Making Sense of a so-Called Frozen War

This brief piece picks up the thread from the latest the Russo-Ukraine war and attempts to reflect on what may lie ahead.

Visiting the Russo-Ukraine Battlefield

Following points briefly reflect the current scene:-

• The Russian defence line currently rests along Bakhmut- Avdiivika- Robotyne-Krynky besides the annexed Crimean peninsula. ^[1] (see map)
• A labyrinth of defensive lines (Wagner line, Surovikin Line, Defence line etc.) developed in multiple layers have provided the advantage of ‘defence in depth’ to Russia. ^[2]
• Complete with large swaths of ant-tank and anti-personal mines, obstacle systems, boots on ground, artillery fire support from depth areas, a strong Russian defences could bear the onslaught of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, keeping their gains very limited. ^[3]
• A part of the strength of the Russian defences also belonged to its air power (strike aircrafts - SU24s, SU34s, 35s and MiG29s and attack helicopters- KA 51/52, Mi8, Mi24, Mi 28). These were no longer venturing in contested skies over Ukraine and taking a thorough beating from the MANPADs and vast array of Ukrainian air defences but now operating over their own defensive positions, reaching out to Ukrainian mechanised thrust lines and causing effective kills. ^[4]
• The Russian defensive electronic warfare (EWs) arsenal comprising of radar jammers in HF domain, VHF/UHF communication jammers, GPS and satellite communication jammers, long range HF jammers, airborne fire control radar jammers and anti-drone jammers are deployed in depth covering the defence lines (unlike being frittered away along multiple thrust lines in penny packets covering multiple thrust lines of the Russian offensive in Feb-Apr 2022). In the current deployment, these have started to prove very effective in taking on the soft killing of drone threat or defeating radar/GPS guided weaponry. ^[5]

With this as a brief stage setter, a few issues about the war are analysed

Frozen War? Not Really

Open sources will have us believe that the ‘war is frozen’ in time with the two adversaries nailed to their respective positions. This is hardly the case:-

• Russian forces reaching out from their strong defensive positions are making some important gains. After a prolonged fight split over nearly five months (Oct-Feb2024) Russian forces managed to capture the city of Avdiivka on 17 Feb 2024. Avdiivka is an important city in the Donetsk Oblast whose capture signified the largest territorial gain after the bloody fight at Bakhmut. ^[6]
• Avdiivka is not just another victory. This town, located in Eastern Ukraine and on the frontline facing the Russian Defences has actually seen war right from 2014 when Russian militarily intervened in the Donetsk region.
• Its loss has two major takeaways for Russia:- ^[7]
  • It provides a gateway for Russian forces to other areas in the gut of Ukraine.
  • The Avdiivka’s defences were built around dominant hills and large rivers. With that crumbled the Ukrainian’s will find it harder to stop the expansion of the Russian onslaught westwards.
• Why Avdiivka happened? One line answer – outnumbered and outgunned. As per a Ukrainian fighter’s account, the Russians besides advancing over the corpses of their own soldiers had a 10:1 shell advantage! In a kind of corroboration of the statement ‘ advancing over the corpses’ (sic) open source has it that in the Battle of Avdiivka Russia lost more soldiers (some 16000+ as per an anonymous military source^[8]) than it lost during the entire ten year Soviet Afghan War!

Shortages and Shortages

The 10:1 remark also points out to the relentless pursuit of tactics Russia adopted after its so called blitzkrieg was inflicted disproportionate hammering by the trio of MANPADS, Anti-tank missiles and Drone power. A change of gear that happened sometime in Aug 2022 was to avoid headlong contact battle; instead pulverise the target with massed artillery fire. ^[9] Once that was achieved, boots on ground moved in to simply mop up. Such heavy casualties of Russians in Avdiivka also corroborates President Zelenski’s words of praise for his troops in ‘exhausting’ the Russian forces before withdrawing.

