Navigating Cross-Strait Relations: The Taiwan Relations Act at 45th Anniversary

Abstract

The evolving political and military dynamics in the Taiwan Strait have become a major point of contention between the US and China, with global implications. The US has upheld a consistent stance toward Taiwan since the enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) in 1979, which allowed for unofficial relations with Taipei after establishing formal diplomatic ties with the People's Republic of China. However, China's increasing military prowess and economic influence, coupled with growing pressure on Taiwan, present a significant challenge to the US's security commitments regarding Taiwan. As the TRA approaches its 45th anniversary, it's essential to assess it in the context of US-Taiwan relations. This examination will offer a concise overview of the history of the US-Taiwan relationship leading up to the adoption of the TRA. It will also expound on the key provisions of the TRA, including the concepts of strategic ambiguity and clarity. With a specific focus on the defence aspect, the analysis will seek to evaluate the policies of both the Trump and Biden administrations, culminating in an assessment of Taiwan's strategic economic importance to the US within the framework of the TRA.

History

The US and Taiwan share a strategic and historical relationship between themselves. As this relationship dates back to 1913, ^[1] when the US was among the very first nations to establish diplomatic relations with the then newly established Republic of China, after the fall of the Qing dynasty. The Kuomintang (Nationalist Party of China) which was then recently established took control of China but was not able to maintain its rule for long. As the tensions developed between the KMT and the rising Communist Party of China the two led to a civil war. Nevertheless, both these parties came together to fight Japan in what is known as the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937, leading to Japanese control over Formosa or Taiwan. ^[2] However, the defeat of Japan in the Second World War led to its retreat from Formosa. Subsequently, Chinese communists achieved success on the mainland, resulting in two million Nationalist troops, government officials and other refugees led by Chaing Kai Shek to flee to Taiwan. The US in response shifted its embassy to Taipei, as the US never recognised or supported the CCP neither in 1921 during its establishment nor in 1949 when the PRC was established. ^[3] The US continued to recognize the Republic of China, located in Taiwan, as the legitimate government of China rather than the PRC. ^[4] Thereafter, Taiwan has remained crucial in the US grand strategy due to its vital geostrategic and geoeconomic position. From the Korean War in the 1950s to the present location of the Bashi Channel and Miyako strait that serves as a critical chokepoint for China’s maritime and economic ambitions, Taiwan serves the US foreign policy objectives.

Despite its significance in the US collective security system in East Asia and the bulwark against communism under the KMT regime, Taiwan started to lose its favoured status in US policies in the early 1970s. ^[5] The intensifying conflict in Vietnam and the ongoing Cold War with the USSR prompted US officials to explore ways to strengthen relations with communist China in order to disrupt the bond between communist nations and provide the US with greater influence in the Asia-Pacific region. President Nixon's groundbreaking visit to China, reciprocated by China's keen interest in improving diplomatic relations with the US amidst growing tension with the Soviet Union, led to the issuance of the first joint communique outlining the intention to normalize relations with China. ^[6]

However, the path to normalizing diplomatic relations between Washington and Beijing faced delays due to Nixon's resignation and the passing away of Mao two years later. The Carter administration expedited the process, ultimately leading to the formal establishment of relations with the PRC in 1979, ^[7] while severing diplomatic ties with Taiwan in line with China's “One China principle”. ^[8] Since then, US relations with Taiwan have been unofficial. The US government withdrew US military personnel from Taiwan and terminated the US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954, culminating in the release of a second joint communique that “acknowledged” the Chinese position that there is only one China and Taiwan is part of it. ^[9]

It's important to note that acknowledging the one-China principle doesn't equate to endorsing it. This means that while the US acknowledges China's stance, it doesn't concede to Chinese demands for recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan. By leveraging this position, the US was able to enact the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which enabled the US to establish and sustain an official relationship with mainland China while upholding its steadfast support for Taiwan, its long-standing ally.

What is the Taiwan Relations Act, 1979 ?

