Arctic: The New Frontier of Power Play

The Arctic region is generally defined as the area of land and water located north of the 66.5°N latitude, also known as the Arctic Circle. ^[1] The term "Arctic" comes from the Greek word 'arktikos,' meaning "of the bear," which refers to the Ursa Major constellation. Covering about 6% of the Earth's surface, it is roughly 1.5 times the size of the United States. ^[2] The Arctic is home to the Arctic Ocean, one of the world's five major oceans, and eight countries, known as the Arctic States, border this ocean. While often viewed as a distant and frozen wilderness, the Arctic has gained global attention in recent decades due to the significant impact of climate change. ^[3] By some accounts, the Arctic is warming at four times the rate of the rest of the world. ^[4]

The region is undergoing a significant transformation, driven by environmental changes, strategic realignments, and geopolitical tensions among major powers like the United States, China, Russia, and NATO. The melting ice caps have brought maritime pathways, like the Northern Sea Route (NSR), into prominence, considerably shortening the shipping distance between Europe and Asia, and offering economic benefits to countries looking for quicker trade routes and lower shipping expenses. They have intensified competition for strategic dominance and access to untapped resources, leading to a complex power struggle.

The Arctic presents India with a complex set of opportunities as well as challenges. Cognisant of these, the government released India’s Arctic Policy on 17 March 2022. The primary actors in the Arctic are the Arctic Council and the eight constituent member states. Apart from these China also plays an increasingly prominent role.

The Arctic Council has evolved significantly since its establishment, becoming a pivotal forum for promoting cooperation, coordination, and interaction among the Arctic States, indigenous peoples, and other inhabitants on common Arctic issues. An overview of its evolution, including important dates and successes achieved is described in succeeding paragraphs.

The Arctic Council was established on 19 September 1996.^[5] It is a high-level intergovernmental forum promoting cooperation, coordination, and interaction among the Arctic states, indigenous communities, and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues, particularly sustainable development and environmental protection. ^[6] The decision-making in the Arctic Council is based on the principle of ‘consensus’. The Council promotes cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States, and common Arctic issues, in particular the issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic. However, it has no regulatory powers for compliance and no enforcement mechanisms.

Members The Arctic Council consists of eight Member States, i.e. Canada, Denmark (including Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the USA. ^[7]

Observers Thirteen non-Arctic states {Germany (1998), Netherlands (1998), UK(1998), Poland (1998), France (2000), Spain (2006), Italy (2013), Japan (2013), China (2013), India (2013), Republic of Korea (2013), and Singapore (2013)}, thirteen intergovernmental and inter-parliamentary organisations, and thirteen non-governmental organisations have been approved so far as observers to the Council. ^[8]

The European Union has not yet been given full observer status (2013) but may observe the council proceedings. As per the Observer Manual (Appendix V), observer organisations may observe the functioning of the Council. However, they may make relevant contributions through their engagement in the Arctic Council only through the Working Groups of the Arctic Council (Arctic Council, 2016). The activities of the Council are conducted through six Working Groups whose members comprise government agencies, expert-level representatives from sectoral ministries, and researchers. At the Kiruna Ministerial meeting an Arctic Council Observer Manual was formally adopted. Subsequently, an amendment was issued in 2016 (Arctic Council, 2016).

Chair The council members meet biannually, and the chairmanship of the Arctic Council rotates every two years. The initial chairs of the Council were Canada (1996-1998) followed by the United States (1998-2000), Finland (2000-2002), Iceland (2002-2004), Russia (2004-2006), Norway (2006-2009), and Denmark (2009-2011). Presently, Norway is serving as the chair of the council, from 2023 till 2025 having taken over from Russia in May 2023. ^[9] Denmark will chair the Arctic Council from 2025–2027. ^[10]

Agreements The Council had initially promulgated two binding agreements, the 2011 ‘Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement’, and the 2013 ‘Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response’, which addresses responsibilities and promotes sharing of information, collaboration in gaining knowledge and training and real-world contingency response (Arctic Council, 2024c). At the 8th Ministerial meeting in Kiruna, Sweden, in 2013, Ministers of the Arctic States mandated the creation of a Task Force, "to work towards an arrangement on improved scientific research cooperation among the eight Arctic States". The culmination of this work came at the 10th Ministerial meeting at Fairbanks, Alaska on 11 May 2017, with the signature of the third agreement, ‘Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation’ (Arctic Council, 2017b).

