Steadfast in Siachen

After every tragedy in Siachen, it is almost laughably predictable to see a spate of articles and programs advocating a settlement (largely on Pakistani terms), if not an outright withdrawal, from the area. Most of these write-ups start with a palpably insincere tribute to the Indian soldiers who serve and often lose their life or limb on the icy heights of the highest and coldest battlefield in the world. Once the lip-service to the soldiers has been paid, the entire thrust of the argument is on why serving on the glacier is a pointless waste of resources and is strategically senseless. Ergo, we should settle the Siachen issue so that the precious lives of soldiers can be saved. Invariably, most of the academics, journalists, activists writing such drivel are very active on track-II circuits, many of them funded by the Pakistanis and some Western donors, even governments, whose line is then plugged to influence Indian public opinion.

Fortunately, for all their efforts, the advocates of the Pakistani line haven’t received much traction in India. Indian leadership has occasionally got a little taken in by the sales pitch of this lobby, but invariably better sense has prevailed and the efforts of the Pakistani lobbyists has come a cropper. For instance, in 1989, the then Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, was misled into considering a deal on Siachen. But it didn’t taken him long to understand the trap that was being laid for him. In the early 1990s, India proposed a possible solution to Pakistan but there was no positive response from the Pakistani side. The Composite Dialogue process that was agreed in 1997 included a track of talks on Siachen. Both sides exchanged proposals but the matter remained unresolved.

From a time when India wanted Pakistan to authenticate the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) before withdrawal, to now when there is a growing insistence on delineating the border before any withdrawal can be considered the Indian position has not only evolved, but also hardened. The only real positive step forward was that both sides agreed on a ceasefire in 2003 in Siachen. Unlike the ceasefire along rest of the LoC, the ceasefire in Siachen has been scrupulously observed by both sides. As a result, there has been no casualty of war for more than a decade, only casualties of weather. In fact, over the years, even the weather related casualties have dropped drastically to a fraction of what they used to be in the first few years after Operation Meghdoot started in 1984. Consequently, there is neither any urgency nor any constraint that would force India to seek a settlement, not on its terms but Pakistan's terms. Even the window of opportunity for a settlement will close in another year or two if the Pakistanis continue to hold out on the minimum demands of India for a mutual withdrawal.

The advocates of demilitarising Siachen base their arguments on a couple of points.

One, cost of conflict. This is clearly an untenable argument. Defending the territorial integrity of a country cannot be weighed in terms of rupees and paisa. If today the argument that defending Siachen is unaffordable (which it is not) is accepted, then tomorrow the argument will be made that India spends much more in Jammu and Kashmir and in the north east than it gets in terms of revenue and keeping these part of India is proving too costly and they should be cut off from India. Extend the argument, and Bihar takes much more than it contributes, so lets get rid of it. Then tomorrow Delhi can say it gives more than it gets so it wants out of India. Clearly this is a nonsensical argument. Related to the cost question is the issue of principle of defending what you rightfully claim to be yours. If you claim it, then defend it; if you can’t defend it, then don’t claim it.

Second, the Siachen conflict is impacting on the environment. Again, a typical Pakistani argument to get through the back door what it cannot get through the front door. There is absolutely no scientific evidence to back this argument. The glacier has receded but that not because of human presence but because of a global phenomenon. What is more, the Indian army has gone out of its way to protect the fragile environment in the area.

Third, there is no strategic importance of the area because no significant military manoeuvres are possible through this area. In support of this argument comments of some former generals are trotted out as though what they have said is the ultimate word in military strategy. Of course, there are other generals who take a totally different stand, but because their position doesn’t gel with that of the lobbyists, it is ignored, if not rejected outright. If Siachen didn’t have strategic importance, why were the Pakistanis wanting to occupy the region in the 1980s? Why do they still hanker for it? Why don’t the Pakistanis just say that India is occupying a wasteland and losing men and money in the process so let them continue doing so? They don’t say this because they know the importance of Siachen. And because they can’t win it through force of arms, they are trying to win it on the talks table by using their advocates in India to make a manifestly false case for demilitarization. Also bear in mind that historically there are innumerable examples where a seemingly impenetrable area was penetrated by some intrepid conqueror to gain strategic dominance. More than two thousand years ago, the Romans never imagined that a huge army could cross the Alps and enter Northern Italy. But this is precisely what Hannibal did! Today, we might think the Siachen is a strategic wasteland, but tomorrow technology or other climatic changes might make large military manoeuvres a real possibility.

Fourth, another self-serving argument that is often forwarded is that both India and Pakistan had reached a solution in 1989 and that they should go back to that. This again is a half-truth. While there was a discussion, even a tentative understanding, in 1989 on how to resolve the Siachen issue, there was no agreement, and unless a understanding is put on paper and becomes an agreement, it is meaningless. Since then a lot of things have changed. The terms of a possible agreement that India might have been willing to consider in 1989, are simply not acceptable today. And the terms which India is willing to offer today, may not be on offer tomorrow.

The fundamental stumbling block in reaching any mutually acceptable settlement is the trust deficit between the two countries. And this trust deficit has only increased after Pakistan's misadventure in Kargil where despite detailed delineation of the LoC, Pakistan tried to unilaterally change the status by aggression in the hope that the areas it occupies will become a fait accompli for India. The Indian concern is that while Pakistan has zero presence on the Siachen glacier right now, it could occupy the positions India vacates and then once again confront India with a Kargil like situation, which will be virtually impossible to overturn. It takes Indian forces around 15 days to reach the Saltoro ridge while for Pakistan it is only 5 days away. Under these circumstances, it would be unwise to demilitarize Siachen without cast iron guarantees which the Pakistanis are not willing to give. Add to this the Chinese factor and the fact that Siachen forms a wedge between China and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir which both countries would like to control as it makes their linking up easier and provides Pakistan a direct access to the Karakorum pass. This factor, in itself belies the argument that Siachen has no strategic significance.

As matters stand, although India has offered a settlement under which demilitarization can take place, Pakistan is not ready to accept the Indian condition that the authentication of the AGPL be made part the substantive agreement, even if it as an annexure, so that it is accorded a legal sanctity. Even if the Pakistanis were to agree to this, it would still not address the concern of Pakistanis reneging on their commitment (as indeed they have done on so many instances in the past) and surreptitiously occupying the positions India vacates. Hence, many on the Indian side are keeping their fingers crossed that Pakistan reject the Indian deal which in turn will allow India to change the parameters of a possible settlement when talks start from square one.

The simple reality is that as long as India has the grit, guts, and gumption to hold on to Siachen, it will remain a part of India; the day India loses the will, wisdom, wealth and weaponry to keep Siachen, even Delhi will not remain a part of India. Everything else – peace park, low hanging fruit etc – is nothing but a spin and dissemble to please the lobbies that pay for the junkets to exotic foreign lands to discuss the fiction of ‘peace’ between India and Pakistan.

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Published Date: 22^nd February 2016, Image Source: http://www.thehindu.com [3]
(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Vivekananda International Foundation)