If We Must, ‘Fight with What We Have’!

It may be Chinese belligerence territorially, in the battle space or geopolitically, and Pakistani obstinacy in continuing proxy war in J&K and preparations for conventional war with nuclear threat, war can be thrust on India without tell-tale signs. It had happened in Kargil in 1999 and again nearly so in Eastern Ladakh in 2020! Then again, wars may remain distant, with only the threat hanging as Damocles sword. It must not also be taken as outside the realms of imagination that the seemingly intractable border issues are put to rest following deft, deliberate political, though long-drawn, negotiations. Military preparedness and readiness, in any which way, is an imperative that cannot be shied away.

The fact is that all wars, unconventional or conventional, are grave and take immense toll on nations, combatants and non-combatants, alike. Despite three years of Ukraine-Russia war, and a year and half of Israel’s Gaza onslaught following the horrendous 07 Oct 2023 terrorist assault, the costs of war, the attrition and destruction it is causing, and unlikelihood of a clear and clean victor are major disincentives for political decision-makers to undertake wars, to try and contain it once it commences, and to de-escalate, soonest thereafter. Any rational decision-makers well understands that wars hence must be the last resort.

Deterrence is widely considered key to avoiding war, discouraging military action by outweighing potential gains, by preventing conflict through the threat of retaliation by punishment or denial. That may be the rationale why terrorists attack on Indian Parliament in December 2001 that led to the ten-month military stand-off in 2002 named Op Parakram or terror attacks in Mumbai in 2008, did not escalate to war. Hence, exaggerated notions of likelihood of war are counterproductive. For war to breakout in 21st Century, it will mandate exceptional incentives for the politicians to negotiate out of compromises, and to contemplate that long term solutions are feasible through bloodshed. Compromise, politically and diplomatically, is hence normally the rule.

However, Carl von Clausewitz had reminded, that war is continuation of politics by other means. So did Mao Tse-tung in 1938, “…politics is war without bloodshed, while war is politics with bloodshed.” Authoritarian regimes are more prone to war, though they too cannot ignore the social contract with the peoples. There can be nationalist obsessions to go to war, like unification of Taiwan, which could satiate the desire for glorious legacy in addition to national goals. National organisations like Pakistan Army have ideological motivations like ensuing their own all-importance in radicalised society. Eventually war may become one of ideological necessity and national obsessions for Pakistan Army, to get out of the chaos it finds itself in and the bedlam it has brought to Pakistan internally. And for this Pakistan Army may choose to ignore cost versus benefit!

Defence Budget in a Nebulous Operating Environment

It is an era of such operating environment, with sprint in military technologies, and the transformation that these are leading to in warfare and structural changes, the demand for enhanced defence capital expenditure is expected. Year after year, however, the demand for grants for Defence presented in Parliament leave most stakeholders guessing about its adequacy and provisioning of capability development. Persisting shortfalls in combat assets of the Armed Forces and capacities in the emerging domains of warfare (cyber, electronic warfare, space, cognitive warfare etc) suggest that defence planners are unable to derive full value out of money being spent. Also, there exists a disconnect between national geopolitical aims, aspirations, and the capabilities required to be created over a given time frame, and the resources being provisioned for the same. The Services endeavour to build their cutting edge in an environment where there is a seeming “lack of ownership” on part of the executive and the legislature for building hard power, commensurate to the country’s global and regional stature.^[1]

Factual figures apart, there has been a prevailing perception that defence budget allocations should be pitched at around 3% of the GDP to adequately meet India’s defence needs. There is no quantified rationale either for the allocation of 1.63% of GDP or the expectation of 3%. The bane of prolonged delays in acquisition lies in the inability to align defence budgets to acquisition plans. Creation of defence capability is to match and obtain advantage in war from a technologically advanced adversary, China, and its open links with the second one, Pakistan. Since defence capability development is a hugely expensive proposition and remains an ongoing process, the challenge is to arrive at what is enough and what should be an optimum yearly defence budget allocation?^[2]

Inevitably with speed of technological changes, this modernisation will remain an ongoing process. The challenge, therefore, is to arrive at what capabilities are optimal currently, in the mid-term of 2035 and long term of 2047? And how do these capabilities translate into long-term assured yearly budgeted allocations?

There is a need, hence, for greater critical evaluation and refinement of current warfighting plans and doctrines, as also strategise for creation of military capabilities. The defence budgets have their own severe limitations for capital expenditure and hence must do more with less. It is also imperative to arrive at an “optimum size” of defence budget, balancing other competing requirements but in tune with national goals and objectives, to be achieved over determined timelines.

In our process the ideal procurement time, post-approval of the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC), is approximately two years. With only a negligible few schemes meeting this timeline, should the allocations be aligned to the schemes to be sanctioned by the DAC and put into the “acquisition funnel” during the financial year, with no certainty of when this procurement may fructify? Or, budgeted based on prevailing critical operational voids? Or, to the capabilities sought to be created over a stipulated period as part of the “Long Term Integrated Capability Development Plan”?^[3] Tedious questions, all!

