The Taliban seized control of Kabul in August 2021, overthrowing the democratic government of Afghanistan. It has been three years since their rule, yet they have not gained international recognition. Many assessments have been made regarding how they will navigate their domestic and international policies even if they do not get recognition. There has also been extensive discussion about how the Taliban's new regime in Kabul will be able to sustain itself without diplomatic recognition. Surprisingly, the Taliban regime in Kabul has been able to sustain itself economically. However, they have been unable to fulfil the promises made in the Doha agreement regarding establishing an inclusive government and ensuring the rights of Afghan women and children. Still, many countries have not officially recognized the Taliban's rule in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, they have engaged with them at economic, political, and diplomatic levels.

Three Central Asian countries - Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan - share a direct border with Afghanistan, making them vulnerable to security threats stemming from the country's post-Taliban takeover. Each country has taken a different approach to engaging with the Taliban. Tajikistan, for example, has been vocal about its anti-Taliban stance and has refrained from political engagement. Tajikistan's tough stance can be attributed to its historical relations with the Taliban, the ethno-cultural connection with Ethnic Tajiks in Afghanistan, and being targeted by the Taliban regime. Nevertheless, Tajikistan has been supplying electricity to Afghanistan. In 2023, Tajikistan exported 2.7 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity, valued at $110.4 million, which was 5% higher than in 2022. It was also reported that the Taliban had cleared all of its energy debt to Tajikistan, and the agreement to supply electricity, which was to be renewed annually, was also renewed for 2024. ^[1] Despite this, Tajikistan has been expressing concerns about the presence of terrorist groups in northern Afghanistan in Badakhshan. Tajikistan is primarily concerned with ISIS-K and Jamaat Ansarullah. The latter operates from Afghanistan intending to overthrow the Tajik government and establish an Islamic emirate. ^[2]

Turkmenistan's relationship with the Taliban has been purely transactional. There have been a few skirmishes along the borders since the Taliban took over; however, trade between the two countries continued without interruption. Ashgabat has also been delivering electricity. The proposed Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline and the lapis lazuli corridor, which connects Afghanistan through Turkmenistan’s ports with Azerbaijan, Europe, and Russia, are the two most important projects that make Ashgabat's engagement with the Taliban obligatory. TAPI hopes to diversify Turkmen's gas exports, which are currently monopolized by China. However, even after nearly two decades, TAPI has failed to materialize due to instability in Afghanistan and the India-Pakistan dispute. Turkmenistan, being a lower riparian country, depends on Afghanistan for its water supply from the Amu Darya River. The Taliban's construction of a large canal to draw water from this river has raised significant concerns for Ashgabat. The Taliban administration has repeatedly stated that the canal would not disrupt the river water sharing with downstream countries. However, the basic techniques used in constructing the canal have already resulted in a significant amount of water being diverted from the Amu Darya River. Recently, there have been several delegation exchanges between Turkmenistan and the Taliban. The main agenda of the bilateral discussions has been centered on the following topics: security issues, water sharing, trade, and transport. Still, Ashgabat has not yet recognized the Taliban regime.

Uzbekistan has been notably proactive in engaging with the Taliban. Uzbek President Shawkat Mirziyoyev has consistently advocated for unfreezing Afghan assets and offering humanitarian assistance to the country. Since 2021, the Regional Humanitarian Logistics Hub in Termez, Uzbekistan has been operational. It has the infrastructure to provide a wide range of transport and logistics services and is located less than 2 km from the border of Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. This hub has been utilized by UN agencies and other international organizations as a logistics center to deliver humanitarian aid to Afghanistan.^[3]

Uzbekistan has been actively involved in promoting infrastructure development in Afghanistan. On July 18, 2023, an agreement was signed by Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan to facilitate the tripartite trans-Afghan railway project connecting the three countries. This railway line will be an extension of the already operating Hairatan-Mazar-e-Sharif railway line, which was built by Uzbekistan’s national rail company, Uzbekistan Temir Yullari (UTY). The 1,520 mm gauge single-track line starts from the freight terminal on the Afghan side of the Amu Darya River, runs through relatively easy terrain to the outskirts of Mazar-e-Sharif, and is connected via a bridge across the river to Termez, Uzbekistan. The line offers connections to the modern Uzbekistan rail system and is expected to have a significant economic impact, as nearly half of Afghanistan’s imports pass through Hairatan. The newly proposed rail line will connect Pakistan's Kurram border crossing at Kharlachi with Termez in southern Uzbekistan. The project is expected to be completed by the end of 2027, and by 2030, trains may be able to transport up to 15 million tons of cargo annually. However, despite high enthusiasm, there are fundamental issues in realizing this project, such as funding. ^[4]

