It was axiomatic that different ideologies would exist in different parts of the world. The whole world obviously could never be built on one pattern. Syama Babu believed that trouble arose only when ideologies and principles, either peacefully or violently, penetrated other territories and disturbed the set-up in those countries. The quest for power, possession and prestige had always driven the world. India, after independence, had not wished to take sides openly. It had its own philosophy and ideology. It stood for the doctrine of ‘live and let live’. But if the ‘red’ signal came, what was India to do? Himalayas, as yet considered impregnable, covered the Indian borders for more than 2000 miles. No separate precaution, or defence by India, had as yet been thought necessary. These borders had suddenly become a critical and an important frontier through which penetration or infiltration into India could take place. How was India to defend this frontier? This question was connected to the internal conditions prevailing in the country. The deteriorating economic conditions were a challenge to India’s internal security and its ability to check infiltration and aggression. India could not tolerate any external interference. When Syama Babu made this statement on 6th December 1950, he was not referring to the ideologies for which Britain or the United States stood. In fact, on the subject of Korean crisis, he had already pointed out inconsistencies in India’s approach. This response had come as a reaction to Nehru’s remark in the Parliament. North Korea had no independent status, rather it was backed by China and Soviet Russia. But in the Security Council India had not hesitated to declare North Korea as an aggressor. Syama Babu questioned whether the fight between North and South Korea went beyond a localized conflict? The United States viewed it as an ideological one. The Chinese on the other hand had acquired enormous strength and were able to meet the finest forces of the United States and other allied powers on the battleground. The Americans claimed that they were fighting the battles on behalf of democracy. Syama Babu wanted India to make up its mind as to what it exactly stood for. China had taken it upon itself the task of liberating other people who were not anxious to obtain liberation. This had naturally created complications. Syama Babu referred to a speech made by Churchill in the House of Commons in London. Churchill had perceived the Korean crisis not in terms of saving Asia or in making Korea a real testing ground. Realistically speaking, he had been bothered about its possible repercussions on Europe, particularly Britain, in case the Korean crisis escalated. Syama Babu understood and appreciated this realistic strategic approach. He wanted the Indian leaders to assess how the Korean problem would realistically affect India.

In fact, India stood for freedom of expression, thought, association and religion. India’s Constitution was based on the principles of democracy. India could not, therefore, accept any principle attached to totalitarianism or dictatorship. If there was a conflict with these ideologies, India could not sit on the fence. Syama Babu therefore, asked for a more sensible and pragmatic approach from Prime Minister Nehru on the critical subject of India’s Foreign Policy. He felt that the inconsistencies and uncertainties of India’s Foreign Policy was making India slowly drift towards disaster, more quickly than what many thought.

There was ambiguity that existed about Pakistan. India had been to war with Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). Pakistan had been a clear aggressor in J&K, although what was true for Korea, was not true for J&K. Syama Babu was alluding to the Indian support for the Resolution in the UN Security Council declaring North Korea as an aggressor. India’s policy towards Pakistan had been conciliatory. Syama Babu called for an ‘Indian Policy based on reciprocity, complete reciprocity’. If India was meted good treatment from Pakistan, Pakistan would also get the same treatment. If that was not the case, there was no use merely stating that India was carrying on a policy of negotiation. Nehru had been happy merely by the fact that 2000 Hindus were returning to East Pakistan every day. But no one had cared to ask as to why had they come to India in the first place, in what condition they had to live in East Pakistan, the humiliations they had been subjected to? Nehru had no answer for it! The Prime Minister had known much better than anyone about the life of misery, shame and humiliation which millions of Hindus in East Pakistan had been forced to live. These were the same people whose loyalty was towards an undivided India; who had made the Indian freedom possible, and today, naturally looked to India for protection and help in emergency. Syama Babu asked Nehru to clarify on India’s policy in respect to these people. Was India weak, as merely to watch and appeal? What India required was to get a proper lead from its government. What had perturbed Syama Babu was Nehru’s announcement about reduction in defence expenditure.

On 28th March 1951, Syama Babu had again risen in the Parliament to speak on India’s Foreign Policy. Talking about the Nehru-Liaquat Pact, Syama Babu said that the main object of this Agreement was not to stop the Hindus to leave East Pakistan, or the Hindus who had come away, to go back to that country. Nehru was a great admirer of statistics, through which he had shown that 10-15 lacs of people had returned to East Pakistan. Syama Babu emphasized the circumstances under which they had been forced to return and their living conditions, which he said was a very sad commentary on the Nehru-Liaquat Pact. It was a matter of common psychology that people get tired of committing murder, loot and arson. Thereafter, the society settles to an uneasy calm.

The objective behind the tragic happenings of the 1950s had been largely achieved by Pakistan. Many who had gone back were returned, disillusioned, disappointed and dejected. Syama Babu feared that the next blow may be soon and coming when lacs of Hindus would forsake their religion and embrace Islam for the purpose of self-protection. The Chief Minister of Assam had recently in his budget speech stated that 8 lac Hindus who had come from East Pakistan to Assam had not found it possible to go back because of the conditions that existed there. The peace that exists today is the peace of the dead and not of the living. Syama Babu again raised the subject of Kashmir and how was India’s relation with Pakistan to be determined with reference to the future of Kashmir.

