On 7 October 2023, Hamas’ military wing, Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, supported by Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s (PIJ) Al-Quds Brigades, launched over 5,000 rockets [3] targeting Israeli security bases, military installations, and civilian areas. This barrage overwhelmed the Iron Dome Air Defence System [4], allowing Hamas operatives to breach security barriers using powered parachutes and motorboats. Drones and snipers disabled remote-controlled machine guns, surveillance towers, and communications, limiting IDF response. Simultaneously, a commando attack on the IDF's Southern Command Headquarters [5] jammed communications, delaying coordinated Israeli defence. Palestinian fighters overran military camps, settlements, and villages. The IDF regained control of the settlements after three days. Following the attack, 1147 Israeli and foreign nationals [6] were killed, including more than 300 IDF soldiers and reservists and 57 police officers [7] and around 240 Israeli and foreign nationals from 26 states were taken under Hamas and PIJ’s captivity [8] in Gaza.
The attack spurred many Israelis to demand a strong military response. A week later, polls showed that 65 percent [9] of Israelis supporting the military invasion of Gaza. Concerns about the limited military experience among the far-right partners [10] to manage significant security crises and combat operations prompted the formation of the National Unity government for management of the so-called 'Operation Swords of Iron' joined by IDF Chiefs Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot as well as Gideon Sa’ar; Hili Tropper and Yifat Shasha Biton, from National Unity Party serving as Ministers without portfolio. A close war cabinet [11] comprising Prime Minister Netanyahu, Defence Minister Yoav Gallant, and Benny Gantz [11], with Minister of Strategic Affairs Ron Dermer and Gadi Eisenkot holding observer positions, was formed to define and direct the strategic goals of military operations, offer policy guidelines to military officials; thorough assessments to fulfil strategic goals and ensure operational plan to compliment foreign policy goals. Benny Gantz, a key rival of Netanyahu, sought to utilise his position in the war cabinet to obtain broader authority in the military decision-making process and increase his popularity. For Netanyahu [12], the unity government and the war cabinet provided political cover, shielding him from criticism about Israel's war management and the influence of his far-right allies. The 7 October attack tarnished Netanyahu's carefully cultivated "Mr. Security" image, with criticism mounting over his handling of the security situation, alleged focus on political survival, and handling of the hostage issue.
Netanyahu's stated war goals, i.e. eliminating Hamas by destroying its military and governing capabilities, rescuing hostages, and ensuring the state's long-term security, have remained unfulfilled. During the ground operation, 377 IDF soldiers [13] have been killed between 27 October 2023 and 20 November 2024. Israeli forces have killed nearly 44,000 Palestinians [14] until November 2024, out of which 70 per cent are women and children. The IDF’s strategy [15] is centred on applying sufficient pressure on the group to force the release of hostages. Israel adopted a deliberate pace in their ground offensive in Gaza, partly to create an opportunity for negotiations with Hamas fighters for the release of their captives. The Prime Minister’s assurance that the IDF could simultaneously kill Hamas leaders and secure the release of the hostages has proved challenging, necessitating simultaneous clandestine rescue missions across multiple locations inside Gaza. Besides, a handful of hostages remain in PIJ's [16] custody, further complicating the rescue process through military or non-military means. IDF so far has rescued only eight captives and recovered the bodies of 37, including three killed by Israeli forces on 15 December [17] 2023. The three captives were reportedly killed waving white flags, raising questions about IDF's war ethics that eliminated surrendering non-combatants.
Hamas had released five hostages [18] in October 2023. Israel, after failure to extract the hostages militarily, opted for an initial hostage deal on 22 November 2023, retrieving 78 Israeli women and children, three Russian-Israelis, one Filipino, 23 Thai citizens and 138 hostages remaining in captivity. Israel, in exchange freed 150 Palestinian prisoners, i.e. 117 children and 33 women [19], and allowed additional fuel and humanitarian aid. The deal while splitting the war cabinet [1] prevailed due to public pressure and support from all the security bodies, i.e. IDF, Shin Bet and Mossad. The progress on returning all the hostages stalled, and fighting resumed on 27 November 2023. Israel's strategy to neutralise Hamas has complicated its efforts to rescue the captives.
The frequency of public demonstrations organised by families of hostages and joined by a large number of concerned citizens are questioning [20] the Prime Minister for de-prioritising [21] the hostage issue and failure to release all captives, inability to be sufficiently proactive, sympathetic and communicative, restoring security, rehabilitating the communities near Gaza facilitating their return and flow of provocative statements including threats to 'raze Gaza' by cabinet members overlooking the human costs. The separate deal to secure the release of women and children agitated the family members of male hostages, worried that their stay could be prolonged. Demands calling for "Now, now, now, all of them" have resonated in the rallies. The hostage issue has impacted the public mood about the war, as reflected in the speeches of the political leadership.
