Does India Need a Strategy of Strategies?

As the India and China have finally reached a deal on patrolling their disputed frontier to end a four-year long military stand-off to pave way for resetting the political and business ties between the Asian giants, there is understandably a sudden sense of optimism in New Delhi and possibly in Beijing. India’s premise, as articulated by the External Affairs Minister articulated – “We always said that if you disturb the peace and tranquillity how can the rest of the relationship go forward?” ^[1], appears to underpin the future trajectory of the relationship on peace and tranquillity on the borders. While certainly it is a different India today that has stood firm in its national security interests while dealing with the border imbroglio, one cannot help being haunted by a sense of déjà vu of the Peace and Tranquillity Agreement of 1993, which was believed to have diminished the overall salience of the boundary in the relationship and stabilised the status quo.^[2] Arguably, it was this very peace and tranquillity that has been repeatedly violated with Beijing’s demonstrated approach and actions on the borders. The previous agreement while undeniably improved relations, it had lulled India to take the eye off the ball on the tenuous border issue, giving China the strategic time and space to rapidly develop its border infrastructure, military capability and presence. The de-hyphenation of the border issue from the relationship was a strategic mistake as it gave exactly what China wanted three decades ago, time to consolidate on its border with India. Given its current Taiwan focus, a hostile border with India is a strategic vulnerability for China as it keeps alive the unwanted possibility of a second front. The current agreement will once again provide the strategic interlude and play into Beijing’s long term Zhongguo strategy as it seeks to reclaim it ‘perceived’ ancient territories, unless India keeps a close eye on the ball. More importantly, it is high time India rolled out its long game.

Every Indian has grown up with an awareness of its rich and glorious ancient civilisational past. A past, which the scientific analysis of evidence from recent excavations reveals to be at least nine thousand years BP (before the present). ^[3] Proud though we are of its historical legacy, India’s Colonial past had scarred our collective consciousness and weighed heavily on the nation’s growth and development since 1947. Independent India came into being with the trauma of partition, violent communal bloodsheds, immense challenges of shortages of food and wherewithal, and an economy in distress, ravaged by the British Empire and its wars. These challenges defined the priorities of the nation, and the immediate needs were managing the effects of partition, bringing peace and harmony into civil society, nation building, and governance. Four wars fought in just over two decades of emergence as a free nation forged and tempered a sense of nationhood, but were debilitating for our economic growth and development. The wars kept our security outlook bound to a continental territorial construct of our land boundaries and underscored the threat from the two adversaries i.e. Pakistan and China. The development of an indigenous deterrent capability to manage this persisting threat drew international opprobrium and fettered the nation with sanctions. Along this arduous journey, we rose from the disparaging label of a third-world country to the resurgent nation that we are today. A strong vibrant economy that has remained resilient through the debilitating challenges brought upon by the pandemic. After seventy-five years, an independent India has not only emerged stronger, the unconditional help and support extended to other nations driven by the world embracing the ancient verity of ‘vasudhaiva kutumbakam’, has elevated its global standing. The challenging years have also coalesced us as a nation and strengthened the sense of nationhood of our people. Seen from a Kautilyan construct, India’s progress has been remarkable. It has adhered to the threefold path of ‘raksha’ or protection of the state from external aggression, ‘palana’ or maintenance of law and order within the state, and ‘yogakshema’ or safeguarding the welfare of the people. ^[4]

We are a nation that began with ‘a comprehensive grand strategy at the dawn of its independence, to meet both external and internal challenges towards becoming a major actor in the international community.’^[5] India’s rise has been thus far fuelled by modest ambitions within our modest means. As we enter the last quarter towards completing a centenary of independence and having emerged as a middle power, it is time to look ahead boldly. All strategies have a shelf life of applicability and usefulness, and if not seen afresh, become self-limiting. The unique and sophisticated Indian strategic culture evolved out of Kautilya’s treatise the Arthashastra, enabled the first pan-Indian empire of the Mauryas which covered most of the Indian subcontinent. This pragmatic realist Kautilyan approach which underpinned subsequent empires and kingdoms, which were systematically crushed in the colonial years of subjugation, is still prevalent in our habitus and its political normativity remains ingrained in Indian statecraft. That it is not articulated and plays a role in a diffused manner, can be explained as ‘that set of shared beliefs, assumptions, and modes of behaviour, derived from common experiences and accepted narratives (both oral and written), that shape collective identity and relationships to other groups, and which determine appropriate ends and means for achieving security objectives.’^[6]