Syama Babu had never appreciated India’s inconsistent policy in respect of Pakistan. To him, Nehru had followed a policy of dynamic inconsistency with Pakistan. Nehru had wanted a number of pacts with that country on subjects that would help facilitate Pakistan’s economy and trade. At the same time, Nehru maintained with ‘great vehemence’ that Pakistan had been the aggressor in J&K and India would go to any length to vindicate its right there. What was the point of hugging Pakistan while India was at war with it? India had been to the UNO with the best of intentions, for it expected a quick and speedy decision with regard to Pakistan being an aggressor recognized there. The natural consequences would then follow. Three and a half years had elapsed. Nehru wondered the total expenditure incurred on the J&K War, perhaps 100 crores. It was not money alone, but the blood and toil of the Indian people too. What was the result? A stalemate, mostly India’s creation. Syama Babu found it amazing that Nehru had failed to get a response that he deserved from the powers adorning the UNO, the so-called big powers, despite India’s case being just and fair. What had gone wrong? Had we gone wrong on the matter of putting our case out properly to the world opinion at large? Had we been outwitted by Pakistan on matters which were most certainly in our favour and within the domain of truth? What had happened? Nehru had said that he was getting ‘curiouser and curiouser like Alice in Wonderland when he came to think of Kashmir’. But did he realize where India was being led to?

Syama Babu was categorical that India should declare emphatically that it does not want the intervention of UNO to settle the issue of J&K. India had had enough of this nonsense. If India was not to get a fair deal from those who always talked of fairness and justice when dealing with problems affecting their own self-interest, then India should remain alone, and if necessary, be prepared to suffer for it. “Very often I have envied Kashmir. If Nehru had come from East Bengal, perhaps, he might have seen a different picture of that area. But that is neither here nor there,” Syama Babu had observed while talking of the soft corner which Nehru had for J&K. Syama Babu hoped that Nehru would stand up for the dignity and prestige of India including J&K. J&K was Indian territory.

A plebiscite had been offered by Nehru, not because of a right to which Pakistan could put forward any claim, but because that was a democratic approach to the solution of the problem creating extraordinary difficulties. This offer had been interpreted as a sign of weakness on India’s part. One cannot have a plebiscite and a war at the same time. Pakistan wanted war. They could not claim a plebiscite up to a point that it helped them to have a plebiscite and carry on their conspiracy and activity with the sole purpose of infringing upon India’s legitimate rights. Syama Babu contended in a forthright manner that not only should the J&K case be withdrawn from the UNO, but the question of plebiscite should also be dropped. Nehru had said that if Pakistan proceeded even an inch into India’s territory, then it would be regarded as a war on India. Why was he being so generous and charitable? Had not Pakistan already annexed, not one inch, but huge swathes of the territory of J&K, that was India? Was not Pakistan in occupation of Kashmiri soil, which was Indian territory? Is that not sufficient justification for Nehru to say, “Unless you vacate the territory you have occupied, we will interpret it as an act of war on India herself?”

It was for Nehru to make up his mind, for he would not get any assistance from the UNO. Syama Babu was not attacking the UNO here. But he had never understood that logic. There was an aggression in Korea and therefore the whole world had to come on the field of Korea to defend it from aggression. China entered North Korea and her aggression was quickly declared. Here, Pakistan had entered another country, J&K, which was part of India, and yet there was so much legal quibble and discussions whether aggression had actually taken place or not. By a strange legal process, it was even sought to be shown that it was not Pakistan but India who was the aggressor.

Pakistan’s position was getting stronger as days passed, but at the same time India was entering into a trade agreement with Pakistan. Everyday 250 wagons were crossing into West Pakistan carrying coal from India; since Pakistan wanted the consignment to reach quickly, it had preferred the land to the sea route. India had obliged to enable Pakistan to help her industry. It was time to decide on India’s policy. If India was afraid and could not fight for its rights and wanted peace at any price, then Nehru should say so. Having once got into the tangle of dividing India on communal lines, if J&K was also to be divided, then Nehru should have the courage to say so, so that the territory of J&K where Muslims predominated could be given to Pakistan. But Syama Babu did not at all favour this. His opinion was clear and straightforward. J&K had acceded to India. It was Indian territory. Anyone who came into that territory was an intruder, an enemy, and had to be ‘kicked out’ of the country. There could be no other interpretation. If, however, the matter had to be settled on some other basis then Nehru should not be making strong public statements and thereafter displaying weak behavior. This had been the bitter experience of the past. The people were confused about India’s policy. The policy of Dr. Jackal and Mr. Hyde could not be followed vis-à-vis Pakistan. Nehru should stand up as one personality, an organic whole, and deal with Pakistan in India’s self-interest.