Following the termination of diplomatic ties with Taiwan, the US Congress enacted the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979 to establish the legal basis for US interactions with Taiwan. ^[10] This legislation has significantly influenced the US's military, security, economic, and political commitments to Taiwan, contributing to the maintenance of the delicate status quo in the Taiwan Strait through what is known as "strategic ambiguity." As we commemorate the 45th anniversary of this act amidst heightened Chinese assertiveness in the Taiwan Strait, it is crucial to revisit its significance.

The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) outlined the US policy to "preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the US and the people of Taiwan." ^[11] In the absence of official diplomatic relations with Taiwan, the TRA serves as a means for the US to uphold its policy aims in cross-strait affairs. As a result, the TRA led to the establishment of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), a non-profit organization tasked with managing interactions between Taiwan and the US.

The act further extends to elaborate on Taiwan’s security by setting out US expectations and guidelines in ensuring peace and stability in the area, which is in the broader interest of the US and the international community at large. In ensuring this, the Act entrusts the US with the provision of “making available to Taiwan such defence articles and defence services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain sufficient self-defence capability.” ^[12] This clause constitutes the most vital part of TRA noting that the quality and quantity of the arms provided to Taiwan be conditioned entirely on the threat posed by the PRC. ^[13] Thus, ensuring that cross-strait military balance would be informed by US arms sales decisions if China continues building up its forces targeting Taiwan.

The TRA thus provides a security framework by requiring the President to inform Congress promptly of any anticipated danger to Taiwan and consult with Congress to devise an appropriate response. It further iterates that any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means including boycotts and embargoes would be treated as a threat to peace and security in the western pacific, which might affect the US’s diplomatic relations with the PRC. ^[14] Each subsequent administration has reaffirmed the TRA so that the absence of a diplomatic relationship with Taiwan does not negatively affect their status with their oldest ally. The existence of TRA thus not only supported US foreign policy in Taiwan strait but allowed both Taiwan and mainland China to pursue their political and socioeconomic transitions in relative peace. ^[15]

US Contemporary Stance on Strategic Ambiguity

While through TRA US committed to supplying defensive weapons and maintaining the capacity to defend Taiwan, it stopped short of clearly promising to intervene militarily if Taiwan attacked. Thus, opting for what is popularly known as a policy of “Strategic ambiguity”. ^[16] Strategic ambiguity as such refers to the supposed US position of not stating whether it will use force to defend Taiwan if and when China invades Taiwan. ^[17] The goal is to avoid giving either Beijing or Taipei a carte blanche, which deters both sides from making unilateral moves to alter the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. It is this policy of strategic ambiguity that has helped maintain largely stable relations between the United States, China, and Taiwan, while China has at times threatened Taiwan if not attempted a full invasion.

However, shifting geopolitical dynamics, including growing Chinese assertiveness with a clear intent to include Taiwan in the PRC, and the vibrant, growing partnership between the US and Taiwan over the decades, have led many administrations to depart from strategic ambiguity. ^[18]

The US seems to be inching towards strategic clarity, of which most significantly was seen during the Trump administration with the passage Taiwan Travel Act, the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative and the National Defence Authorisation, which signalled strong political-diplomatic support for Taiwan. However, as political signal clarity means nothing unless it is backed by actual and sufficient military capabilities. The Trump administration became the only administration to provide not only the highest value of arms but also the big-ticket arms to Taiwan amongst all the US administrations. ^[19] Thus, indictaing that Washington will no longer appease the communist regime in Beijing, and will maintain a robust relationship with Taiwan like other unofficial partners of the US.

This realisation which was initiated by the Trump administration was further picked up by the Biden administration where Biden showed its clear intent 4 times since in office to defend Taiwan in an unprecedented attack. First, Biden Compared Taiwan with its NATO allies in an interview in August 2021. ^[20] Secondly, at a CNN town hall in October 2021 Biden gave an affirmative reply to a question about whether the US would come to Taiwan’s defence if it was attacked by China. ^[21] Thirdly, during a visit to Tokyo on May 23 2022, Biden replied yes to getting the military involved to defend Taiwan unlike in the Ukraine war. ^[22] Fourthly, on the CBS news programme 60 Minutes in September 2022, a correspondent asked Biden whether US military forces would defend Taiwan? He replied, “Yes, if in fact there was an unprecedented attack.” ^[23]