The re-emergence of our ancient strategic approach of ‘what is best for the state’, and that strategy truly belongs to the state and its citizens, is evident today. The comprehensive grand strategy of the past has evidently been distilled and narrowed to focus on economic growth and progress, as this end would provide the ways and means to not only deal with the external and internal challenges, but it would also elevate our international standing. The visible markers of the successful outcome of this strategy are the swift bounce back of the economy, despite the international downturn, the assertive use of the military instrument for punitive political signalling, resilient actions within our borders, and a self-assured international outlook. As a nation, India is at the crossroad with the choice of reclaiming India and the ‘wonder that it was’ or to continue on a plateau of mediocrity and ambivalent goals. So where does India go from here – Quo Vadis India? The closely interlinked and interdependent threefold path of raksha, palana, and yogakshema provide the grand strategy for India’s future rise to a great power. History of the world stands testimony to the rise of nations that have invested in a future vision, strategies to leverage the ways and means to get there, and commitment and resilience to achieve their goals. For India, the Bhagavad-Gita provides the appropriate and justified grand strategic vision and goal of ‘Tejastejasvinamaham- of the splendid I am the splendour’. ^[7]

The transition from a third-world country to its sharp upward trajectory was made by an accommodative and adaptive approach in the past, often constrained by the circumstances and limited to the near future. Today India is relatively well placed in its ways and means to expand its future vision beyond modest ambitions to achieve the ends of where we want to be. It is time we exchanged our modest goals and aspirations for bolder and bigger ones to establish and secure our position in the world. Having achieved a middle power status while maintaining its strategic independence despite polarising influences, and with its increasing growth trajectory, empowers the nation towards a more ambitious future vision. The four cornerstones for India’s rise are – ambition, future, strategy, and vision. Ambition – a strong desire, future – the time ahead, strategy – the way ahead, and vision – to see where we want to be. It is on these cornerstones that we must build to achieve our ‘splendorous’ goal. India today justifiably can and must transform its great power aspirations into an achievable ambition.

Our strengths are – a proud civilisational lineage, being the largest democracy, a growing economic and Digitech capability, immense human resource potential, a favourable demographic profile, and a mature and robust comprehensive national power. The continued increase in capability, capacity and confidence in the future will enable us to realise the great power ambition if we choose to be one. This choice becomes a necessity given that India will soon be the most populous country in the world and the future needs of our large young and aspirational demography. Defining a timeline for the future presents the challenge of quantifying how far ahead we must think. The year 2047, when we complete a hundred years of India’s independence which is twenty-three years hence is an appropriate one. Also, within this timeline, five years hence could be considered as near or short term, fifteen years hence the mid-term, and twenty-five years the long term. Given the often-overwhelming short-term imperatives and the impermanence of strategy itself, a long-term strategy timeline is a difficult proposition. In the past, this has led our strategic approaches to be limited to the short term of governmental tenures. This limited us from taking a long-term holistic overview and narrowed our vision to the near long term of a decade at best. This has changed in recent years as we as a nation have become more confident and assured of our future.

The Chinese approach of a long-term vision to regain its civilisational great power status and matching, if not overtaking the United States of America, and its graduated strategy to get there, elucidated in its periodic White Papers on Defence over almost three decades, serves to highlight the necessity of a future vision. ^[8] The centenary of India’s independence provides an ideal timeline for its rise to great power. We are a nation that has civilisationally believed that the world is truly one family, a world where all nations grow and prosper together. But this faith of ours will be put to test increasingly in the future by our strong neighbour, with whom we not only share borders but also the Asian continent. All indications underscore the fact that its ambitions and actions will be impediments to our legitimate rise, and a threat to our sovereignty, peace and prosperity in the future. Thus, it is imperative that we achieve our great power ambition, secure our sovereignty, ensure the safety of our people and provide the opportunity to fulfil their aspirations, in a rules-based, harmonious and peaceful world. This is imperative, not just for our national interest, but for our international interest as well.

