliance that could spark a domestic sectarian conflagration. Not surprisingly, PM Nawaz Sharif embarked on a visit to Riyadh and Tehran on January 19-20, 2016 on a mediatory role.

Saudi Coalition

Though Saudi Arabia had announced a 34-nation coalition in mid-December 2015 to fight terrorism (read Iran), tensions between the Saudi Arabia and Iran peaked in early January 2016 after the former executed a prominent Shia cleric Nimr al Nimr on terrorism charges, a move that was widely condemned. Mobs stormed the Saudi Embassy in Tehran and set it on fire; Saudi Arabia and some Gulf countries promptly cut off diplomatic ties, flights and trade with Tehran and Saudi jets bombed the Iranian embassy in Yemen on January 7th. While escalating hostilities are unlikely, tensions between the two have ramifications for the entire Islamic world.

Pakistan was caught off-guard by Saudi Arabia’ unilateral announcement of its participation in the coalition, reflected in the contradictory statements made by the foreign secretary and advisor on foreign policy. Just like the Saudis’ April 2015 unilateral announcement of an anti-Yemen coalition, this time too the Saudis’ surprise unilateral announcement of Pakistan’s inclusion in the 34-member coalition was embarrassing. Pakistan had to awkwardly backtrack and agree to be part of the coalition, after having first expressed ignorance about it.

Seeking to co-opt Pakistan in its camp, Riyadh has ratcheted up pressure for Pakistan’s military involvement in its alliance. This is borne out by the quick succession of escalatory level of visits by Saudi leaders like Assistant Defence Minister Muhammad Bin Abdullah Al-Ayish, followed by Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir and finally Defence Minister and Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to Islamabad.

Though the objectives of the alliance are vague, Pakistan has sought to justify its inclusion stating that the coalition is directed against terrorism and its role would be limited to providing training, capacity building and counter-insurgency help. Pakistan clarified that while it would defend the territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia (knowing that Saudi Arabia does not face a physical threat), no troops would be deployed and neither would Pakistan become part of any action directed against a specific country.

Details of how the objectives would be achieved are also vague : Through war? Regime changes? Intelligence operations? Political intervention? With Iran supporting the government of President Bashar al-Assad any ‘intervention’ by Pakistan at the behest of Saudi Arabia will have serious blowback consequences.

Moreover, terrorism itself has not been defined by Saudi Arabia and neither has ISIS been specifically named. If anything, the Saudis have ignored the activities of ISIS in Syria and Iraq due to their attempts to remove Bashar al-Assad in the former and due to their anathema towards the Shia regime in the latter.

However, the exclusion of Iran, Syria and Iraq from the coalition (despite ISIS being most active in the last two countries) and a joint operations center being based in Riyadh “to coordinate and support military operations” clearly indicates sectarian undertones of the coalition. Pakistan’s support for the ‘additional measures’ that Saudi Arabia is considering could further aggravate the sectarian divide within Pakistan.

Pak Dilemma & Policy

Since the time of Zia ul Haq, Saudi Arabia and Iran have waged a proxy war by creating and funding ideological groups, many of whom have been armed, within Pakistan. According to a recent report, there are 285 foreign-funded madrassas in Pakistan of which one-third or 95 were funded by Iran and two thirds or 195 by Saudi Arabia. Creation of such groups has led to frequent violent sectarian clashes, now deemed a Shia genocide by many observers in Pakistan. In this fragile sectarian situation, Pakistan cannot afford to be seen taking sides between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Sectarian issues apart, both Saudi Arabia and Iran have been critical to Pakistan’s well-being in the past and have even greater potential for the future. Saudi Arabia has historically bailed out Pakistan,whether with oil supplies or cash. In the wake of western sanctions after the 1998 nuclear tests, Saudi Arabia provided 50,000 barrels of oil per day to Pakistan for a year on deferred payment basis. Later, the outstanding payment was treated as a gift. Saudi Arabia is the largest market of Pakistani manpower worldwide; between 1.5-2 million Pakistanis worked in Saudi Arabia who remitted almost $5.6 billion in 2014. An additional $4.2 billion in remittances came from the United Arab Emirates, a close ally of Saudi Arabia and Pakistanis employed in other GCC countries sent remittances of $2.1 billion during the same period. These remittances keep the Pakistani economy afloat.

On the other hand, Iranian helicopters and pilots had helped Bhutto crush Baloch rebels in 1977. In the future, with the removal of US sanctions, Iran has the potential to become an energy partner for Pakistan via the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline as well as a transit point for Iranian gas. However, such prospects would be imperiled if Iran saw Pakistan edging closer to Saudi Arabia in an anti-Shia alliance; worse, it could well nudge its proxies in Pakistan.

