Afghanistan in 2024: A Year of Diplomacy, Economic Challenges, and Humanitarian Crises under Taliban 2.0

Since the Taliban seized power in Afghanistan in August 2021, the country has found itself at the centre of complex geopolitical dynamics. The Taliban's resurgence as Afghanistan's ruling regime is marked by a mix of isolationism and selective engagement, leading to 'diplomatic quandaries' regarding internal policies and their style of governance. As Afghanistan enters 2025, the Taliban’s strategy continues to evolve in an environment that is filled with internal challenges, complicated regional diplomacy, and an escalating humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan.

This article will explore the key socio-political, economic, and humanitarian developments inside Afghanistan in 2024, the Taliban’s diplomatic engagements with regional countries, and its implications for regional stability.

The Taliban’s Persistence in Power: Three Years of Control

The year 2024 marked the third anniversary of the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul and the current regime on 14 August [3] commemorated the day with celebrations and organized a military parade at Bagram Airfield [3], the former U.S. military base, featuring Soviet-era tanks, artillery, and military equipment that were left behind by U.S. and NATO forces, including Humvees, helicopters, and tanks. This symbolic display of human resources as well as arms and ammunition underscore the Taliban’s ability to remain in power despite earlier predictions of its incapability to sustain authority and continue as the government of Afghanistan. In the face of numerous internal and external challenges, the Taliban has survived without a ‘formal constitution’ [4] to date, no political opposition, or significant internal resistance against the regime. Such resilience is indicative of the regime's tightly controlled centralized governance structure, although the question regarding the Taliban being the legitimate government of Afghanistan persists among its international partners since the Taliban after three years in power remain unrecognized by the international community.

Recognition remains a pivotal issue for the Islamic Emirate because “International recognition [5]” would grant the Taliban legitimacy to continue its rule over Afghanistan and could remove diplomatic barriers to attracting much-needed finance and investment deals from abroad. However, the international community has set conditions for recognition, including improvement in the human rights situation of the Afghans—especially the Afghan women, forming an inclusive government, to engage in dialogue with different political factions, and to address issues like terrorism and drug trafficking etc. On November 15, the U.S. Deputy Spokesperson for the State Department mentioned, “As long as the Taliban continues to effectively prevent 50 percent of its population from fully participating in society, it will not be able to secure the international recognition it seeks.” In response, the interim government has dismissed these demands as interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs, consistently urging the international community to refrain from such intervention.

The position of women in Afghanistan’s socio-political and economic life were further brought down with several decrees passed by Hibatullah Akhundzada. It has been found that between August 2021 and January 2023, the Emir has passed nearly forty-four decrees on [6]—women, education, judiciary, Sharia law, dress codes, land, revenue, security, etc. Last August-September, the Emir in Afghanistan came out with around 35 new laws/ decrees [7] dictating behaviour and lifestyle for the Afghan people. Among these thirty-five laws, the new morality law that called for wwomen’s faces, bodies to be covered outside their homes [7] led to a huge outcry from the Afghan women.

On 2 December 2024, the Emir verbally issued a directive banning women from studying at medical schools in Afghanistan [8] that came into effect from December 3-4. The training given to midwives and nurses [8] was the last higher educational option available to women in Afghanistan after the Taliban banned all other forms of higher education in December 2022. Following the ban around 35,000 women [8] who were studying in different public and private Afghan health institutions had to leave according to the Taliban’s Ministry of Health. Apart from laws and decrees in the above-mentioned areas, last December the Emir had also brought out a decree concerning curbing human trafficking, composed of six principles that included penalties of one to three years in prison for those convicted of human trafficking [9].

Despite the regressive nature of some of the decrees passed by the Amir ul-Mauminin, it is unlikely to come across any condemnation against those norms from members of the Taliban group except few based in Kabul. The complexity regarding adhering to these norms arises after Taliban’s minister of higher education, Neda Mohammad Nadim, declared that disobeying the orders of their reclusive leader, Hibatullah Akhundzada, is equivalent to defying the “will of God [10]”. Critics including religious scholars are of the opinion that laws passed by the Emir lack Islamic legitimacy and are based on personal interpretations or ethnic and partisan views and hence, cannot be considered divine commands [10].

