Beijing's Strategic Engagement with Bangladesh in the Aftermath of Power Shift

The political landscape in Bangladesh underwent a dramatic transformation in August 2024 when Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina was forced to step down following a wave of student protests, now known as the ‘Monsoon Revolution [3]’. The protests, which initially began against the High Court order regarding the Quota system in the country, quickly evolved into a broader movement calling for her resignation. In the wake of Hasina's fall, China's diplomatic efforts were ramped up, with the PRC’s ambassador to Bangladesh, Yao Wen, taking the lead in engaging with the country’s interim leadership and political elites.

Beijing's immediate response to the political turmoil in Bangladesh has been one of ‘cautious diplomacy [4]’, underscoring its long-standing commitment to the country’s stability and its desire to work with whichever political leadership emerges. While Yao Wen has emphasized that the PRC will not interfere in Bangladesh’s internal affairs, he has also reiterated China’s eagerness to deepen bilateral relations across various sectors, including trade, defence, and infrastructure. The PRC’s proactive approach signals its intent to further cement its influence in Bangladesh, especially with the prospect of pro-China political forces like the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh (JIB) potentially gaining power in upcoming elections.

China's diplomatic engagement with Bangladesh has always been carefully calibrated, even under Hasina’s leadership. While Hasina maintained strong relations with China, she was cautious [5] about antagonising India, carefully balancing her country’s ties with regional giants. Hasina’s geopolitical manoeuvring aimed to pursue a Bangladesh's foreign policy that followed a middle path, avoiding an overt tilt toward either China or India. This approach, however, appears to have shifted in the wake of Hasina’s downfall, with China now taking the opportunity to build deeper ties with Bangladesh, particularly in areas where Hasina's administration was seen as constrained.

The PRC’s diplomatic overtures have been wide-ranging. Yao Wen has met [6] with key figures within the interim government, including the Chief Advisor, Dr Muhammad Yunus, and several political figures from rival parties [7]. Beijing’s messaging has been consistent: China is committed to maintaining a solid partnership with Bangladesh, irrespective of political changes. This approach is crucial for China, as Bangladesh is a critical partner in the region’s broader geopolitical framework.

The PRC’s strategic interests in Bangladesh go beyond the economy; they are also intertwined with defence [8], influence over regional water-sharing issues [9], and China’s broader geopolitical competition with India. Historically, Bangladesh has received significant Chinese military assistance [10], including arms and equipment that constitute a substantial portion of the Bangladesh Armed Forces (BAF) inventory. The PRC has been the largest supplier [11] of military hardware to Bangladesh, providing everything from submarines to fighter jets, and this military cooperation will likely continue and expand. Bangladesh’s ongoing efforts to modernise its military, particularly in light of its new geopolitical realities, make it an ideal partner for China.

The BAF’s ambitious Forces Goal 2030 plan [12], which seeks to transform Bangladesh’s military into a 21st-century fighting force, will likely spur greater demand for Chinese military systems. The PRC’s willingness to provide affordable, modern equipment, coupled with a long-standing relationship between the officer corps of the BAF and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), places China in a favourable position to continue strengthening defence ties.

While military cooperation has been a cornerstone of Bangladesh-China relations, economic engagement is also vital. China has been Bangladesh’s largest trading partner [13] for nearly a decade, and its investments are substantial. The PRC’s involvement in Bangladesh’s infrastructure development, mainly through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has been transformative. Major projects, such as the Padma Bridge [14], were constructed by Chinese companies, and China has invested heavily in power plants and other infrastructure critical to Bangladesh’s growth.

In addition to its economic contributions, China has been working with Bangladesh to expand trade and investment ties further. There have been ongoing discussions between Dhaka and Beijing about creating a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement [15] (CEPA) or a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Such an agreement would facilitate even deeper economic cooperation by reducing trade barriers and enhancing investment, intellectual property rights, and government procurement collaboration. As Bangladesh looks to diversify its economy and attract foreign investment, China's involvement will likely be increasingly pivotal. In particular, China has expressed a desire to relocate [16] solar panel factories to Bangladesh, which would help Bangladesh transition to a greener economy while expanding its export capacity.

The PRC’s influence in Bangladesh is not limited to economic and defence matters. China has also sought to deepen its political ties with the government and key opposition parties. The BNP, which has historically had a pro-China stance [17], and JIB, which shares an anti-India sentiment with Beijing, will likely be central to China’s strategy as we advance. The PRC has actively engaged with these parties to ensure that even during a political shift, it will retain a strong foothold in Bangladesh.

The importance of keeping Bangladesh within its sphere of influence is evident for China. A Bangladesh that leans toward China would provide strategic benefits, including a counterbalance to India’s influence in South Asia and greater leverage over regional issues like the Rohingya crisis and water-sharing disputes with India.

In recent years, China has used its diplomatic and economic clout to influence Bangladesh’s foreign policy direction. Under Hasina’s leadership, Bangladesh managed to maintain a delicate balance between China and India, but that balance may now be under strain. New Delhi has long sought to curb China’s influence in Bangladesh and other parts of South Asia, and its concern with Bangladesh’s growing ties with China is well-documented. India’s attempts to foster closer defence cooperation with Dhaka, including proposals for defence pacts and increased military assistance, reflect its strategic concerns over China’s growing presence in Bangladesh. However, with the political changes in Bangladesh, these agreements may be revisited or shelved, which would likely constitute a strategic win for China.

Another critical issue in the evolving geopolitical landscape is the situation in Myanmar. Bangladesh shares a border with Myanmar’s Chin and Rakhine states, which have become increasingly important to China’s regional strategy. The PRC has been fostering ties with ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) in Myanmar, including the Chin National Army (CNA) and the Arakan Army (AA), both of which are pro-China. These groups are gaining ground in Myanmar’s border regions, and China could use this relationship to enhance its influence in Bangladesh. Bangladesh’s insurgent groups, like the Kuki-Chin National Front (KNF), are based in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and have received training in Myanmar. China’s role in helping to mediate between Dhaka and these groups could be pivotal in securing Bangladesh’s internal stability and ensuring the repatriation of Rohingya refugees, which remains a critical issue for Bangladesh.

Looking ahead, China’s influence in Bangladesh will likely grow as it seeks to capitalise on its strategic location and increasing economic and geopolitical importance. The PRC has significantly invested in Bangladesh’s infrastructure, and its trade and defence relationships with Dhaka remain strong. As the interim government takes shape and prepares for upcoming elections, Beijing will continue to court political leaders and parties open to its vision for bilateral relations. Whether Bangladesh remains a neutral regional player or moves closer to China will depend on the evolving political dynamics. Still, China is determined to shape the country’s future direction in years to come.

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