From Operation Desert Hawk to Indo-Pakistani War of 1965

About 59 years ago, in the year 1965, India was experiencing an extreme food shortage across the country. The monsoon had failed badly in the year, and the subsequent droughts had severely impacted food production.^[1] Major seaports of India became the funnels to feed the cheap imported grains from the US. India was on the precipice of ship-to-mouth existence. The Prime Minister of India, Lal Bahadur Shastri, highlighted food imports’ demerits and emphasised achieving self-sufficiency in food production.^[2] Self-imposed restraints on consumption were encouraged. Inflation was building its own skyscrapers, net investment remained low, and the country depended on foreign aid. In the cultural sphere, Indians were squabbling over whether Hindi should get the status of “National Language.” Later, to soothe the dissenters, English was adopted as an associate language in dealings between the central government and the non-Hindi-speaking states’ state governments. Apart from these issues, India was also recovering from the debacle it faced against China in the 1962 war. The Indian Armed Forces were still rebuilding and reorganising itself.

In the same year and the same period, Ayub Khan declared himself the winner of a rigged election and came back to power as the President of Pakistan. Despite the dictatorial nature of the Ayub Khan Regime, Pakistan was witnessing an economic upsurge due to the generous donations coming from the defender of democracy in the world. The undemocratic ruler of Pakistan was able to sharpen the teeth of the Pakistani military with the help of its Democratic western CENTO partners. Pakistan had recently received new missiles, F-86F Sabre jets, M47 and M48 Patton tanks, and other lethal weapons from their so-called democratically inclined western masters. Hence, the Pakistanis might have felt that they were invincible. The Pakistanis thought that it was the right time to use their qualitative edge in airpower and armour against a militarily weakened and economically poor India and seize Kashmir.^[3]

In April 1965, Pakistan launched Operation Desert Hawk, and the Pakistani Army entered Rann of Kutch with an infantry division and armoured regiments with Patton tanks to assess India’s military strength and the Indian government’s response.^[4] The better-equipped Pakistani forces were able to occupy a significant amount of territory in Kutch, and India had to call for reinforcements. The ulterior motive of Pakistan was to pull India’s military forces, especially the Indian armoured regiments, southwards to Rann of Kutch, away from Punjab.^[5] It was because of this military adventure that the Pakistanis tested their newly acquired equipment and gained the confidence that they needed for a larger attack on India. An UN-sponsored ceasefire in July ended the conflict, and status quo ante bellum was established.^[6]

In the next stage of their devious plan, Pakistan launched Operation Gibraltar in Jammu and Kashmir in August 1965. The codename of the operation was inspired by the 8th century CE Muslim conquest of Spain and Portugal by an Umayyad military commander named Tariq ibn Ziyad.^[7] Unlike the 1300-year-old inspiration for the operation, this military adventure of Pakistan was destined to fail. Under this doomed mission, Pakistan secretly infiltrated more than 20,000 Pakistani soldiers from the so-called ‘Azad Kashmir’ Regular Force and Tribal Jihadis into Jammu and Kashmir between July and August.^[8] These infiltrators were dressed in civilian clothing and had the guise of Mujahideen. This same tactic was also used in 1947, which highlights the lack of creativity in the minds of the military leaders in Pakistan. The Pakistani military top brass believed that this large body of infiltrators would be able to provoke the Kashmiris to rise and revolt against India. This fictitious or fabricated rebellion by the Kashmiris in Jammu and Kashmir would give Pakistan a virtuous reason to launch a military action. However, the Kashmiris did not support the infiltrators pushed by Pakistan. The Kashmiris helped the Indian Army in locating the infiltrators in the valley, and most of the infiltrators were either eliminated or captured by the Indian Army.^[9]

The then Prime Minister of India Lal Bahadur Shastri stated that "India cannot go on pushing the Pakistanis off its territory. If infiltration continues, we will have to carry the fight to the other side."^[10] In an unprecedented move, the Indian Army did not wait passively and attacked across the Line of Control (LOC). The Indian Army was able to capture the launch pads inside Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (POK) from where the major infiltrations had taken place.^[11] In late August, the Haji Pir pass was captured by the 68th Infantry Brigade thanks to the gallant efforts of Major Ranjit Singh Dayal.^[12]

We can gauge the insanity of the Pakistani military leaders by looking at the next stage of military escalation, which was Operation Grand Slam. Rather than making any swift gains in Jammu and Kashmir, the Pakistanis had lost most of the infiltrating force launched during Operation Gibraltar and even vital positions, including Haji Pir, in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir. Under Operation Grand Slam, launched on September 1, Pakistani infantry and armoured regiments comprising M47 Patton and M48 Patton tanks attacked Chhamb^[13] (Chhamb was under India’s control till December 1971). This was followed by Pakistani air strikes on Indian airfields. The purpose of the Pakistani Chhamb offensive was to capture the crucial Akhnoor Bridge on the Chenab River and cut off Jammu and Kashmir from the rest of India.^[14] The outgunned and numerically smaller Indian troops, comprising mostly of AMX-13 Light tanks, couldn’t match the firepower of the advanced Pakistani tanks. The Indian forces defending the area were pushed back towards the Tawi River, but they were able to create enough resistance to stall the Pakistani offensive and prevent ingress into other territories.

