‘Rising Lion’, the operation codenamed by Israel and launched recently to target critical assets of Iran, especial the latter’s nuclear facilities and its senior military leadership, has a biblical connect. It’s an expression taken from a verse of the Book of Numbers in the Bible. The verse says that people shall rise again like a great lion—and the lion shall not rest unless it has consumed its prey and satiated itself. The verse, verbatim, is more descriptive, and has been credited to a diviner who prophesied that Israel would emerge with enormous power and strength.

Interestingly, a similar sounding codename was given by the Egyptian armed forces to a less known and written about attack that they had planned weeks before the outbreak of the 1967 Six-Day war fought between Israel and a bunch of Arab nations—a war in which Israel emerged decisively victorious. The name that the Egyptians had given to their planned attack was Operation Lion (al Asad), and it was led by the First Vice President in charge of Egypt’s Armed Forces, Abdul al Hakim Amer.

This controversial military leader was the (then) Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s close friend, and later a member of his family. He would be invested with many important responsibilities, one of them being the military’s head—he would eventually promote himself to the rank of Field Marshal. Over time, however, Amer became increasingly ambitious and independent as more designations got added: he became the Minister for Science and Chairman of the Egyptian Atomic Energy Commission. His recklessly independent conduct raised concerns in Nasser’s mind, creating a chasm between the two. But the President was more or less helpless in containing his one-time friend as the latter had entrenched himself in the powerful Army, winning over the loyalty of key members by extending all sorts of patronages to them.

The pre-Six-Day-War conflict began with Israel marking its independence in May 1967. The Israeli government had decided on a low-key celebration, given the prevalent tensions in the Middle East (West Asia). Unknown to Israel’s leaders, including Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, Egypt had begun to amass a considerable number of its troops in the Sinai region. When its attention was drawn to the buildup, the Israeli leadership first did not take it too seriously, believing that it was yet another vain attempt by Nasser to sabre-rattle and burnish his status in the Arab world. The Israelis believed that the incident could at worst result in a short, localised conflict. Later, though, worry began to creep in; the number of troops being gathered there was too much for Israel’s comfort. It began to quietly respond by transferring its own military personnel to the southern border.

The counter-response led to reactions in the Arab world, with Syria and Egypt raising the prospect of war. However, a few sane voices cautioned them, pointing out that the concentration of Israeli forces per se in one region did not amount to an intention of war by the Jewish nation. Perhaps, had the Egyptian leadership understood the gravity of the situation and recalled its troops, things would have remained under control, at least at that point in time. But Nasser was in a bind; to recall the troops would result in a loss of face, and he would be derided in the Arab world. Then there were the bellicose elements within his establishment, not the least of them being his chief of the armed forces.

Amer contemptuously dismissed the cautious voices within the establishment, some of whom pointed out that Egypt, already struggling economically, could ill-afford an expensive military confrontation with Israel. His ‘Operation Lion’ campaign, as he planned it, would have Egypt’s combined infantry, commando and armoured units enter Israel and sweep across the Negev desert right up to the Jordanian border. At the same time, the Egyptian Navy would block the port from the south, thereby cutting off the route for reinforcements that Israel could receive from the sea. Amer had other concurrent plans in mind too, which were given the fanciful names of Operation Leopard (Fahd) and Operation Arrow (Sabm), and these included Egyptian military offensives along Israel’s coast and an intensive aerial bombing of Israeli settlements in Gaza.

Hectic diplomacy ensued. Israel’s Prime Minister Eshkol spoke with several Western leaders including the Presidents of France and the US, in the hope that they would be able to drill some sense into Cairo. But the Egyptian buildup continued, and Syria too joined in the rabble-rousing. This created a problem for other Arab nations such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan, who, left to the themselves, would have wished to defuse the deepening tensions. It must be kept in mind that in those days, there were serious differences among Arab countries themselves on a variety of issues. King Hussein of Jordan had once remarked that he was unsure as to whom he could trust less: his Arab allies or Israel! But the evolving situation compelled them all to speak in one voice.

Now, the Israelis had begun to take the Egyptian military deployment much more seriously and also take counter measures. The gravity of the situation became further obvious after Nasser asked the UN to remove its troops from his country, and the UN obliged. Reservists (of whom Israel had, and has, many) were called into action. Domestic politics also played a role in Eshkol taking a belligerent position: his rival and former Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, cooling his heels in the opposition, had begun to ridicule the government for its ‘failure’ to win international support for the country’s defence. Yitzhak Rabin, the Israel Defence Forces chief (and later to be the country’s Prime Minister) assured Eshkol that Israel would defeat the Egyptians, though the victory would come at a heavy price. Also, at hand to offer optimism was Moshe Dayan, the Defence Minister.

