China as Hydro- Hegemon : The Onset of Water Wars

The Chinese civilization is characterized by its ability to do long term perspective thinking of an unusual order. As far back as 1952, Chairman Mao Ze dong had articulated that Water Stress in the Northern and Western parts of China would be a very major challenge that would emerge a half century or so later. In fact this strategic long term thinking seems to have originated much earlier than 1952 and seems to have been instrumental in China’s decision to invade and conquer Tibet – the Water Tower of Asia – in 1950 itself.

The following facts are pertinent:-

• The region South of the Yangtze River in China has 36% of Chinese territory and 81% of its water resources.
• The Northern Areas of China (that include the major metropolises of Beijing and Tianjin) have 64% of the nation’s territory but only 19% of its water resources. These plains also have 47% of China’s total population.
• Due to rapid industrialization, increasing urbanization and massive population pressure, by 2030 China is expected to face a severe supply gap in its projected water demand of over 25%. In fact by 2050 China’s water deficit will be a staggering 400 Billion cubic meters. Two thirds of China’s cities are already experiencing serious insecurities about water supply. In fact out of 640 Chinese cities, 300 are currently facing water shortages and 100 are faced with severe scarcities.
• The problems of water stress are being exacerbated by environmental pollution, highly uneven distribution of water within its territory leading to disproportionate levels of water availability.
• China’s agriculture in fact is a miracle of 22% of the world’s total population being fed as just 7% of its land area.
• Over-pumping of water has caused the water table to fall at an alarming rate. Over- pumping has depleted shallow aquifers. Due to overuse of fertilizers and chemicals each year China looses 180,000 hectares of farm land to salinity and 200,000 hectares become desert.
• Hence water stress is not a theoretical issue in China. It is a civilisational nightmare for a nation that tends to look far ahead into the future and do perspective thinking of an order that systematically spans the decades. These cold statistics bear testimony to the grave seriousness of the problem and the decision pressure they are bound to put on the Chinese decision makers and leadership.

The Roots of Water Hegemony

The severe nature of the water stress in China needs to be seen in the light of another set of circumstances that make China a natural hydro (or water) hegemon. Consider the following:-

• China has 10 major rivers flowing out of its territory to 11 countries. No river flows into China from outside. This puts China in the unique position of being the Upper Riparian State to all its neighbours.
• China controls Tibet which is the water tower of Asia. 46% of the world’s population depends on Tibetan rivers.
• China can control the flow of the Irrawady and Mekong which are the lifelines of South East Asia. China can also control the flow of the Indus, Satluj and Brahmaputra and hence hold South Asia to ransom. It equally dominates the flow of the Ili and Irtugush rivers that flow into Central Asia.
• Uttam Kumar Sinha, a scholar at the IDSA observes that this upper riparian status feeds China’s hydro- arrogance, hydro-egoism and hydro-aggression. China is the Hydro Hegemon of Asia and shows scant regards for the sensitivities and needs of the lower riparian states.
• Legal Frame Work The fact is that there are some 260 river basins in the world that cater for nearly 40% of the world’s population. Sharing of these river waters is covered by some 145 sharing agreements/ treaties. China has not signed a single water sharing agreement with any of its neighbours. In fact China is one of the world’s only three countries that voted against the 1997 UN Convention on non-navigational uses of international water courses. This international convention had sought to lay down norms and rules which China rejects. Its plan for the utilization, harnessing and diversion of its water resources are highly opaque and secretive and are increasingly becoming a cause for serious concern for all its Lower Riparian neighbors.
• Power Asymmetry The situation is further compounded by the huge power asymmetries that have arisen between China and each and every one of its neighbors in terms of economic and military power and in fact the entire gamut of Comprehensive National Power (CNP).
• All this provides the basis for the highly hegemonic behavior of China in terms of trans- boundary water relations. China is the natural hydro-hegemon of Asia. This is in stark contrast to the carefully cultivated image of China’s peaceful rise

Water Wars

Many strategic experts have been forecasting that the 21^st Century will see the era of Water Wars as opposed to the earlier wars for the control of hydro carbon energy resources. However, acuteness of Water Stress was supposed to reach threshold levels of conflict only sometimes around the middle point of this century. Unfortunately, China’s hydro-aggression is now threatening to usher in the start of water wars many decades in advance.

Diverting the Brahmaputra

The Chinese leadership has always thought in hydrological terms. Hence its very early attempts to seize Tibet and assume control of the water tower of Asia. That is why the Chinese leadership invests such strategic significance in the TAR. Even today many top Chinese leaders are hydrological engineers. In fact Prime Minister Wen Jiabao is a Geological Engineer and President Hu Jintao is a Hydraulic Engineer. The plan to divert the Brahmaputra (Yarling Tsangpo to the Chinese) was initially mooted by a Chinese Engineer called Liling in his book “Tibet Water will save China”. He elaborated the idea of a massive Shuomatan Canal (stretching from Sumatan in Tibet to Tanjiang in North China). This canal would take off from the bend of the Yarlung Tsangpo and divert its water to the North of China. This grandiose plan was vociferously supported by Gen Gao Kai of the PLA. This was supposed to commence in 2002. This issue caused considerable concern in India. In 2006 when President Hu Jintao was visiting India, the Chinese Water Resources Minister Wang Shucheng tried to allay these fears. He deemed this grandiose project as “unnecessary, unfeasible and unscientific”. The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson (Lui Jian chao) confirmed that, “The Chinese government had no plans to build a dam on the Yarlung Tsangpo to divert its waters to the Yellow river”. Liu Changming, a hydrologist at the Chinese Academy of Sciences stated that the proposal to tap the Brahmaputra would be “far too expensive, technologically unfeasible and controversial” (in terms of international reaction)

