Uzbekistan’s Pragmatic Engagement with Afghanistan: Significant for the Region

During a recent visit to Tashkent, I had attended the roundtable on ‘Foreign Policy of Uzbekistan: Openness and Prosperity for Peace’ on 25 October 2024. The speakers were some of the prominent policy makers with long experience of diplomacy and international relations.

Senator Sodyq Safoev, former Foreign Minister of Uzbekistan, defined the Uzbek policy as ‘pragmatic’ with emphasis on ‘managing the borders’ particularly with its Central Asian neighbors. He observed that Uzbekistan had a ’pro-active’ foreign policy and was emerging as a regional power in Central Asia and beyond.

The pragmatic neighbourhood policy of Uzbekistan is visible in its relations with the ruling establishments in Afghanistan, pivoting smoothly from recognition and support to the Ghani government to tacit acceptance of the Taliban regime immediately after August 2021.

At the roundtable Ambassador Ismatulla Irgashev, Special Representative of the President of Uzbekistan for Afghanistan shared his thoughts on ‘Achieving lasting peace in Afghanistan is an essential strategy of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy’. He said that Uzbekistan desired friendly relations with all its neighbours and had no wish to interfere in the internal affairs of any country. He noted that Uzbekistan has had contacts with the Taliban movement since the 1990s and post-2021, Uzbekistan could be a bridge between the global community and Taliban regime. Any armed resistance to the Taliban regime was futile and would only result in more bloodshed and chaos in Afghanistan prolonging the suffering of the people.

Uzbek Prime Minister Abdullah Aripov was in Kabul on 17-18 August 2024 for ‘strengthening bilateral trade and investments’. An exhibition of Uzbek products was opened in Kabul by the Uzbek PM. This was the highest-level visit of any foreign dignitary to Afghanistan after the Taliban takeover. During the visit reportedly trade and investments worth more than $ 2 billion were discussed including a $100 million project to develop gas fields in Afghanistan. A preferential trade agreement has come into force on 1 October eliminating import duties on 14 types of goods. Phyto-sanitary requirements for Afghan agricultural products have been relaxed by Uzbek customs.

There are reports that Afghan cotton would be sourced by Uzbek spinning mills. Also, there was a recent agreement to refine Afghan crude in Fergana refinery in Uzbekistan.

During the trip there was an opportunity to visit the Termez International Trade Center operating from ‘Airitom Free Zone’ designed for duty free trade with Afghanistan. The 36 hectare heavily fenced zone is adjacent to the 3 km. long ‘Friendship Bridge’ across Amu Darya linking Termez with Hairatan in Afghanistan. Afghans are allowed to visit visa free for stay upto 15 days. Most of them come for a day, though. They are allowed to bring and take goods up to 10kg duty free. Uzbeks are allowed to buy up to $300 worth Afghan goods duty free. The complex is just two months old and was buzzing with construction and commercial activity with a good number of Afghan men moving around. More than 5000 Afghan men, women and children visit the complex on Fridays to sample Western branded food and to have a good time as an escape from the strict Afghan society.

The complex has a 70-bed hospital with four Operation Theaters and is already operational. Two Indian para medics are working there. Afghan patients demand to see Indian doctors so appointment of some Indian doctors is expected.

The Zone has been developed by Akfa Group in Public-Private-Partnership mode. Its founder Jakhangir Artikkhodjayev is a former mayor of Tashkent.

Uzbekistan is positioning itself as a transit point for regional trade with Afghanistan. More than 200 large trucks cross into Afghanistan daily from the Friendship Bridge. Most of the Western and UN aid to Afghanistan is supplied through this route. Uzbek-Afghanistan trade was $900 million in 2023 and is likely to rise to $1.5 billion in 2025.

Apparently, the Taliban regime has controlled the activities of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) terrorists against Uzbekistan. But the continued high drug production in Afghanistan remains a concern. Another source of friction looming on the horizon is Afghanistan’s digging a 285 km canal from Kosh to Tepa to divert the waters of Amu Darya for irrigation. After its completion, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are likely to lose 15% of their intake from this mighty river. Uzbeks acknowledge the right of Afghanistan to use these waters but are upset that the canal is being dug in a primitive manner which would lead to massive wastage of water. Uzbeks have offered their expertise for lining the canal to prevent seepage.

Uzbekistan has continued to have their Ambassador in Kabul after August 2021 but he has not presented fresh credentials to the “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’. It recently received a representative of the Taliban government in Tashkent. However, he is not permitted to fly the Emirate flag or display the IEA name on their building.

Uzbekistan is keen to have India’s support for the proposed railway line from Termez to Mazar-e-Sharif to Kabul to Peshawar in Pakistan. One branch of this railroad is planned towards Herat and then towards Iran. Uzbeks are confident that in due course, India will also benefit from this connection. Finance for this $5 billion project is yet to be tied up.

Among our friendly countries, Uzbekistan has the closest ongoing communication, contacts and understanding with the Taliban regime. South Block will be well advised to coordinate our policy towards Afghanistan with Uzbekistan and focus on Humanitarian assistance for alleviating the suffering of the Afghan people. Any form of economic engagement could come thereafter.

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