The International ‘Agreement to Prevent Unregulated Fishing in the High Seas of the Central Arctic Ocean’ entered into force in 2021. The Agreement will prevent commercial fishing by the signatory states in the high seas of the Arctic Ocean for sixteen years was signed by ten countries: Canada, Iceland, the Kingdom of Denmark, Norway, the United States and the Russian Federation, as well as China, Japan, South Korea and the European Union (Arctic Council, 2021).

Present Status: The Arctic Council turned 25 in 2021. Despite committing “to maintain peace stability and constructive cooperation in the Arctic” (Fairbanks declaration, Arctic Council, 2017), due to Russia special military operations in Ukraine, the Arctic Council has been in a state of suspended animation since March 2022. The current chair Norway (2023-2025) has been attempting to revive functioning of some working groups.

In response to Russia’s Special Military Operation in Ukraine on March 3, 2022, seven out of eight Arctic Council (AC) members suspended their participation in all council activities. ^[11] This occurred during Russia’s presidency of the AC, which spanned from 2021 to 2023. ^[12] Shortly thereafter, the Nordic Council of Ministers, the European Commission and the Barents Euro-Arctic Cooperation (BEAC) also suspended cooperation with Russia in research, science, and innovation.

The United States also decided to terminate various relationships and research collaborations with Russian government-affiliated institutions and individuals in science and technology. Presently, apart from cooperation between the US Coast Guard and the Russian Border Guard on maritime safety on either side of the Bering Strait, enforcement of treaty-based commitments such as the ban on fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean and aeronautical and maritime search and rescue in the Arctic, there is no interaction between Russia and the West.

Much of the research and data sharing between scientists has been put on hold due to restrictions imposed by European and US funding agencies (Bisen, 2024). Several field experiments originally planned for the region have shifted to the North American or European Arctic. The curbs have led to the cutting off of data on permafrost research from Russia, a key source of information for climate models that help researchers predict future warming. The suspension is despite the existence (since 2018) of an Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation between the eight Arctic Council members.

Key Players in the Arctic

The United States has recognised the strategic importance of the Arctic and has taken various measures to strengthen its presence in the region. With Alaska as part of its Arctic territory, the U.S. maintains military bases, including in Greenland, and has established specific Arctic strategies across different departments. Initiatives like the establishment of the 11th Airborne Division^[13] and the Polar Security Cutter program^[14] underscore its commitment to Arctic operations, while recent bilateral defence agreements with Nordic countries enhance military cooperation.

Russia, with its significant territory, population, and resources in the Arctic, is a key player in the region. Despite facing sanctions, Russia continues to invest in Arctic infrastructure and military presence. However, its special military operations in Ukraine have led to isolation within the Arctic Council, which, after the accession of Finland and Sweden, has become one with NATO except for Russia.

NATO's involvement in the Arctic, including exercises like Trident Juncture and Nordic Response, has heightened the geopolitical environment. Finland's and Sweden’s NATO membership and their increased defence expenditure contribute to the complex security situation.

China has declared itself a "Near-Arctic State"^[15] and has invested heavily in Arctic infrastructure and energy sectors. The concept of the "Polar Silk Road" as part of its Belt and Road Initiative highlights its economic interests in utilizing Arctic shipping routes. However, China's claims and investments face opposition from the U.S. and other Arctic states.

Key Issues in the Arctic

Boundary disputes among Arctic states, such as overlapping continental shelf claims and maritime boundaries, add to the region's complexity. Despite some resolutions, unresolved issues persist.

Cooperation within the Arctic Council has come to a complete standstill since Russia's military operations in Ukraine. Lack of engagement between Russia and the West has disrupted scientific research and data sharing, hindering efforts to track climate change, monitor biodiversity, and address environmental threats like permafrost thawing and radioactive waste. The suspension of funding and cooperation in Arctic climate change research since 2022, particularly the absence of Russian data, has impeded scientists' understanding of the region's warming trend and its global implications.