That said the 10:1 needs further analysis:-

• The fall of Avdiivka has also shown that Ukraine is running out of the quantum of arms and ammunition that is required to hold the Russian forces.
• As per their President there have been serious shortages in supply of shells and long-range missiles in Ukraine. ^[10]
• The Ukrainian defence minister has described it as ‘shell-hunger’ to the French led Artillery Coalition. This coalition, launched by the French Armed Forces Minister Mr Sebastien Lecornu and Ukrainian Defence Minister Mr Roustem Oumerov on 18 Jan 2024 aims at providing artillery guns and munitions to Ukraine. For starters France has promised 6 Caesar Guns (155mm) to Ukraine within weeks and some 74 more in 2024. ^[11]
• As per Mr Sebastien five ‘capability coalitions’ have been created for Ukraine involving 50 member countries of the Ukraine Defence Contract Group. These cover the areas of air defence, armoured vehicles, air force, maritime security and now Artillery. ^[12]
• Situation is getting dire as we progress from early 2024 into the summer months. As per one US estimate, military shortages could grow to catastrophic levels for Ukraine if the promised aid from US continues to hang in the balance. ^[13]
• President Biden has gone a step further to blame the inaction by the US Congress as the reason for the fall of Avdiivka. ^[14] The Ukraine’s new Army Chief Colonel General Oeksandr Syrskyi has stated on record that the main reason for their withdrawal from Avdiivka was to save his troops from getting fully surrounded by Russian troops as they were facing acute shortage of arms and ammunition. ^[15]

On Reciprocal Gears

As the situation is unfolding by the day, Russia and Ukraine appear to be riding on reciprocal gears. In that, while Russia continues to push in more boots on the ground (a la Operation Barbarossa) and continues to pump in huge amounts of artillery firepower ( in spite of taking disproportionate casualties on its ammunition depots and rail/road-based supply lines, Ukraine continues to drain both in manpower, as well as, the wherewithal to stop the Russian onslaught. President’s Putin’s revelations to Fox News host Tucker Carlson even after correcting for all the associated ‘drama’ do show a much stronger Russia than its adversary at this point in time. ^[16] On pushing boots-on-ground, there has been a lot of hue and cry in recent week of gullible youth in search of jobs being tricked by scrupulous elements and sent to Russia only to land up at frontlines of battlefield ( Nepal, India?)

The Aid Tap

US Aid

A huge 74.3Bn $ (Military 46.3 Bn, financial 26.4 Bn and humanitarian 1.6 Bn) by Feb 2024 really kept the ‘global war chugging along with all guns firing for the brave Ukrainians. ^[17] What about now?

• The current aid package of 95 Bn $ (60Bn for Ukraine, 10 Bn for Israel and rest for Taiwan and border security) duly passed by the US Senate is stuck up in the US Congress. ^[18]
• A perusal the on-going debate surrounding this issue, the formidable Republican resistance for sending ‘precious American treasure’ to wars in far off lands without a clear strategy for the future; without top priory attention to US border security and border laws is very much palpable. It does give a sense that the aid is unlikely to pass the vote any time soon. At best, only the military aid to Ukraine (60Bn) may be green-lighted sometime in the future. Even that looks remote as on date (US elections Nov 2024!) ^[19]
• Surely EU cannot replace the tap dried of US aid. Another problem with EU aid is the large gap between what is promised and what gets delivered. According to one such report of 15 Jan 2024, out of a total 144 Bn € in aid promised by EU, only 77 Bn € actually got allocated. This is roughly divided half-half between Military (35.2 Bn€) and Financial (34Bn €).^[20]
• The current aid package of 50Bn € as promised in Feb 2024 is basically for the recovery, reconstruction and modernisation of Ukraine as a part of its accession to EU. This amount is likely to be deployed by 2027. IMF has estimated the Ukraine’s funding gap to be around 85.2 Bn $ in the period 2024-2027. ^[21]
• Outside the EU framework, aid has come from different European nations under bilateral arrangements. Germany is the largest donor with 17.7 Bn€ in military commitments out of which 9.4 Bn€ stand delivered. Denmark has committed 8.4 Bn€ of which 4.5Bn € have been allocated. French has committed some 3.8Bn € between Feb 2022 to Dec 2023. ^[22] UK has also been the major donor. Total aid pledged since Feb 22 is 12 Bn€ out of which 7.1 Bn is for military assistance. The Govt has announced an additional 2.5 Bn € for FY 2024-25. ^[23]