Biden’s interpretations as such were simply applauded or criticised for abandoning the longstanding US stance of strategic ambiguity for strategic clarity. But as observed by Russell Hsiao, it is an inaccurate understanding and should be seen as a military intervention by the US in the event of the Chinese invasion of Taiwan, but not to offer an unconditional explicit guarantee of Taipei’s independence. ^[24] By making it clear that the US does not take a position on the sovereignty of Taiwan it has reiterated its commitment to the “One China policy.” This was also reflected in the words of President Biden when he stated “Taiwan makes their own judgements about their independence[…] we’re not encouraging their being independent […] that’s their decision.” ^[25]

The debate between ambiguity and clarity remains intrinsic and closely connected to other issues. The US aims to avoid opting for strategic clarity while still clearly signalling to the Chinese side not to take any actions that could disrupt the peace in the region. This recognition comes with the understanding that a shift in US foreign policy could pose risks, particularly in the wake of recent events in Ukraine and Israel. The US is aware that gradually moving away from strategic ambiguity in favour of strategic clarity could potentially prepare Beijing for risks, allowing for the pursuit of ambiguous strategies while reducing US influence on developments across the Taiwan Strait. This is a fair concern given the success Washington has had in maintaining peace in the Taiwan strait under the current approach. Therefore, the US is going for a carefully calibrated US policy that not only resolves political differences between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait but also advances US interests and values.

Defence Provision under TRA

45 years to the TRA and there are seismic economic, political and military shifts that the world is witnessing. China has grown exponentially in military and economy, with its military capabilities fast closing up to the US capabilities and its economy being the second largest after the US. The economic and military might, combined with China's clear intent to use aggression in absorbing Taiwan has forced the US to take a hard look at updating its policies and practices to reflect the objective reality with time. Consequently, US arms sales to Taiwan became significant despite the absence of a defense treaty with Taiwan since 1979, under section 2(b) (4-6) of TRA which can be read to indicate a broad commitment to Taiwan’s defense. Taiwan, thereon remained one of the largest buyer of US defense equipments, with Taiwan being the 4th largest importer of the US arms in 2013-17. ^[26] In FY 2021-22 also Taiwan emerged as the largest purchaser of the US defence equipment through FMS route. ^[27]

In addition, the data from the Taiwan Defense and National Security website represents the FMS notified sales of Congress from the US to Taiwan, highlighting the US’s concern for Taiwan’s security. As per the data, the highest amount of such sales was recorded in the year 2019 amounting to $10.79bn, which is almost 5 times the average of the sales from the 1990s. This marks not only the highest amount of FMS sales but also the highest number of notifications i.e. 10, ever by the US to Taiwan. The data not only reveals year-wise notified sales but also helps reveal the administration-wise focus of the US to enhance Taiwan’s defence capabilities. It can be observed that the Trump administration (2017-2021) laid an eminent focus on the sales of arms, with the total value ranging to $18.27 billion, the highest amongst all the US administrations. However, the sales under the Biden administration seemed to be far less than the Trump administration, where the total value till now amounts to $4.77 billion. Furthermore, when comparing the two terms of the Obama administration from 2009 to 2017, the total amount also comes to $13.96 billion, which is collectively less than the spending during a single administration of Trump. This reiterates the underlying focus of the Trump administration.

Upon closer examination, it is evident that the two administrations not only vary in the quantity of arms supplied to Taiwan but also in the quality. The Trump administration appears to be focussed on a conventional strategy, arguing that Taipei should prioritize acquiring high-value systems. This is due to concerns that the US may not be able to deploy forces in a timely manner if Beijing were to invade or blockade Taiwan. ^[28] As such, the Trump administration pushed to boost arms sales to Taiwan by approving the sale of big-ticket arms like F-16 fighter aircraft, advanced missiles and torpedoes, and long-range capabilities such as the Army Tactical Missile systems and standoff land attack missile expanded response (SLAM-ERS). ^[29] These SLAM-ERS, which is the advanced version of SLAM developed by Boeing, indicate the importance given to offensive arms under the Trump administration to Taiwan as they provide a tactical advantage to the attacker by standing off from the consequences of their attack, by striking the target without actually exposing themselves to immediate retaliation. Also, this highlights the desirability of shifting towards a more asymmetric approach that would turn Taiwan into a ‘hard ROC’.

