The Kursk Incursion – An Analysis

Scope

This work attempts to analyse the issues related to the recent incursion of Ukrainian forces in the Kursk region of Russia. In that, it examines the so-called 'gains' from such an incursion in the light of existing realities.

The Event ^[1]

On 06 Aug 2024, a minimum of 1000 Ukrainian troops ( later the number built up to 10k-15k) duly supported by mechanised forces (Challenger tanks, Stryker armoured fighting vehicles), air defence systems ( Buk M1 and S-125 SAMs), rocket artillery (M 142 HIMARS) and drones made a surprise incursion into the Kursk region of Russia.

Russians did get caught by surprise though some sources claim that the intelligence warning of troops amassing at the border across the Southwest region of Kursk were allegedly ignored by Chief of General Staff of the Russian Army. ^[2]

The Kursk front was very lightly held with reserves, border guard forces and some conscripts. Some highlights of this incursion are very briefly stated only to set the background for the ensuing analysis:-

• Within the first week, Ukrainian military advanced nearly 30 km, captured some 1000sq km of Russian territory and 28 settlements. ^[3] By 22 Aug 24 Ukraine had captured some 1200 km of territory and 93 villages. ^[4]
• By 19 Aug 24 Ukrainian forces claimed to have destroyed 3 key bridges across the Seim River that winds through the Kursk region. ^[5]
• As on 03 Sep, Ukraine claimed to be in control of some 1300 sq. km in Kursk region that included 100 settlements. ^[6]
• As per an open source report dated 16 Sep 24, a total of 152,000 Russians civilians have been evacuated/ in process, ever since the Kursk incursion started on 06 Aug. ^[7]
• Russia started the counteroffensive on 14 Sep 24 and is attempting to penetrate into the Ukrainian positions. There were reports of some 40,000 Russian troops including re-enforcements from the erstwhile Wagner mercenaries that are currently operating in Kursk. ^[8]

Analysis and Deductions

The succeeding portion of the work attempts to analyse the multiple issues which Ukraine has been claiming as gains of the offensive it took on 06 Aug.

Achieving a Better Bargaining Position

The Ukrainian claim doing the most rounds is, that by doing this surprise incursion, it wanted to capture maximum Russian territory so as to be in a better ‘bargaining position’ as and when peace talks may happen.

Expanding the scope of the above assertion, President Zelenskyy made a statement on 19 Aug 24 that the Ukrainian push into the Kursk region was aimed to create a buffer zone, destroy as much Russian war potential as possible and conduct maximum counteroffensives. ^[9]

Following points are stated:-

• In all probability, even President Zelenskyy would have been convinced that given the Russian capability to push back and engage in a perpetual war of slow attrition, it may not be really possible to either capture sizeable territory, and more importantly, hold on to the same for good till the day to barter arrives.
• These fears are already coming true as Russians have started to push back the Ukrainian forces and are attempting to re-claim the Kursk region in a slow forward grind. ^[10]
• Further reports indicate that Russia has now committed some high calibre units in the offensive (51st Airborne Regiment, Wagner Private Military Company and more). The offensive which is currently nibbling at the western fringes of the occupied area has retaken a couple of villages. ^[11]
• It is the sense of the author that even if the counter offensive is slow at this moment, it is likely to catch momentum in due course. Given the depth in the Russian war machinery, its capability to absorb casualties and its capability to recoil and persist in a hard-slog blood bath, are testimonies to this claim (Russian casualties - Battle of Bakmuth- 32000-43000 dead, 95000 wounded ^[12] , Battle of Avdiivka-more than 47000 dead. Both cities were eventually taken by Russians). ^[13]
• Open sources are already reporting, digging down on both sides setting a stage for Jun 23 type of a duel where the Russian defence lines had petered out a much-hyped Ukrainian counteroffensive.
• Consider the following:-
• Bargaining chip has value if it bears a semblance of equivalence. As of Sep 2024, Russia is in occupation of 27% of Ukrainian territory (161000km2) ^[14] Kursk incursion is a mere 1300 sq. km! ^[15]
• Bargaining chip will come into play when there will be peace negotiations. Nothing can be farther from this eventuality at this point in time.

This perceived gain cannot be given to Ukraine at this point in time.

