The Quad vs AUKUS Debate: Implications for India

In recent years, there has been an upsurge of minilaterals in the Indo-Pacific to bolster a more diversified regional security architecture alongside the traditional US-led alliance system. The Indo-Pacific’s strategic significance lies in its vital sea lanes which are critical for global trade and energy transport. The region today is becoming increasingly militarised, driven in large part by China's rapid naval expansion. In 2023, just 11 years after the first Chinese Navy’s fighter aircraft landed on the Liaoning aircraft carrier, China’s second carrier, the Shandong, was already conducting live-fire drills in the South China Sea. In this evolving landscape, the significance of collective security frameworks like the Quad and the AUKUS have become increasingly pronounced.

The Quad comprising the United States, Japan, India, and Australia traces its origins to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, where the four countries coordinated their disaster relief efforts. In 2007, in a speech at the Indian Parliament, the late Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe had called for uniting democracies across the Eurasian rim and the Pacific Ocean. Although the concept lost momentum, Abe sought to revive it before he assumed office again in 2012 as the Asian Democratic Security Diamond. However, it was under the Trump administration in 2017 that the Quad began to solidify as a strategic partnership. In September 2021, the US, Australia, and the UK signed a trilateral security pact called AUKUS. Under this pact, the three countries focussed on a deeper integration of security engagement including defence technology and military industrial supply chains. The flagship project under the AUKUS involves the US and the UK helping Australia to build nuclear-powered submarines.

In recent years, China has actively sought to unilaterally alter the status quo and escalate tensions in the region through the militarisation of disputed territories, aggressive use of its coast guard, and persistent efforts to hinder other nations from accessing their offshore resources. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) boasts of a formidable fleet including two operational aircraft carriers (Liaoning and Shandong), advanced destroyers like the Type 055 Renhai-class, and a growing fleet of nuclear and conventional submarines. In its 2020 Annual Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments involving the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Pentagon raised concerns over China's rapid naval expansion, noting that “the PRC has already achieved parity with—or even exceeded—the United States in several military modernisation areas… including shipbuilding, missiles, and integrated air defense systems.” China’s naval buildup is projected to continue at an aggressive pace until 2035, aligning with its goal of completing military modernisation. A leaked slide from the US Office of Naval Intelligence in September 2023 revealed that China’s shipbuilding capacity surpasses that of the United States by a 200-degree fold. This staggering lead can be attributed to China's large shipyards which significantly outnumber those of ^[1] the US. The Jiangnan Shipyard near Shanghai, one of China’s largest shipyards alone boasts a capacity equivalent to all US shipyards combined together. ^[2]

A 2017 Government Accountability Office analysis of US Navy shipyard facilities discovered that clearing the backlog of restoration and maintenance projects would take at least 19 years, extending through fiscal year 2036. ^[3] This backlog has made it fiscally challenging for the US to compete with the PRC in both wartime and peacetime, prompting a shift toward focusing on asymmetric weapons and networks to counterbalance China’s growing capabilities. This shift has reignited interest in submarines for their powerful deterrent effect. Submarines are considered vital asymmetric assets, capable of challenging superior adversaries. Unlike surface ships, they can operate independently and remain undetected for extended periods. Their versatility in gathering intelligence, disrupting enemy operations, and protecting critical undersea infrastructure makes them indispensable in high-threat environments.

Although China has significantly advanced its anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities in recent years, it still lags behind those of advanced navies, such as those of the US, Japan, and Australia. In its February 2024 Military Balance report, the Institute for International and Strategic Studies highlighted that significant investments by Northeast and Southeast Asian militaries have transformed the region into “a hotbed for undersea warfare developments”. ^[4]

AUKUS Pillar 1 focuses on nuclear-powered submarines, including the rotational deployment of four US and one UK SSNs to Western Australia. Nuclear propulsion provides significant advantages, including extended range and endurance limited only by food supplies and crew stamina, for positioning during attacks. The US plans to sell three to five Virginia-class SSNs to Australia, marking the first such transfer outside the UK since 1958, reflecting a deepening defence partnership. US shipyard bottlenecks, however, present challenges to fulfilling domestic submarine production as well as AUKUS commitments. Australia will also construct up to eight SSNs based on a joint UK-Australian design, aiming for delivery by the 2040s, significantly enhancing its military capabilities and deterrence posture. AUKUS Pillar 2 emphasizes collaboration on emerging technologies like artificial intelligence, quantum computing, hypersonic weapons, and autonomous systems to maintain technological superiority, bolster cybersecurity, and aligning of defence strategies. The 2024 formalised agreement facilitates the transfer of nuclear materials and reactors under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, with provisions for cooperation until 2075.

The Quad's objectives include promoting a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific through initiatives such as joint military exercises, enhancing interoperability, and tackling non-traditional security challenges like climate change and cybersecurity. The Quad has six working groups focusing on critical and emerging technologies, climate change, cybersecurity, infrastructure, vaccines, and outer space. The annual Malabar naval exercises have been crucial in improving interoperability among the navies of the four countries. Despite its strategic importance, the effectiveness of the Quad in deterring China remains debated. Some experts argue that the Quad’s non-military approach prevents provoking a stronger reaction from Beijing, allowing for deeper security cooperation when necessary. Others assert that its broad geoeconomic agenda has addressed regional challenges and strengthened ties with ASEAN, solidifying its central role in Indo-Pacific affairs. However, critics question whether the Quad's efforts have been sufficient to deter China’s assertiveness, particularly in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Straits. For India, the Quad remains a cornerstone of its foreign policy, reflecting its strategic priorities and commitment to shaping the security landscape of the Indo-Pacific.

Some commentators assert that the Quad has lost relevance with the emergence of AUKUS. The varying strategic priorities and capabilities of the four member countries raise concerns about their ability to present a unified response in the event of a military contingency involving the PRC. India, in particular, is often seen as limiting the Quad's full security potential due to its aversion to military alliances. While shared democratic values and a common opposition to China's assertive policies have strengthened cooperation within the Quad, the group serves to also engage India within the US alliance system. India’s role has become increasingly vital in addressing emerging challenges and maintaining a regional balance of power. Its strategic location near key maritime chokepoints, such as the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, enhances its ability to secure sea lanes and counter Chinese military expansion. Additionally, India’s leadership in areas like IT, space, and emerging technologies (such as AI and quantum computing) aligns with broader objectives to sustain technological superiority.

The second term for Donald Trump as president could have significant implications for both the Quad and AUKUS, although the specifics remain unclear. Trump's policies may place greater pressure on allies to contribute more to defence obligations. In conclusion, both the Quad and AUKUS reflect shifting Indo-Pacific security dynamics. While the Quad encompasses a broader range of initiatives, the AUKUS is more focussed on high-end military capabilities to strengthen allied deterrence. Both groupings signal a long-term commitment to countering Chinese aggression and reaffirm shared principles, such as respect for international law and unimpeded navigation.

References

^[1] 2020 Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF [3]
^[2] China’s Shipbuilding Capacity is 232 Times Greater Than That of the United States, https://www.americanmanufacturing.org/blog/chinas-shipbuilding-capacity-is-232-times-greater-than-that-of-the-united-states/ [4]
^[3] Naval Shipyards: Actions Needed to Improve Poor Conditions that Affect Operations, https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-17-548 [5]
^[4] https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance/ [6]

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