Too Little Too Late

It is the sense of the author that so long as the main pipe (US) remains dry , small trickles from several others will only prove to be too little too late.
The points at issue are:-

• Russia is at a much firmer position than it was in the early months of Feb 2022.
• Russian economy besides 12 packages of economic sanctions, exclusion from global financial services and with around 260 Bn$ worth assets of its Central bank frozen worldwide has registered a GDP growth of 2.6% (UK -0.6%, EU- 0.9%) basically Russian firms have learned to sidestep sanctions. Russian public coffers are flooded with oil money thanks to the dark fleet of uninsured vessels and loopholes in accounting (not discussed further). ^[24]
• Against this, the economic growth report of Oct 2023 has it that Ukraine’s economic output is only a fraction of its pre-war levels. In the first year of the conflict, the country lost something like 30-35% of its GDP and in FY 2023 it’s GDP is projected to grow, if at all, by a meagre 0.5%. ^[25]

No Meeting Ground

The pre-war conditions (read demands) of Russia were an international treaty that not only must prevent Ukraine from ever joining NATO, but also the withdrawal of NATO from existing member status and reversal to 1997 position. This soon got further amplified as war ran its course, the conditions now doing the rounds are de-militarisation and denazification of Ukraine.

Against this backdrop, here is Ukraine’s 10-point peace plan put forward in Nov 2022 (only some points quoted) – Restoration of Ukrainian borders prior to the 2014’s annexation of Crimea; Full withdrawal of Russian military forces from Ukraine and prosecution of war crimes in the Russian invasion of Ukraine. ^[26]

If the two warring factions are at these respective positions where is the need to discuss the peace efforts by the rest of the world (case in point – China Peace Plan). Also, with the possible accession of Ukraine to NATO already on course and Sweden’s entry to NATO on 07 Mar 2024 throwing to winds its 200+ years of neutrality (not discussed further) things are only more difficult for a re-conciliation than ever before.

Paul Dibb the Professor of Strategic Studies at Strategic and Defense Studies Centre at the Australian National University (ANU) delivering the ANU Public Lecture 2024 on the theme ‘Two years on: How Russia’s war on Ukraine will end?’ stated the following reasons why Russia went to war in the first place^[27]:- (only essence quoted)

1. The collapse of Soviet Union in 1991 and President Boris Yeltsin’s recognition of Ukraine as a separate country. (As per President Putin, historically there is no separate country called Ukraine). ^[28]
2. NATO’s expansion to the borders of Soviet Union is an act of aggression. (President Putin in his interview to Tucker Carlson has further qualified this position – The arming of Ukraine by US and West is an act of provocation ^[29])
3. Ukraine’s ambition to be a part of NATO is a first order strategic challenge to Russia.
4. West was seeking to destroy Russia and Russia is now fighting for its own survival.

How can this war end in Ukraine’s favour?

• 180 degree reversal of what has happened of the counter offensive till date.
• Such tremendous, seamless and overwhelming military support starts pouring in from US and West as to arm Ukraine for a turnaround (what about the training deficit in using the new weapons of war received from the rest of the world? – no comments).
• Making Russian not only to suffer defeat on current defensive lines but also to make them yield all the Ukrainian lands now under their control (Crimea, Lohansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhya,). Essentially defeating a country with some 1500 strategic nuclear weapons and many thousands of tactical nuclear weapons.

Is such a scenario feasible in the foreseeable future? – Answer neither sought nor given.
If the current situation prevails

• Avdiivka won’t be the last major city to fall. Russian forces will continue to consolidate further, inching towards their goal of de-militarising and denazifying Ukraine (whatever that may mean)??
• The current 18% of Ukraine’s land which Russia controls will surely swell further.
• If the analogy of the ‘whole of NATO’ expansion to ‘the entirety of the borders of Russia is given credence to, as the Professor Emeritus Paul Dibb referred to, then is there a possibility of the war extending to neighbouring NATO countries (Norway, Finland, Denmark, Latvia). There are already voices from many concerned quarters to prepare for the worst (not discussed further). ^[30]
• In the on-going situation if ever there is peace thrust upon Ukraine as a fait accompli, Ukraine will be a highly truncated State with nominal notion of independence and always at the mercy of Russia and of course under a different political leadership. President Putin has vowed for a regime change as he has always seen the current dispensation as the root cause of the current ‘straying away’ ^[31],

That briefly explains the current state of the frozen war which in the sense of the author is ANYTHING BUT FROZEN.

