Pak Unlikely to Mend its Ways

We should be clear-sighted about the impact of Osama bin Laden’s killing on the domestic situation in Pakistan, US-Pakistan relations, the situation in Afghanistan, China’s goals in the region, the war on terrorism and, of course, India.

Pakistan has been hugely embarrassed by the episode as it cannot credibly claim that bin Laden was hiding for almost 6 years in the garrison town of Abbottabad without anybody’s knowledge. Pakistan’s duplicity in simultaneously fighting and shielding terrorists has got dramatically confirmed by the unearthing of the Al Qaida leader in an ISI safe-house.

The US operation has damaged the prestige of the Pakistani military, as it could not detect this deep intrusion into the country by a foreign military force. General Kayani’s personal stature, built by the Americans, has been badly dented. Pakistan’s sovereignty has been blatantly violated, exposing the helplessness of the country’s leadership.

The Pakistan military may have been put on the defensive domestically and internationally, but any dramatic change in the civil-military equation within the country should not be expected. The issue of sovereignty is always very sensitive and, as is to expected, the Pakistani establishment is playing it up to deflect attention away from its own culpability in sheltering global terrorists and project, instead, the country as an undeserved victim of external bullying.

No doubt General Kayani and the ISI Chief Pasha have had a gruelling session with Pakistani parliamentarians, but not only Pasha’s reported offer to resign has not been accepted, Prime Minister Gilani’s has publicly called the ISI a national asset, indicating the incapacity of the civilian power to call the military to account. General Kayani has signalled through a press briefing that the miltary will continue to control the country’s policies towards India, Afghanistan and on nuclear matters. President Zardari, unpopular and weak, can hardly challenge the military, more so as the political parties are themselves involved in fractious, survival politics.

The US will seek to ferret out other Al Qaida leaders in Pakistan. Kayani will cite resentment in the public and in the military barracks against the Osama operation for not doing the US bidding against the Haqqani group in North Waziristan. The bilateral relationship will remain contentious.

With political and press opinion in the US turning against Pakistan, some Congressmen are seeking US aid cuts, but others are already calling for a more measured reaction. Senator Kerry has just visited Pakistan, no doubt to ask for more transparent cooperation on terrorism and also to convey assurances about continuing US financial and other support. As proponent of the munificent Kerry-Lugar Bill he is politically and morally answerable for the mistaken assumptions on which it was enacted- of better securing Pakistani cooperation in fighting terror with large infusions of economic assistance.

For the US Administration the fundamentals of the situation facing it in the Af-Pak region haven’t changed with bin Laden’s slaughter, whether it is Pakistan’s duplicity on terrorism as well as the ISI’s links with key Afghan Taliban groups killing NATO soldiers, its dependence on Pakistan for logistics in conducting the war in Afghanistan or the fear that sanctions on Pakistan would only push it towards failure and add to America’s travails in the region. It is these unchanged considerations that explain the Administration’s current effort to bring the relationship with Pakistan back on the rails. Defence Secretary Gates is arguing that no hard evidence exists that the top military leadership of Pakistan was aware of bin Laden’s presence in Abbottabad etc. The effort to exculpate policy level echelons is intended to avoid entrapping the Administration into a situation in which it may be obliged under law to take some punitive decisions.

Bin Laden’s elimination fuelled some speculation that President Obama may now have a freer hand in winding down US involvement in Afghanistan on the ground that as it was bin Laden who had prompted US intervention there in the first instance, with his elimination the President could declare “mission accomplished”. With the US unable to achieve its goals in Afghanistan and afraid to be bogged down in an unwinnable war that is already draining the country’s strained finances, Obama, under compulsions also of the presidential electoral calendar, could conveniently varnish failure with this coat of success.

But this would leave unanswered larger questions about US goals in this region linked to pressuring Iran, preventing China and Russia from politically and economically monopolizing the Central Asian space, especially its energy resources, and balancing China’s mounting influence in a nuclear armed Pakistan. These objectives require a viable US presence in Afghanistan, coupled with a good understanding with Pakistan. Can the US secure its longer-term interests by a premature withdrawal from Afghanistan that would allow a militarized Pakistan with radical islamic linkages dramatically exposed by the bin Laden episode to extend its sway there. In this perspective how far will the US push for reconciliation with Afghan Taliban groups that remain under some form of Pakistan tutelage. Or would the US want an internally reformed Pakistan, with the military under civilian control and the radical religious groups effectively suppressed as a partner for the long haul?

China’s reaction to the Osama affair has been characteristically cynical. As against US search for some Pakistani accountability for the country’s terrorist affiliations, the Chinese have sought to release pressure on Pakistan at a critical moment by whitewashing its sins, lauding its contributions to the combat against international terrorism and recognizing the sacrifices it has made. Particularly insidious is the understanding China demands of Pakistan’s domestic situation in judging its anti-terrorist campaign. The implication is that Pakistan should not be unduly pressured to act in North Waziristan or against the Punjab-based jihadi groups targetting India. China is opportunistically consolidating the goodwill it enjoys in Pakistan by condoning its rogue activities just when they are under international scrutiny.

Our Defence Minister’s statement that bin Laden’s removal is a watershed in the global war on terrorism presumes that the terrorist threat to us would now get reduced. But, India became a victim of terrorism long before bin Laden emerged. Pakistan is the source of terrorism directed at us, not the Al Qaida. The answer to our problem lies in the calculus of the Pakistan military and the radical groups it has nurtured for conducting an asymmetric war against India. So long as the Pakistan military remains “India-centric” and cultivates the paranoia that India constitutes an existential threat for Pakistan, and so long as it receives political and material backing from key global powers for their own agendas, and from Saudi Arabia and sections of the Islamic world on a religious ideological plane, it will not be deterred from pursuing a high risk policy of using terrorism as an instrument of state policy.

Our own policy of playing down the terrorist threat from Pakistan in order to preserve the viability of our dialogue option releases pressure on our adversary for a policy change. When we remain anxious to engage Pakistan and not close doors on it, to the point of renouncing any sanctions for directing terror at us, how can we ask the US and others to chastise it for the same sins against them?

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Published in Mail Today Dated: 24^th May, 2011