Trump and the Indo-Pacific Security Structure - More of the Same?

Donald Trump’s re-election to the White House was not entirely unexpected. If anything, it was much in line with the political trends the world witnessed in 2024, a bulk of which were marked by upheavals and change of guard. But while change is, indeed, the only constant, it also leaves much to speculation in a world mired in geopolitical crises. Trump’s predictable unpredictability comes across as a double-edged sword, especially in the context of the nebulous security structures in the Indo-Pacific Region, providing an occasion for reimagination and realignments while facing an existential challenge from a potential American reluctance to continue as a critical Indo-Pacific power [3].

Indo-Pacific and Its Security Structures - What Are They Anyway?

In recent years, the Indo-Pacific region has emerged as a “symbol of regional engagement [4]” between different countries, including the US, India, Australia, and ASEAN nations, to enhance collective efforts in promoting a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific. A loosely, but ideologically, tethered Indo-Pacific has proven critical to the emergence of alliances, treaties and similar apparatuses between like-minded countries in this part of the world. A security structure in the Indo-Pacific, then, figures as a “latticework of partnerships [5]”, involving multiple minilateral and bilateral strategic and military initiatives, such as the Quad [6].

Despite the absence of an institutional linchpin, the glue for the Indo-Pacific as a symbolic, yet security-critical arrangement is a combination of opportunities and risks. As home [3] to half the world’s population, 2/3rds of the global economy and large military powers, the Indo-Pacific has been perceived by successive US administrations as significant to global (and American) security and prosperity [7], making it a vast hotspot for opportunities for national and transnational growth. But with great opportunities come greater risks. Today, the Indo-Pacific as a geopolitical theatre is facing growing [8] challenges and restrictions on the freedom of navigation and trade, great power rivalry and increasingly volatile competition over the resources, territories and international waters, to name a few. Notwithstanding its relatively recent rise as a theatre of prominence, the Indo-Pacific has long been exposed to strategic, economic and geopolitical vulnerabilities, necessitating strategic initiatives to preserve its characteristic freedom and openness, particularly against actors that may not be aligned to similar ideals and values.

Without falling into the trap of cause and effect, suffice it to say that China and its increasingly aggressive assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific appear prominently [9] in the strategic calculus of the different partnerships that have emerged in this part of the world. As a result, a good chunk of the known Indo-Pacific-centred strategic and military initiatives, including the 2018 US Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific, have come to allude to the growing Chinese threat in the region as a critical motif. This declassified strategy, whose echoes [3] can be heard in the outgoing American administration’s actions and policies too, acknowledges an ascendant but pushy China [10] as not only a strategic competitor but also a norm-breaker that is expected to “circumvent international rules to gain advantage”. However, despite the ongoing China fixation in successive American administrations, it is still not easy to predict which side of the fence the Trump administration is more likely to come down on in the Indo-Pacific.

Will it shift, or won’t it?

A part of this uncertainty is a result of Trump’s known penchant for mercurial decisions and [11] unpredictability on matters of foreign policy, while the other part has to do with the anticipated [11] conflicts between his nominated representatives that could inhibit timely and cohesive foreign policy stance. Added to this, a domestically divided [9] America may further impair a potentially dysfunctional administration, affecting its transnational engagements even as it was under Trump’s previous administration that the strategic concept of the “Indo-Pacific” gained much traction [12], however tumultuous [13]. But while it may be too soon and even a bit wishful to seek a quotient of certainty in knowing ‘what’s next’ for the Indo-Pacific, there are some broader ideological and normative dimensions, especially from Trump’s prior Presidential stint and his recent political campaigns and choices of representatives, which may serve as signposts to avoid being taken completely by surprise.

Trump’s repeated emphasis on “America First [14]”, coupled with his nominations [11] for key posts within the White House, are unlikely signals of an incoming thaw in the fraught US-China relationship. Far from it, the bilateral tensions between the US and China are speculated to increase amid a potential aggressive reframing [15] of the ideological and economic competition between the two countries on matters ranging from values to tariffs and trade. For the Indo-Pacific, Trump and his administration’s strategically hawkish and economically transactional view of China (and the rest of the world) could play out in two different ways.

On the one hand, the Chinese appendage to the American approach in the Indo-Pacific could push countries like Japan and Australia to seek further cooperation among themselves and an increase in defence spending to extract American concessions, such as the Host Nation Support [16], to bolster their interests in the Indo-Pacific. In other words, they will have to entice [13] a mercantile Trump with a promise of decreased pressure on American coffers to keep the latter interested in the region, which may in turn further deepen the existing partnerships for cost and burden sharing. On the other hand, the same China fixation could hamstring existing and emerging alliances, especially for many Southeast Asian countries whose enmeshment [7] with China is more geographically proximate, territorial, and concerns regional assertion of Chinese power more than principles, unlike the US. Trump’s re-carving of the American approach in more economic and less military terms, could then not only intensify great power rivalry in the region, but it may also see a simultaneous backsliding of the American interest to serve as a critical security bulwark [17] in the region, which can be concerning [13].

Minilateral and bilateral are likely to become more prominent [14] either way, especially as an economically (over)sensitive America exacts reciprocity for whatever it does or does not do. A coincidence of interests, and burden-sharing as mentioned above, is likely to assist in the proliferation of more one-to-one strategic commitments and arrangements, such as that recently sounded by Japan [18] vis-a-vis Taiwan, while multilateral groupings may take a further hit under Trump.

With Trump’s administration having been inaugurated on Jan 20, the world is likely to be on its toes to catch signals of continuity and departure to understand, if not predict, the course of the new American government. The unsettled nature of the Indo-Pacific region as a geopolitical reality and strategic idea, sans an institutional framework, is particularly vulnerable to Trump’s deviations and divesting of interest and investment. But it will be prudent for the other stakeholders to show resilience and adaptability in their approach and engagement as the Indo-Pacific, both as a theatre and a concept, will outlast the last term of an unpredictable president.

(The paper is the author’s individual scholastic articulation. The author certifies that the article/paper is original in content, unpublished and it has not been submitted for publication/web upload elsewhere, and that the facts and figures quoted are duly referenced, as needed, and are believed to be correct). (The paper does not necessarily represent the organisational stance... More >>