Despite domestic pressure to prioritise hostage release, Israel's war efforts remain popular, especially among Likud and far-right parties' voter base. Prime Minister Netanyahu's popularity had dipped following the attack. Channel 12 poll in December 2023 revealed that Netanyahu’s Likud tally at 18 [22] seats as compared to Gantz’s National Unity Party at 37 seats in case of fresh elections. Israel Democracy Index [23] in January 2024 reported that only 15 percent opted for Netanyahu to stay in power after the end of the war with Hamas. Netanyahu, defying predictions, however, managed to retain his position and by May 2024, [22], the support for the Prime Minister tilted at 36 percent and Gantz at 30 percent. Maariv poll [24] on 13 September 2024 reported 24 seats for Likud compared to 21 for the National Unity party. The current ruling coalition, however, managed 53 seats against 58 for the opposition in case of new elections. The gradual advance indicates renewed support for Netanyahu’s policies.
Netanyahu government's relative success in degrading the military capabilities of Hamas and Hezbollah, the killings of Ismail Haniyeh, Yahwa Sinwar, and Hassan Nasrallah, among others, have boosted the Prime Minister’s popularity and support for the military approach. Netanyahu has also benefited from the lack of a strong challenger. While Benny Gantz, Yair Lapid, Naftali Bennet and Avigdor Lieberman have considerable support, they have failed to present an alternative outlook beyond criticising Netanyahu. Netanyahu’s firm stance to stay on course and deter international pressure, including from the US and its European allies, regarding the full-scale war in Gaza and Lebanon, the Rafah campaign, control of the Philadelphi corridor and demand for a ceasefire has been popular among his support base. It, however, needs to be seen whether Netanyahu's plans to secure the northern region can succeed even after a full-scale assault against Hezbollah. Netanyahu [25], while promising to make an inquiry about the 7 October security failure after the war, has deliberately refused to accept fault. Netanyahu realised that admitting responsibility could jeopardise his fate not only in the present but also in future elections. The expansion of the goalposts, ranging from the return of all the hostages, destruction of Hamas, defeat of Hezbollah, and return of citizens to north and south Israel to containment of Iranian aggression, have worked to preserve Netanyahu's support base.
Netanyahu has preserved his 64-seat majority coalition by accommodating far-right demands for West Bank and East Jerusalem expansion and ultra-Orthodox parties' exemption from conscription. This backing has allowed him sufficient manoeuvring space to sustain the war effort and gradually change the public attitude towards his leadership. Notably, Benny Gantz’s disagreements with Netanyahu about his acquiescence to the hard-liners’ position led to his resignation from the war cabinet in June 2024. The dismissal of Defence Minister Yoav Gallant, long sought by Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich, highlighted internal tensions. Gallant was dismissed [26] due to disagreements about conscription of the ultra-orthodox community, hostage negotiations and calls for an urgent state inquiry commission regarding the 7 October attack.
Gallant, [27] differing on Netanyahu’s total victory over Hamas rhetoric, opined that IDF’s military success had created conditions for a hostage deal which could be missed in case of delay. The removal of Gallant showcased Netanyahu's continuing de-prioritisation of the hostage issue, which led to renewed protests calling for negotiations. The Hostage Families Forum expressed concern over how the sudden change could affect the fate of the 101 hostages. Netanyahu has continued to argue that any hostage deal in exchange for the end of the war would allow Hamas to exist in some form. Israel, therefore, rejected the US-Egyptian-Qatari three-phased proposal that encapsulated issues of hostage and prisoner exchange, security control of the Gaza Strip and reconstruction efforts.
Following Yoav Gallant’s dismissal, the ruling coalition’s popularity has witnessed a dip [28] (62 seats for the opposition and 48 for the ruling coalition in the 15 November 2024 Maariv poll) due to war efforts in Gaza and south Lebanon, mandatory military service issue and Jerusalem District Court’s rejection of Netanyahu’s request to postpone his testimony in the corruption trial. Netanyahu’s critics [28] argue that his consistent rejection of ceasefire stems from his intention to delay elections. There is also a shift in public opinion [29] in favour of the hostage deal. Channel 12 poll on 15 November 2024 reported that 69 percent favour finalising a hostage deal compared to 20 percent preferring continuation of the war. Notably, 52 percent opined that deal had not been reached due to political reasons. Among Likud voters, 46 percent preferred a hostage deal, and 36 percent opted to continue the war. Moreover, Naftali Bennet has replaced Netanyahu as the most popular leader at 37 percent compared to 35 percent in the 15 November 2024 Maariv poll. It needs to be seen how the gradual shift in public perception towards continued operation and the hostage issue affects the war efforts.
The military approach to rescue hostages until now has proved ill-fated, and humanitarian pauses and, eventually, a ceasefire would be necessary to free them from captivity. Netanyahu, amid opposition from his far-right political partners who could withdraw support, has impeded the reaching of a deal. Netanyahu will ensure that any deal could occur only if it can ascertain his political survival. In the case of Hamas, temporary humanitarian pauses and retaining the option to renew the fight left little incentive to agree to Israel's terms. Hamas, even in its weakened state, is unwilling to relent to Israel’s continued control over the Philadelphi corridor and Netzarim corridor. In the aftermath of Yahwa Sinwar’s death, it is also unclear whether a single command to negotiate hostage release is available.