Diplomatic Engagement amid Isolation

The year 2024 was another year of diplomatic engagements for the Taliban amid several areas of isolationist policies under the interim regime. One of the most pressing dilemmas faced by the Taliban government was balancing its isolationist tendencies with selective diplomatic engagement. Unlike the Taliban’s first regime (1996-2001) which focussed on maintaining an isolationist foreign policy and limited interactions with the international community, Afghanistan’s present economic and worsening humanitarian situation has led the Taliban to increase diplomatic relationships with regional countries and participate in multilateral platforms, addressing its immediate needs.

The geostrategic and geo-economic importance of Afghanistan has led countries like China, Russia, and the Central Asian Republics to expand their diplomatic and economic engagements with the Taliban regime since the time of US withdrawal from the country. The reopening of embassies (the more recent Saudi Arabia in December 2024 [11]) and several consular appointments in Kabul signalled a shift in the Taliban’s foreign policy priorities and intentions to improve diplomatic ties with the international community. The Taliban's diplomatic efforts saw notable successes after the regime in July 2024 initiated talks with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan regarding the new railway project that would link Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan [12]. In addition, in May 2024, Afghanistan and Uzbekistan have reaffirmed their commitment to completing the US$4.8 billion Trans-Afghanistan Railway project [13], which connects Uzbekistan to Pakistan through Afghanistan and has the potential to boost trade, and regional connectivity.

Beyond economic collaborations, Central Asian Republics have also made diplomatic outreaches to the Taliban in 2024. In September 2024, the government of Kyrgyzstan removed the “Taliban Movement” from its list of banned entities [14]. In another similar move, Kazakhstan removed the Taliban from its list of banned organizations on 29 December 2023 [15], allowing for greater cooperation in trade and security. Meanwhile, Russia’s parliament [16] last December approved a legislation allowing the country’s Supreme Court to remove the Taliban from its list of banned groups, which could pave the way for Russia to normalize relations with the Taliban without officially recognizing it. Meanwhile, another diplomatic achievement for the Taliban was the formal presentation of credentials by two ambassadors of the Islamic Emirate to Uzbekistan and the UAE. Taliban leader Ghaffar Bahar in October 2024 presented his credentials to Uzbekistan's Foreign Minister [17] extending the latter’s acceptance of the Taliban leader as the new ambassador to the country. Similarly, on November 28, Taliban leader Badruddin Haqqani [18] presented his credentials to the UAE President as the new Afghan ambassador to their country. In addition to diplomatic exchanges, the Taliban regime in 2024 hosted numerous high-level visits, including dignitaries like the Prime Minister of Uzbekistan [19] which is the highest-level visit by a foreign official since the Taliban returned to power three years ago. All these events in 2024 appear significant as they symbolize Afghanistan’s expanding diplomatic channels and their growing acceptance on regional and international platforms. After three years of the Taliban into power, the administration is now in control of 40 Afghan embassies [20] and consulates globally (after new consuls were appointed to Afghan embassies abroad), while Kabul hosts nearly twenty foreign missions in the country. This surge in diplomatic engagements underscored the Taliban’s increasing international collaborations despite challenges. Meanwhile, there have been reports of suspension of consular services in 13 European countries including in Britain that were operating under diplomats from the previous republican government [21] on the pretext of Taliban’s refusal to engage with former Afghan officials.

Besides increase in bilateral exchange, the current regime’s diplomatic ties with Iran strained over the issue of Afghan refugees living in Iran along with the age-old conflict related to water-sharing issues concerning the Helmand River. Taliban government’s relations vis-à-vis Pakistan appear conflictual over the issue concerning Pakistan’s volatile security scenario with the significant rise in attacks carried out by the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The Taliban regime faces difficulties balancing its relationships with other countries while dealing with internal policies that have made it hard to gain international support. These tensions create challenges for the government as it tries to manage both regional relations and internal issues.