Like the era of globalisation had for a period drawn all like-minded nations together, interconnecting them on economy and trade, the international outlook is trending towards a phase in the near future of a more overt ‘nation first approach,’ increased ascent of middle powers, and a steady drift towards the creation of an alternative international system by China, Russia, Iran and other nations who are increasingly looking for an anti-US led world order. India has carved its own independent foreign policy space which will be difficult to sustain unless we adopt a longer strategic vision and approach. Strategy formulation is not easy, and even more challenging is its implementation given the vast size, diversity, and population of India. Long-term strategies themselves are fraught with uncertainties and risks, and hence there is an inherent resistance on the part of governments and policymakers to take a long view. To realise India’s ambition of rising to a great power status by the year 2047, however, will not be possible with short-term strategies. For this, the Government has to take a long view of the future.

Though in the past the Indian establishment has been reticent to adopt long-term strategies from a security perspective, of late there is a distinct increase in visualising and adopting long-term approaches. Governmental stability and longevity play a vital role in its strategy timelines, and this allows the policymakers greater strategic space for their policies to produce tangible outcomes. This automatically enhances confidence and reduces risk aversion, thus allowing for bolder long-term approaches. But the challenge is that in a geostrategically volatile international system, adopting long strategy timelines will at best be conservatively limited to low-risk, more-predictable areas within the comfort zones of the establishment. But national security in its current wide-ranging avatar, where security has expanded to include all the critical constituents of national power, can no longer be engaged in individual silos. An innovative overarching strategy of strategies approach would certainly provide a more comprehensive outlook with a long vision and three-phased strategy timelines. This also needs the individual short, medium, and long-term strategies of each of the verticals of national security to be comprehensively included for prioritisation, resource allocation, and timeline synchronisation. This will not be possible without resorting to a process-driven adoption of a strategy formulation model or models. Marshal’s net assessment and McNamara’s strategy analysis have served the US over decades to take a larger and longer perspective. In the past, a net assessment approach was taken to formulate the ‘Long View from Delhi,’ which endeavoured to define an Indian grand strategy for foreign policy in 2010, for a period of ten years. ^[9]

‘Tejastejasvinamaham’ is a worthy grand strategy ambition for India, and today it is at the crossroad where the goal is visible. But in this complex world and the difficult to predict future, if the Indian state wants to fulfil its ‘Raj dharma’ to its citizens, to assure them a peaceful, stable, and prosperous future, it has to ensure its security first. It has to free its path of obstacles, prevail over the challenges, and pursue its legitimate goal relentlessly. It will need shedding shibboleths of the past, breaking self-limiting and impeding mindsets, and adopting new strategies and new paradigms. The increasing realism plus global power struggle which has already commenced with the waning of the power of the US and the rise of China, with attempts to create an alternative international system, increase in the conflict of choices for rising middle powers, and the myriad challenges beyond human control – all highlight the imperative for India to chart its own graded interim strategies with a long term vision. China will remain the most significant and strident challenge in India’s security construct and the primary continental challenge. Paired with its client state of Pakistan it will continue to impact our external security policies in the foreseeable future.^[10] The ghosts of the past must become harbingers for India’s future, as it must reset its short-term strategies into a cohesive, visionary, and a bold long-term one.

It will mean changing and adopting changes in certain key areas of national security and especially the instrument of military power. The persistence of threats on our borders means that while in the short term we need to mitigate and manage them, in the long term we have to resolve them to our advantage. Upgrading our deterrence in the near future and expanding it towards coercive deterrence in the long term to buttress our hard power to secure India’s regional and international power, position, and standing. Our nuclear strategy will certainly need to be made future robust and resilient. With the military remaining a vital vertical of national security, it needs to evolve into an inclusive multi-domain multi-dimension instrument from the current single-service single-domain surface-centric approach. Strategy bridges to link the services, the government, the civil domain, and the citizen are a must for an inclusive way forward. ^[11] Investing in key future technologies, research, and development will not only help self-reliance in critical areas but also create an India-centric and India-dependent region, not only in the IOR but the larger Indo-Pacific construct. For all of this – ‘A comprehensive approach is now undeniably the way ahead, and an all-of-government approach needs to be structurally formalised in dealing with matters of national security’ with a long-term strategy of strategies.^[12]