The Prime Minister of India, Lal Bahadur Shastri, took a landmark decision and permitted the Indian forces to cross the international border in Punjab. On 6th September 1965, the Indian Army launched an offensive into the Punjab province in Pakistan to divert the military pressure inserted by Pakistan on the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. The Indian Army entered Pakistan at multiple points, which completely surprised the Pakistanis in the Lahore sector.^[15] 11 Corps of the Indian Army moved towards Lahore, and the 1 Corps marched towards Sialkot.^[16] Indian forces had crossed the Ichogil Canal, which was the last physical obstacle on the way to Lahore and engaged the Pakistani forces in different parts of Pakistani Punjab. Some of these important battles took place in Burki and Dograi. The Battle of Dograi fought on the outskirts of Lahore between 20 and 22 September, was a major victory for the Indian troops.^[17] The proximity of Dograi next to Lahore provided India with a bargaining chip in the later negotiations. Later, for tactical reasons, the Indian forces pulled back from the outskirts of Lahore to the Ichogil Canal. ^[18]

In order to provide an apt reply, Pakistan launched its counter-offensive on 7th September into Indian Punjab and headed towards Amritsar.^[19] On 8th September, the 1st Armoured Division of the Pakistani Army, equipped with Patton and Chaffee tanks, captured the Indian border town of Khem Karan and continued their advance towards the Beas River. ^[20] The Indian troops in the region, commanded by Lt. Gen. Harbaksh Singh, prepared a death trap for the advancing Pakistani tanks in Asal Uttar. ^[21] Indian forces had breached the irrigation canals and flooded the sugarcane fields near Asal Uttar. Not only that, a division-strong Indian force had formed a horseshoe-shaped defensive position around Asal Uttar. The advancing Pakistani Patton tanks were very heavy, and they got bogged down in the flooded fields. The slow-moving Patton tanks sank axle deep in the slushy mud and were sitting ducks. The defending Indian old WWII-era Sherman tanks, Centurion tanks of the 3rd Cavalry, 9th Horse, and 8th Light Cavalry, along with anti-tank jeeps, took cover in the tall sugarcane fields. Many Indian tanks were disguised as haystacks, and they were prowling on Pakistani tanks from a very close range to penetrate the thick armour of the Patton tanks. Abdul Hamid, PVC (posthumous) of the 4 Grenadiers, destroyed four enemy tanks with his Jonga-mounted recoilless rifle (anti-tank jeeps).^[22] About 97 Pakistani tanks were destroyed or captured in the Battle of Asal Uttar^[23] and the Pakistanis had to withdraw their forces.

The Indian Army was successful in the Sialkot sector as well. In this sector, the Indian Army’s 1st Armoured Division, comprising Sherman tanks and Centurion tanks of the 16th Cavalry Regiment, 17th Horse Regiment, 4th Horse Regiment and 62nd Cavalry Regiment, along with mechanized infantry regiments (43rd Lorried Brigade), confronted the advanced Patton tanks of the 6th Armoured Division of the Pakistani Army in Phillora in Pakistani Punjab.^[24] In the Battle of Phillora, Indian tanks advanced in Pakistani sugarcane fields, destroying 60 Patton tanks. ^[25] India lost 12 Centurions and 6 Sherman tanks in their effort to destroy the myth of the superiority of the Patton tanks. The Pakistani troops retreated on 12th September to the village of Chawinda.^[26] In the following Battle of Chawinda, Lt. Col. Ardeshir Burzorji Tarapore of the Poona Horse was posthumously awarded Param Veer Chakra. Lt. Col. Tarapore’s heroic actions inspired the men of his regiment, and in a pitched battle, the crews of the tanks of the Poona Horse were able to destroy approximately 60 enemy tanks.^[27] The Poona Horse lost only nine Indian tanks in the battle, which highlighted the superior military training of the Indian forces.

On 20th September 1965, the United Nations Security Council adopted a unanimous resolution demanding a ceasefire on the morning of 22nd September and a subsequent withdrawal of all armed forces to the position of 5th of August.^[28] By the end of the war, India had lost over 3000 brave soldiers, 300 square miles of territory, about 175 tanks and 60-75 aircraft.^[29] Pakistan, on the other hand, lost over 3800 soldiers, 700 square miles of territory, 200 advanced American tanks, and 20 aircraft. ^[30] The UN-sponsored ceasefire came into effect on 22 September, after which both countries ceased hostilities. India held the upper hand in this war, but eventually, both countries moved back to their pre-war positions after the signing of the Tashkent Agreement in June 1966.

India fought the most intense war in its military history during a period when it was experiencing an extreme economic crisis. Throughout the 1960s, India was experiencing food shortages and had to depend largely on imported food grains from the West. This, along with the debacle of 1962, left the Indian Army seeking for modernisation that it could not afford. Pakistan, on the other hand, was experiencing a period of economic growth due to the support it got from the West. The Pakistani military had also collected better equipment from the West to add venom to its fangs. The 1965 India-Pakistan war revealed the grit and determination of the Indian soldier facing the advanced military equipment of the enemy with dated equipment. It also revealed India’s willingness to take the battle to the enemy. It showed India’s capabilities in successfully launching an offensive into enemy territory.

