Myanmar's Civil War: A Turning Point, or a Descent into Chaos?

Myanmar's civil war has taken a major turn. The rebels have scored big wins, pushing the military out of many border regions. The conflict has become increasingly militarised, with a rise in violence from both sides. The military's control is weakening, and the ethnic armed groups are playing a more prominent role in the resistance movement, with greater coordination between the National Unity Government (NUG) and Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs). Several EAOs, such as the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), Arakan Army (AA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), Karenni Nationalities People’s Liberation Front (KNPLF), and Karenni Nationalities Defence Force (KNDF), are actively involved in the conflict. These groups have demonstrated strong centralisation, extensive combat experience, and possess large arsenals, enabling them to mount significant challenges against the military regime. The conflict has transitioned from a civil disobedience movement in 2021 to an armed struggle now. The article provides an overview of the complex dynamics unfolding in Myanmar since the military's seizure of power in 2021 and implications for India.

Changing Dynamics of Conflict in Myanmar

The conflicts in Myanmar have changed their nature and expanded their spread. In 2021, the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), involved boycotts, protests, and street barricades. Initially, the national police responded, but later, the armed forces became involved. These conflicts unfolded at three levels: between the military and the NUG armed wing (People's Defence Forces), inter-ethnic conflicts, and conflicts between the military and Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs). In 2022, violence persisted across many townships, particularly in the western and southern regions. The regime escalated atrocities, including increased airstrikes, while the opposition targeted military air bases due to a lack of anti-aircraft weaponry. The military faced manpower shortages and resorted to deploying civilians and coercing villagers into military training. Ceasefire agreements were extended with some EAOs, but key groups like the Kachin Independence Army declined. Conflict with the Arakan Army resumed but reached an unwritten ceasefire in November 2022, but again fighting resumed in 2023.

The year 2023 marked a turning point as ethnic armies launched major offensives, capturing several military bases and gaining significant territory, particularly along the China and India borders. In late 2023, armed resistance in Myanmar intensified, raising hopes of defeating the once formidable military regime. The Operation 1027 by the Three Brotherhood Alliance posed significant challenges to the military, leading to the seizure of numerous bases and towns. Ethnic armed groups gained territory, notably along the China and India borders.

The Kachin Independence Army (KIA) [4] and its allies have targeted various townships and key roads in Kachin State, resulting in the KIA occupying several towns and over 80 junta positions. Recently, the KIA launched attacks in Momauk and Mansi townships in Kachin State and they are intensifying their efforts to isolate military troops [5] in Bhamo township, aiming to expand the buffer zone around its headquarters in Laiza town. Control of these townships is crucial for the KIA to safeguard its headquarters, control routes to China, and thwart junta reinforcement efforts. There has been a flare-up in tensions between Myanmar's military and the TNLA [6], an ethnic armed group. The TNLA accuses the junta of violating a China-brokered ceasefire by shelling a TNLA outpost.

The Arakan Army (AA) since November 2023, the AA has seized control of more than half of Rakhine State and neighbouring Paletwa Township in Chin State. In May 2023, AA claimed to have seized control of Buthidaung town [7] in Rakhine state. The AA also launched a large-scale attack on Maungdaw town [8]which would leave only one town under the regime's control in northern Rakhine and expand AA's control over the border with Bangladesh. While Sittwe and Kyaukphyu have not been attacked yet, there are concerns about potential civilian casualties if the regime responds with heavy naval attacks. Additionally, the Chin resistance forces successfully captured two towns, Cikha and Tonzang [9] near the border with India.

