Security Disaster in Afghanistan?

Maj Gen G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd)
Senior Fellow, VIF
Triumphalism in Islamabad:

The 60 nation conference in London has raised the specter of the return of the Taliban in Kabul. There is a strident tone of triumphalism in Pakistan these days. There was a consensus born of pure battle fatigue in London that the “Good Taliban” should be engaged in peace parleys and ultimately be made to share power in Kabul. Generous funding was promised to buy off the Taliban. The Peace and Reintegration Trust Fund promises $ 140 million initially, which will subsequently be increased to $ 500 billion. There were reports in September 2009 that Saudi Arabia had tried to broker talks between President Hamid Ali Karzai’s representatives and the Taliban at Mecca. There have in fact been secret meetings between the Taliban representatives and Kai Eido, the UN Special Representative in Afghanistan and a number of Taliban leaders have been taken off the list of terrorists. The sudden mysterious capture of Mullah Barader in Karachi seems to be linked to the Pakistani game plan for brokering peace talks with the Good Taliban. India, despite its $ 1.3 billion investment in that country and major soft power offsets, finds itself completely marginalised and sidelined.

Zero-Sum Game Mentality:

The self congratulatory tone of the Military- ISI complex in Islamabad stems from the perceived vindication of its grand strategy to play a ruthless zero- sum game to gain at the cost of each and every one of its neighbours. The Military –ISI complex was always crystal clear that the US and NATO lacked the stomach to stay the course in Afghanistan. Sooner, rather than later, they were bound to leave. The Pakistanis therefore embarked on a deliberate strategy of inducing strategic fatigue and mission failure in Afghanistan. Even as they pretended to join the Global War on Terror (GWOT) as its most loyal foot soldiers, they strained every nerve to ensure that the Taliban survived as a military force that would make short shift of the Afghan National Army (ANA), once the US and its allies left.

There were two components of this strategy- the provision of sanctuaries and support to the Taliban and a constant lobbying effort with the Americans to keep the Afghan Army weak and under resourced. A third subtext was to regionally isolate the Karzai regime and not let it stabilize economically by establishing natural trade linkages with the most vibrant economy and market in South Asia. This strategy has worked flawlessly. The ISI sheltered the Quetta Shoora of Mullah Mohhmad Omar (who is married to one of the daughters of Osama Bin Laden) in the military cantonment of Quetta itself (reportedly it shifted last year to the Binori Madrasa in Karachi). The Sirajuddin Haqqani Shoora, advertised as a prime strategic asset by Gen Kayani himself ( for its repeated attacks on the Indian embassy in Kabul) is ensconced in North Waziristan. It is noteworthy that the Pakistan Army has point blank refused to attack this area after its much advertised assault on South Waziristan against the renegade TTP. The Hizbe Islami Shoora of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is harboured in the NWFP. It is not so well known that Hekmatyar , the poster boy of the ISI, is one of the most hated men in Afghanistan because he had bombed the city of Kabul to rubble in the post –Soviet withdrawal fighting.

The second plank of this strategy was made plain by Gen Kayani himself in his recent interview to the Dawn. Kayani had just returned triumphant from his visit to the NATO HQ in Brussels from January 27-29. Dilating at length on his Afghan strategy he averred that India’s role in Afghanistan was unhelpful. What he said next was chilling. He stated inter alia that Afghan State institutions (including the Afghan Army and police) must be fashioned in such a manner that they don’t pose a threat to Pakistan’s strategic interests. This Pakistani pressure possibly explains the most baffling failure to raise a credible ANA and an effective Afghan police even 10 years after the end of Op Enduring Freedom. This would have saved tremendous number of lives and treasure for the Americans and NATO.

