On Road to Integrated Theatre Commands

Reports emanating from the Joint Commanders Conference (JCC) held at Lucknow on 04-05 September 2024 suggest that a blueprint for the proposed Integrated Theatre Commands (ITC) has been formulated by the services and presented to the Raksha Mantri (RM) for consideration by the government. This was a part of deliberations by the top defence hierarchy on issues related to future capability development of the armed forces to meet emerging geopolitical and technological challenges through joint and integrated response. ^[1]

Integration and theaterisation of the armed forces is a politico-military endeavour, to bring about fundamental changes in the national security realm, which will help the country effectively tackle the entire spectrum of conflict. ^[2] It will enable the conduct of multidomain operations, fusing emerging technologies with conventional warfighting, in an India-specific environment.

According to the details available, the raising of three ITCs – the China-specific Northern Theatre Command, with HQ at Lucknow; the Pakistan-centric Western Theatre Command with HQ at Jaipur and a Maritime Theatre Command, with HQ at Thiruvananthapuram are being contemplated. This is in line with what has been in circulation thus far. A significant new recommendation now made is that all three theatre commanders and the Vice Chief of Defence Staff (a new appointment) be four-star Generals, at par with the Service Chiefs and the CDS. This seems to be an outcome of the detailed deliberations over the vast charter of operational responsibilities proposed to be vested in him/her.

These recommendations, pertaining to the most ambitious military reorganisation contemplated post-independence, will be intensely debated in the national policy-making circles. They have also triggered some thoughts in the minds of observers outside the system. Some of these are discussed in succeeding paragraphs.

Terminologies

A perusal of the press release and statements issued reveals an overlapping use of terminologies of `Jointness’ and `Integration.’ Commencing an exercise of this magnitude, it would be in order to get the nuanced distinction between the two right.

`Jointness' lies more in mind than in structures, an endeavour underway in India since the setting up of the Joint Services Wing (JSW) (01 Jan 1949) and the National Defence Academy (NDA) (December 1954) – the pioneering tri-services military academies in the world. It is built on a foundation of mutual understanding and trust, creating a cohesive culture of shared values, beyond embedded cultural beliefs of respective service. It entails cross-service coordination in planning, operations, communications, training, capability development, acquisitions, and more. In implementation, it entails operating together seamlessly while retaining individual service identity, organisational command, and control construct.

`Integration’ on the other hand entails an organisational reconfiguration merging individual service identities to achieve a cohesive construct. The resources of the three services and the specific functional agencies/ commands (Space. Cyber, electronic warfare, special operations etc.) are amalgamated at different levels and placed under a single commander for the execution of assigned tasks. This enables harnessing of operational and logistic capabilities, and integration of sensors, systems, and networks to create a comprehensive cross-domain picture and capability.

`Theaterisation' is a process of assigning a geographic area of responsibility to an integrated, `tri-service plus’ operationally oriented formation, under a designated commander. Ideally, this formation should be self-contained in resources operationally and logistically, as well as to secure its hinterland. This entails formulation of an integrated theatre plan, and a directive assigning missions and command responsibilities.

A fundamental aspect to be noted is that `the road to theaterisation runs through integration.' In the Indian context, while integration is an urgent and non-negotiable imperative, which is already long delayed, theaterisation is a desirable process, to be evolved progressively. Also, integration and theaterisation must be driven by the logic of enhancing operational efficiency and the most optimal utilisation of resources. `Perceived economising’ by reducing 17 single service commands to a `fewer number' is secondary. Viewed from another perspective, a country-wide footprint of military HQs at the level of `Command' has its positives, realised during calamities or crises of magnitude.

Strategic Guidance and Planning

While a near unanimity seems to have emerged over creating an ITC each for the Northern, Western and maritime theatres, their composition, resource allocation and organisational structure require greater deliberation. There is a need to formulate clear strategic guidance and military strategy for each of these fronts. Based on this, the existing single service commands must formulate detailed operational plans, to be finally integrated by a designated and empowered military commander for the particular theatre. The resource allocation and initial deployment for each theatre would be based on these considerations. Notably, this does not require waiting till the theatre commands are raised. Formulation of these directives, war gaming and test-bedding of these directives should be part of the preparatory action.

Concurrent Restructuring Actions

To accord momentum to the `invisible’ planning effort, it must be complemented with tangible reorganisation/restructuring actions between the services, akin to the creation of Joint Logistic Nodes (JLN). This could include cross-assigning medium lift and attack helicopters from the Airforce to the Army; Air Defence units from the Army to the Air Force and Navy; assigning army formations with amphibious/ marine roles to the Navy; coordinating ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and reconnaissance) grid and resources; integration of some intelligence resources; the amalgamation of relevant training centres; rationalization of overlapping holdings of weapon systems etc. These visible actions will enable overcoming inertia and commence optimisation, without getting operationally unbalanced.

At this initial stage of planning and restructuring, the existing single service Command HQs must be retained. This will help draw on their long years of experience and institutional knowledge. During this period the Theatre Command HQs are proposed to be superimposed over existing command HQs, though without accretion of posts.