However, the military responded with increased violence, including aerial bombings, leading to higher civilian casualties. Recently, in the Magwe Region, [10] two devastating airstrikes by the junta resulted in significant civilian casualties. An attack on a Buddhist monastery on May 9 killed at least 16 people, while another airstrike on May 14 in Saw Township [11] killed seven civilians, including children. These incidents are part of a broader pattern of aerial assaults on civilian targets since the coup, with reports indicating around 500 deaths, including children and the elderly, between February 2021 and October 2023. The Myanmar military is increasingly using advanced Chinese drones [12], like the CH-2 and CH-4, for precise targeting, resulting in casualties among both anti-junta forces and civilians. Since the military coup in February 2021, rebel forces have also adopted drones as a cost-effective countermeasure against airstrikes and artillery. The drone attacks [13] on 04 April 2024 was a significant psychological blow to the military which targeted military headquarters, an airbase, and leader Min Aung Hlaing's residence in Naypyitaw. This technological shift raises concerns about escalating violence as drone warfare intensifies.
Amid the ongoing civil strife, new resistance groups are establishing state-like structures and providing public services in areas they've liberated, akin to ethnic armed organisations' practices since the 1960s. Even foreign fighters [14] have begun joining anti-regime forces in Myanmar, aiming to enhance resistance capabilities against the military. While estimates suggest only about a dozen foreigners have joined, they bring combat experience and tactical knowledge to aid resistance efforts. Their presence is viewed as a potential boost for ethnic armed groups and newer resistance forces battling the regime. However, arms and ammunition shortages remain a significant challenge for opposition forces nationwide. Additionally, the efforts by the National Unity Government (NUG) and militias to launch urban resistance fronts have largely faltered. While Operation 1027 resulted in significant territorial gains, progress elsewhere has been slower and costly [15]. Attempts to capture strategic towns have stalled, and some "liberated" areas have faced near-destruction and depopulation.

The realities of territorial control are multifaceted. While the NUG and resistance groups claim control over a substantial portion of Myanmar's territory, the strategic importance and economic value of each area vary. Much of the population still resides under military rule, and the junta controls key infrastructure and revenue sources. Despite recent gains by anti-junta forces, their control in contested areas remains precarious, often coinciding with high levels of violence and instability. It also remains uncertain if the anti-junta forces can maintain their momentum from victories in the forested borderlands and extend it to the central plains, including capturing major cities. Even if they prevail, establishing a genuine federal democracy will likely require lengthy and complex negotiations. Therefore, it is often argued that there is a likelihood of a persistently fragmented state. According to a recent report by the International Crisis Group [16], although the military itself is not on the brink of collapse, the fragmentation of Myanmar is significant as ethnic armed groups consolidate control over their regions.

The Way Forward

The situation in Myanmar has evolved significantly, with anti-regime forces making notable gains, seizing control of numerous military bases and towns. The State Administrative Council (SAC), the military regime, seems to be losing ground against the NUG and EAOs and it lacks the capacity to retake lost territory and faces internal divisions, defections, and recruitment issues. Even the public perception, particularly among Bamar youth, is shifting away from the military. But the military in Myanmar does not need to win the war; it only has to avoid losing it. As long as the junta controls the central territories, it retains critical resources and influence over how external actors engage with Myanmar.

In contrast, the NUG and EAOs have emerged as major political and military players, shaping Myanmar's future. However, they also face significant challenges due to the lack of a safe base area within the country, hindering its ability to build governance legitimacy and garner support. These groups are primarily focussed on securing self-determination for their respective regions rather than maintaining the existing Myanmar union. While the NUG and some EAOs are coordinating efforts, there is a need to overcome their differences and establish a new, federal government. There is clearly a possibility that the conflict in Myanmar may continue with no clear victor and eventually lead to fragmentation into separate entities, potentially aligned with regional powers like China.
Myanmar's strategic importance for India is underscored by their shared borders and security concerns. Post-coup, security threats have risen with increasing influx of refugees, Myanmar military’s overlooking of and/or its inability to deal with Indian insurgent groups and incidents of drug trafficking. Furthermore, China's influence further complicates India's strategic interests in the region. India needs to tackle the Myanmar crisis by engaging with a wider range of stakeholders, including the NUG and various EAOs especially at Indian borders, while leveraging the ties of its Northeastern states. Appointing a special envoy and utilising regional frameworks such as ASEAN Plus and the QUAD could promote inclusive dialogue and peacebuilding. Additionally, instead of fully fencing the borders, India should consider temporary fencing and modern surveillance to balance security and requirement of open borders. Finally, recalibrating development assistance to focus on empowering local communities is essential. This ongoing crisis is fast becoming a regional problem and the regional players like ASEAN, India and China must play a pragmatic role in facilitating an inclusive dialogue involving all stakeholders.

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