Hellfire from the Heavens – A Perspective on Contemporary Aerial Strikes

Punitive response with the employment of air power is nothing new, and goes back to the British ‘watch and ward’ missions that the Indian Air Force undertook with the Royal Air Force in 1937, towards policing the recalcitrant tribes of Waziristan in the North West Frontiers. Punitive air action “played a major part in the compelling submission of the tribes” as “they not only served as punishment but also resulted in the surrender of hostiles and return of kidnapped person”.^[1] One of the most path-breaking air strike in peacetime took place in 1981 when the Israeli Air Force struck and partially destroyed Iraq’s Osirak nuclear research reactor at Tuwaitha. ^[2] In 1986 the US fighters carried out an air strike on targets in Libya after flying 3500 miles each way, in response to the bomb explosion on board a TWA flight in the air and the La Belle Discotheque bombing in West Germany by terrorists. ^[3] Closer home, India’s air strike on Jabba Top in 2019, was another example of the kinetic use of air power for inter-state political signaling during peacetime. In contrast, the use of drones and rockets for targeting emerged as the preferred choice of non-state actors and rebel groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, Houthis, etc., enabling the use of the aerial dimension to carry out long-range attacks on civilian targets, as a convenient and easier alternative than physical strikes. The recent mass retaliatory aerial strike by Iran on Israel, in response to the latter’s air strike on the former’s consulate in Syria, has introduced an added dimension to politico-military messaging. The exclusive use of missiles and drones by Iran as a state response is interesting, considering that their offensive use in peacetime was largely an irregular warfare option, exercised primarily by non-state actors. Iran has opted to carry out a somewhat scaled down pre-warned strike to convey an escalation-restrained strong political message instead of employing more lethal and offensive surprise attack using fast-flying and precision-guided ballistic missiles, giving Israel very little time to prepare and respond. ^[4] The vastly superior Israeli Air Force also would have also deterred Iran possibly from a classical conventional air power response using its small inferior Air Force. In effect, the use of missiles and rockets has provided an alternative aerial response option to a state with a weaker air power than its adversary.

Missile attacks go back to World War II when Germany launched the V-1 and V-2 rockets from across the Channel to target cities in England, while Katyusha rockets were used extensively for saturation bombardment by the Soviet military. Long-range stand-off aerial strikes using missiles, rockets, and drones have found extensive contemporary use in ongoing wars and conflicts, where targeting has spilled into civilian spaces. In the current Gaza conflict, it is estimated that 3000 rockets were fired in the first attack surprise attack on October 07, 2023, ^[5] and since then over 9500 more have been launched by Hamas. ^[6] On the other hand in the ongoing conventional war in Europe, Russia has launched more than 8,000 missiles and 4,630 drones at targets in Ukraine since its invasion two years ago. ^[7] Though accurate figures are difficult to establish, there is no denying that the number of such attacks is on the increase both in irregular and conventional conflicts, and has generated much narrative as to how they have changed warfare. Arguably, despite the technology-driven hype, extensive use of missiles, rockets, and drones are not the game-changers of warfare as some armchair strategists profess them to be. Sadly, the game remains the same – the use of lethal force or violence by military or armed bodies for achieving political ends. What has changed is that the ways and means of prosecuting violence and warfare have expanded. However, there is a danger in drawing pre-mature lessons regarding the use of these weapons from ongoing conflicts without consideration of their specific circumstances and attempting to apply them in general to all warfare, especially from an Indian perspective.

Missiles in Context

Let us first consider the use of missiles and rockets in the ongoing conventional Russo-Ukraine War. The Soviet military has a long history of relying on missiles for depth targeting since the Cold War era when continental Europe or NATO had strong Air Forces. Even today, despite modern platforms and weapons, the air power advantage, and the vast air defence cover that extends deep into Ukrainian airspace, Russia has used its long-range surface and air-launched missiles to strike vital depth target systems. The United States, which primarily relies on its offensive air power for depth targeting, uses long-range cruise missiles from aerial and maritime delivery platforms to supplement its aerospace attack as ‘the opening offensive operation of the war’. The Russians perceive their greatest threat from the West to be a ‘massed aerospace missile attack’ or MRAU, which is essentially the combined use of air, space, land, and sea assets to deliver long-range air and missile strikes against the critical nodes of their manoeuver formations as well as their critical infrastructure. ^[8] Moscow expects that follow-on depth air strikes will be sequenced to break through their air defence (AD), and destroy ‘strategic nuclear carriers, airfields, aviation, and air defence command posts, aircraft on the ground and in the air, air defence missile systems, ammunition depots, fuel and lubricants.’ ^[9]