While the momentum towards asymmetric ability continued under the Biden administration, it didn’t pursue the big ticket arms sales to Taiwan. But rather implemented what is known as the Porcupine strategy. ^[30] According to this strategy, Taiwan must rely on a large number of dispersed, mobile, lethal asymmetric systems to assimilate defensive capabilities in such a manner to ensure possible invasion is difficult and costly. In this context, Biden administration arms sales mainly constituted of items such as Tactical Data link, C4 life cycle support, radar surveillance capabilities and short-range air-to-air sidewinder missiles, ^[31] which aim to improve the recipient’s capabilities to meet current and future threats by physically blocking an attack by the invader. Thus, so far the Biden administration has not proposed sales of weapons with a higher international profile like F-16 fighter aircraft or SLAM, that gives Taiwan the capabilities to attack the Chinese mainland. This is also due to the lessons learnt from the Russian-Ukraine war, where Ukraine has been able to hold Russia with the help of dispersed defensive capabilities. ^[32] As the traditional system or large weapons like fighter planes are easily detectable, small and agile weapons in a dispersed manner will have the capacity to survive attacks and inflict serious blows.

The contrast in the types of weapons sold to Taiwan by the Trump and Biden administrations is further underscored by a study conducted by CATO, a US-based think tank (Fig. 3). ^[33] The study analyzed weapon sales under four categories (Asymmetric, Traditional, Maintenance, Munitions) and revealed that the Trump administration heavily favoured traditional weapons, totalling $10.4 billion, whereas the Biden administration's sales amounted to $1.3 billion, indicating a significant difference of $9.1 billion. Furthermore, the analysis showed that the Biden administration doubled the number of maintenance arms sales to '8' compared to the Trump administration's '4,' suggesting a shift in arms sales priorities under Biden.

Recent Developments in Defence Provisions

Understanding the varied approaches pursued by both administrations, it is vital to understand the problem of the arms sale backlog to Taiwan. As per the CATO report, Trump administration remains mainly responsible for the current arms sale backlog to Taiwan, ^[34] as nearly every US arms sale before Trump took office has been delivered. However, due to weapon production timelines, the responsibility of delivering the arms and clearing the tab falls on the Biden administration. Owing to this and the ongoing Ukraine and Israel war where the US has been the primary supplier of arms, President Biden invoked Presidential Drawdown authority for Taiwan, ^[35] to allow the US to expedite the delivery process of US arms supplies to Taiwan by providing from the DOD stocks to US allies and partners in times of crisis. The status which till now was only given to the Ukraine, makes it entirely unique. The status indicates two intents of the US. Firstly, it shows the US's strong determination to provide arms to Taiwan by streamlining the process and removing obstacles. Secondly, it aims to signal to the PRC and the world that Taiwan is considered a US ally and that the US stands by Taiwan in times of crisis.

Another way in which the Biden administration changed how the US supplies arms to Taiwan is by adopting the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) strategy in addition to Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial Sales. Upon approval, they aim to provide up to $ 2 billion a year in direct loans and loan guarantees. ^[36] The US House of Representatives recently approved an appropriations bill for the fiscal year 2025 that includes $500 million in military aid for Taiwan. ^[37] These provisions further supplement the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act, which will provide up to US$10 billion in FMF over five years from 2023 to 2027, to strengthen deterrence across the Taiwan Strait. ^[38]

Finally, progress in US-Taiwan relations would be incomplete without mentioning the Taiwan Policy Act of 2022. This act has a significant impact on diplomacy and arms sales by offering nearly $4.5 billion in security assistance over the next 4 years. ^[39] By streamlining bureaucratic processes to enhance backing for Taiwan’s democratic regime and providing comprehensive support, the US underscores its dedication to Taiwan under the TRA.

