China-Africa Cooperation Forum: An Analytical Overview

China hosted the Ninth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Beijing on September 4-6, 2024. In the Ministerial conference of the 2024 FOCAC summit, Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, stated that the summit would be ‘China’s most important home diplomatic’ effort of the year. ^[1] Leaders and Ministers of 53 African countries, along with other regional and international organisations, participated in the summit. The summit was conducted under theme of ‘Joining Hands to Advance Modernization and Build a High-Level China-Africa Community with a Shared Future.’ ^[2]
The summit was attended by heads of state and government from 51 African countries, presidential representatives from 2 African countries, the Chairperson of the African Union (AU) Commission, adjoined by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. ^[3] This article put forth the expectations and key outcomes of the 2024 FOCAC summit.

Introduction to FOCAC

FOCAC is a partnership platform between China and 53 African countries. Eswatini is the only country in Africa that is not a part of this partnership as the nation continues to maintain ties with Taiwan. The forum was established in 2000 with the aim of equal consultation, enhancing understanding, expanding consensus, strengthening relationships, and promoting cooperation between China and African countries. ^[4] The mechanism of the triennial forum is built at three levels; i) a ministerial conference, ii) a senior officials meeting and a senior officials preparatory meeting, and iii) a meeting to be held at least twice a year between the African Diplomatic Corps in China, and the Secretariat of the Chinese Follow-up Committee (this committee is set up in the Department of African Affairs of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China). ^[5]

Since its inception, FOCAC has evolved into a quintessential component of China’s grand strategy for the global South. ^[6] The partnership platform has deepened China’s engagement in the continent across the economic, political, security, and developmental sectors. ^[7] The 2024 FOCAC summit was a significant event considering the uncertain geopolitical environment.

Backdrop to the 2024 FOCAC Summit

The summit was held against the backdrop of uncertain geopolitical dynamics, increasing prominence of the Global South, and evolving demand for green energy transition. Prior to the summit, China’s President Xi Jinping had bilateral meetings with some African leaders, including leader of Eritrea, Mali, Comoros, Djibouti, Seychelles, Guinea, South Africa, Togo, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). During this bilateral dialogue, President Xi Jinping expressed China’s commitment to strategic cooperation, engaging in mutually beneficial economic specifically in the fields of agriculture, energy, infrastructure, mining, and social development. ^[8]

There were certain expectations leading to the summit. The continent is experiencing an unprecedented rise of debt. The total external debt, for Africa, rose from $ 1.12 trillion in 2022, to $ 1.152 trillion in 2023. ^[9] With the soaring global interest rates and the multiple debts taken by African countries reaching maturity, the challenges are set to increase for the continent. ^[10] African countries anticipated an increase in investment in loans from China during the summit.

Further, considering that 42.1 percent of the Sub-Saharan African countries have imposed export restrictions on raw materials and metals, there is an impetus among the African countries to engage in fairer resource extraction deals. ^[11] For instance, in the case of lithium, it is estimated that Africa could potentially supply around 20 percent of global demand of lithium by 2030. ^[12] But to best serve the interest of development in African nations, the African leaders are demanding that external miners go beyond extraction and add value by locally processing the raw mineral. ^[13]

It was anticipated that the outcomes of the 2024 FOCAC summit would be framed, focusing on such developments. China, along with other deliverables offered during the summit, was expected to strengthen investments in soft loans, uplift the green energy industry, and deliver value addition to mineral export. However, African negotiators are constrained by China’s ambitions and due to the lack of a coordinated approach of African countries in setting up their strategic agenda for the FOCAC summit. This lack of coherence among the African nations is primarily due to their limited capacity, expertise, and political will amongst the African states. ^[14]