The Arctic faces severe climate change impacts, with temperatures rising four times faster than the global average. ^[16] Thawing permafrost poses risks of future pandemics and carbon/methane release, while unmanaged radioactive waste threatens ecosystems and public health. Reduced cooperation exacerbates these risks, with potentially catastrophic consequences for all states amidst the global climate emergency.

Russia’s importance in the Arctic cannot be ignored. It is more than the other seven Arctic states put together in Arctic coastline, population, hydrocarbon reserves, mineral resources and permafrost. Lately, there has been a growing realisation of Russia's crucial role in Arctic cooperation in the West. Officials from the US and Norway have stressed the necessity of Russian involvement in combating climate change during the Arctic Frontiers Forum in January 2024.

Due to the cessation of cooperation within the Arctic Council, indigenous peoples of the Arctic also lack adequate representation to address threats to their communities. Climate change, pollution, and resource extraction endanger their way of life, emphasizing the need for equitable partnerships between states and local communities.

To address concerns, the Arctic Council has resumed official Working Group meetings in a virtual format, ^[17] aiming to restore cooperation among member states and Indigenous Permanent Participant organizations. However, the suspension of scientific cooperation has also affected research efforts of Asian Observer countries, such as India and China, due to limitations in their engagement with the Arctic Council.

The strained relationship between the West and Russia poses a significant risk of military confrontation in the Arctic. Increasing polarization and hostility, coupled with the abandonment of cooperative mechanisms, elevate the danger of misunderstandings and miscommunication leading to conflict escalation.

To address this, re-establishing confidential, unofficial exchanges could help clarify misunderstandings, define basic interests, and avert crises. These initiatives could introduce guardrails or confidence-building measures to enhance predictability and inject creative policy ideas into official discourse. However, clear incentives for participation must be presented to all parties to minimise risks and prevent dangerous escalation, anchored in common interests and mutual benefits.

Due to its continued isolation, there are signs of potential Russian withdrawal from the Arctic Council. Russia has halted annual payments until "real work" resumes with the participation of all member countries. ^[18] This follows earlier amendments to Russia's Arctic policy, emphasising bilateral relationships over multilateral cooperation. The prospect of Russian withdrawal could further complicate Arctic governance and cooperation efforts.

Russia is also seeking to create a parallel governance mechanism in the Arctic and as part of its BRICS Presidency from 01 January 2024, plans to create an international scientific and educational centre for the BRICS and SCO countries in the Russian Pyramiden settlement on the Svalbard Archipelago. ^[19]

Despite political tensions, science must be freed from ideological constraints to address urgent challenges. International agreements like the 2017 Arctic scientific cooperation agreement obligate states to facilitate collaboration, ensuring access to infrastructure, research areas, and data. Impeding science restricts academic freedom and hinders vital research on human survival.

India and Russia: The relationship between India and Russia is deeply rooted and enduring, spanning various sectors such as politics, diplomacy, economics, and defence. The strategic partnership between the two countries has evolved over time, marked by regular high-level meetings and cooperation in areas like defence, energy, nuclear, space, and technology. India values its relationship with Russia, which is reciprocated by Moscow, as demonstrated by President Putin's acknowledgment of India's independent foreign policy. Amidst Russia's potential isolation in the Arctic Council, there's a likelihood of closer ties between Russia and India on the Arctic, especially considering India's strategic importance in global geopolitics.

Russia and China: Russia's relationship with China has also been strengthening, particularly in the economic realm. The two countries have witnessed significant growth in bilateral trade and collaboration, including in the Arctic, where China has emerged as a key partner for Russia. However, Russia's increasing dependence on China poses challenges for India's strategic interests, necessitating efforts to provide alternative avenues for Russia's engagement, thus reducing its reliance on China.