Economic importance of Taiwan to the US

While looking into the US-Taiwan relations under the auspices of TRA, it becomes imperative to look into the economic dimension of this relationship. TRA has been a crucial link that has facilitated a security umbrella to foster Taiwan’s economic expansion and democratisation. As an export-dominated economy, Taiwan became the US's 10th largest trading partner ^[40] with the US being the second-largest trading partner of Taiwan after China, in the FY 2022. ^[41] For decades, Taiwan’s top export market has been China, but recent data shows the US topping the list for the first time since August 2003. ^[42] This trend is reinforced by the trade and economic collaboration between the two nations through the “Taiwan-US Initiative on 21st-century trade”, which is touted as the most extensive trade agreement since 1979. ^[43] Moreover, the burgeoning trade volume between the US and Taiwan, totalling $140 billion in 2022, is indicative of Taiwan’s evolving economic priorities amidst rising tensions in the region. ^[44]

However, it is not the data on trade that underscores the importance of Taiwan to the US, it is the role of Taiwan in global supply chains that signifies its importance. As the world’s largest producer of semiconductors, ^[45] which are critical for phones, electronics, and military equipment, it has become a key supplier to major US tech companies. As per the US-Taiwan Business Council report, Taiwan is the second largest source of US semiconductor imports, with nearly US$12 billion worth of imports in 2022, after the rest of the world (Fig.5). ^[46] Taiwan thus acts as a key player in the major US business model, as the US is heavily dependent on imports to fulfil its demand for semiconductors. In addition to the commercial use of semiconductors, it’s use in defense equipment contours the US’s foreign policy objectives. It can be understood in the words of US Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo who warned that at one point it was due to the shortages of semiconductors that the US halted the supply of weapons to Ukraine. ^[47] Thus affecting the strategic goals of the US in maintaining its hegemony.

Taiwan’s strategic economic importance to the US and the world could be understood in the sense that Taiwan sits in the world’s most economically consequential region. Any conflict or blockade over Taiwan has the potential to not only devastate the global economy but also reduce the revenue of major US companies dependent on Taiwan by $2.5 trillion^[48] and $1.6 trillion respectively. ^[49] As such losing Taiwan to China will result in a great blunder, which will prove detrimental to the region’s broader security concerns and US national strategic interest. PRC’s purposeful and single-minded march towards establishing a new global order will be fuelled by the heightened economic rise by adding US$760 billion (of Taiwan’s GDP) ^[50] to the Chinese economy but will also provide PRC with high-tech intersectionality that is capable of shifting the balance of power in the region.

Way Forward

The People's Republic of China's claim on Taiwan as an integral part of China in the 1993 White Paper ^[51] and its reaffirmation by Xi Jinping in his annual New Year's Eve address, ^[52] alongside the US declaration of Taiwan as a focal point of its national interest in the Indo-Pacific, has heightened the potential for conflict over Taiwan. This has amplified the importance of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) as the primary mechanism for fostering peace in the region. Given that a conflict in the Taiwan Strait could disrupt the global supply chain due to Taiwan's strategic geographic position and its status as a leading producer of semiconductors, there appears to be considerable US support for Taiwan, as emphasized by the speech of US Secretary of Defense Kurt Campbell on the eve of the 45th anniversary of the TRA. ^[53]

Despite continuous efforts by the U.S. to bolster Taiwan's status, the military balance in the region remains unbalanced. The People's Republic of China (PRC) surpasses Taiwan significantly in artillery, ships, missiles, and defense budget, the latter being nearly equal to Taiwan's entire GDP. ^[54] As a result, Taiwan relies heavily on U.S. support and seeks more meaningful engagement. However, it is often noted that the U.S. uses Taiwan primarily to signal its stance on China, rather than strategically and tactically engaging with Taiwan to address the challenges posed by mainland China.

