India: Opportunities in Internal Security

Introduction:

Strengthening India’s internal security mechanism has been discussed regularly at several fora including media, both print and electronic. The discussion has generally been Delhi-centric with focus on the efforts of the central government and its programs aimed at improving domestic security environment. An opportunity for the corporate sector, across the spectrum, in providing technology and cutting edge support is vast and has remained untapped for several reasons. The security managers are finding it difficult to identify required technology for their requirements and often tend to look outside for procuring ready - made or tailor - made solutions. The time has become appropriate to change the system. This change must commence with the making Union Home Ministry innovative and technology driven as also to develop the ability to look beyond the curve. The Union Home Ministry (MHA) plays a major role in ensuring internal stability and is also the nodal body to deal with all matters of internal security through its various organizations, agencies and institutions that are performing preventive, regulative and investigative roles. Its central armed police forces are made up of over 11,000 officers and nearly a million men under arms and growing steadily. There are also other agencies such as the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), National Security Guard (NSG), Special Protection Group (SPG), Railway Protection Force (RPF) and India Reserve Battalions that buttress the internal security structure.

The bulk of the central armed police forces have a specific border management mandate. These comprise the Border Security Force (BSF), Indo-Tibet Border Police (ITBP), Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB) and the Assam Rifles. The Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) takes on the responsibility of providing aid to civil power, counter-insurgency operations, man guarding and VVIP protection duties, there are others duties that are assigned to it from time to time. In addition to their primary tasks, the border guard organizations are also assigned counter-insurgency duties on a regular basis.

It is significant to note the absence of a dedicated organization to fight non-conventional warfare. Ironically, the only organization that was created specifically for conducting guerilla warfare in Indo-Himalayan region during the early sixties, the SSB, was converted into a central armed police force keeping in with the recommendation of the Kargil Review Committee (KRC). This has left a major gap in this strategic sector. Threat to national security in the Indo-Himalayan region (IHR) has not decreased in a direct sense and tensions remain undiminished. Time has come to look at this aspect seriously. One of the methods is to recreate a new organization, for IHR, by reviving the erstwhile SSB, well known for its non-conventional warfare experience. Legacy battalions of the former SSB must form nucleus of the new force. They can also be utilized for counter insurgency operations elsewhere. A dedicated mechanism must replace the existing ad-hoc counterinsurgency management system. A counter-insurgency force must be lean and mean with effective delivery mechanism. It must be backed by the best available technology in the country.

Need for revolutionary thinking towards national security:

The need for revolutionary thinking in our approach to national security must be underlined in clear and cogent terms. It is important also to changing the existing mind-set. There is an urgent need to get out of the time warp. There are two challenges that India currently faces, the first is that our institutions of governance are based on sector specific knowledge and management systems. Experience points out that these systems are unable to collaborate in delivering multi-disciplinary and multi-sectoral responses to national challenge; and they can no longer be independent variables. The second challenge lies in changing the enduring notion of National security, which we need to understand in a comprehensive sense rather in narrow military terms. A unique feature of the emerging landscape is the need for increasing salience of cross-cutting, sharing of synergies and judicious use of resources for common good of national interest. We must also recognize the fact that the government alone cannot deliver on national security. It importantly requires a coalition of partners or stake holders to fulfill its tasks.

In this, the business sector, in its many formats, has a major role to perform. It must increasingly seek to be at the high table of national security management. There must be more discourse on national security at all levels and across the spectrum. Understanding existing situation and meeting future challenges requires a new template. The business sector must link itself to national security requirements. The government at its highest political levels must take the lead in removing the unnecessary red lines that are preventing more dissemination of information, exchange of views and giving policy inputs on matters of importance.

Opportunities in internal security:

Let me dwell briefly on existing Constitutional arrangements. Law and order is a state subject. The state is therefore the first responder to any event that threatens law and order, public safety and security in its jurisdiction. The state police force is the primary service provider in all such cases. The Union government comes to aid of civil power when the situation so dictates or as requested by the state or union territory concerned. The Union government has the option to deploy multiple resources drawn from the home ministry, defense ministry and others it may feel appropriate.

Internal security challenges are states-centric:

A majority of India’s internal security challenge is states-centric. This has been endemic since 1947 beginning with Pak sponsored separatist militancy in Jammu and Kashmir, ethnic unrest in several states of the northeast region, violence in Punjab, Maoist threats spreading across our eastern sea board and others. While some of these are externally sponsored and supported, others are by-products of political mismanagement, lack of governance and corruption. The situation in the states today is far from satisfactory. Mr. NN Vohra, Governor of J&K, while delivering a key note address at the United Service Institute (USI) in 2014, summed it up by expressing anxiety on poor preparedness of state police forces, especially special armed units, to deal with changing threat levels in their respective jurisdictions.