Defending the Rodina or the motherland against an aggressive and massed aerospace-led Western military offensive, therefore, drives the Russian military strategy. The strategy is centred on the concept of active defence, which relies heavily on the Russian Aerospace Force or the VKS, primarily for air defence against these mass air attacks. Its long-range aviation comprising of bombers is a part of the nuclear triad for aerial delivery, while its tactical aviation is tied to the support of the surface battle. Thus, conceptually and structurally, despite the integration of its modern fighter platforms with stand-off precision weapons, the Russian AF is unable to exploit its air power offensively as the US does. Since control of the air is not a doctrinal requirement of the VKS, its somewhat half-hearted attempt and failure to seize the initiative to control the Ukrainian airspace in the opening rounds of the war, has cost it dearly. Consequently, due to the effective regrouping of Ukrainian AD with extensive NATO support, Russia has been unable to exploit its offensive air power capability for in-depth conventional targeting. It has changed tactics since, and is currently using Russian airspace to deliver stand-off weapons. Ukraine cannot defend its frontline positions from Russian glide bombs since it cannot intercept the launch aircraft in Russian airspace with US-provided air defense systems. This underscores the efficacy of Russian AD, the limits of Ukrainian AD, and the suboptimal employment of Russia’s offensive air power. The presence of extended range Beyond Visual Range Air-Air missile-armed Russian fighters obviates all possibility of the remnants of Ukrainian AF carrying out any AD or offensive air operations. Simply put, in the US-led Western approach to warfare, long-range missiles complement the reliance on offensive air power for deep strikes as a military strategy, while on the other hand, Russia relies on missiles to supplement their doctrinal gap which inhibits the use of its air power for depth and strategic targeting. Interestingly, the Chinese AF whose offensive capability is still nascent, seeks to fill the gap with its rocket force in its military deployment against India. China is well aware of this strategic limitation and therefore, it is not a surprise that it is upgrading its air power capability in the region at a hectic pace. For India, having learnt the harsh lesson of a disadvantageous BVR (Beyond Visual Range) asymmetry post Balakot, where the Advance Medium Range Air-Air Missile armed F-16s forced the Indian fighters on the defensive, ^[10] the necessity to have and maintain a BVR missile advantage is not only critical for India’s airspace sovereignty in peacetime, but equally for unhindered offensive air operations in war.

Though surface-launched missiles are a part of the inventory of most militaries, air-launched missiles provide greater range, accuracy, and employment flexibility. There is an important cost caveat when it comes to extensive use of missiles. ‘Typically, long-range missile and stand-off targeting have limitations in accuracy, weapon-to-target matching, over-the-target throw weight needed to create necessary effects, etc. The enormous quantum of rocket, cruise, and hypersonic missile employment has not produced the desired war outcomes for Russia due to two key reasons – weapon accuracy and weight of attack. The first necessitates advanced delivery systems and seeker-heads which come at a cost. The higher the accuracy greater the cost. For a greater weight of attack, more weapons need to be fired against a target to achieve the desired level of destruction. Again, a greater number of weapons used means more cost. Cost-effectiveness becomes an issue with expensive modern weapons and the selected target systems being attacked.’ ^[11] The cost of some of the advanced missiles used in the Ukraine War is not cheap. For example, the Russian Kalibr Cruise missile and the hypersonic Kinzhal missile cost more than $6.5 million and $10 million each, while the Iskandar cost $3 million. Amongst the Western weapons, the US High Mobility Artillery Rocket System supplied to Ukraine costs $4 million per launcher, and the proposed Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) comes at $1.5 million apiece.