In August of this year, a high-level Uzbek delegation led by Uzbek Prime Minister Abdulla Aripov visited Afghanistan. During the visit, trade and investment-related agreements worth USD 2.5 billion were signed between the two countries, showcasing Uzbekistan’s increasing bilateral relationship with the Taliban government. The bilateral trade turnover between Afghanistan and Uzbekistan was USD 461 million from January to June 2024. Both sides aim to increase this to USD 3 billion. ^[5]

The main point of conflict between Uzbekistan and the Taliban is the Qosh Tepa Canal. Uzbekistan heavily relies on water from the Amu Darya for irrigation. Despite numerous discussions with the Taliban regarding this issue, the Taliban's position has not changed. Engaging in discussions with the Taliban is almost impossible due to significant power struggles within the group, making it unclear who holds the decision-making authority in the regime. Uzbekistan understands that increased economic engagement with the Taliban is necessary to have some influence in altering their viewpoints. In this regard, the recent delegation of Uzbek PM Aripov is considered hugely important.

In an unprecedented move in August of this year, Kazakhstan, despite not sharing a direct border with Afghanistan, recognized the Taliban-appointed diplomat as Afghanistan's envoy within its territory. The Taliban diplomat Mohammad Rahman Rahmani now serves as the Chargé d’Affaires of the Afghan Embassy in Astana. Kazakhstan has become the third country to recognize a Taliban diplomat, following China and the UAE. In June of this year, Kazakhstan removed the Taliban from its list of terrorist organizations. Additionally, Astana has been working to strengthen its economic ties with Afghanistan. Bilateral trade in 2022 amounted to around USD 988 million but dropped to about USD 640 million in 2023. ^[6] Kazakhstan has also expressed interest in engaging in the development of the Trans-Afghan corridor. Kazakhstan's increased involvement in Afghanistan is the result of regional competition with Uzbekistan. Since the Uzbek president came to power, there has been indirect competition between the two countries to become the undisputed leader of the region.

Conclusion

Three years have passed since the Taliban took control of Afghanistan in August 2021. During this time, there has been increased interaction between the Taliban and its Central Asian neighbors, primarily involving trade, investments, and infrastructure development cooperation. The Central Asian countries understand the potential benefits and drawbacks of engaging with the Taliban. However, they recognize the need to carefully navigate this relationship, as they believe it is better to engage with the Taliban rather than isolate them, which could destabilize the region. Despite their engagement with the Taliban, none of the Central Asian nations have officially recognized the political authority of the Taliban regime. They continue to advocate for an inclusive Afghan government and human rights, particularly women's rights.

Endnotes

^[1] ‘Afghanistan clears electricity debts to Tajikistan’, EurasiaNet, Feb 5, 2024. https://eurasianet.org/afghanistan-clears-electricity-debts-to-tajikistan
^[2] Shaul Shay, ‘Afghanistan and The Terror Threat in Central Asia, Security Science Journal, Vol. 5 No. 1 (2024). http://www.securityscience.edu.rs/index.php/journal-security-science/article/view/137/91
^[3] Termez Cargo Center becomes international transport and logistics hub, The Tashkent Times,
2022-06-23. https://tashkenttimes.uz/national/9116-termez-cargo-center-becomes-international-transport-and-logistics-hub
^[4] Shanthie Mariet D’Souza, ‘The Cost of Uzbekistan’s ‘Pragmatic’ Taliban Policy, The Diplomat, July 22, 2023. https://thediplomat.com/2023/07/the-cost-of-uzbekistans-pragmatic-taliban-policy/
^[5] Catherine Putz, ‘Uzbekistan Forges Ahead, Deepening Relations With Taliban-ruled Afghanistan’, The Diplomat. August 21, 2024. https://thediplomat.com/2024/08/uzbekistan-forges-ahead-deepening-relations-with-taliban-ruled-afghanistan/
^[6] Bruce Pannier, ‘Central Asia in Focus: Kazakhstan Officially Accepts Credentials of Taliban Envoy’ , RFE/RL. August 27, 2024. https://about.rferl.org/article/central-asia-in-focus-kazakhstan-officially-accepts-credentials-of-taliban-envoy/

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