Key Outcomes of 2024 FOCAC Summit

The 2024 FOCAC signals a policy shift from China on their engagement with Africa, which focuses on trade, modernisation, and investments in small development projects. The summit came out with a consensus on the Beijing Declaration on ‘Jointly Building an All-Weather China-Africa Community with a Shared Future for the New Era’^[15] and adopted the ‘Beijing Action Plan (2025-2027) of FOCAC.’ During the summit, China offered to implement ‘ten partnership action initiatives,’ and to deliver those initiatives, China pledged to provide a financial support of around USD 50.9 billion over the next three years. The financial support would be broken down into three verticals; USD 29.7 billion (approx.) as credit, ii) USD 11.3 billion (approx.) as development assistance, and iii) USD 9.9 billion (approx.) in investment by Chinese companies in Africa. ^[16]

The recent FOCAC reflects an upsurge in China’s investment pledges to Africa. During the eighth FOCAC meeting, China had reduced its financial commitments to Africa. The current pledge shows China’s renewed interest in Africa. Although the pledge increased as compared to the previous FOCAC meeting, yet it was relatively less when compared to the pledges of 2018 FOCAC summit (See Figure 1). The domestic slowdown in China and global economic uncertainty may be responsible for this reluctance to provide more funds to African countries. ^[17]

The major feature of the 2024 FOCAC summit was promotion of modernisation across the African continent and South-South Cooperation. ^[18] This includes cooperation on anti-corruption policies, agriculture, infrastructure, trade, technology transfers, poverty reduction and rural development. ^[19] Modernisation, as portrayed during the summit, was under the parasol of a shared past of ‘historic injustices by the West’ and a shared future of ‘justice, inclusivity and equality’.

The 2024 FOCAC summit called for ten partnership action initiatives by China, these included the ‘partnership action on trade prosperity’. Within this initiative China became the first country to have zero-tariff treatment for all the Least Developing Countries (LDCs) having diplomatic relations with China, including the 33 African LDC countries. China’s goal to import USD 300 billion worth of goods from African countries, announced in the 2021 FOCAC meeting, has been surpassed ahead of schedule. As per, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning China’s imports from Africa from December 2021 to July 2024 have reached US$ 305.9 billion. ^[20] With the ‘partnership action on trade prosperity’, China’s trade with Africa will surge further.

In ‘partnership action for development cooperation,’ China pledged to implement 1,000 ‘small and beautiful’ livelihood projects to boost Africa’s development. This initiative is an extension of China’s pivot from ‘project of the century’ to ‘small and beautiful’. Under this approach, China promotes those investments that are smaller, greener, less financially risky, more profitable, and scalable. ^[21]

Further the 2024 FOCAC summit, investment portfolio seemed to align with the Global Development Initiative (GDI) launched in 2021. Much of the ten partnership action initiatives coincided with the priority areas of the GDI concept paper, ^[22] for instance;

• Food security; China pledged around USD 140 million in food security and aims to build 6,670 hectares of standardised agricultural demonstration.
• Climate Change and Green Development; China is ready to initiate 30 clean energy projects, establish 30 joint laboratories to collaborate on satellite remote sensing and, lunar and deep-space exploration. The ‘partnership action for green development’ is reflected in the rising exports by China to Africa of Electric Vehicles (EVs) (rose by 291 percent during 2023) and lithium batteries (rose by 109 percent during 2023). ^[23] Considering the rising restrictions from the West, particularly Europe, on the imports of Chinese EVs, the African market could be the new destination for Chinese EVs.
• Digital Economy; China proposes to build a digital technology cooperation centre within Africa and initiate 20 digital demonstration projects.
• Connectivity; China is prepared to carry out 30 infrastructure connectivity projects in Africa.

Lastly, China aims to build a security partnership with Africa under the Global Security Initiative (GSI). China pledged around USD 140 million in military assistance, along with efforts on capacity building to provide training to 6,000 military personnel and 1,000 police and law enforcement officers. Further, fresh joint military exercises are to be conducted between China and Africa.

There were various country specific MoU’s and deals, with the Chinese government and companies, that were negotiated on the sidelines of the summit. China, Tanzania and Zambia signed an MoU on the revitalization of 1,860 kms project of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority (TAZARA) railway. ^[24] Zambia’s state-owned power utility company, ZESCO Ltd, also signed an MoU with China Datang Corporation Limited to increase use of rooftop solar panels across Zambia. ^[25] Kenya's Cabinet Secretary for the National Treasury, John Mbadi, signed a loan agreement of $281 Million with the China Development Bank (CDB) for the construction of rural roads. ^[26]

Conclusion

The expectations of African nations from the FOCAC summit pertaining to debt reliefs was partially met, as around 58 percent of the total pledge, of $ 50.9 billion, was allocated for credit disbursements. China did follow through on better access to China’s markets and funding through smaller loans on modest development projects.