More diplomacy followed, with the United Nations stepping into the ring. Somehow the crisis triggered by ‘Operation Lion’ was averted, but it was a precursor to the Six-Day war that soon followed, and in which the incompetence of Amer was displayed. Israel faced the combined might of Syria, Egypt and Jordan (which had tried every trick to keep itself out of the conflict till the last hour), and ended up adding more territory (it became more than three times its previous size, with full control over Jerusalem) to its fold than it had before the war broke out.

Popular perception is that Israel managed the victory as a result of the military aid that it received from the US. The fact is that before and even during the 1967 war, the US had not directly supplied any defence equipment to Israel. The US became an important defence material exporter to Israel after the war, and until that happened, a considerable part of the foreign defence equipment that Israel possessed, had come from France.

There are many differences between Operation Lion and Operation Rising Lion, but the most important one is the replacement of Arab nations with Iran as Israel’s adversary. During Operation Lion, Israel and Iran (then under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi) actually shared cordial relations. After the Shah’s ouster and the arrival of theocracy in Iran led by the clerics, this relationship went south, and worsened to such an extent that Iran declared its intention to exterminate Israel.

While today, Arab countries issue regular statements criticising Israel for its offensive against Iran, they are far from engaging in a direct military conflict with Tel Aviv. Over the decades since Operation Lion, Israel and many leading Arab states have inked mutually beneficial agreements, and none of them is prepared to turn the clock back and re-start old military battles. It may be that Iran’s proxies such as the Hezbollah, the Houthis, and even the Hamas have patronage in some Arab countries, but the Arab world is not in a mood to go beyond that.

It remains a mystery as to why Iran, after turning theocratic in 1979, began to hate Israel so much. Unlike some Arab nations, it does not have border or territorial disputes with Israel. Nor has it shown the kind of emotional attachment to Jerusalem that the Palestinians or the Arab nations nurture for historical reasons. In fact, Iran had been the second Muslim nation after Turkey to extend recognition to Israel. While it is true that Iran had opposed the UN’s partition plan that created Israel as a Jewish nation, it had also taken a middle path, suggesting the formation of one Palestinian state with one parliament, but with the nation divided into clearly-defined and demarcated Jewish and Arab regions. (That the solution was unworkable, is another matter.) Where then was the logic for Tehran to later develop such deep hatred for the Jewish nation?

The first friction happened in 1951 when Iran’s Prime Minister, Mohammad Mosaddegh, nationalised the country’s oil industry and severed the British’s monopolistic control over his country’s valuable natural resource. Since Israel was seen as a close partner of the West, Mosaddegh broke off ties with Tel Aviv as well, in an attempt to win over Arab support for his nationalisation project. His decision had nothing to do with opposition to Zionism, though there were some anti-Zionistic feelings developing in Iran in those days, led by certain Shia religious leaders.

The broken relationship was dramatically mended after the Shah from the Pahlavi clan took charge; Iran became a major supplier of oil to Israel through a pipeline that went from Iran to Israel. Both Tehran and Tel Aviv developed extensive military and security cooperation, and all these developments also naturally led to improved ties between Iran and the West.

But after the Iranian Revolution—which was partly brought about by the public’s growing anger over the Shah’s poor governance and rampant corruption—that catapulted Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to the forefront, a new chapter in Iran-Israel ties was written. The Ayatollah turned his ire towards Western powers (the US particularly) and their supporters—and Israel was among the most prominent of them. With Islam and antisemitism added to the cauldron of hate, the US became the ‘Great Satan’ and Israel, the ‘Little Satan’. Tehran cut off all diplomatic ties with Israel, and since then the two have been sworn enemies. Iran launched a project of uranium enrichment to gain nuclear strength, and made it clear that Israel was its prime target. This led to Israel vowing to prevent Iran from developing the nuclear capability that threatened the Jewish nation’s very existence.

Given this background, it is difficult to imagine what it would take for the enmity between the two countries to end, or even taper down. Perhaps things will get worse before they (hopefully) start becoming better.

(The paper is the author’s individual scholastic articulation. The author certifies that the article/paper is original in content, unpublished and it has not been submitted for publication/web upload elsewhere, and that the facts and figures quoted are duly referenced, as needed, and are believed to be correct). (The paper does not necessarily represent the organisational stance... More >>