Kargil After 25 Years: Assessing Technological Impact on India’s Armed Forces

The Kargil war of 1999 was not just a conflict between two traditional rivals but a major direct confrontation between two nuclear powers that had defied global norms by conducting nuclear tests. This saga was catalysed by technological achievements, fought with technological prowess, and resulted in the enhancement of the Indian armed forces' technological capabilities. Rawalpindi's prime consideration for this misadventure was that after achieving mastery over nuclear technology, any alteration in the status quo [3] of the Line of Control set by the Simla Agreement of 1972 would deter India from counterattacking and lead to favourable conditions [4] for Pakistan in negotiations.

During the actual conflict, the Indian forces were at a disadvantage as the Pakistani infiltrators had gained strategically forward positions at high altitudes on the hills. It was with the tactical use of the Bofors guns [5], along with the restrained use of the Indian Air Force—especially the Mirage 2000 with laser-guided munitions [6] — that the Indians retaliated against the Pakistani infiltrators to regain lost territory. The most important technological episode lies in the aftermath of Operation Vijay when the Kargil Review Committee [7] (KRC) identified serious intelligence and technological shortcomings that had resulted in infiltration and difficult conditions for fighting troops at higher altitudes. Hence, technology remains one of the important dimensions to be considered while understanding the lessons taught by the Kargil war.

Technological and Intelligence Overhaul

Nuclear deterrence has empirically shown that nuclear power avoids direct confrontation, minimising the possibility of conventional war. However, the Kargil War ruptured this belief as direct confrontation between nuclear powers became a reality. Although the war was not full-scale, policymakers' efforts for nuclear deterrence or eliminating the possibility of conventional war have become complex with the threats of traditional war, limited wars, and proxy wars like terrorism. The conflict of the summer of 1999 highlighted that technological superiority is irreplaceable in warfare, necessitating new allies and indigenous defence development. Israel was tested as a reliable partner [8] during the Kargil conflict, providing India with necessary mortar ammunition and laser-guided bombs for its fighter jets. This underscored that finding new tech partners in defence deals was not a choice but a compulsion for the armed forces.

Commenting on intelligence, the KRC records, “Pakistani armed intrusion in the Kargil sector came as a complete and total surprise to the Indian Government, Army, and intelligence agencies, as well as to the J&K State Government and its agencies.” The KRC's recommendations [7] led to an overhaul of the Indian intelligence structure in terms of intelligence gathering, processing, and dissemination. Apart from RAW and IB, each of the three services have their own intelligence wings. Moreover, the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) was constituted in 2002, and the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) was set up in 2004 to fill intelligence gaps [9] highlighted by the KRC. While several of these organisations are reluctant to disclose detailed information due to source confidentiality, they all hold frequent coordination meetings and exchange helpful data.

By 1999, India’s own indigenous attempts to manufacture UAVs for reconnaissance operations had resulted in poor outcomes. The Lakshya and Nishant UAV models were either produced in limited quantities [9] or were still undergoing flight tests. This led to the purchase of Heron and Searcher UAVs from Israel for all three services in the early years of the Kargil conflict. During the early days of the war, the US denied a request [10] from the Indian armed forces for access to the GPS system, resulting in heavy troop losses due to inaccurate assessments of the situation. This experience spurred the development of India’s own indigenous Satellite Navigation Systems like NAVIC.

Modernization, Strategic Partnerships

The modernisation of the Indian Army's infantry and artillery was crucial after the Kargil episode. To update combat capacity, the Army has been equipped with modern assault rifles, light machine guns, and sniper guns. The M777 howitzer and the K-9 Vajra-T self-propelled howitzer are newly acquired systems that have significantly enhanced artillery capabilities, improving firepower and mobility—essential in high-altitude terrain similar to that encountered during the Kargil War. For aerial threats, advanced surface-to-air missile systems like the Akash and the Israeli SPYDER have been deployed with great effectiveness. The Army Aviation Corps has also undergone significant upgrades with the introduction of new helicopters such as the AH-64E Apache, CH-47F Chinook, and the indigenously developed HAL Dhruv, intended to bolster the Army's fleet for troop mobility and close air support.

In the years following Kargil, India advanced its defence partnerships with a pragmatic approach. The General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) with the US, signed in 2002, facilitated the sharing of military intelligence between the two countries. Gradually, agreements like the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA), and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) were inked, laying the groundwork for deeper strategic and defence collaborations. The effectiveness of this cooperation was evident during the Galwan incident in 2020, successfully managed with timely intelligence [11] provided by the US under BECA. This meaningful technological cooperation between India and the United States, overcoming historical burdens in sharing actionable intelligence, is a key lesson learned from the Kargil war.

The Kargil war also led to improvements in communication signals and logistic support infrastructure. Maintaining communication during the high-altitude warfare in 1999 was extremely challenging, with army personnel from the Signals Corps enduring a rain of shells and shrapnel to ensure seamless communication. Without communication, the troops become paralysed. To address this challenge, the military's ultra-modern communications network, called the Armed Forces Network [12] (AFN), is being developed. This network will enable the Indian Army, Navy, and Air Force's 414 bases across the country to communicate and exchange data securely.

All-weather connectivity has become a priority since the Kargil infiltration occurred during the winter months. Recent construction and upgrades of roads, strategic tunnels, and the near-completion of the Udhampur-Srinagar-Baramulla Rail Link have significantly enhanced the Indian Army's logistics capabilities. These developments enable swift mobilisation of military assets, reduce transit times, and facilitate the efficient transportation of troops and war stores. Notable upgrades include the four-lane Jammu-Akhnoor-Rajouri-Poonch highway and strategic tunnels like the Zojila Tunnel, ensuring all-weather connectivity and rapid deployment.

Future Challenges

The technological up-gradation is ongoing, with major advancements in emerging technologies opening new areas for enhancing existing skills and generating new challenges. India must increase its space presence [9] in imaging satellites while also enhancing surveillance by deploying an adequate number of HALE (High Altitude Long Endurance) [13] unmanned platforms. The cyber field has drastically impacted warfare, with technology becoming both a facilitator and a driver in modern conflict. The notorious actions, like the Galwan incident and salami-slicing tactics of a technologically superior China, are alarming. Additionally, the threats of cyber warfare have made technological challenges more serious than ever. The Kargil war was a wake-up call for technological adaptation in the Indian armed forces, teaching the lesson that excellence in a single critical technology like nuclear weapon is not enough to protect borders. It must be fuelled with continuous up-gradation and diversification.

(The paper is the author’s individual scholastic articulation. The author certifies that the article/paper is original in content, unpublished and it has not been submitted for publication/web upload elsewhere, and that the facts and figures quoted are duly referenced, as needed, and are believed to be correct). (The paper does not necessarily represent the organisational stance... More >>