The latest trend of China’s lending to Africa in 2023, not only shows a rise for the first time in seven years but also, reflects a change in the strategy of China’s engagement in Africa. In 2023, more than half of the loans extended to the continent were to African multilateral banks, highlighting a risk mitigation strategy adopted by China to counter the debt challenges of African countries. ^[27] In the same period, the modest size of loans by China also focussed on assisting solar and hydropower projects with positive environmental and social outcomes, resonating with China's ‘Small is Beautiful’ approach. This new prudence and risk aversion among Chinese lenders is intended to ensure that China can continue to engage with Africa in a more resilient and sustainable manner. ^[28]

The 2024 FOCAC summit shows a substantial push towards green energy transition as evident in the ‘partnership action for green development’. Although there was nothing noteworthy on China’s strategy towards the demands by African countries on fairer resource extraction deals. Hence, mineral exports are a potential arena of negotiation for the continent.

Finally, China is ambitious to become a key development partner for the continent. The 2024 FOCAC summit has offered impressive deliverables on development corporation, green development, connectivity, and security partnership. Although there are speculations that opacity will prevail about the degree of implementation of the initiatives in the future. ^[29]

Endnotes

^[1] Ministry of Foreign Affairs. September 3, 2024. The 9th Ministerial Meeting of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation was held in Beijing. The People’s Republic of China.
https://www.mfa.gov.cn/wjbzhd/202409/t20240903_11484369.shtml [3]
^[2] Zeyu, X. & Zijun, T. September, 2, 2024. FOCAC illustrates China's vision and aspirations for Global South. Xinhua.
https://english.news.cn/20240902/a0e9a3619be74644982c6584775a1756/c.html [4]
^[3] Ministry of Foreign Affairs. September 5, 2024. Xi Jinping Attends the Opening Ceremony of the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation and Delivers a Keynote Address. The People’s Republic of China.
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyxw/202409/t20240906_11486351.html [5]
^[4] FOCAC Mechanisms. Accessed on September 15, 2024.
http://www.focac.org/eng/ltjj_3/ltjz/ [6]
^[5] ibid.
^[6] Yu, Shirely. February 3, 2022. What is FOCAC? Three historic stages in the China-Africa relationship. LSE.
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2022/02/03/what-is-focac-three-stages-the-new-china-africa-relationship-trade-economics/ [7]
^[7] Yu, Shirely. February 4, 2022. FOCAC and the future of China-Africa relations. LSE.
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2022/02/04/focac-the-future-of-china-africa-relations-trade-forum-cooperation/ [8]
^[8] Friends of Socialist China. September 10, 2024. Xi meets with heads of state from Eritrea, Mali, DRC, Comoros, Djibouti, Seychelles and Guinea.
https://socialistchina.org/2024/09/10/xi-meets-with-heads-of-state-from-eritrea-mali-drc-comoros-djibouti-seychelles-and-guinea/ [9]
^[9] African Development Bank Group. May 15, 2024. Annual Meetings 2024: old debt resolution for African countries – the cornerstone of reforming the global financial architecture.
https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/annual-meetings-2024-old-debt-resolution-african-countries-cornerstone-reforming-global-financial-architecture-70791 [10]
^[10] ibid.
^[11] World Bank Group. 2023. Africa’s Resource Future Harnessing Natural Resources for Economic Transformation during the Low-Carbon Transition. Africa Development Forum. Overview. Page 35.
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/2cfa1ec3-1318-4415-aa8e-c8f3ce5e11ab/content [11]
^[12] Gbadamosi, Nosmot. August 16, 2023. Zimbabwe’s ‘White Gold’. Africa Brief. Foreign Policy.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/08/16/zimbabwe-china-lithium-exports-green-technology-africa/ [12]
^[13] ibid