Just to provide a context on cost-effectiveness, Russia’s large-scale attack on Ukraine on the night of 28/29 last December, which consisted of a variety of air and ground-launched cruise missiles, including the Kinzhal, and Shahed Kamikaze drones, cost the Russians US $1.273 billion. The attack reportedly killed 26 people and left more than 130 injured. ^[12] The attack reportedly killed 26 people and left more than 130 injured. A similar attack on Kyiv Oblast in the morning of 7 February 2024, which comprised of a mix 44 of advanced missiles, and 20 Shahed Kamikaze drones, cost the Russians US $423.4 million^[13] and caused three deaths, and damage to 58 private homes, six apartments in five apartment buildings, a cultural center, an educational institution, a post office, and 12 passenger cars. ^[14] The Russian military can afford the costs as it is backed by a robust defence industry, while Ukraine is increasingly dependent on Western support, to the advantage of the vested arms industry. According to SIPRI reports, 41 percent of the world’s weapons come from the US, and both its Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial sales have gone up by almost 50 percent in 2022. ^[15] The outcome of this war will unfortunately depend on the capability and capacity of the Western arms industry to sustain Ukraine against the Russian military-industrial juggernaut. The Indian defence-industrial complex, which has got the impetus due to the driving necessity to be militarily self-reliant, must resist the temptation of mirroring or replicating the enemy’s warfighting capabilities, and instead focus on building and strengthening critical war-winning asymmetric capabilities.

Electronic warfare holds a special place in the Russian concept of operations. Radio-electronic warfare or REB, is considered a vital element of the Russian armed forces that can degrade the combat systems of an opponent to such an extent that any technological superiority will be severely compromised. ^[16] It has emerged as the silent assassin of Western technology as ‘Russia’s jamming of the guidance systems of modern Western weapons, including Excalibur GPS-guided artillery shells and the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, or HIMARS, which can fire some U.S.-made rockets with a range of up to 50 miles, has eroded Ukraine’s ability to defend its territory.’ ^[17] All modern weapons inevitably find their limits in applications as counters to defeat technology run alongside their development. If a war or conflict goes on long enough, counter-technology will find a way to neutralize, if not defeat the asymmetric technology edge enjoyed by a side. The extent and effectiveness of Russia’s dense web of electronic warfare and AD systems, and their ability to counter Western technology is a cause of serious concern. ‘Russia’s ability to combat the high-tech munitions has far-reaching implications for Ukraine and its Western supporters — potentially providing a blueprint for adversaries such as China and Iran — and it is a key reason Moscow’s forces have regained the initiative and are advancing in the battlefield.’ ^[18] The importance of this domain in the Indian context is a future-relevant imperative given the rapidly transforming high-technology adversarial military inventories, especially that of China.

Of Rockets and Drones

When it comes to the use of rockets, the story is different. Rockets have lesser range and accuracy when compared to missiles and hence are used at the tactical level by militaries to supplement their artillery barrage firepower. Modern variants of the famous Katyusha rockets developed in World War II are a very a part of the contemporary Russian artillery inventory even today. With their current ability to fire their load of 40 rockets in 20 seconds in a shoot-and-scoot mode, they form an integral part of the tactical firepower of Russia’s surface forces. Their range, however, limits their strategic employment against targets in depth. Unlike missiles, rockets are much cheaper and relatively low-technology weapons that have found extensive use in irregular warfare and terrorism. Hamas and Hezbollah have been using cheaper variants of the Katyushas for over a decade for carrying out stand-off attacks into Israel, as a simpler option compared to the challenges of physical ground attacks. On the other hand, the retaliatory air strikes on Gaza by the Israeli Air Force are a continuation of a long-pursued Israeli response strategy. While the actual lethal effects of these weapons have been relatively limited in terms of loss of lives and infrastructural damage, the mass use of low-cost rockets underscores the cost-asymmetry of the conflict. The Katyusha rockets favoured by Hamas and Hezbollah typically cost about $300 apiece, while the Tamir missiles of Israel’s much-touted Iron Dome AD system, cost about US $ 40-50000 according to a researcher at Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies. ^[19] The state-of-the-art Iron Dome AD system claimed to be 90 percent effective^[20] has undoubtedly saved Israeli lives, but has demonstrated that even the best of systems cannot assure a hundred percent failsafe AD. The sobering fact however is that despite the most modern AD systems, missiles, rockets, and drones will still manage to get through as no system can ensure total safety. This is especially relevant for India’s national security given the sheer geographical spread of over 7000km of hostile borders shared with China and Pakistan, and the humongous volume of sovereign airspace requiring AD coverage in war and peace. Also, since long-range missile trajectories in the future will increasingly use the near space for transit, ‘air defence’ needs to be expanded in its overall construct to include both air and space towards a more comprehensive ‘aerospace defence.