Afghanistan’s Relations with Pakistan

Since the Taliban's takeover of Kabul in August 2021, Afghanistan-Pakistan relations have faced growing challenges, leading to shifts in strategic dynamics between the two countries. A key source of tension in the past three years has been the resurgence of Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which Pakistan had hoped the Afghan Taliban would help them curb, as some TTP factions are believed to be based in Afghanistan [22]. However, the situation has not unfolded as Pakistan had anticipated. The Afghan Taliban has repeatedly emphasized that it does not allow its territory to be used against Pakistan or any other country and has urged Pakistan to focus on resolving its internal issues rather than blaming them for the increase in TTP attacks. In return, Pakistan has implemented various measures to pressurize the Taliban into addressing the TTP threat including the deportation of Afghan refugees (both legal as well as illegal) from Pakistan and restrictions on cross-border movements. In 2024, both Pakistan and Afghanistan saw rise in border clashes between troops [23], which resulted from a number of activities including Pakistani fighter jets seen patrolling the Afghanistan’s airspace, though the reports later could not be confirmed. All these events led to the closure of important border crossing points, especially Torkham and the Chaman thereby, causing huge loses in trade volumes [24] between the two countries.

Pakistan has adopted a multifaceted response to increasing militant activities inside the country in the form of cross-border raids inside Afghanistan that took place last year in March and December, where the Pakistani military conducted attacks inside Afghanistan’s eastern provinces—claiming to target TTP hideouts [25]. The Afghan Taliban in response denied sheltering TTP [25] militants inside the country and accused Pakistan of killing innocent Afghan people (mostly women and children) during their military offensive in last December. Meanwhile, the United Nations Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) [26] responded to these attacks and agreed with the views of the Taliban regarding the killing of innocent civilians inside Afghanistan during the cross-border attacks.

However, the fallout of these military operations inside Afghanistan by the Pakistani military did not bring much peace to Pakistan but complicated its relations with its neighbours. In the aftermath of the March airstrikes by Pakistan, the TTP launched a series of attacks against foreigners inside Pakistan, especially the Chinese nationals [27] who were part of the CPEC project. These attacks resulted in diplomatic pressures from China after Pakistan was asked to “take action against the militants responsible for repeated attacks on Chinese workers, warning that the violence was unacceptable and posed a constraint on Beijing’s investments under its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)” [28]. On the other hand, Pakistan in a bid to end a year of diplomatic pause with Afghanistan had sent a Pakistani delegation [29] led by Special Representative for Afghanistan [30] Ambassador Mohammad Sadiq to Kabul in December 2024. He interacted with several Taliban ministers, which however ended with Afghanistan’s foreign ministry summoning [31] the Charge d’Affaires of the Pakistani Embassy in Kabul over Pakistan’s airstrikes inside Khost and Paktia—limiting the latter’s chances of immediate diplomatic negotiations with the Taliban government of Afghanistan.

However, according to experts, the diplomatic upheavals between Afghanistan and Pakistan since the Taliban’s coming back to power for a second time add to some advantage for India, Pakistan’s arch rival. India which aims to restore its influence in a region where China has significantly stepped up its presence [32], Taliban’s tumultuous relationship with Pakistan shall help India re-establish its influence in Afghanistan.

India’s Strategic Engagement with Afghanistan

After the Taliban takeover, India’s relationship with Afghanistan has been marked by caution and pragmatism. While India refrains from formally recognizing the Taliban as Afghanistan's legitimate government like other regional and global powers, it has maintained diplomatic channels with the Taliban, and remains focussed on providing humanitarian assistance to the people of Afghanistan. As it appears, India’s Afghanistan policy in the past three years has been driven by tactical interests, focusing mainly on engaging with the Taliban regime on humanitarian grounds. India’s interactions with the Taliban government in 2024 [33] have been through various regional forums. For example, India participated in a Regional Cooperation Initiative [33] meeting in Kabul, hosted by the Taliban in January 2024 that had representatives from China, Russia, Pakistan, and Iran. The meeting aimed at fostering a “region-centric narrative [33]” towards developing regional cooperation necessary for building a positive and constructive engagement with the Taliban regime. India’s presence and participation at such forums indicate their desire to maintain influence in Afghanistan, especially at a time when there is a growing presence of regional powers like China in the country. In addition to India engaging in talks with regional partners about Afghanistan, the relationship between India and Afghanistan grew stronger when the Taliban appointed Ikramuddin Kamil [34] as their new representative at the Afghanistan Consulate General in Mumbai.

Although India’s diplomatic engagement with the Taliban focuses on protecting its strategic interests inside Afghanistan, the former at the same time have expressed “concern” [35] over decrees issued by the Taliban [36] banning education for women at school and university levels. Meanwhile, India’s approach [37] towards the Taliban administration has captured significant disappointment from a section of the Afghan civilian population, former republican government officials, and the Afghan women in particular especially on the grounds of the regime’s harsh policies towards the women folk of the country.