Endnotes

^[1]Ukraine in maps: tracking the war with Russia,” at www.bbc.com [3]. Accessed on 06 Mar 2024
^[2]Russian defence lines during Russian invasion of Ukraine,” at www.en.m.wikipedia.org.Accessed [4] on 06 Mar 2024
^[3] “Ukraine counteroffensive against Russia in maps,” at www.ft.com [5]. Accessed on 06 Mar 2024
^[4]“Why Russian airpower poses a threat to Ukraine’s counter offensive?” at www. popularmechaniscs.com. Accessed on 07 Mar 2024
^[5]“How Russian electronic warfare units turned the tide against Ukraine,” at www.telegraph.co.uk [6]. Accessed on 07 Mar 2024.
^[6]“Battle of Avdiivka,” at www.en.m.wikipedia.org [7]. Accessed on 08 Mar 2024
^[7]“Russia captures Avdiivka: what this means for Ukraine, the War and Europe,” at www.indianexpress.com [8]. Accessed on 08 Mar 2024.
^[8]6 ibid
^[9]“The power of the God of war: assessing Russian adavantage in Artillery,” at www.vifindia.org [9]. Accessed on 08 Mar 2024
^[10]7 ibid
^[11]“Ukraine: the artillery coalition has been launched.” At ww.defense.gouv.fr.Accessed on 09 Mar 2024
^[12]Ibid.
^[13]“US estimates Ukraine military shortages could grow catastrophic by late march . Accessed on 09 Mar 2024
^[14]ibid
^[15]“Russia-Ukraine war: Kiev pulls out troops from Avdiivka due to arms and ammunition shortage.” At www.cnbc18.com [10] Accessed on 09 Mar 2024.
^[16]“What did Vladimir Putin say to Tucker Carlson? “at www.aljazeera.com [11]. Accessed on 09 Mar 2024.
^[17]“How much aid US has sent to Ukraine?” at www.cfr.org [12]. Accessed on 09 Mar 2024.
^[18]“Is the house where Ukraine and Israel aid goes to die?” at www.responsibleststecraft.org [13]. Accessed on 09 Mar 2024.
^[19]ibid
^[20]“Ukraine Support Tracker: Europe has a long way to go to replace US aid.” At www.ifw.kiei.de [14]. Accessed on 09 Mar 2024.
^[21]“Ukraine’s funding gap by numbers,” at www.politico.eu [15]. Accessed on 10 Mar 2024.
^[22]French military equipment delivered to Ukraine,” at www.defense.gouv.fr [16]. Accessed on 10 Mar 2024.
^[23]“Military assistance to Ukraine since Russian invasion,” at www.commonslibrary.parliament.uk [17]. Accessed on 10 Mar 2024.
^[24]“Russia’s economy is now completely driven by the war in Ukraine..” at www.theconverstaion.com [18]. Accessed on 10 Mar 2024.
^[25]“Ukraine: what’s the global economic impact of Russian invasion,” at www.economicobservatory.com [19] Accessed on 10 Mar 2024.
^[26]“Peace negotiations in the Russian invasion of Ukraine,” at www.en.m.wikipedia.org [7]. Accessed on 10 Mar 2024.
^[27]“Two years on: how will Russia war on Ukraine end.” At www.anu.edu.au [20]. Accessed on 11 Mar 2024.
^[28]“Article by Vladimir Putin”On historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians,” at www.kremlin.ru [21]. Accessed on 11 Mar 2024.
^[29]16 ibid
^[30]“ Debunking Russian disinformation on NATO,” at www.nato.int [22]. Accessed on 12 Mar 2024.
^[31]26 ibid

(The paper is the author’s individual scholastic articulation. The author certifies that the article/paper is original in content, unpublished and it has not been submitted for publication/web upload elsewhere, and that the facts and figures quoted are duly referenced, as needed, and are believed to be correct). (The paper does not necessarily represent the organisational stance... More >>