Easing Pressure from Ukraine’s Eastern Front

The position obtaining on the Eastern front just prior to Kursk incursion is briefly stated:- ^[16]

• Ukraine was continuing with its drone strikes inside Russian territory. A Russian submarine Rostov-on-Don was claimed to be sunk by Ukraine in the Black Sea using its un-crewed surface vehicle (USV). Also on 04 Aug a Russian S 400 long range air defence and anti-missile system was damaged by drone strike.
• Approximately 40,000 Russian troops were reported advancing towards the important town of Pokrovsk. This town is known to be a logistic hub and sits at the crossroads of several important roads. Capture of Pokrovsk would weaken the Ukrainian frontline and its defences could crumble. ^[17]
• Russia’s offensive across the front line in Donetsk region was intensifying. Large scale aerial strikes, Shahed drone attacks, firing of S-300 missiles and Kh-31 Kinzhal missiles were happening in Kherson region. ^[18]
• In addition, Russian missile and drone attacks were also regularly targeting Ukrainian power grid. A major attack took place near Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant on 04 Aug.

It was against this backdrop of a potential danger of a crumbling frontline, Ukraine did a Kursk. One of the many reasons could be to ease pressure from the eastern front line. Q - Did it happen? Ans. –Not really.

Some points are stated in this context:-

• In the initial days of incursion, there were no signs of Russians easing pressure on the eastern front. In fact, by 1 Aug Russian forces inched closer to Pokrovsk by launching offensives and capturing areas nearby (villages of Ivanivka and Svydonivka) and continued their advance towards Pokrovsk.
• On 04 Aug and again on 26 Aug, a massive air raid took place all across the Ukrainian front damaging the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant.
• Right through August and in Sept Russia kept making advance towards Pokrovsk by continuing to capture villages to the east and SE of this major town.
• Then around mid Sep Russian counteroffensive to expel the Kursk incursion got going, as stated earlier. As per Ukrainian assessment, some 60-70,000 troops have been committed. ^[19]
• As this is being written, claims and counter claims are in process. One dated 15 Sep claims that Russia has reclaimed 63 sq. km of captured land. ^[20] A day later Ukrainian sources have claimed that the Russian advance has been stopped. ^[21]
• While President Zelenskyy has stated several things at various fora; Russian eastern front offensive has slowed down; some 60-70k troops have been moved out to Kursk; Russian artillery firing intensity ratio has come down from 12.5 to 2.5; so are the number of glide bomb attacks… the reality on ground is reported to be like this:- ^[22], ^[23]
• As on 29 Sep Russian sources claimed to have thwarted Ukrainian attempts to expand their foothold by trying to enter western Kursk region. ^[24]
• Instead of troop reduction in the eastern front, Russia is doubling down on the capture of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. Both these are major logistical hubs the preservation of which is critical to sustaining the Ukrainian defensive positions. As this is being written Russian forces are about 8 km from Pokrovosk and 4 km from Myrnohrad. ^[25]
• The troops are outnumbered 1:8 and artillery fire power 1:10. The weapons doing the maximum damage are the highly destructive glide bombs (GPS aided bombs with wings for precise navigation), kamikaze drones and motorcycle and dune- based small attack teams. ^[26]
• Short of ammunition and manpower, the Ukrainian forces feel exhausted. A feeling is getting home that pulling out battle-hardened troops from the eastern front for Kursk was a ‘poor deal’, whose effects are getting to show in the Donetsk region now.
• Long gone are the frontal headlong armoured assaults of Feb/May 2022, Russian offensives are now being executed by small and highly mobile infantry units supported by hard -hitting mechanised teams. These agile outfits try to encircle the objectives from several directions trapping small bodies of Ukrainian troops into cauldrons.

That much for easing the pressure from the eastern front.