Given the above, Pakistan has little option but to steer a neutral course between the two countries. Its effort at mediation to bridge the gap between Saudi Arabia and Iran is a reflection of this reality even though mediation between the two is indeed complicated.

However, Pakistan’s credibility with Iran is already stretched thin. Gone are the days when Pakistan’s first PM, Liaquat Ali Khan paid his maiden foreign visit to Tehran in May 1949. Apart from the frequent massacres of Shias in Pakistan, the Fauji Foundation had advertised Bahrain National Guard positions in Pakistan and around 2,500 exclusively Sunni soldiers were sent to Manama in 2011. As a result, Sunni Pakistanis constitute around one-third of the National Guard of Bahrain where local Shias are barely recruited to the army. Now that Islamabad has formally agreed to join the Saudi coalition that increasingly has Sunni overtones, it could further alienate Iran.

Then there is the personal factor- Nawaz Sharif owes his life and present-day career to the Saudi kingdom. This could potentially impact objective decision-making by him.

The jury is still out if Pakistan’s refusal to send troops to Saudi Arabia to fight the Houthi rebels in April 2015 has been forgotten temporarily and if Pakistan itself has forgotten the slight made by UAE’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Dr Anwar Mohammed Gargash. He had warned that Pakistan would have to pay a “heavy price” for taking an “ambiguous stand” on the issue and “the moment of truth distinguishes between the real ally and the ally of media and statements.”

For Pakistan, rebuffing Saudi Arabia a second time (after the Yemen rebuff) would have serious economic implications. If Saudi Arabia were to make it difficult for Pakistanis to find work in the region, or go a step ahead and start sending back Pakistanis, hundreds of thousands of workers would return to an economy that is unable to create jobs. Massive unemployment and unrest would follow, while a decline in remittances would create a foreign exchange and budgetary crisis.

Pakistan is also constrained by the fact that its armed forces are already fighting insurgencies in FATA, Balochistan and Karachi and deployed against India. Sparing troops to sustain Saudi ambitions could strain Pak army’s deployment plans within the country. This, however, is unlikely to impress the Saudis very much in case they start recalling old debts.

Thus, the key objectives for Pakistan in the Saudi-Iran face-off are to play the role of an objective mediator between Saudi Arabia and Iran; prevent both Saudi Arabia and Iran or their respective proxies to settle scores in Pakistan; and to ensure the continuity of economic benefits from both countries. As a result, Pakistan’s policy has been to extend bilateral support to Saudi Arabia and its territorial defence, avoid deployment of Pakistani troops against any other country as part of the Saudi coalition, provide intelligence and training support for counterterrorism efforts, and to play the role of a mediator.

Pak Mediation

To initiate the mediation effort, PM Nawaz Sharif accompanied by Army chief Raheel Sharif visited Riyadh and Tehran on January 19 and 20, 2016. From the initial reports it would appear that in Riyadh at least, the emphasis was on bilateral relations and the 34-nation ‘counter-terrorism alliance’. By the end of the Saudi leg of the visit, the mediation initiative seems to have been downgraded to ‘good offices’ for the resolution of the tensions between the two countries. The Pak statement said “Pakistan has always expressed its readiness to offer its good offices to brotherly Muslim countries for resolution of their differences through dialogue and reconciliation”.

While Saudi Arabia has been pressuring Pakistan to pick a side, Iran has expressed no public interest in Pakistan’s mediation effort. In an environment where the international sanctions against it have been lifted, Iran today has many more options and is likely to tread judiciously. The one concrete suggestion made by Nawaz was the appointment of ‘focal persons’ by the three countries, to try and defuse tensions and hosting a meeting between the leaders of Saudi Arabia and Iran in Islamabad. The outcome of such suggestions is unknown at present.

The key prerequisite for narrowing the differences between Iran and Saudi Arabia would have to be that both refrain from interference in the internal affairs of other countries, especially Syria and Iraq. For the sake of their regional stakes, however, neither is likely to do so at the present juncture. In any case, Pakistan is hardly in a position to suggest such a course of action, given its own historic record of interference in Afghanistan and India. An ‘honest broker’ has to be first of all honest and be seen to be so. Pakistan fails miserably on both counts. Hence, its efforts are not likely to be credible.

In fact, if anything, China acted with greater alacrity with Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Ming flying to both capitals urging them to calm down, show restraint and step up dialogue and consultations.

At best, due to pressures from quarters other than Pakistan, some progress like exploratory talks or even restoration of diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia could take place. If that happens, Pakistan could take some comfort in that the potential of a sectarian conflagration would have been averted and its economic stakes in both Saudi Arabia and Iran would have been preserved.

Till the next round.

The author is a former Special Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India.

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Published Date: 3^rd February 2016, Image Source: http://www.dawn.com
(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Vivekananda International Foundation)