So, ‘Fight with What we Have!’

It is inaccurate to say that all armed forces globally are starved for funds. However, many countries face significant defence budgetary constraints, leading to potential issues with modernization, equipment upkeep and overall readiness. India’s defence budget for 2025 has seen 9.52% increase, to Rs 6.81 lakh crore. However, much of this growth is attributed to rising pension costs and revenue expenditure. Despite this increase, the defence budget remains at 1.9% of the projected GDP, a figure that experts argue is insufficient given India’s strategic challenges. The most significant rise in allocation is in the pension category, which accounts for 23.60% of total budget and stands at Rs 1,60,795 crore, reflecting a 13.8% increase from last year.^[4]

That brings to fore oft repeated cliché, “We shall fight with whatever we have.” This was stated by COAS in response to a journalist's question about the Indian Army's lack of weapons and equipment during the 1999 Kargil War. Donald Rumsfeld, the United States’ former Secretary of Defense, had on 08 December, 2004 in Kuwait said, “You go to war with the army you have, not the army you might want or wish to have at a later time.” It was in response to an Army specialist in Operation Iraqi Freedom who said his company was armouring its Humvees with broken ballistic glass and scrap metal, then driving to face the roadside bomb threat. “You can have all the armour in the world on a tank, and a tank can be blown up. And you can have an up-armoured Humvee, and it can be blown up,” was the rest of the infamous quote. Simple implication was – fight with what you have!

In a commentary based upon apex level experience it was stated that “Armies have to crystal gaze to anticipate the contours of the future battlefield and develop systems to meet next-generation challenges. Failure to do so will mean fighting the wars of tomorrow with the weapons of yesterday. …this is precisely what armies around the world must do – anticipate during peacetime, rather than improvise during war or war-like conditions. We will then be able to fight future wars with the army “we wish we had”.^[5]

What does ‘fight wars with what we have’ imply? There is an inherent underlying feel that armed forces always desire much more wherewithal to prosecute decisive war. Implicit in fight with what we have is a sense of haste or urgency, with limited time to modernise, necessitating immediate actions largely with what is available for the immediate war. Hence, the philosophy of what we have is simple, it underscores the importance of utilizing existing strengths and capabilities to the fullest, even if they may not be ideal for the specific conflict facing a superior force. Apparently, preparations for the war had severe shortfalls, in developing optimal military capabilities, in available ‘means’ to achieve political ‘ends’ in planned ‘ways’.

This does not imply that a weaker force has never defeated a superior force. Finnish Winter War 1939 is such an example of the weaker foe achieving military success against a stronger foe, USSR. At Longewala, in India-Pakistan War of 1971, 2000 to 3000 Pakistani soldiers and 40 tanks attacked and were defeated by 120 Indian troops and IAF strikes. Viet Minh against French, Vietcong against Americans, Afghanistan against USSR, Taliban against the US are some cases in point. Vulnerabilities of the stronger force can be exploited with focussed strategy and doctrines, strong transformational leadership, terrain advantages, treachery and cunning, risk-taking abilities, asymmetrical operations, positive attitude and strategic culture.

Wars are too serious a business to be left to intangibles. Military capabilities and modernisation are more that simple acquisitions of modern military platforms and technology. Improving effectiveness of military capabilities ought to be based upon newer concepts of operations, tactics, command and control, supporting infrastructure, organisational structure, training and personnel policies. In this context, first imperative is to define and delineate military capabilities and their components, lay down clear prioritisation, the methodicity of their creation and acquisition, and the long-term budgetary support necessary.

Obviously when faced with a difficult or impromptu situation, ‘fighting with what you have’ signifies determination to find solutions despite potential disadvantages, by resilience and adaptability. This ought to be strategized for. This however cannot be a long-term policy.

Endnotes

^[1] Anil Ahuja, Defence Budget 2023-2024: More of the Same, Delhi Policy Group, Volume VIII, Issue 12, February 23, 2023, accessed at https://www.delhipolicygroup.org/uploads_dpg/publication_file/defence-budget-2023-2024-more-of-the-same-4856.pdf [3]
^[2] Ibid
^[3] Ibid
^[4] The Economic Times, New Delhi, 03 Feburary 2025, accessed at https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/more-for-pensions-less-for-firepower-is-indias-defence-budget-strategically-weak/articleshow/117880711.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst [4]
^[5] Manoj Mukund Naravane, Don’t fight wars of tomorrow with weapons of yesterday. Armies must prepare for future battles, The Print, 04 March 2024, accessed at https://theprint.in/opinion/dont-fight-wars-of-tomorrow-with-weapons-of-yesterday-armies-must-prepare-for-future-battles/1987010/?clientId=663c631856e840159e994170&mobileView=false [5]

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