Although terrorism has yet to find a universally acceptable definition and continues to be contexed with insurgency and militancy, we in India go by a generic description. Terror is associated with acts of unbridled violence against established authority, intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for a political purpose and intent. There are no considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them. Translated to the earthiest explanation, terrorism differs from the less extremist terms such as insurgency and militancy primarily on the basis of the choice of targets; these include innocent civilians, women and children, and the properties destroyed therein. In terrorist violence there are no qualms about the nature of casualties; all are considered legitimate targets by terrorists. Soldiers on leave in home stations, unarmed policemen and even school buses with children. The series of attacks on theatres in Russia, including the latest one by the Islamic State Khorasan (ISK), leading to deaths of many civilians, is just another example.

In India, there have been several instances of political violence of a stand-alone nature but full-blown terror campaigns have primarily taken place in J&K, Punjab and various zones where attempts to push the radical, ideological and separatist agenda have been made. Much of this has been supported by Pakistan in the form of proxy war sponsoring the terrorists. The proxy war became a long-haul hybrid war which has been shaped by the existing environment, our vulnerabilities and the concept of counter terror operations. In earlier years there was a reluctance on the part of the government and the security agencies about terming the various acts of violence as terrorism. Separatist Sikh violence in Punjab and elsewhere was colloquially loosely termed as ‘Sikh militancy’ and only sometimes ‘Sikh terrorism’. It was during the Kargil war and the related violence witnessed in J&K that official orders to use the term ‘terrorism’ for all acts related to Pakistan sponsored proxy war were received. In view of the lack of universally acceptable clear-cut definitions of these terms, the approach towards Counter Insurgency (COIN) and Counter Terrorism (CT) remains blurred at most times. What's the difference between COIN and CT? Within this great debate, there are two schools of thought: counterterrorism, which mainly consists of an enemy centric approach of hard power precision strikes; and counterinsurgency, which consists of a combination of hard and soft power with a mostly population centric approach. No country abides by these definitions in the adoption of CT policy and India too follows a mix of the two in ratios as convenient to the existing environment.

What Existed in Terms of Policy Pre-2014?

CT policy of any nation will invariably be based upon its experience of handling the same in the past and the prevailing situation. Three distinct phases of terrorism were experienced by us in the past up to 2014, all sponsored by Pakistan: -

• First phase was in the Eighties with Sikh separatist terrorism, in Punjab, and sporadically elsewhere in North India, such as Delhi.
• Second was the J&K terrorist movement which commenced in the late Eighties within J&K and has continued till date in varying intensity, with different phases each having distinct characteristics. Being examined here, in this part is the period till 2014.
• Third phase (linked to the second) was again the period of the Nineties and the early 2000s where Pakistan sponsored terrorist activity in other parts of India. It largely terminated with the 26/11 (Mumbai terror attack). It included the attack on India’s Parliament on 13 Dec 2001.

In generic terms, to comprehend the nature of terror of those times, these three phases require a description of the basic characteristics.

The Eighties: Beginnings of the Indian Terror Scene

The North East witnessed the first of the movements in Assam. Terming it terrorist in nature could be debated by some but it had kinetic power and many times there was targeting of innocent ethnic minorities. The sponsorship was from abroad and terror networks of different kinds, from drugs to finances and overground workers (OGWs) gave it the colour of terrorism. The Army was drawn into the CT campaign (Op Rhino) but fought the same akin to any COIN situation.

Punjab was much more serious where political shenanigans played a major role. Religious minorities and some ethnically different people were mercilessly killed and there were running fights between the terrorists and the police forces. First for a short while in 1984-85 and then in 1990-92 the Indian Army was employed in CT role which again was mostly akin to COIN type operations. There were no specialized troops for CT. Conventional troops from all Arms performed these duties. With COIN in place, there was yet no doctrine for outreach and military civic action. The government, yet unaccustomed to the dynamics of terror, realized that tasking the Army in large scale precision targeting, such as its employment in Op Bluestar, was counterproductive. Pakistan shifted focus to J&K the moment first signs of people’s response to a carefully orchestrated campaign had begun. It abandoned Punjab, only to pick up cudgels for Sikh separatism only in recent times.