Medong Project Despite these denials China commenced a $ 60 Billion plan in March 2009 to construct a series of dams on the Yarlung Tsangpo bend. A 141 km long road has been constructed in the Nymchang area and a Tunnel in the Galuglya Mountain. Zongmi is the first dam in a series of dams that will be built at Jicho, Zagola, Leyla and Medong. When quizzed about these dams, the Chinese replied that these were run of the river hydro power projects and would not affect the down stream flow to India’s North Eastern States or to Bangladesh. India’s Foreign Ministry tamely agreed. To prepare our people for a virtual fait accompli , a canard was spread that the bulk of the water in the Brahmaputra came from South of the Himalayan water shed and hence diversion of the Yarlung Tsangpo waters would not affect us adversely. This anxiety to avoid conflict with China on such an ultra sensitive issue is baffling. As per the tenets of International law, an act of diverting water away from reaching towards India is tantamount to an act of war. However, with Armed Forces that have most deliberately been under funded and under resourced for the last two decades, India today is hardly in any position to wage war against China (It has shied away so far from even taking Pakistan to task on the issue of terrorism). We have therefore chosen to put blind faith in China’s pronouncements that these are just run of the river projects. Claude Arpi writes that after five years, Prof Wang Guang Quian of the Chinese Academy of Science has clearly said that China has no choice but to divert the waters of the Yarlung Tsangpo. He, in fact, speaks of a new proposed route “The Brahmaputra waters are expected to be routed to Xinjiang along the Quinghai – Tibet railway line alignment and the Hexi corridor part of the Silk Route located on the Gansu Corridor”. Wang conceded “We thought this would be a plan 50 years later”. He added that “Chinese experts and government officials are still studying the feasibility and impact of these new proposals”.

The entire problem is the speed of Chinese decision making on subjects of such great enormity. The Three Gorges Dams were pushed through without a thought for their adverse ecological and Seismic consequences. These are now coming to the fore and causing serious disquiet. The water stress factor weighs heavily on the Chinese leadership. It is now compounded with great fears regarding food security for the huge Chinese population. Over farming in China is leading to desertification. Over use of chemicals and fertilizers is leading to soil salinity. Add water scarcity to this and the mix is explosive. Gen Ma Xiiaotian, China’s former Defense Minister, had in a series of startling speeches highlighted a Chinese concept of Lebensaraum or the need for living space for the Chinese masses in neghbouring countries. Water-hegemony is the thin edge of that wedge. Water shortage is becoming a major impediment to China’s goal of food security. Therefore the quest for water is an unyielding imperative for China. Chinese needs seemingly override the needs of all other countries in the region. The Chinese have shown scant regard for the sensitivities of the lower Riparian States of the Mekong and the Brahamaputra Rivers. The Medong Project on the Yarlung Tsangpo bend will be completed by 2015.

What can India do? It can at the very least strongly articulate its concerns. We cannot feed the paranoia in the North Eastern States by signaling that for Delhi they could not matter less. It will only strengthen the narrative of callous neglect and unconcern in the North East. India therefore urgently needs to: -

• Draw China into a dialogue on Water Issues and raise hydrological concerns at all bilateral meetings.
• Advocate the principles of International Water Law and make common cause with other lower riparian States in South, South East and Central Asia. It must commence a concerted Information campaign on this theme. Global pressure must be mounted on China to accede to the UN Convention on the use of international water courses and sign bilateral treaties with all its lower riparian states.
• Shed its perplexing diffidence and assert its legitimate national interests through firm dialogue.
• Should dialogue fail, be prepared to exert leverages by playing, if necessary, the Tibet Card.
• In all eventualities prepare for the contingency of military conflict. This implies an urgent speeding up of our military equipment modernization and force expansion programs. We urgently need to raise 6 to 8 additional Mountain Divisions for the Chinese front.
• It would be essential to deter the Chinese from such a disastrous course which could cause ecological and seismic catastrophes in the North Eastern States and in Bangladesh. Chinese companies are also proposing to construct a series of dams on the Indus in POK, another seismically ultra sensitive zone.
• It would be essential to put in place an alliance architecture of concerned lower Riparian States as also bring in extra- regional balancers like the USA and Japan into this equation.
• Above all we must rapidly develop the means to safeguard our own vital national interests. Deliberately underfunding of our armed forces makes us weak . Such self-induced weakness forces us to compromise on our vital national interests. We must break this vicious cycle.

Notes

1. Uttam Kumar Sinha, “Examining China’s Hydro-behaviour” Paper published by the IDSA May 11
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
4. Ibid
5. Lester R Brown etal “State of the World,” Norton New York1984-1994
6. Ibid
7. Ibid
8. Claude Arpi” Will China divert the Brahmaputra”, Pioneer 12 Jun 2011
9. Ibid
10. Ibid
11. Sachin Parasher “Beijing has not Denied Plan on Brahmaputra: Experts”. Times of India 16 Jun 2011

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Published Date: 6^th July, 2011