Endnotes

^[1] Aiyar, SA, “Drought not a big calamity in India anymore,” The Times of India, July 29, 2012. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/Swaminomics/drought-not-a-big-calamity-in-india-anymore/ [3]
^[2] “‘Avoid parties, grand weddings’– Lal Bahadur Shastri on India’s 1964 food shortage,” The Print, February 4, 2024. https://theprint.in/opinion/great-speeches/avoid-parties-grand-weddings-lal-bahadur-shastri-on-indias-1964-food-shortage/1952469/ [4]
^[3] Singh, Ajay (2020). India’s Battlefields: From Kurukshetra to Balakot, Pentagon Press, page-152.
^[4]Hiranandani, G.M. (2000). Transition to Triumph: History of the Indian Navy, 1965-1975, Lancer Publisher, page-21.
^[5]Hiranandani, G.M. (2000). Transition to Triumph: History of the Indian Navy, 1965-1975, Lancer Publisher, page-21.
^[6]Singh, Ajay (2020). India’s Battlefields: From Kurukshetra to Balakot, Pentagon Press, page-153.
^[7]Faruqui, Ahmad (6 August 2018). "Why did Operation Gibraltar fail?" Daily Times.
^[8]Singh, Ajay (2020). India’s Battlefields: From Kurukshetra to Balakot, Pentagon Press, page-153.
^[9]Rao, K. V. Krishna (1991). Prepare or Perish: A Study of National Security, Lancer Publishers, page- 123.
^[10]Sarkar, Bhaskar (1999). Kargil War: Past, Present, and Future, Lancer Publishers, page- 39.
^[11]Singh, Ajay (2020). India’s Battlefields: From Kurukshetra to Balakot, Pentagon Press, page-153.
^[12]Sarkar, Bhaskar (1999). Kargil War: Past, Present, and Future, Lancer Publishers, page-41.
^[13]Sarkar, Bhaskar (1999). Kargil War: Past, Present, and Future, Lancer Publishers, page-42.
^[14]Sarkar, Bhaskar (1999). Kargil War: Past, Present, and Future, Lancer Publishers, page-45.
^[15]Kumar, Abhijeet, “Flashback to 1965: The war and the Indian Army's near capture of Lahore,” Business Standard, September 6, 2024. https://www.business-standard.com/external-affairs-defence-security/news/flashback-to-1965-the-war-and-the-indian-army-s-near-capture-of-lahore-124090600488_1.html [5]
^[16]Singh, Ajay (2020). India’s Battlefields: From Kurukshetra to Balakot, Pentagon Press, page-154.
^[17]Dabas, Maninder, "The Battle of Dograi - When The 3 Jat Battalion Sealed the Victory for India in the 1965 War," India Times, September 20, 2017.
https://www.indiatimes.com/news/the-battle-of-dograi-when-the-3-jat-battalion-sealed-the-victory-for-india-in-the-1965-war-259753.html [6]
^[18]Chhina, Man Aman Singh, “On this day, during 1965 war: When Indian Army attacked Lahore from three sides,” The Indian Express, September 6, 2023. https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-history/1965-war-when-indian-army-attacked-lahore-8927784/# [7]
^[19]Clodfelter, Micheal (2017). Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Encyclopedia of Casualty and Other Figures, 1492–2015 (4th ed.), McFarland, page- 600.
^[20]Singh, Ajay (2020). India’s Battlefields: From Kurukshetra to Balakot, Pentagon Press, page-154.
^[21]Clodfelter, Micheal (2017). Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Encyclopedia of Casualty and Other Figures, 1492–2015 (4th ed.), McFarland, page- 600.
^[22]Chakravorty, B.C. (1995), Stories of Heroism: PVC & MVC Winners, New Delhi: Allied Publishers.
^[23]Singh, Ajay (2020). India’s Battlefields: From Kurukshetra to Balakot, Pentagon Press, page-154.
^[24]Sindhu, Kuldeep Singh, Armoured Operations: Indo-Pak Conflict 1965, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, Journal, Autumn 2015, page- 111.
^[25]Sindhu, Kuldeep Singh, Armoured Operations: Indo-Pak Conflict 1965, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, Journal, Autumn 2015, page- 113.
^[26]Zaloga, Steve (1999), The M47 and M48 Patton Tanks, Osprey Publishing, page- 34-35.
^[27]Cardozo, Major General Ian (retd.) (2003), Param Vir: Our Heroes in Battle, New Delhi, Roli Books, page- 105-106.
^[28]Pradhan, R. D. “1965 War, the Inside Story: Defence Minister Y.B. Chavan's Diary of India-Pakistan War,”. Atlantic Publishers & Distributors, page- 84.
^[29]Thomas M. Leonard (2006). “Encyclopedia of the developing world,” Volume 2, Taylor & Francis, page 806.
^[30]Thomas M. Leonard (2006). “Encyclopedia of the developing world,” Volume 2, Taylor & Francis, page 806.

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