The ‘Afghanisation’ of the war was the most obvious and logical solution. Yet the ANA was kept ridiculously undersized in relation to its task. Intially the US had planned for a 134,000 strong ANA by 2011. This target has now been raised to 171,600 by Lt Gen Stanley McChrystal. It is noteworthy that the pre-Soviet invasion era strength of the Afghan Army was 350,000.By the time the Soviets left they had raised it to peak strength of 550,000. This Afghan Army had successfully held off the Mujahideen for nearly four years till Gorbachov, in his ruinous fit of peace making, stopped paying for this force (very few armies in the world will fight if they are not paid!) The planned ANA therefore is far below the optimal strength required to fight the Taliban in a standalone mode. Besides it is being raised as a pure foot infantry force that is little more than armed constabulary. Pakistan does not want it to have any artillery or armour and no Air Force whatsoever. Besides the Pakistan Army Chief stated that Pakistan should train the ANA (so that it can be honed in the fine art of staging coups at the behest of the ISI). The scenario is very clear. By its sheer asymmetry of will Pakistan has been able to wear down its American and NATO interlocutors to accept the Good Taliban in Kabul.

Once the Americans leave, Pakistan will send in its Pathan troops in mufti with tanks and heavy artillery to make short shift of the all infantry ANA and reinstall the Quetta Shoora in triumph. Jihadi triumphalism will then touch a bizarre new height. They will claim to have routed both the former super powers and set their sights on a so called regional power like India and its perceived ally Israel. Because of the sheer pusillanimity and unwillingness of its enemies to fight, Jihadism would have won without a shot being fired. The Military -ISI complex in Islamabad is conjuring up new visions of a Caliphate in Islamabad that will completely curtail India’s access and influence in Central Asia. By sending back Uzbek fighters of Tohir Yuldashev and Taragami of the IMU it will ensure that the dominoes begin to fall in Central Asia within the time frame of a decade or less. Pakistan is thus orchestrating a ruthless zero- sum game to completely marginalise India from Afghanistan and Central Asia. In their desperate haste to get out of Afghanistan, the US and NATO seemingly could not care less for the security interests of India, Iran , Russia, China and the Central Asian states. They will simply be left to face the music. India in fact is being pressurised to appease Pakistan on the twin issues of Kashmir and river waters because it has always been so reasonable and amenable. The Pune blast possibly sends signals that India should be prepared to lose a thousand or so citizens each year till it finally cedes Kashmir. With US/NATO patronage Pakistan seeks to prevail at the cost of all its neighbours.

What can India do to stave off this looming security disaster? India must do everything in its power to shore up the democratic and modernist state in Afghanistan and ensure that Hamid Karzai does not meet the same fate as the hapless Najibullah with the ISI bosses personally supervising his hanging from a lamppost to send less than subtle hints to the ruling elite of Central Asia.

Regional Approach:

In its latest bout of one- upmanship Pakistan ensured that India was pointedly kept out of the conference in Turkey on the plea that It has no borders with Afghanistan. But nor do Turkey or Saudi Arabia, for that matter. Besides POK is part of India and its borders do abut the Wakhan Corridor in Afghanistan. Pakistan did its best to marginalise India to the sidelines in the London conclave that followed. India should respond in kind by organizing a conference of regional players like Russia, Iran, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrghistan and Khazakistan etc who have a clear stake in preventing a return of the Taliban in Kabul. India should be far more proactive in aggressively pursuing a regional approach to safeguard its vital national interests in this region and engage likeminded countries with a stake in preserving the status quo. It must warn the regional players against any toppling of the dominoes in Central Asia and Pakistan once the Taliban is reinstated in Kabul in any form whatsoever.

Colonial Mindset:

Lastly, Pakistan’s demand for extra territorial rights in Afghanistan is simply not tenable in the 21st century. Pakistan cannot dictate with whom the Afghan government can establish diplomatic ties and at what level; with whom it should trade and what should be the strength of the Afghan armed forces. Pakistan has started behaving like an imperial power of the colonial era. Is it incumbent upon all other nations in South and Central Asia to feed these delusions of the imperial grandeur of a new Caliphate in Islamabad?

Overturning Electoral Verdicts:

In the end there is a major issue of principle. Who has elected the Taliban for sharing power in Kabul? The Taliban has never faced an election. In recent opinion polls 82% of Afghans had expressed their opposition to the Taliban. Only 4% favoured the Taliban. What right does Pakistan have to overturn popular electoral verdicts in its neighbouring states and impose extremist regimes of its choice? That just highlights the Caliphate mindset increasingly becoming visible in the Military-ISI complex in Pakistan. Gen Kayanis triumphant and garrulous interview after his visit to the NATO HQ in Brussels is a case in point.