J&K: Terror as a Tool of Proxy War

Terror in J&K commenced with mass infiltration of foreign terrorists (FTs) and previously exfiltrated local youth who were trained in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Following was some of the major dynamics: -

• Targeting of Kashmiri Pandits to create fear in the environment and force mass exodus to Jammu.
• Religious indoctrination using the tenets of extremism and radical Islam.
• Taking over mosques from the moderate Sufi order. Replacement with Ahle Hadith clergy.
• Creating financial networks for easy transfer and movement of terror financing.
• Creation of a cadre of Over Ground Workers (OGWs) in cities and rural areas.
• Establishment of a network of lawyers (Bar Council), government servants, university teachers and other white-collar workers.
• Separatist organizations and OGW networks in every district and tehsil – to handle anti-government propaganda and later to manage street agitations and stone throwing.
• Terrorist intelligence networks to garner intelligence on movement of security forces (SF), identification and cultivation of vulnerable elements.
• Network of rabble rousers.
• Compromised Vyapar Mandals with sympathisers for separatism.
• Drugs and arms trafficking networks.
• IED manufacturing networks through IED doctors.
• Network of hideouts to house infiltrated FTs.
• At later stages – network of stone throwers.
• Media networks. Over 30 English newspapers were developed for publishing a plethora of ongoing propaganda.
• Radio communication network for coordination of various activities. This was later converted to mobile internet networks making it much easier for them to function.

Terror tactics underwent frequent change in the hinterland, with some of the following progressive characteristics: -

• Initially, direct confrontation with Indian SF was the order of the day. As terrorists suffered casualties the strength of contacts reduced.
• vFrom 1996 only Pakistani and Kashmiri terrorists were encountered. The pipeline of other foreign terrorists (FTs) dried up. IEDs proliferated and continued till 2008 when they too dried up.
• Elections were the prime target, to prevent people’s participation in India’s democracy.
• From 1999, commenced the ‘fedayeen period’; attempts to penetrate SF establishments with two/three-man squads, with deception. This was quite distinct from suicide bombing. It was a virtual suicide act but was classified as ‘suicide terror’, where a few terrorists attempted to get into the facilities and rest camps of the Army, BSF and the J&K Police (JKP).
• From 2006, a series of ambushes of buses and vehicles of SF.
• Criminal actions against soldiers on leave and unarmed policemen; grenade throwing at public places also became rife.
• Infiltration continued but at much lower levels after 2004, after the fence was approved and executed. It was the source of leadership provided mainly by FTs. It also helped sustain the strength of FTs and continued to intimidate the Army at the LoC through combined teams of terrorists and Pakistan Special Forces personnel, called Border Action Teams (BATs). These teams attempted to cause casualties on our patrols at the LoC.
• A source for the continued supply of youth to the anti-India sentiment groups in Kashmir has been local recruitment, made much easier by the then prevailing method of terrorist funerals with ceremony, pomp and show.
• From 2008 onwards a new phenomenon emerged just as the strength of FTs dwindled due to the degree of difficulty to infiltrate because of the LoC Fence.
• An unarmed movement on the streets involving stone throwing and intimidation of SF commenced in mid-2008. It was termed ‘agitational terrorism’ and had its own dynamics borrowed from the famous American scholar Gene Sharp’s seminal book – “From Dictatorship to Democracy”.
• The agitational terror continued for three years, 2008-10 and was shelved in 2011 by the separatists, rabble rousers, OGWs and religious ideologues in the form of the Jamaat-e-Islami (J&K). All other terrorist and CT actions continued as before, including large scale attempts at infiltration which were mostly neutralized.