^[14] Mishra, Abhishek. September 3, 2024. Dealings at a China-Africa forum that India must track. Editorial. The Hindu.
^[15] Ministry of Foreign Affairs. September 5, 2024. Beijing Declaration on Jointly Building an All-Weather China-Africa Community with a Shared Future for the New Era. The People’s Republic of China.
https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyxw/202409/t20240905_11485993.html# [13]
^[16] Xinhua. September 5, 2024. Keynote address by Chinese President Xi Jinping at opening ceremony of 2024 FOCAC summit.
https://english.news.cn/20240905/e898a78004754f229763ad2bb5be7aa3/c.html [14]
^[17] Amare, T. & Dr. Vines, A. September 13, 2024. China–Africa summit: Why the continent has more options than ever. Chatham House.
https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/09/china-africa-summit-why-continent-has-more-options-ever [15]
^[18] Li, H. & Hackenesch, C. September 16, 2024. FOCAC 2024: Moving Away from Large Infrastructure Deals towards Normative Power of China. SWP.
https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/megatrends-spotlight-38-focac-2024-towards-normative-power-of-china [16]
^[19] Li, H. & Hackenesch, C. September 16, 2024. FOCAC 2024: Moving Away from Large Infrastructure Deals towards Normative Power of China. SWP.
https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/megatrends-spotlight-38-focac-2024-towards-normative-power-of-china [16]
^[20] Ministry of Foreign Affairs. September 3, 2024. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning’s Regular Press Conference.
https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/fyrbt/202409/t20240903_11484316.html [17]
^[21] Yeung, Chloe. March 19, 2024. The Belt and Road Initiative 10 Years Later: China’s Transition to ‘Small and Beautiful’. Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada.
https://www.asiapacific.ca/publication/china-belt-and-road-initiative-10-years-later [18]
^[22] Ministry of Foreign Affairs. September 21, 2021. Global Development Initiative- Concept Paper. The People’s Republic of China.
https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zy/jj/GDI_140002/wj/202406/P020240606606193448267.pdf [19]
^[23] South China Morning Post. September 5, 2024. China to open markets to African countries, Xi Jinping says – FOCAC summit as it happened.
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/3277231/china-africa-summit-xi-jinpings-speech-shed-light-expanding-ties-amid-us-rivalry [20]
^[24] Xinhua. September 4, 2024. Chinese, Tanzanian, Zambian presidents witness signing of MoU on revitalizing TAZARA railway. The State Council. The People’s Republic of China.
https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202409/04/content_WS66d83da2c6d0868f4e8ea972.html# [21]
^[25] Afful, C. Michael. September 7, 2024. ZESCO Signs MoU with Chinese Firm To Develop Energy Projects To Solve Power Crisis. Energy News Africa.
https://energynewsafrica.com/zambia-zesco-signs-mou-with-chinese-file-to-develop-energy-projects-to-solve-power-crisis/ [22]
^[26] Herbling, David. September 4, 2024. China, Kenya Agree on $281 Million Loan for Road Construction. Bloomberg.
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-09-04/china-kenya-agree-on-281-million-loan-for-road-construction?sref=uMuyuNij [23]
^[27] Boston University. August 21, 2024. Relative Risk and the Rate of Return: Chinese Loans to Africa Database, 2000-2023. Global Development Policy Center.
https://www.bu.edu/gdp/2024/08/21/relative-risk-and-the-rate-of-return-chinese-loans-to-africa-database-2000-2023/ [24]
^[28] AFP. September 6, 2024. China pushes smaller, smarter loans to Africa to shield from risks. Voice of America.
https://www.voanews.com/a/china-pushes-smaller-smarter-loans-to-africa-to-shield-from-risks-/7773830.htmlhttps://www.voanews.com/a/china-pushes-smaller-smarter-loans-to-africa-to-shield-from-risks-/7773830.html [25]
^[29] Bhatia, Rajiv. September 11, 2024. A panoramic view of the 2024 China-Africa summit. Editorial. The Hindu.

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