Making Sense of Trump’s Ukraine U-turn

The US President Donald Trump’s friendlier stance towards the Russian President Vladimir Putin, on the one hand, and fiery altercation with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, on the other, has baffled the world. Within the US, the Democrats have sharply condemned Trump’s approach towards Ukraine as reckless and quite a few political analysts have called it a “reverse Kissinger” stance. However, much of the meaning to the U- turn in Trump’s stand could be culled from the immediate period of the post-Cold War era that apparently ended the strategic triangular relations among the US, the USSR and China. Arguably, Trump’s position on Ukraine is driven by the need to undo a series of foreign policy missteps the US committed towards Russia since the end of the Cold-War when at least there was a fair chance to bury the US-Russia conflict once for all.

After the Cold War ended with the disintegration of the USSR, there was not much rationale for the existence of NATO which was essentially founded in 1949 by the US, Canada and several Western European nations to resist the Soviet Union militarily. Indeed, the post-Cold War era saw a kind of reconciliation between the US and Russia when the latter disavowed communism and agreed to the reunification of Germany. But while the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact, a counterpart of NATO, was disbanded, NATO still remained in place. Rather, despite the US assurance of not expanding NATO, the NATO expanded much further into Eastern Europe much to the chagrin of and concern for Russia. In fact, the enlargement of NATO took place in three phases. In 1999, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic joined. In 2003, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia joined. And in 2009, Albania and Croatia joined.

One might recall that Eastern Europe acted as a military buffer for Russia in the Cold War era. Evidently, this region helped Russia to address its historical vulnerabilities. In history, Russia’s foreign policy was driven by two security considerations. One was the need for a buffer given its flat open terrain devoid of natural barriers, and two, a need for a warm water port. It may be recalled that the two most notable European invasions against Russia in history were by Napoleon in the 19th century and Hitler in the 20th century taking advantage of the flat unhindered terrain. The March 2014 Russia’s annexation of Sevastopol, a city in Crimea and which has been an important port and naval base throughout history is a telling example of Moscow’s historical vulnerability.

In this backdrop of Russia’s security vulnerability, the NATO expansion in the post-Cold War era could be considered a strategic mistake on the part of the US. Lacking a military buffer Russia felt encircled by the Western forces in the garb of NATO. Things came to a pretty pass when in 2011 the NATO began considering the candidacies of Georgia and Ukraine. More critically, it became the principal rationale for Russia’s pivoting to the East and ushering in the Russia-China friendship, which in 2022, came to be hailed as ‘no-limits friendship’. Undoubtedly, the new bonhomie provided a leverage to Russia in its dealings with the West. But more significantly, it emboldened the Chinese to embark upon a decisively belligerent foreign policy course under President Xi Jinping clearly challenging the US global preponderance.

In fact, the NATO expansion instead of reinforcing the US unipolar moment, reinstated the essence of the strategic triangle that had defined the power balance among the US, the USSR and China during much of the Cold War era. Delving into the Cold War history, after China had detonated a nuclear bomb in 1964, it was catapulted to the ranks of the great powers and became a partner in the formation of a strategic triangle in East Asia. It may be recalled that in the context of the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s, the capitalist US reached out to the Communist China to jointly check the growing power of Russia. This ushered in the period of US-China rapprochement in 1972 which was not only symptomatic of the thawing of Cold War ideological divide but also the beginning of the balance of power politics in Asia. Of course, the disintegration of the USSR in 1991 rendered the strategic triangle irrelevant.

However, the NATO expansion into Eastern Europe clearly spelt a security threat to Russia that provoked it to close ranks with China creating a new power balance that could boldly take on the US. In fact, riding on the Russo-China friendship, China has adopted a more belligerent foreign policy stance as evidenced in the South-China Seas dispute, India-China disputes on the LAC (Line of Actual Control), and the Cross-Strait conflict. In other words, the NATO expansion has created a greater menace for the US, the looming China threat. And a new cold war has seemingly begun.

For the US, its entire foreign policy since the end of the Cold War has been to consolidate the unipolar moment. This has clearly been shattered with the rising China challenge. Therefore, to Trump’s US the principal foreign policy challenge is not Russia, but China. For those who are lamenting Trump’s diplomatic spat with Zelensky as ‘reverse Kissinger’ stance have clearly missed the rationale for Kissinger’s US-China rapprochement, that was hinged upon befriending the weaker side and isolating the stronger one. Trump’s current tilt towards Russia is principally aimed at weaning away the latter from China’s tentacles and diluting the Russo-China bloc. This is certainly not an irrational foreign policy move given a deep-rooted historical animosity between Russia and China. Also, Russia loathes the status of a secondary power vis-à-vis China. But the fact today is, Russia needs China more than does China. Plus, Russia is deeply concerned with China’s westward expansion into Central Asia (Russia’s backyard) through its Belt and Road initiative. Understood in this perspective, it does lend credence to Trump’s refusal to provide a security guarantee to Ukraine by bringing it within the NATO fold.

Contrarily, one may buy into Zelensky’s apprehension about Putin’s insatiable ethno-nationalist ambitions of regaining historical Russian territory and thus, gobble up Ukraine. In this context, the US softening of its relations with Russia could well be compared with the West’s appeasement policy towards Hitler that had disastrous consequences dragging the countries into the Second World War. However, if Ukraine is brought within the NATO fold, then Russia would be unstoppable for sure. And the US, bound by NATO, would be trapped into a war with Russia. Seen in this light, Trump’s reaching up to Putin is a better geopolitical gamble. This will certainly give Russia much needed confidence and dignity in its dealings with China. Gleaning through Russian history, it is notable that Russia was more an isolationist power, neither comfortable with Europe on its Western periphery nor with the Chinese on its Eastern frontier.

The US insistence for a negotiated peace between Russia and Ukraine is a pragmatic way forward. And certainly, more desirable than that of Europe’s championing to stand with Ukraine and prolonging the war. As for the US, it is the opportunity to undo the wrongs it committed by prodding NATO to expand into the Russian backyard, and thereby, project itself as a responsible power.

(The paper is the author’s individual scholastic articulation. The author certifies that the article/paper is original in content, unpublished and it has not been submitted for publication/web upload elsewhere, and that the facts and figures quoted are duly referenced, as needed, and are believed to be correct). (The paper does not necessarily represent the organisational stance... More >>