Terrorist Activities Outside J&K and Punjab

Attempts to spread the footprint of terrorism outside Punjab and J&K, were rife. The Punjab terror groups could spread into Haryana, parts of Delhi and portions of UP. Nothing substantial was achieved except a negative perception which eroded once the J&K issue became the main terrorist zone. The J&K terrorists had the advantage of more extensive networks within the rest of India. Through the period after 1992 when the Babri Masjid was destroyed, a loose cooperation between the Pakistan sponsored Kashmiri terrorists, Islamic movements within India and criminal networks of the Mumbai syndicates became the order of the day. A series of terrorist activities from 1993 (Mumbai bombings) occurred till the Mumbai terror attack 26/11. From Delhi to Gujarat and Maharashtra the terrorist activities were frequent but much of these dried up after 26/11.

2014 and Its Aftermath

Activities Outside J&K 2014-18

Almost simultaneous with the NDA government coming to power in May 2014, the world witnessed the advent of one of the most vicious terrorist groups in the Middle East. This was the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), an organization whose rise was triggered by the defeat of the Republican Guard of Iraq in Gulf War II, 2003 and the killing of Osama bin Laden in 2011. Its tentacles spread into India with one coordinator apprehended from Bengaluru after eight months of conducting electronic activity on behalf of ISIS. ISIS made efforts to spread its dragnet into India hoping to attract Indian Muslims to its cause. Indian Muslims generally shunned all efforts and the few who got attracted (minuscule by number) were mostly involved in logistics. ISIS attracted 40,000 foreign fighters from US, Europe, Chechnya, Central Asia and South East Asia, to its cause in Mosul which it had made its capital. The low Indian turnout was obviously a reflection of the good and effective controls by the Indian intelligence organizations and the social messaging which the Government successfully put out in the environment.

Noticeably, despite high levels of terrorist activity in the Middle East, the status of India’s security outside the State of J&K remained on even keel. Except for the Pathankot terror attack on 01 Jan 2016, which took place against the run of play, there was no other manifestation of terror in the rest of India. Terrorist activity remained confined to J&K where the sponsored proxy hybrid war continued in several different avatars. However, there is no denial about the fact that ISIS made regular attempts to cultivate influence in Southern India; it succeeded only partially in creating a few networks. Elsewhere, the implosion in Syria due to the civil war, the push for immigration into Europe leading to a series of terrorist actions in UK and in EU, and the ongoing Pakistan Army operation termed Op Zar-e-Azb, continued without much effect on India.

Counter Terrorism Actions in J&K 2014-18

The period 2014-18 was characterised by a string of major terrorist activities which need to be taken note of: -

• Terrorism’s revival of sorts, which had commenced in 2013 in J&K under the new generation local leadership of Burhan Wani, was stemmed after it had achieved initial success. In July 2016, Burhan Wani was killed in a successful operation in South Kashmir. It created much turbulence in the streets but was controlled with a mix of kinetic methods, persuasion of the leadership and neutralization of the rabble rousers.
• The National Investigation Agency (NIA) remained focussed on the plethora of networks which exist in J&K in support of terrorism. Prime among those networks that the NIA seems to have neutralized were those connected to finances. This control helped greatly in subsequently ensuring that separatist, OGW and stone thrower networks remained shorn of adequate funding in the post Pulwama period in 2019.
• An appropriate message was sent across in September 2016 when Pakistani terrorists targeted the Uri Brigade and killed 20 soldiers; four died by initial gunfire but the rest by a fire which emanated in the local fuel dump. The retribution was swift and sharp with a trans LoC, five-pronged surgical strike against terrorist camps. Ownership of the response was taken by the NDA Government, in a major difference from the past when the Indian Army usually responded on its own without political sanction. The Government’s ownership lifted the status to a proper strategic response with a clear message that it could happen again at a time and intensity of our choosing, each time a Pakistan sponsored terrorist action took place on our soil. There would be no need for any evidence to prove culpability.
• The above action single handedly turned the Pakistani strategy of ‘strike and denial’ on its head. Pakistan had to measure India’s threshold of tolerance for sponsored terrorist actions, much more carefully, as explained subsequently. The surgical strikes had a hidden message too; that the scope could extend to strikes on Pakistan Army’s regular units if warranted in future.
• Threat of Battalion Action Team (BAT) actions by Pakistan rose in 2013-16 but died down after the surgical strikes. Pakistan was too deeply involved in CT operations with Operation Zarb-e-Azb. One third of Pakistan Army formations committed to it. Pakistan continued to allege sponsorship by India of the various radical terror groups in Pakistan, especially after the attack on Army Public School, Peshawar on 16 Dec 2015.
• Operation All Out was launched by Northern Command in early 2017 in order to map out and neutralize strongholds of LeT, JeM, Hizbul and Al- Badr all over Kashmir. The high-density areas of Sopore-Pattan-Baramulla in North Kashmir, and Pulwama-Shopian-Anantnag were targeted. OGW networks were also countered by arrests. Areas like Tral came under special attention. In two years, the strength of terrorists was largely reduced with some losses to their own troops.
• However, stone throwing continued, as also intimidation at encounter sites where a transformed concept of integration between the Army’s Rashtriya Rifles (RR), CRPF and JKP (J & K Police) ensured greater effectiveness.
• Among the many initiatives taken by SF with political backing, was first the ban on any public funerals of FTs. Later this was extended to funerals of local terrorists too, to ensure no public adulation and martyr status was extended to the slain terrorists.