India and the Arctic: India, although geographically distant from the Arctic, has a contingent interest in the region's future. India’s tryst with Arctic began in 1920 when it signed the Svalbard Treaty in Paris. India’s Arctic research station ‘Himadri’ was set up in 2008 at Svalbard. ^[20] As a growing global power with a rapidly expanding economy, India recognizes the economic potential of the Arctic's resources and their trade routes. In addition to its economic interests, India has also identified strategic concerns in the Arctic, such as the potential impact on global climate patterns and the need to ensure the peaceful and cooperative governance of the region. Over the next few decades, India envisions a proactive role in the Arctic, balancing its economic aspirations with its commitment to environmental sustainability. India's strategic interests will focus on promoting peaceful cooperation in the region, advocating for responsible resource exploitation, and safeguarding the rights of indigenous Arctic communities. Economically, India aims to leverage its expertise in technology and renewable energy to contribute to sustainable development in the Arctic. As India seeks to secure its strategic and economic interests in the Arctic over the next few decades it faces the dual challenge of harnessing opportunities while mitigating the environmental impact. ^[21]

India’s Concerns: For India, the Arctic holds strategic significance due to its impact on India's climate, monsoon patterns, strategic minerals and energy security. India's interests in the region align with its broader geopolitical goals, such as ensuring a multipolar world order and safeguarding its sovereignty. India's participation in the Arctic is driven by scientific research, economic opportunities, and the need to address climate change. It is also a matter of considerable significance that two of India’s closest strategic partners, Russia and the US and India’s principal adversary, are locked in a strategic contestation in the Arctic, which makes it imperative for India to remain engagement in the region.

Given the evolving dynamics in the Arctic, India needs to step up its engagement, to secure increasing national interests. It is in India’s long-term strategic interest to wean Russia away from Chinese embrace by providing suitable alternatives in terms of markets, finance, access, manpower and where possible, technology. The Russian Arctic could potentially address India’s energy security and deficiency of rare earth/strategic minerals. India’s oil purchase from Russia in 2023, 40 % of India’s oil imports in 2023, is a case in point.

India needs to enhance its bilateral cooperation with Russia in the Arctic and support Russia's proposal for enhanced BRICS+ engagement in the Arctic. This would not only provide Russia with an alternative to Chinese influence but also open avenues for Indian industries to collaborate with Russia in various sectors.

As far as the original Arctic Council is concerned, India must not only remain engaged but expand its engagement with the Arctic Council Working Groups. Within the Council, India along with the other Asian Observer States must push for full resumption of its activities. India, in concert with the other Asian Observers, must also lobby for an expanded role for the Observers in the Council and for doing away with the present inequities in the Arctic Council vis-à-vis the member states. India’s long-term goal ought to seek a reconstitution of the Arctic Council and seek a full membership for itself.

Endnotes

^[1] Arctic
^[2] Arctic Ocean - 2022 World Factbook Archive’
^[3] Mathew Gross. (02 Dec 2020), Geopolitical Competition in the Arctic Circle
^[4] Mike Rantanen et al, The Arctic has warmed nearly four times faster than the globe since 1979, Nature, 11 August 2022
^[5] ‘EDOCS-1752-v2-ACMMCA00_Ottawa_1996_Founding_Declaration.PDF’, n.d accessed 13 September 2024 .
^[6] ‘EDOCS-1752-v2-ACMMCA00_Ottawa_1996_Founding_Declaration.PDF’, n.d.
^[7] Arctic States
^[8] Arctic Council Observers
^[9] All Chairmanships
^[10] https://arctic-council.org/about/states/denmark/ [3]
^[11] Joint Statement on Arctic Council Cooperation Following Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine
^[12] Russian Chairmanship 2021-2023
^[13] 11th Airborne Division Activation Ceremony
^[14] Polar Security Cutter
^[15] A New Cold War? China Declares Itself a ‘Near-Arctic State’
^[16] The Arctic has warmed ‘nearly four times faster’ than the global average
^[17] One year into the 2023-2025 Norwegian Chairship: A Q&A with SAO Chair Morten Høglund
^[18] Russia Analytical Report, Feb. 16-26, 2024
^[19] Massive Russian Mobilization in the Arctic, High North News' overview shows
^[20] Press Information Bureau Government of India Ministry of Earth Sciences, Research Stations in the Arctic and Antarctica. 12-August-2013 16:10 IST
^[21] India’s Arctic Policy. (2022)

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