In India’s case, with its large number of strategic institutions and think tanks which are actively involved in their niche areas, it makes sense to leverage them in evolving a strategy of strategies. It is opportune to create a ‘Suraksha Kuutneeti Aayog’ to be the apex body of strategic decision-making professionals, specialists, and subject matter experts. This body could coalesce all discussions and debates on India’s grand strategic goal of 2047, identify the key areas of security to study its past and likely futures, identify key drivers for each component of national security, prioritise them based on desired future outcomes and develop pro-con scenarios allowing for reasonable unpredictability. Importantly, it could identify appropriate security and growth strategies for each field of comprehensive national power, and weave the areas of overlap and synergy into an overarching strategy of strategies. This would enable a multipronged simultaneous approach forwards in policy formulation, implementation, and outcome oversight.

India has to emerge as a clear stable, secure, mature, and inclusive alternative power to the complex and divisive US and China-centric groupings, with a ‘friends with all and enemies with none’ approach. The rising credibility of India’s independent ‘nation-first’ foreign policy, independent thinking, and inclusive approach underscores both its rising stature and respect. India must become the bulwark of an alternative Asian and international security system in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) to ensure stability, peace, and cooperative mutual development. This will mean a more energetic and imaginative regional security engagement policy of expanding arcs, pivots, and loci of influence, in order to establish India’s regional salience. It will also mean looking at national interest and national security from a larger perspective to include the key elements which directly affect the citizens of the state – food, water, health, energy, and the environment. While each aspect of security will need visionary strategies and implementation timelines, the sheer interconnectedness and interdependence amongst the security verticals necessitate an overarching strategy of strategies to coincide with goals and timelines. To turn this achievable ambition into a reality will need the nation and its citizens to take a long view of where we want to be, create innovative and visionary strategies, and undertake a national commitment to achieve our goals. Thus, it is time for India to develop a long-term strategy of strategies to keep its eye on the ball for it to skilfully dribble its way forward in a contested Asia to reach its justified great power goal.

References

^[1] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/india-china-have-arrived-border-patrolling-pact-indias-top-diplomat-says-2024-10-21/ [3]
^[2] Shiv Shankar Menon, Choices, Penguin Random House India, 2016, p. 43
^[3] https://www.nature.com/articles/srep26555.pdf [4]
^[4] LN Rangarajan, The Arthashastra, Penguin Random House India, 1992, p. 3.
^[5] K. Subrahmanyam, Grand Strategy for the First Half of the 21st Century, Grand Strategy for India 2020 and Beyond, Edited by Krishnappa Vekatshamy and Princey George, Pentagon Security International, New Delhi, 2012, p.13.
^[6] Thomas G. Mahnken, United States Strategic Culture, Science Applications International Corporation Report, Contract No: DTRA01-03-D-0017, Technical Instruction 18-06-02, revised November 13, 2006, McLean, VA, Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), p.4.
^[7] S Radhakrisna, The Bhagavad-Gita, Chapter 10, Verse 36, Harper Collins India, 1993, p. 315.
^[8] https://www.andrewerickson.com/2019/07/china-defense-white-papers-19952019-download-complete-set-read-highlights-here/ [5]
^[9] Rajiv Kumar, Admiral Raja Menon, The Long View from Delhi, Academic Foundation, New Delhi, 2009
^[10] Air Mshl Diptendu Choudhury, Security Vision 2047: A Hundred Years of Independence, VIF Paper November 2022
^[11] Ibid
^[12] Ibid
(The paper is the author’s individual scholastic articulation. The author certifies that the article/paper is original in content, unpublished and it has not been submitted for publication/web upload elsewhere, and that the facts and figures quoted are duly referenced, as needed, and are believed to be correct). (The paper does not necessarily represent the organisational stance... More >>