Counter Terrorism Actions in J&K 2019 Onwards

The year 2019 was a decisive one in the context of the proxy war. Imran Khan was at the helm in Pakistan, with total support of the Pakistan Army. Army Chief General Qamar Bajwa was then into the last year of his original tenure. He was brimming with confidence with Pakistan’s internal security operations having virtually ceased due to perceived success against the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP). As the Indian general elections neared in early March 2019, a sponsored terrorist action on 14 February, 2019 at Pulwama, involving a suicide bomber resulted in a car IED attack against the CRPF convoy. It resulted in the death of 40 policemen returning from leave. The provocation was well over the top and the Indian response came in the form of the Balakot (Jabbar Top) strike by the Indian Air Force on 27 February, 2019. The subsequent sequence of events is too well known to describe. Pakistan released Wg Cdr Abhinandan, the Indian pilot shot down in PoK to reduce tensions between the two countries. However, a message got clearly spelt that as a policy India will invariably respond if the redlines are crossed; those redlines remain diffused, as they should.

Briefly, in April 2019, terrorist networks were shaken by the sudden attack in Sri Lanka by ISIS (the Easter attacks). The core of the network responsible for it lay in Coimbatore giving rise to speculation that ISIS had penetrated the South and established roots there. Indian agencies were ruthlessly efficient in neutralizing this and displacing the cadres probably to Afghanistan. While the potential remains high, the manifestation has escaped the southern region. An effective vigil and surveillance over the southern states needs to be maintained to prevent a repetition.

Counter Terrorism Actions after 5 Aug 2019

The actions of CT during the period 2014-19, and Op All Out in particular curbed the momentum with which Pakistan had been able to ratchet up the new generation terrorists and ideologues in J&K. The fact that the area south of Pir Panjal was generally free of violence was helpful in focusing attention on the Valley. Attention towards the Jammu-Samba-Kathua belt to limit and neutralize the increasing infiltration from that direction was easier. In addition, the Punjab problem started to take greater shape. It had largely been on the backburner, except for the issue of narcotics while J&K burned. After the Pathankot attack of 2016 the linkages between the J&K groups and the Sikh groups expanded at the behest of Pakistan’s ISI. Finding the Kashmir valley’s infiltration routes all under scanner with a strong LoC fence-based counter infiltration network and deployment, the ISI could not plan quick delivery actions in Kashmir. Each specific mission took a long time to execute. This is also the reason why activity shifted to the Jammu-Samba-Kathua sector where the grid was much weaker. Since weapons, explosives and ammunition could not be inducted into the Valley via the Northern infiltration routes the switch to the Samba area took place. The ISI found it convenient to broaden the zone of proxy war; Punjab, the expanded zone too, is a variant of proxy war with a different focus. The introduction of drones by the ISI was inevitable and movement of lesser quantum of weights in terms of weapons and ammunition through mass attempts proliferated, as expected. The BSF (Border Security Force) has been successful in countering this to a great extent due to development of smart systems for response. However, the fuller exploitation of drones has yet to emerge from the other side. The BSF is confident of handling this.