Other Intangible Gains

There have been several intangible gains which cannot be wished away. Some of these are stated:-

• Turning the tables on a mighty nuclear power that has been on the offensive for very long time having grabbed more than 26% of Ukrainian sovereign territory, killed more than 100,000 of their nationals and having converted a once beautiful country into a rotten mass of death and destruction … the feeling of the Ukrainian soldiers carrying back Russian flags and artefacts as ‘war mementoes’ from Kursk was very ‘palpable’ and well understood!
• ‘Giving Russia a taste of its own medicine’ was a feeling echoed by the attacking soldiers. ^[27] Some other associated thoughts that reflected a boosted morale went like this: -
• It is like the liberation of Kherson! (happened in Nov 2022).
• Even after all this time we are capable of attacking Russia – it is a good feeling!
• Vulnerabilities of the enemy stand exposed.
• President Zelenskyy counting the gains of his decision also claimed that the aim was to prevent Russia from using the Kursk region as a firm base and a launch pad to launch offensives in the Ukraine’s NE towards Kharkiv. He also announced it loud that he wanted to tell the world that with the right king of support from its allies this is what the brave Ukrainians can achieve.

Looking at it from the hindsight, following points are made: -

• While the ‘morale adrenalin’ with all the feeling of a ‘high’ a kind of ‘revenge’ if you please, taste of ‘one’s own medicine’ etc. are undeniable, it is also undeniable that the initial euphoria and josh are petering out steadily.
• Kursk is turning out to be a hard-slog with both sides digging down for the harsh winter ahead. Only one problem though; while the defences on the Russian sides are slowly getting a fillip of soldiers, mercenaries and weapons, the same are hard to find on the opposite side.
• There is also a talk of emergence of a new type of operation in the Russo-Ukraine war. The one that involves executing surprise attacks on lightly held territories and making a quick gain, causing humiliation to the bigger power and earning some currency in the barter that might take place at some point in time.
• It is the sense of the author that such an option was always available. The question is how much of it can be executed given the current state of manpower and weapon deficiencies at hand and more importantly, how much of its gains, tangible or otherwise can be grabbed and retained for good, given the current power balance?

What to say of the intangible gains? Gains for sure but these are likely to peter out sooner than later.

Concluding Observations

In the fast-changing landscape of the Russo-Ukraine war, there are breaking news not by weeks and months but almost every day. Here is brief take on these in the context of the current work.

There is much talk of President Putin having changed (read tweaked) the Russian Nuclear Doctrine which was heretofore based on the principle of No First Use (NFU). In its new version, Russia is reportedly going to consider an attack even from a non-nuclear state that is backed by a nuclear armed nation to be a joint attack wherein Russia will reserve the right to respond with nuclear weapons. The same will be true for Russia, as well as, its ally Belarus with which the changed status has been agreed to. ^[28] Following points are made:-

• President Putin’s has thrown such threats earlier as well. This one is a repeat performance. However, there is one change, this time around it is backed with a ‘tweaked doctrine’.
• The new red-line is basically aimed at Ukraine which if it chooses to use the US and UK’s long-range missiles (MGM 140 Army Tactical Missile Systems or ATACMs of US, range 300 km ^[29] and Franco-British long range cruise missile named Storm shadow, range 550 km) ^[30], the red-line would be deemed to have been crossed.
• It is no wonder therefore, while the President of US and Prime Minister of UK have both committed support both morally and financially, they have shied away from crossing President Putin’s new red lines by holding on to the permission sought by President Zelenskyy (use of their long-range missiles inside Russian territory).
• That said, while both the donors very well know the ‘rhetoric content’ in President Putin’s sabre rattling; the ‘deterrent content’ of the red lines (whatever of it is perceived) is somehow holding.
• While the current aid package from US has been made available under the PDA (Presidential drawdown Authority – an authority which enables the President to provide military assistance from existing DoD funds) President Zelenskyy knows very well that future packages will require Congress approval. With Mr Trump as a possible claimant of White house, that may not be easy. (not explained any further).
• Then there is this infeasibility absurdity and impracticality of the so called ‘Victory Plan’ of President Zelenskyy (only known in parts till now). Reportedly it calls for a complete withdrawal of Russian troops from the sovereign territory of Ukraine besides other equally impractical wishes.
• It is the sense of the author that President Zelenskyy is well past the option that could have led to some hope to end the war – NATO membership! (the raison d'être of the Russo-Ukraine war). Other things are only footnotes that will not propel Russia towards that direction even by an inch! There is no hurry or compulsion for Russia to engage in peace talks. The very mention of this looks so much out of place at this point in time.

Back to Kursk incursion. Here is the sign off line…

• The bold incursion did yield some very positive instant gains both in the tangible, as well as, the intangible domain. Unfortunately, these are wearing out sooner than later.
• All the rhetoric notwithstanding, the return to peace is not even a distant pipe dream as of now.