Politico-Military- Foreign Policy Dimension

A significant aspect, not being appreciated is that the Theatre Commanders need to be `Strategic level’ commanders, rather than adding yet another layer of operational command. The organisational construct of PLA Theatre Commands and the US Unified Combatant Commands, from where the parallels are being drawn for our own restructuring, suggest that the charter of the Theatre Commanders extends beyond the traditional `military domain.' They have a `politico-military' charter, either with internal or external dimensions.

The PLA Western Theatre Commander, besides the Army and the Airforce resources, has under his command the Border Defence (BD) formations and units, which carry out border guarding duties similar to the tasks being performed by BSF, ITBP, and SSB in India. Units of People’s Armed Police (PAP), newly raised (in 2020) militia, Rocket force (with conventional and nuclear assets) and the elements of Information Support Force (ISF), Cyberspace Force, and Aerospace Force are all placed under his command. He derives his political authority from the Central Military Commission (CMC).

The Unified Theatre Commands of the US on the other hand have a substantial foreign policy charter. For instance, the US Indo-Pacific Commander deals with 36 countries, Central Command with 20, Africa Command with 53 and European Command with 51 nations. Here again, the Theatre Commander derives his political authority from the President/ Secretary of Defence.

This landmark reform must be considered as a larger `security structures reform,’ than being perceived as mere `military reorganisation.’ It must resolve the anomalies related to the unity of operational command and control of all security forces (ITBP, BSF, SSB) deployed together in a particular theatre, and other such functional issues.

Command and Control

Not many details are available in the public domain on deliberations related to the chain of command of Theatre Commanders and formations therein.

There are primarily two options available. The theatre commanders could either be placed under command of the CDS, in his capacity as the permanent Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee; or placed under the RM, with the CDS acting as an intermediary, quite like the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitting orders between the Secretary of Defense and the Commanders of Combatant Commands in the US system.

Placing theatre commanders under command CDS would entail redefining his role from that specified in the Government notification of 24 December 2019; ^[3] redefining his authority over the Service Chiefs and Theatre Commanders; major restructuring of HQ Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) with substantial augmentation and orientation for directing operations. It will also entail the CDS shedding responsibilities of the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) to the Vice Chief of Defence Staff (VCDS).

The placing of Theatre Commanders under the RM, while providing the benefit of a direct political interface, would entail substantial challenges related to planning and directing operations. This will entail the creation of additional structures like professionally manned functional operational Centre at the Ministry of Defence.

The aspect of deciding the channel of command and control is vital to the process of theaterisation and must evolve with due diligence. The Chain of Command of the US Combatant Commands, in fact, has been evolving since World War II, balancing considerations of improving the effectiveness of the armed forces on the one hand, and preserving civilian control of the military, on the other.

Whatever decision is taken, it must be formalised through legislation and by amendments to the Allocation of Business^[4] and Transaction of Business rules. ^[5]

Span of Control

The span of control of each of the visualised continental commands extends over 3000 Km, and that of the maritime command would extend along 7500 Km of coastline and the vast expanse of the Indo-Pacific. Looking back at some of the delineation exercises however – the carving out of the Army's Northern Command from the Western Command in 1972; Southwestern Air Command in 1980; the creation of Leh-based 14 Corps in 1999; and the Army's Southwestern Command in 2005, the rationale for creating each of these formations was of to make the span of control `manageable'. The practicality of theatre commanders exercising control over vast frontages, under given conditions of communications, infrastructure, and terrain merits detailed deliberation.

Finally, a reorganisation of security structures of this magnitude should have commenced with the formulation of a well-deliberated, time-lined budget-supported, documented roadmap. Though delayed, even now, the implementation must be preceded by such a base document. This will ensure due diligence on critical aspects and ensure the maintenance of continuity of the reform process irrespective of personalities at the helm. Also, besides various operational benefits accruing from this exercise, it must result in the armed forces becoming stakeholders in strategic decision-making at the national level.

References

^[1] Press Release. Ministry of Defence. Raksha Mantri Shri Rajnath Singh presides over maiden Joint Commanders’ Conference in Lucknow. 05 September 2024. https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2052252 [3]
^[2] Pandit Rajat. Theatre commands on the anvil, will boost country’s war-fighting capacity: CDS. The Times of India. 15 July 2023.
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/theatre-commands-on-the-anvil-will-boost-countrys-war-fighting-capacity-cds/articleshow/101772126.cms [4]
^[3] Press Release. Cabinet approves creation of the post of Chief of Defence Staff in the rank of four star General.
Press Information Bureau, Government of India. 24 December 2019. https://pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetailm.aspx?PRID=1597425 [5]
^[4] CABINET SECRETARIAT. The Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961. https://cabsec.gov.in/writereaddata/allocationbusinessrule/completeaobrules/english/1_Upload_3861.pdf [6]
^[5] CABINET SECRETARIAT. THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA (TRANSACTION OF BUSINESS) RULES, 1961. https://cabsec.gov.in/writereaddata/transactionofbusinessrulescomplete/completeaobrules/english/1_Upload_3892.pdf [7]
(The paper is the author’s individual scholastic articulation. The author certifies that the article/paper is original in content, unpublished and it has not been submitted for publication/web upload elsewhere, and that the facts and figures quoted are duly referenced, as needed, and are believed to be correct). (The paper does not necessarily represent the organisational stance... More >>