Economic Struggles, Structural Vulnerabilities and Humanitarian Crisis

Afghanistan’s economy in 2024 showed some signs of modest growth [38], but the overall situation remains unpredictable. The Afghan economy has still not recovered from the cumulative 27 percent shrinkage [39] experienced since 2020 and appears to be stabilizing at a very low level of activity. According to the World Bank’s Afghanistan Development Update, the country’s GDP grew by 2.7% [40] since the Taliban took power, driven largely by private consumption. However, this growth is fragile, and Afghanistan has only recovered about 10% [40] of the losses sustained since the regime’s takeover in 2021. The economy continues to face significant structural challenges [41], including fiscal constraints, trade imbalances, and limited public infrastructure investment. In addition, several “public institutions [39], particularly in the economic sector, continue to lose technical expertise and capabilities, including women employees—further exacerbating the fragile Afghan economy”

Another critical issue facing the Afghan economy is its reliance on imports, particularly for essential goods like fuel, food, and machinery. The increasing trade deficit [42] and growing dependence on foreign goods put the country at risk of further economic instability. The World Bank reported that Afghanistan faces a widening trade deficit, which poses a significant risk to its long-term economic stability. While exports remained stable, imports have surged in 2024, [43] fuelled by an increase in the value of the Afghan currency and growing demand for foreign goods. This trend highlights Afghanistan’s vulnerability to external economic shocks and reliance on international trade to meet domestic needs. Meanwhile, Afghanistan’s struggling economy in the country is responsible for causing a severe humanitarian crisis. Political and economic instability, exacerbated by natural disasters such as droughts, earthquakes, and floods, has left millions of Afghans in urgent need of assistance. The United Nations estimates that over 23.7 million people, more than half of Afghanistan’s population, are in need of humanitarian aid. [44] However, there has been a delay on the part of the current regime in Afghanistan in providing basic services to the population, leaving millions to rely on international aid for survival.

Afghanistan’s economic collapse, combined with the Taliban’s repressive gender-biased policies, has further contributed to the suffering of the Afghan population. The lack of women’s participation [45] in the economy remains a significant barrier to sustainable growth. The proportion of women working across all sectors has also dropped dramatically, from 11 percent in 2022 to just six percent in 2024 [39]. The Afghan government’s failure to address gender inequality, education, and healthcare needs further aggravates the country’s economic potential. As a result, restricting women's participation in the economy is harmful to Afghanistan’s efforts to address its economic crisis. Therefore, there is a need to improve the banking system, including the microfinance sector [39], which plays a crucial role in supporting women-led small businesses. Since 2021, these businesses have shrunk by 60%, [39] making it even more important to address these challenges. Further, in 2023 the closure of beauty salons resulted in the loss of over 60,000 jobs, [46] further making it difficult for women in navigating job opportunities available to them. Moreover, the ban on women working in international NGOs and the social sector has discouraged potential international donors from providing support which is likely to worsen the present humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan [47].

Considering the current policies of the Taliban against the Afghan women which include restricting them attaining education (beyond sixth grade and university education) and denying them economic opportunities by curtailing there entry into the labour market has left a deep impact on the country’s overall economic development [48]. According to the UN, denying women economic rights will cost Afghanistan up to $1 billion [49], something the country will find it difficult to recover based on the current economic crisis. Therefore, in view of the fragile Afghan economy, it is important the Taliban should bring changes to its policies regarding women so that there increased participation in education can enable them to develop skills necessary to contribute towards the country’s economy and development.

The Path Ahead

To conclude, as Afghanistan enters another year, the Taliban's continued control of Afghanistan has resulted in a fragile balance of internal governance, diplomatic engagement, and ongoing humanitarian challenges. While the regime has survived for three years through a tightly centralized controlled structure and selective international outreach, its strict policies, particularly towards women, have drawn widespread condemnation and hindered the country’s economic recovery. The lack of international recognition and the reliance on foreign aid are likely to exacerbate the country’s economic struggle in the coming years. Moving forward, the Taliban's approach to governance and regional diplomacy will play a crucial role in shaping the nation’s future, but without significant policy reforms, especially regarding women’s rights, Afghanistan’s progress remains limited.

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