In this context, it would be beneficial for the US to expand its relationship with Taiwan beyond military cooperation. Trade and diplomatic engagements should be heightened by publicly supporting Taiwan's involvement in global multilateral forums such as IPEF or CPTPP. Moreover, the US should engage in in-depth discussions regarding a Free Trade Agreement with Taiwan. These initiatives will foster substantial collaboration and convey a powerful global message, all without resorting to a confrontational approach. Additionally, they will mitigate Taiwan's economic reliance on China, freeing it from China's economic and political sway, and encourage other nations to engage in free trade agreements with Taipei.

Regardless of the challenges and obstacles, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) has established a strong and enduring foundation. It remains crucial to US interests and will only become more significant in the years ahead. For the US, Taiwan plays a vital role in bolstering US allies and advancing their interests in key regions. Losing such a valuable partner would greatly undermine US credibility, leading allies to question their reliance on the US. The United States can no longer overlook the significance of its interests in the Taiwan Strait and must pursue a more assertive strategy to safeguard them. It's time for the US to adopt innovative policies that reflect the realities of the 21st century and to take a comprehensive approach to US-Taiwan relations, building upon the framework laid out in the TRA.

End Notes

^[1] Curtis, John. (2023). Taiwan: Relations with the US (Report no. 9265). House of Commons Library. https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-9265/CBP-9265.pdf [3]
^[2] Institute, G. T. (2017, July 12). Political Warfare Alert: Forging a United Narrative between the CCP-KMT on the Second Sino-Japanese War. Global Taiwan Institute. https://globaltaiwan.org/2017/07/political-warfare-alert-forging-a-united-narrative-between-the-ccp-kmt-on-the-second-sino-japanese-war/ [4]
^[3] Curtis, John. (2023). Taiwan: Relations with the US (Report no. 9265). House of Commons Library. https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-9265/CBP-9265.pdf [3]
^[4] Ibid.
^[5] Bellows, T. J. (1976). Taiwan’s Foreign Policy in the 1970s: A Case Study of Adaptation and Viability. Asian Survey, 16(7), 593–610. https://doi.org/10.2307/2643160 [5]
^[6] U.S.-PRC Joint Communique (1972). (2022, March 30). American Institute in Taiwan. https://www.ait.org.tw/u-s-prc-joint-communique-1972/ [6]
^[7] The Establishment of Sino-U.S. Diplomatic Relations and Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping’s visit to the United States. (n.d.). Retrieved July 3, 2024, from https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/200011/t20001117_697797.html [7]
^[8] Ibid
^[9] Curtis, John. (2023). Taiwan: Relations with the US (Report no. 9265). House of Commons Library. https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-9265/CBP-9265.pdf [3]
^[10] Taiwan Relations Act. (n.d.). American Institute in Taiwan. Retrieved July 3, 2024, from https://www.ait.org.tw/policy-history/taiwan-relations-act/ [8]
^[11] Ibid
^[12] Ibid
^[13] Institute, G. T. (2018, January 10). Reassessing the “Quantity” and “Quality” of Taiwan’s Defense Needs. Global Taiwan Institute. https://globaltaiwan.org/2018/01/reassessing-the-quantity-and-quality-of-taiwans-defense-needs/ [9]
^[14] Taiwan Relations Act. (n.d.). American Institute in Taiwan. Retrieved July 3, 2024, from https://www.ait.org.tw/policy-history/taiwan-relations-act/ [8]
^[15] Green, M. J. (2017, January 13). What Is the U.S. “One China” Policy, and Why Does it Matter? https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-us-one-china-policy-and-why-does-it-matter [10]
^[16] Hu, R. (2013). Review of US Taiwan Strait Policy: The Origins of Strategic Ambiguity [Review of Review of US Taiwan Strait Policy: The Origins of Strategic Ambiguity, by D. P. Chen]. The China Journal, 70, 290–292. https://doi.org/10.1086/671321 [11]
^[17] Ibid
^[18] Kuo, R. (2022, February 3). Strategic Clarity and the Future of U.S.-Taiwan Foreign Relations | The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) [Interview]. https://www.nbr.org/publication/strategic-clarity-and-the-future-of-u-s-taiwan-foreign-relations/ [12]