Endnotes

^[1] “Ukraine’s incursion of Kursk Oblast,” at www.en.m.wikipedia.org [3]. Accessed on 18 Sep 2024
^[2] Gerasimov ignored warnings of Ukrainian troop build-up near border,” at www.yahoo.com [4]. Accessed on 18 Sep 2024.
^[3] 1 ibid
^[4] “Ukraine in maps: Tracking the war with Russia,” at www.bbc-com.cdn.ampproject.org [5]. Accessed on 18 Sep 2024.
^[5] Ukraine hits third bridge in Russia’s Kursk,” at www.aljazeera.com [6]. Accessed on 20 Sep 2024.
^[6] “It was all a blur: Ukraine’s troops on their audacious incursion.” at www.the [7] guardian.com. Accessed on 20 Sep 2024.
^[7] “Russia orders more evacuation in Kursk region,” at www.themoscowtimes.com [8]. Accessed on 23 Sep 2024.
^[8] “Ukraine’s Kursk offensive was seen as a major success but it came at a huge cost,” at www.edition.cnn [9]. Accessed on 23 Sep 2024.
^[9] “Ukrainian President Zelensky says push into Russia is to create buffer zone there,” Accessed on 24 Sep 24.
^[10] “Ukrainian war briefing: major Russian counter offensive reported in Kursk,.” At www.yeguardian.com [10]. Accessed on 26 Sep 2024.
^[11] “Russia begins efforts to expel Ukraine from Kursk but the offensive is yet to gain momentum,” at www.cc.com [11]. Accessed on 26 Sep 2024.
^[12] “Battle of Bakmuth,” at www.en.m.wikipedia.org [3]. Accessed on 26 Sep 2024.
^[13] “Russia’s Avdiivka losses higher than entire Soviet Afghan War,” at www.newsweek.com [12] . Accessed on 26 Sep 2024.
^[14] “Russian occupied territories of Ukraine,” at www.en.m.wikipedia.org,” . Accessed on 26 Sep 2024.
^[15] “Ukraine in maps: Tracking the war with Russia,” at www.bbc.com [13]. Accessed on 26 Sep 2024.
^[16] “Timeline of Russian invasion of Ukraine,” at www.en.m.wikipedia.org [3]. Accessed on 27 Sep 2024.
^[17] Pokrovsk: Ukraine’s vital eastern town.” At www.bbc.com [13]. Accessed on 27 Sep 2024.
^[18] 16 ibid
^[19] “Russia begins efforts to expel Ukraine from Kursk,” at www.cnn.com [14]. Accessed on 29 Sep 2024
^[20] “Russia dials up pressure on Ukraine Kursk offensive,” at www.ft.com [15]. Accessed on 30 Sep 2024
^[21] “Russian advance in Kursk stopped..” at www.france24.com [16]. Accessed on 30 Sep 2024
^[22] “Military briefings: Russia ’overwhelms’ Ukrainian forces on the Eastern Front
^[23] “We are surrounded by Russian troops -but escaped.” At www.bbc.com [13] Accessed on 30 Sep 2024.
^[24] “Russia says it thwarted Ukrainian attempts to enter Kursk region,” at ww.reuters.com. Accessed on 30 Sep 2024.
^[25] ibid
^[26] “Russia launches counteroffensive in Kursk region” at www.lemonade.fr [17]. Accessed on 30 Sep 2024.
^[27] “Putin cries foul as Ukraine gives Russia a taste of its own medicine,” at www.omny.fm [18]. Accessed on 30 Sep 2024.
^[28] “Putin proposes new rules for using nuclear weapons,” at www.bbc.com [13]. Accessed on 30 Sep 2024.
^[29] “ATACMS,” at www.en.m.wikipedia.org [3] Accessed on 30 Sep 2024
^[30] “Storm shadow” at www.en.m.wikipedia.org [3]. Accessed on 01 Oct 2024.

(The paper is the author’s individual scholastic articulation. The author certifies that the article/paper is original in content, unpublished and it has not been submitted for publication/web upload elsewhere, and that the facts and figures quoted are duly referenced, as needed, and are believed to be correct). (The paper does not necessarily represent the organisational stance... More >>

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