The US President-elect Donald Trump has appointed several pro-Israel figures in his new cabinet, including Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff. Learning for Trump's first term, he took pro-active actions favouring Israel's position, including shifting the embassy to Jerusalem, recognition of Golan Heights, awarding more Palestinian territories to Israel in the so-called Deal of the Century and Israel's normalisation with key Arab states. In the new term, Trump will continue to push for normalisation with Saudi Arabia. Trump does not want the US to be entangled in 'forever wars' or renew hostilities with Iran. Trump could likely create conditions to officially end the war, secure the captives and claim credit while allowing IDF to continue special operations and security control over the Gaza Strip, prolong the war against Hezbollah, increase the flow of weapons to Israel, maritime support and air raids against Houthis and concur to Israeli annexation of parts of West Bank and settlement expansion.
[1] Defence Minister Yoav Gallant [30] and senior military and intelligence officials opposed any pause and advocated that the military campaign should be intensified to build pressure on the group. The press conference by three war cabinet ministers on 18 November reflected how the fate of hostages gradually dominated tactics and strategy in the war against Hamas. Benny Gantz and a few others have insisted that the government act immediately to save whoever it can. Gantz [31] noted that the state has "decades if needed to destroy this thing; we don’t have decades to bring the people home.” Gadi Eisenkot [32], an observer in the war cabinet, mentioned that “the return of the hostages is the supreme priority [of the war], ahead of the destruction of Hamas.” Netanyahu assured that his government is doing its best to rescue most hostages, including in stages.
(The paper is the author’s individual scholastic articulation. The author certifies that the article/paper is original in content, unpublished and it has not been submitted for publication/web upload elsewhere, and that the facts and figures quoted are duly referenced, as needed, and are believed to be correct). (The paper does not necessarily represent the organisational stance... More >>
Links:
[1] https://www.vifindia.org/article/2024/november/21/The-Hostage-Issue-in-the-Israel-Hamas-Conflict
[2] https://www.vifindia.org/author/hirak-jyoti-das
[3] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/7/what-happened-in-israel-a-breakdown-of-how-the-hamas-attack-unfolded
[4] https://www.tbsnews.net/worldbiz/middle-east/iron-dome-how-was-israels-world-renowned-missile-defence-system-overwhelmed
[5] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/how-israel-was-duped-hamas-planned-devastating-assault-2023-10-08/
[6] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/longform/2023/10/9/israel-hamas-war-in-maps-and-charts-live-tracker
[7] https://www.timesofisrael.com/authorities-name-44-soldiers-30-police-officers-killed-in-hamas-attack/
[8] https://edition.cnn.com/2023/11/22/middleeast/israel-approves-hamas-hostage-deal-intl/index.html
[9] https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/almost-half-of-israelis-oppose-immediate-gaza-ground-invasion-poll/
[10] https://www.timesofisrael.com/knesset-okays-war-cabinet-pm-saturday-most-horrible-day-for-jews-since-holocaust/
[11] https://en.idi.org.il/articles/51080
[12] https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/10/israels-cruel-dilemma-it-embarks-ground-operation-gaza
[13] https://www.gov.il/en/pages/swords-of-iron-idf-casualties
[14] https://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-73
[15] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hostages-mind-israel-moves-slowly-gaza-ground-offensive-2023-10-30/
[16] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/11/19/israel-hamas-gaza-hostage-deal/
[17] https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog-december-15-2023/
[18] https://www.nytimes.com/article/israel-hostages-hamas-explained.html
[19] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/28/arrests
[20] https://www.timesofisrael.com/thousands-in-tel-aviv-rally-for-hostages-netanyahu-critics-renew-jerusalem-protests/
[21] https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/haaretz-today/2023-11-14/ty-article/.highlight/israeli-families-of-kidnapped-hostages-fear-that-time-is-running-out/0000018b-cea7-d168-a3ef-dfff02e60000
[22] https://www.timesofisrael.com/for-first-time-in-a-year-poll-shows-netanyahu-preferred-to-gantz-as-prime-minister/
[23] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/only-15-israelis-want-netanyahu-keep-job-after-gaza-war-poll-finds-2024-01-02/
[24] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/new-israeli-poll-shows-netanyahus-party-advancing-2024-09-13/
[25] https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-823588
[26] https://www.timesofisrael.com/defense-ministry-director-submits-resignation-to-new-chief-in-latest-wartime-shakeup/
[27] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/nov/05/benjamin-netanyahu-fires-israeli-defence-minister-yoav-gallant
[28] https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/popularity-of-netanyahu-coalition-falls-for-2nd-straight-week-poll/3394792
[29] https://www.timesofisrael.com/large-majority-of-israelis-want-hostage-deal-even-if-it-means-ending-gaza-war-poll/
[30] https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-11-19/ty-article/.premium/israeli-war-cabinet-split-over-terms-of-hostage-deal-as-idf-expands-operation/0000018b-e40e-d867-abab-f5ae6e680000
[31] https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/gantz-returning-the-hostages-is-a-priority-we-have-decades-if-needed-to-destroy-hamas/
[32] https://www.timesofisrael.com/day-44-of-the-war-hostages-take-center-stage-and-what-would-constitute-victory/
[33] https://www.hrw.org/modal/107410
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