^[19] Bush, R. C. (2017). U.S.-Taiwan Relations in the Trump Administration: No Big Fixes Needed. Asia Policy, 23, 29–35.
^[20] Brunnstrom, D. (2021, August 20). U.S. position on Taiwan unchanged despite Biden comment—Official | Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-position-taiwan-unchanged-despite-biden-comment-official-2021-08-19/ [13]
^[21] Mason, J., & Brunnstrom, D. (2021, October 23). White House repeats no Taiwan policy change; experts see Biden gaffe | Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/white-house-repeats-no-taiwan-policy-change-experts-see-biden-gaffe-2021-10-22/ [14]
^[22] House, T. W. (2022, May 23). Remarks by President Biden and Prime Minister Kishida Fumio of Japan in Joint Press Conference. The White House. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/05/23/remarks-by-president-biden-and-prime-minister-fumio-kishida-of-japan-in-joint-press-conference/ [15]
^[23] Biden tells 60 Minutes U.S. troops would defend Taiwan, but White House says this is not official U.S. policy. (2022, September 18). https://www.cbsnews.com/news/president-joe-biden-taiwan-60-minutes-2022-09-18/ [16]
^[24] Hsiao, R. (2022, June 1). President Biden and Incremental Clarity on US Commitment to Taiwan’s Defense. Global Taiwan Institute. https://globaltaiwan.org/2022/06/president-biden-and-incremental-clarity-on-us-commitment-to-taiwans-defense/ [17]
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^[26] Wezeman et al., (2023). Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2022. SIPRI. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2023-03/2303_at_fact_sheet_2022_v2.pdf [19]
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^[28] Kessler, E. (2022, October 25). US Arms Sales Reveal Discord in Taiwan’s Defense Strategy [Research]. The Chicago Council on Global Affairs. https://globalaffairs.org/research/report/us-arms-sales-reveal-discord-taiwans-defense-strategy [21]
^[29] Browne, R., & Hansler, J. (2020, September 17). Trump Administration readies major arms sale to Taiwan | CNN Politics. https://edition.cnn.com/2020/09/17/politics/us-taiwan-arms-sale/index.html [22]
^[30] Abramson, J. (2022). U.S. Offering More Arms to Taiwan | Arms Control Association. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2022-10/news/us-offering-more-arms-taiwan [23]
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^[32] Fann, K., & Bursi, C. (2023, April 14). Protecting the Porcupine: Why Taiwan Matters. https://epicenter.wcfia.harvard.edu/blog/protecting-porcupine-why-taiwan-matters [25]
^[33] Gomez, E., & Giltner, B. (2023, November 14). Breaking Down Taiwan’s Arms Backlog, Part 3: Comparing the Trump and Biden Administrations. Cato Institute. https://www.cato.org/blog/breaking-down-taiwans-arms-backlog-part-3-comparing-trump-biden-administrations [26]
^[34] Gomez, E. (2024, June 14). The Taiwan Aid Bill Won’t Fix the Arms Backlog. Cato Institute. https://www.cato.org/commentary/taiwan-aid-bill-wont-fix-arms-backlog [27]
^[35] Campbell, Caitlin. (2024). Taiwan: Defense and Military Issues. Congressional Research Services. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12481 [28]
^[36] Ibid
^[37] Chen, C. Y., & Ju, T. P. (2024, June 29). U.S. House passes bill with US$500 million in military aid for Taiwan—Focus Taiwan. Focus Taiwan - CNA English News. https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202406290003 [29]
^[38] Ibid
^[39] Text—S.4428—117th Congress (2021-2022): Taiwan Policy Act of 2022 | Congress.gov | Library of Congress. (2022, September 15). https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/4428/text [30]
^[40] Foreign Trade—U.S. Trade with. (2022). Retrieved July 3, 2024, from https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/top2210cm.html [31]
^[41] (2024, January 10). Taiwan—Market Overview. https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/taiwan-market-overview [32]
^[42] US topples China as Taiwan’s largest export market due to chips, AI demand—The Economic Times. (2024, April 12). https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/us-topples-china-as-taiwans-largest-export-market-due-to-chips-ai-demand/articleshow/109255751.cms?from=mdr [33]
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