The extensive employment of drones in recent irregular conflicts and conventional wars appears to have captured the public imagination for several reasons. The use of drones to target terrorist organisations began as a covert part of the US global war on terror. It has since become institutionalised as a regular aspect of its military tactics and operations ^[21] and found extensive use for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and precision strikes in the benign and low-threat AD environments of counter-insurgency warfare. ‘The MQ-9 Reaper and other large, fixed-wing drones like the MQ-1 Predator were designed in an era in which US air supremacy was assumed. They were developed after the end of the Cold War, at a time when no nation could challenge the United States militarily. These assumptions held in Afghanistan and Iraq, conflicts for which these platforms were optimally matched.’ ^[22] A Washington Post investigation revealed the mounting losses of more than 400 large drones in major accidents of the US military, which has logged more than 4 million flight hours and owns about 10,000 drones, from one-pound Wasps and four-pound Ravens to one-ton Predators and 15-ton Global Hawks. ^[23] These do not include the losses in combat or hostile environments in contested airspaces. Considering that the cost of a Reaper at $30 million is equivalent to the cost of an F-16, they are by no means cheap. Their vulnerability, even in a relatively benign hostile AD environment, is evident from the loss of five US Reaper to Houthi rebel fire. In the highly contested AD environment, the combat employment of heavy long-range systems by Ukraine like the Turkish Bayraktar, Iranian Shahed 131, and 136 Kamikaze drones has been extensive, but has also demonstrably proven their vulnerability to AD systems. The interesting fact is that while the US has restricted the usage of its high-end large drones to irregular conflict situations with no air opposition, Ukraine is finding use for them in combat to offset the lack of an effective and offensively capable Air Force, against the hostile Russian AD.

Cheaper drones, on the other hand, provide multiple employment options in the tactical battle areas for real-time surveillance, intelligence gathering, and suicide attacks, but are limited in their employment due to terrain, weather, payload capacity, range, etc. The Ukrainians, in the absence of offensive air power capability, have been forced to innovate and rely on drones to fill the gaps, but not without some inherent challenges. ‘The Ukrainian-Russian border is flooded with GPS jamming. Although off-the-shelf autopilots can navigate with a compass and inertial guidance systems, the drift rates are high enough to cause a mission failure without sophisticated custom code and other engineering hacks. The jamming environment also means that datalinks are unlikely to work; worse, a careless radio frequency (RF) transmission might be enough to invite a Russian artillery strike on the pilot.’ ^[24] The Royal United Service Institute estimates that Ukraine is losing 10,000 drones per month, indicating their widespread use, and their high loss rate. High and medium-altitude ISR drones that gained credibility in precision targeting in the US global war on terror, are extremely vulnerable in a hostile AD environment, due to their low speeds and limited manoeuvrability. While small drones have delivered some tactical successes in the conventional warfighting domain, they have not produced strategic outcomes as the war continues unabated. ^[25] Development and combat employment of drones in the Indian context must therefore, be driven by the dynamics of their effectiveness to produce tactical outcomes in contested battlespaces and harsh environmental and terrain conditions while balancing costs versus survivability.

National Resilience

One common and important factor to bear in mind is that all the recent and ongoing conflicts and wars, whether irregular or conventional, are being fought without any air opposition. Israel’s retaliatory air strike strategy allows a kinetic response without putting boots on the ground, in an uncontested airspace over which it has total control. Over 30000 aerial weapons employed in a strategy to target the Hamas leadership, personnel, weapons, and infrastructure, have come at a high cost of collateral civilian casualty ^[26] despite the extensive pinpoint targeting, use of advanced technology, and aborted strikes by the Israeli Air Force. ^[27] Reports claim that 18000 tons of bombs have been dropped on Gaza and the destruction on the ground is consistent with this figure. Even in Ukraine, there is practically nil opposition to the VKS as the remnants of its AF are no longer taking to the skies. The claimed reports of Ukrainian casualty statistics are revealing. 95% (20,423) of civilian casualties have not surprisingly occurred in populated areas. Ground-launched explosive weapons including missile strikes, artillery shelling, and rockets, have caused 67% (14, 298) of civilian casualties, whereas air-launched explosive weapons have caused 16% (3,402) casualties. ^[28] While the relatively greater accuracy of air-launched weapons will have had a part to play, it must be considered that if the VKS had control of the skies over Ukraine, and used its air power more offensively, how would it have impacted the civilian losses?