Focus attention on States/Union Territories:

No state/Union territory in India today is fully free from challenges to internal security. Some of them confront several threats – both conventional and asymmetrical. Experience has shown that the response of the states to major threats and challenges has been weak, reactive and often confused. A study of the non-sensitive portions of the Pradhan-Balachandran report on the 26/11 Mumbai attacks underlines the parlous state of affairs. The central government spends massive amount of money on police modernization, both at the central and state level. This includes weapons and equipment, mobility, training, quick response to emerging threats, electronic surveillance, acquisition, assessment, interpretation and dissemination of timely intelligence and protection of critical infrastructure. The internal security portion of the KRC and observations of the Second Administrative Reforms Commission make excellent reading for students of internal security management especially for those in the corporate world.

We, therefore, are looking at enormous opportunities in strengthening internal security in 28 states and 7 Union Territories across the country. If a state by state assessment is conducted, we will possibly create a play list of over 200 items. In my experience, it is comparatively easier to deal with state governments in matters of training, equipment, transport and communication. Several state governments have developed pro-active plans based on their experience and necessity. There is no shortage of funds since the states receive generous subsidy in the form of police modernization grants and also under several other programs from the central government. If the desire is to enhance and strengthen the state level capacity then it must be accompanied by accountability and effective utilization of funds.

Unlike the defense ministry, the internal security mechanism must create an effective scientific and technical arm to take care of its future requirements. It must create a mechanism for active collaboration with the domestic corporate sector or research and development purposes. There is enormous progress and development in the private sector in the manufacture of military ordnance suited for the Indian environment. The central police forces and its adjunct agencies may not always be up-to speed on this aspect. Like-wise, the private sector is not in a position to assess the requirements of the forces. Therefore, there is an urgent need to bridging the gap between supply and demand as also address the knowledge deficit. The State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are not in a position to address this situation despite the monopoly existing in their favor. There are two options. Firstly, to create joint ventures between SOEs and private sector in critical areas and, secondly, to outsource requirements to the private sector, where the capacity already exists.

Yet another strategic necessity is to focus, support and encourage the next generation entrepreneurs or “start-ups” in bringing forth technology suited to needs of internal security managers. In this direction, the governments – both state and center – should become “Angel Investors” and earmark substantial funds under modernization head for this purpose. The role of small and medium industries in providing solutions must be emphasized. The subject of cyber-security is another area of substantial national interest. Our forces and agencies need to reach out to the experts in the corporate world to address the lacunae existing in the systems.

Each state may consider setting up its own version of NATGRID, create technology for better monitoring of communication systems utilized by anti-national elements, build language “laboratory”, both vernacular and selected foreign languages, new methods of forensics vital in counter-insurgency operations, money laundering to name a few. The synergy available in the open market is substantial for meeting present and future requirements. This has to be harnessed for maximum benefit.

Internal security has multiple stakeholders and some of the major players are the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI), Customs and Central Excise, Railways, Ports, Airports, Space, Atomic Energy, Information Technology, Cyber, Telecom and Disaster management. These agencies cannot act as independent variables. Each impacts and is impacted in what happens in other areas. They also create considerable opportunities for participation by the corporate sector.

Coastal security has assumed national importance since 26/11 Mumbai attacks. An elaborate network has been envisaged and put into place. There is more work to be done. India has 8 states, whose police forces that have a mandate to ensure safety and security in their respective areas, it is commonly acknowledged that they are still vulnerable and suffer from serious deficiencies. Besides, they have jurisdiction over 12 major ports and over 180 minor ports. In a span of 7-8 years the burden will increase with the implementation of the “Smart city” project all over the country. The use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) will be force multiplier and will have a spin-off effect. It will create employment for young men and women as also give fillip to the industry itself. If covered under “Make in India” initiative, it will have added advantages.

There is obviously a need for eliminating the existing knowledge gap between the security forces and the corporate sector. Greater synergy is one way forward. A nodal body must address this in an earnest way taking care to match all requirements. The corporate sector must consider a suitable platform to engage with state governments on a wide array of security related requirements. There is also the need to create a consultative mechanism at the Centre. Dissemination of information on products and technology is very important. The Niti Ayog can be the precursor for the new format.

PM Heblikar is Managing Trustee, Institute of Contemporary Studies Bangalore (ICSB) and a former Special Secretary, Government of India.

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Published Date: 5^th October 2015, Image Source: http://indiatoday.intoday.in [3]
(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Vivekananda International Foundation)