Syama Babu was convinced that India’s machinery regarding external publicity was halting, weak and sometimes hypothetical. It had many a times betrayed India’s cause. Many foreigners had talked of India’s defensive approach on this account. India, in its anxiety to appear fair, has often bungled. India’s policy has been hesitant, weak and vacillating – ‘Do not go and hit your enemy, because one does not know what the reaction will be’. This was the attitude which was ruining India. It was not a question of personal whim or prestige, rather, the prestige and honour of the country that was at stake.

India stood for democracy and believed in the rule of law, the supremacy and sovereignty of the people. That was India’s philosophy. In a crisis, in a clash of two ideologies, where would India stand? Could it remain quiet? If a war, not of India’s seeking came, could India remain quiet? Syama Babu’s suggestion to Nehru was that India should make it clearly understood that it did not believe in dictatorship or totalitarianism. India did not believe in suppression of opinion, thought or freedom of association. It believed in democracy, in the rule of law. If a conflict came, India would stand upholding the cause of democracy.

On the subject of Indian Missions overseas, Syama Babu made a specific mention of the Indian High Commission which cost Rs. 48 lacs per year, equivalent to the entire expenditure for the External Affairs Ministry of India. India’s Mission in London was the biggest establishment abroad. He suggested that the Indian Mission should represent the Indian India and not uphold its recent British legacy.

While delivering the Presidential Address at the Inaugural Meeting of the People’s Party in Calcutta on 9th June 1951, Syama Babu expounded on the shameless policy of appeasement of Pakistan followed by India. This policy had been a major national disaster for which the Government of India had been solely responsible. Partition of India, a political expediency, had been agreed between Congress and the Muslim League. It did not solve any problem whatsoever. Apart from untold sufferings of millions, the partition affected India and Pakistan economically, strategically and internationally. Both countries became distrustful of each other, a great triumph of British diplomacy and statecraft. The goal of united India was not a communal issue. Syama Babu considered it vital and essential that India and Pakistan raise their stature in the Asian context. India’s policy of appeasement had been a blow to its honour and interests. Any country with an iota of self-respect would not allow a portion of its territory to be occupied by a foreign country, as had happened in the case of J&K. 75 Crores of rupees had been transferred to help Pakistan in its inimical activities towards India. India was practically friendless in the international sphere. India’s countenance as a member of the British Commonwealth had given it no relief, rather it had acted as a drag and hindrance on vital occasions.

While analyzing India’s Foreign Policy, Syama Babu brought up the question of Tibet which was interlinked with China. Nehru had ‘naturally’ reminded the Parliament the part India played progressively in the matter of recognition of the legitimate rights of the Communist Chinese Government. Syama Babu wanted people to recount what Communist China’s response had been? How had they reciprocated? China may or may not have had to lose sovereignty over Tibet historically. But when India asked China not to proceed on a violent path vis-à-vis Tibet, China’s response to India was shocking and most disappointing.

India seemed unaware about China’s settled policy on Tibet and India’s suitable, structured response to Chinese actions and utterances on Tibet. To Syama Babu, it appeared that Nehru was just glossing over this issue. India had reiterated its request asking China to be peaceful with Tibet, but as yet, India did not know whether it had made any difference in Chinese policy. Syama Babu compared the case of Tibet with that of Korea, for he found the analogy suitable that for both the countries for which the ‘so-called liberation process’ was started by China, would become the worst sufferers. It was like the old story of a ‘surgical operation being fully successful and the patient succumbing’. A graphic account of the last British correspondent who had left the North Korean capital stated that ‘he found the whole place burning’. In regard to Tibet, India sent frantic appeals to China asking her not to be violent, but China had paid no heed to India’s appeal. Syama Babu appealed to Nehru not to gloss over this matter which affected not only the people of Tibet but also India’s security. Of course, the boundary between India and Tibet was not definitely defined yet. Nehru had stated that India stood by the McMahon Line, but the Chinese maps in circulation already included portions of Assam, Leh-Ladakh and other territories, vitally important to India. The Chinese reply to India clearly indicated that China will do everything necessary to keep intact what it considered to be China’s border. And when China referred to its borders, it included Tibet and the undefined boundary of Tibet, which touched Indian borders.

Nehru had raised the issue of Nepal. Syama Babu was clear that if by any chance, civil war continued in Nepal, it was not India, but China that would be benefitted. The Chinese would come through Tibet and play havoc in that part of Asia. He pleaded with Nehru that time had come when India had to take decisions on major questions confronting it and be prepared to act on it before it was too late.

No one in the Indian Parliament, so early in Nehru’s career as India’s Prime Minister, had questioned so seriously, the calamitous repercussions of India’s Foreign Policy.

(The paper is the author’s individual scholastic articulation. The author certifies that the article/paper is original in content, unpublished and it has not been submitted for publication/web upload elsewhere, and that the facts and figures quoted are duly referenced, as needed, and are believed to be correct). (The paper does not necessarily represent the organisational stance... More >>