What is indisputable is that low-cost missiles, rockets, and drones today provide a cheaper alternative option to compensate for the absence or inadequate offensive air power capability to states, and an asymmetric capability in irregular conflicts to non-state actors. Despite their limited lethality, accuracy, and effectiveness, their increasing employment imposes high costs on regular forces, which are forced to commit extremely expensive high-technology weapon systems to combat the proliferation of cheaper, home-manufactured low-tech weapons. Though these may not be the game-changing silver bullets they have been made out to be, they have expanded the employment options of the aerial dimension in warfare with their ability to carry the fight beyond the battlespaces, deeper into the adversary's heartland. They have also demonstrated their ability to bring the war to the doorsteps of a nation’s citizens deep inside rural and urban spaces. Indian citizens are no strangers to terror attacks, and some sections of our border populations have experienced occasional firing and shelling, but a majority have no exposure to mass-scale conflict since the 1971 war. Containing and managing our border disputes in the past decades to focus on the nation's growth and developmental aspirations, has served to push out the possibility of war and its associated horrors from the mind of the average Indian civilian. This has also possibly created a sense of detachment in the population from matters-military and national security, which should be a cause of deep concern. The border crises of Doklam and Galwan serve as a stark reminder that conventional war, with all its associated civilian collateral, remains a clear and present danger.

India’s threat scenario is unique in its context as it shares disputed borders with two nuclear-armed adversaries who are strategic partners. Both adversaries have strong Air Forces and the capability to target our military, strategic, and civilian assets deep inside the nation. Saturation air and missile strikes in our high population-density rural and urban spaces resulting in mass civilian collateral are a reality that has not been given adequate attention. The most important aspect to consider is that modern wars and conflicts will inevitably and unavoidably impact the civilian population as the fighting no longer remains limited to border battlespaces. In India’s post-independence history of four major wars and a conflict, the civilian collateral was limited and essentially restricted to those residing in the border areas, while the majority of the nation was not directly confronted with the brutal ravages of full-fledged war. The political concerns of enemy air attacks on Indian cities constrained the use of offensive air power in 1962 in the Indo-China War, ^[29] and the outcome still haunts the national psyche even today. In the 1965 Indo-Pak War, the concern of city bombings persisted and again initially constrained pre-emptive offensive air operations. ^[30] However, in both the 1965 and 1971 wars enemy air attacks on cities of Agra, Amritsar, Jodhpur, etc., were essentially on IAF airfields and radar installations. While the Indian Air Force too carried out extensive depth strikes which were exclusively against strategic and military targets in the Pakistani cities of Lahore, Karachi, etc., ^[31] the loss of civilian lives in urban spaces was limited since deliberate targeting of the civilian population has been steadfastly eschewed in India’s national and military war objectives. However, while the civilian population of the border villages was evacuated in both wars, there were certainly collateral civilian casualties and destruction of infrastructure, as they bore the brunt of shelling and military action. India’s major wars occurred within a little over two decades of its independence when the majority of the civilian population had directly or indirectly experienced the freedom struggle, the horrors of partition, and the hardships caused by the ravages of two centuries of colonial rule. A civilian population that knew the value of hard-earned freedom and was willing to pay the price to preserve it. Given the current conflict trends of mass-scale missile and rocket attacks against high-density population centers, one hopes that the majority of the current generations, who haven’t seen a large-scale war for over half a century, display the same resilience, fortitude, and national fervor of their past generations when faced with mass scale civilian death and destruction.

End Thoughts

India’s future growth trajectory, place in the geopolitical world order, and national security are intrinsically linked to its regional threat scenario. It has already long been a victim of state-sponsored terror attacks, and the growing range of grey-zone threats has further blurred the lines of irregular warfare with the conventional warfighting domain. Thus, future conflicts and wars can no longer be expected to be restricted to the borders as they will inevitably spill over into civilian spaces. Massed aerial attacks will not only target tactically deployed forces but will also include the targeting of depth military, industrial, and strategic assets and infrastructure, to weaken the nation’s warfighting wherewithal. With India’s high population density in rural and urban spaces, civilian collateral in terms of lives and infrastructure, can be expected to be significant. As the nation prepares for such an eventuality from a military perspective, the need for the citizens to understand the stakes of India’s future national security is equally important. The military today is no longer the sole keeper of a nation’s security, as all elements of comprehensive national power and therefore all its citizens, are equally invested in it. The extent of the willingness of its citizens to pay the price for its freedom, no matter the cost, will be the defining factor of a nation’s resilience in large-scale wars and conflicts of the future.