Some other characteristics of the post 2019 period which are notable are given below: -

• The policy to retain the CI/CT grid in almost the same density as before has paid dividends. The grid must not be disturbed for a fair period until a comprehensive review is carried out. The adage – ‘the absence of violence is not peace’, must be universally followed in our country.
• Only after the numerous networks have been effectively neutralized with very limited potential of revival, should dilution in grid deployment be done.
• The dynamic nature of the ISI’s concept brought innovations in approaching the management of the proxy war. It is initially difficult to counter initiatives such as targeting of minorities, migrant labour, traffic policemen or soldiers on leave. However, strong measures executed jointly by the SF ensured an end to these.
• Since 2019, stone throwing, a phenomenon which used to make news for the separatists, came to a virtual end because of the targeting of terror financing networks. The end of ‘agitational terror’ spelt the doom of the stone throwers.
• Similarly, local media received a jolt with most media houses unable to keep up with the checks and balances. Expressed opinion also changed towards a more centric opinion.
• Over ground workers (OGWs), the strength of the networks that sustain proxy hybrid war, were neutralized through fool proof identification of their activities and putting an end to that; mostly these activities by the State appear mundane but greatly help in sustaining peace in the future.

Current Conditions of Terror in India

Terror invariably follows the path of least resistance, hence there can never be a let up even after gaining the upper hand in a nasty proxy terror situation. Keeping adversary’s sponsored networks neutralized is one of the key factors. There is a second wave of Global terror arising from the events in Ukraine and Israel-Palestine. The effect is yet to surface but trends are noticeable. India’s experience in handling and neutralizing global terror’s first cycle was extremely productive. We need to network with the regional CT organizations of different nations from where such activities usually start. Intelligence is the key and ever since the setting up of the Multi Agency Centre (MAC) and the State MAC (SMAC) where inputs from different agencies are collated and discussed, the quality of intelligence has improved manifold. With the success of the Financial International Task Force (FITF) norms being applied to Pakistan some of the enablers that were employed by Pakistan have been placed under surveillance and largely neutralized. That status must continue.

Successful conduct of the Lok Sabha elections in J&K has empowered the intelligence and security agencies. It's now time to conduct the polls for the J&K Assembly and let democracy play its legitimate role in the final healing process. A long-term strategy for bringing Kashmiri society into the Indian mainstream should be worked out. The ‘Hearts and Minds’ game has been good but may yet be insufficient; something more scientifically evolved and executed needs to be considered.

The coordinated terrorist attacks in the Jammu region launched with effect 9 June, 2024, timed with the inauguration of the NDA 3.0 under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, were designed to convey a message from Pakistan’s deeply layered leadership which is actually a deep state. It was a statement to the effect that Pakistan’s relevance to J&K could never be wished away and it would remain a stakeholder come what may, having invested 35 years in the proxy war that it sponsors. The attacks proved that terrorism is a dynamic entity and its eradication is always a challenge. It plays a crucial role in dictating the situation in a given area where it may have persisted for some time. India would be wrong to assume that short term measures will overcome the problem. Strategy has to be long term and must touch all the domains – political, social, economic, military, diplomatic and psychological. India has been one of the few nations which has successfully battled terrorism with a balanced strategy but it has to be ready for much more in the future.

(The paper is the author’s individual scholastic articulation. The author certifies that the article/paper is original in content, unpublished and it has not been submitted for publication/web upload elsewhere, and that the facts and figures quoted are duly referenced, as needed, and are believed to be correct). (The paper does not necessarily represent the organisational stance... More >>