Endnotes

^[1] Pushpindar Singh, Himalayan Eagles, History of the Indian Air Force, Volume I, The Society for Aerospace Studies, New Delhi, 2007, p.46
^[2] https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/iraq-nuclear-vault/2021-06-07/osirak-israels-strike-iraqs-nuclear-reactor-40-years-later [3]
^[3] Judy Endicott, Raid on Libya: Operation Eldorado Canyon, US DOD Report, https://media.defense.gov/2012/Aug/23/2001330097/-1/-1/0/Op%20El%20Dorado%20Canyon.pdf [4]
^[4] https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/04/irans-attack-israel-was-not-failure-many-claim-it-has-ended-israels-isolation [5]
^[5] https://www.timesofisrael.com/as-war-grinds-on-israel-sees-sharp-drop-in-rocket-attacks-from-gaza/ [6]
^[6] https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/israel-almost-10000-rockets-fired-from-gaza-since-october-7/articleshow/105064500.cms?from=mdr [7]
^[7] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-says-russia-has-launched-over-8000-missiles-4630-drones-during-war-2024-02-22/ [8]
^[8] https://defence.nridigital.com/global_defence_technology_mar22/russia_electronic_warfare [9]
^[9] M Kofman, A Fink, D Gorenburg, M Chesnut, J Edmonds, and J Waller, Russian Military Strategy: Core Tenets and Operational Concepts, CAN Research Memorandum, August 2021, https://www.cna.org/reports/2021/08/Russian-Military-Strategy-Core-Tenets-and-Operational-Concepts.pdf [10]
^[10] https://www.sps-aviation.com/story/?id=2639&h=The-Sukhoi-Vulnerability-and-Other-Post-Balakot-Lessons [11]
^[11] Air Marshal D Choudhury (Retd), Chariots of Fire: Air War in Ukraine and Gaza, Medals and Ribbons, Apr-Jun 2024, Vol.4, Issue 2
^[12] https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/12/29/7435068/ [12]
^[13] https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/02/7/7440754/ [13]
^[14] https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/02/7/7440839/ [14]
^[15]John A Tirpak, US Arms Sales Shoot up Nearly 50 Percent in 2022, Driven in Part by Ukraine, Air & Space Forces Magazine, 25 Jan 2023https://www.airandspaceforces.com/us-arms-sales-shoot-up-nearly-50-percent-in-2022-driven-in-part-by-ukraine/
^[16] https://defence.nridigital.com/global_defence_technology_mar22/russia_electronic_warfare#menu [15]
^[17] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/05/24/russia-jamming-us-weapons-ukraine/ [16]
^[18] Ibid
^[19] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-10-12/pentagon-owned-stocks-in-israel-transfered-to-defense-forces [17]
^[20] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-20385306 [18]
^[21] Coyne, Christopher J. and Abigail R. Hall, The Drone Paradox: Fighting Terrorism with Mechanized Terror, The Independent Review, vol. 23, no. 1, 2018, pp. 51–67. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/26591799 [19]
^[22] https://mwi.westpoint.edu/reaper-down-three-takeaways-from-russias-intercept-of-a-us-unmanned-aerial-vehicle/ [20]
^[23] https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2014/06/20/when-drones-fall-from-the-sky/ [21]
^[24] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/ukraines-drone-strikes-are-a-window-into-the-future-of-warfare/ [22]
^[25] https://www.businessinsider.com/tanks-troops-in-the-open-are-hit-within-10-minutes-ukraine-official-2023-9?r=US&IR=T [23]
^[26] https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/02/14/gaza-war-israel-civilian-deaths-urban-warfare-hamas/ [24]
^[27] https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/israeli-air-force/israeli-air-force-bombing-gaza-or-pinpoint-strikes/ [25]
^[28] https://aoav.org.uk/2024/ukraine-casualty-monitor/ [26]
^[29] BN Mullick, The Chinese Betrayal, Allied Publishers, Delhi, 1971, pp. 350-351
^[30] Jasjit Singh, The Icon, Second Edition, KW Publishers, Delhi, 2001, pp.153-154
^[31] SN Prasad, History of Indo-Pak War 1971, MOD History Division, 1991

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