Operation Sindoor marks a pivotal shift in India’s national security doctrine, comprising a strong, carefully calibrated, and lawful response to Pakistan’s State sponsorship of terrorism. Pakistan’s cross-border terrorism not only impeded border regional security in South Asia but also undermined the global efforts on international peace and security. India’s security doctrine is measured and calculated, where every act of terrorism against India, its unity, and people will result in retaliation, be it on the military, diplomatic, legal, or financial front. Over the past decade, India’s national security doctrine reflects the emergence of a responsible Great Power’s unwavering commitment to fighting terrorism, acknowledging the adverse impact on international security and protection of human rights worldwide.
Pakistan’s State-sponsorship of terrorism against India is multi-layered and cross-dimensional, ranging from exploiting climate change-related vulnerabilities at home to engaging in asymmetrical warfare against India during peacetime. A diagnosis of the multifarious nature of global terrorism is required to measure the position of India’s stance, where every act of terrorism emanating or sponsored by Pakistan is an Act of War against India and its people. The Indian position reflects sovereign determination to interpret the far-reaching implications of such sponsorship and rightfully as a direct threat to its national security and territorial integrity.
Pakistan has tactfully evaded and breached various counterterrorism conventions and treaties, undermining the global efforts on international peace and security. The acknowledgement of unremedied breaches under the international rule of law is required to facilitate India’s robust national security paradigm. Since the year 1963, nineteen international conventions and protocols have been adopted to counter the multifarious manifestations of terrorism that include ship-hijackings, hostage takings, crimes against internationally protected persons, terrorist bombings and acts of nuclear terrorism. [1] Pakistan has wilfully violated the international norms on counterterrorism. The International Law Commission (ILC) Articles on State Responsibility strictly prohibit state terrorism, meet obligations to counterterrorism, and extradite or submit to prosecution, as argued by renowned international law and counterterrorism scholar, Kimberley N. Trapp, in State Responsibility for International Terrorism. [2]
Under the international rule of law, every member state is entrusted with the duty to prevent and repress terrorism on its soil stressed in a compelling legal authority of 15 subject-specific multilateral conventions, seven regional treaties, and a range of United Nations Security Council and United Nations General Assembly resolutions. [3] The UNSC Resolution 1373 remains an important pillar in the fight against terrorism. The rule includes criminalisation of terrorist offences, investigation of such acts, and prosecution or extradition of suspected offenders, and freezing their assets. A report on the codification of terrorism as an offence prepared by the United Nations Security Council Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate stresses that terrorist acts should be defined with clarity and precision. [4] Additionally, global scholarship in the field of counterterrorism re-emphasises the typologies developed according to actors, underlying methods, and intent to understand terrorism. The measure of outcome is essential to determine the terrorist offence attributable to an act of war. A global consensus on the categories of global terrorism is that they are criminal, mystical, revolutionary, military and state-sponsored, of which three qualify as an act of war, namely, revolutionary, military and state-sponsored. No universally accepted definition of terrorism under International Law presents a grey area exploited by state sponsors. In a scholarly book, titled, “Terrorism and the State: Rethinking the Rules of State Responsibility”, an Israeli scholar Tel Becker argues highlighting the gap often exploited by the perpetrators of terrorism --, “a change to the traditional international law on the responsibility of states for internationally unlawful acts to provide for state responsibility, where factual causation, legal causation, and policy reasons indicate that a state has encouraged or acquiesced in the development of terrorist groups. If an internationally accepted definition of terrorism is to be reached, it should require states to prevent and repress terrorist violence by state and non-state actors alike, and should include measures to prevent state terrorism and the state sponsorship of terrorism. [5]”
To under the architecture of sponsored terrorism, as a bedrock of Pakistan’s hybrid warfare architecture, it is imperative to diagnose the drivers and sources of terrorist finance and establish a link between financing terrorists and offences attributable to acts of war under international norms. Pakistan’s state-sponsored terrorist financing combines a thorough network of direct budgetary allocations, a diversion of funds received for humanitarian work, utilisation of informal value transfer systems such as hawala, and sustaining the unholy nexus of organised crime networks and terrorist organisations in Pakistan. Additionally, Pakistan’s black economy enables regulatory laxity, opaque banking practices and the compromise of non-profit organisations in the teeth of international obligations under the UNSC resolution 1373 (2001). [6]
The key international legal instruments on combating the financing of terrorism – 1) The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999) and 2) The International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997) pronounce that terrorist financing includes providing funds, directly or indirectly, with the knowledge or intention of it being used for terrorist purposes. In a UNSC Ministerial meeting, External Affairs Minister of India, H.E. Dr. Jaishankar, underscored in his statement at the 20th Anniversary of Security Council Resolution 1373 (2020) and the establishment of the Counter Terrorism Committee: Achievements in international cooperation, challenges, and opportunities that “Preventing terrorists from accessing financial resources is crucial to successfully countering the threat of terrorism. Over the years, terrorist groups have developed a diversified funding portfolio through a range of criminal activities, including extortion, kidnapping, money laundering, drug smuggling, and trafficking of natural resources, humans, and antiquities. Terrorist organisations have also begun to exploit the anonymity afforded by blockchain technology for fundraising and finances. [7]”
Additionally, the broad scope of the conventions includes acts intended to intimidate or compel governments or international organisations to do the same. While both the conventions offer a framework for criminalising and prosecuting terrorist finance, certain states, notably Pakistan, use proxies and complex financial networks to sponsor terrorism while evading direct accountability. The conventions focus on individual criminal liability, leaving a critical gap in state sponsorship. Terrorist finance in Pakistan has three component sources: globalisation, private sponsors, and state sponsors. According to comprehensive research carried out by IDSA[8], the external sources of terrorism finance (TF) include counterfeit currency, drug trafficking, charities, NGOs, and sponsorship by the Pakistan Government, with its coordination role in West Asia. The financial flow includes legal routes and trade. The former US Assistant Secretary of State for Terrorist Financing, U.S. Department for the Treasury, indicated the use of charities, which are advertised openly in Pakistan and facilitate terrorist finance for movement and fund mobility. [9] Other sources of Terrorist finance include real estate laundering, and gemstone trade via the Surat-Dubai-Karachi corridor.
Pakistan-sponsored threat of terrorism is continually evolving, with the acquisition of weapons by terrorists exacerbating the gravity of the situation. An unambiguous verdict suggests a symbiotic relationship between Pakistan’s military and terrorist organisations, often making it difficult to separate one from the other. Yet, the biggest challenge that this synergy brings is the increasing turnover and diversion of small arms and light weapons (SALW), unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs)/ Chemical Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) materials to the terrorist groups leading to an international security threat of huge magnitude. [10] Pakistan-backed terrorist groups increasingly rely on the use of improvised explosive devices that merit greater collective action against terrorism by the international community.
According to a UN CTED brief, the guidelines to facilitate the implementation of the UNSC resolution 2370(2017) and related international standards and good practices on preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons, the terrorist offences comprise serious violence, such as hijackings, bombings, and heinous attacks with the use of weapons and explosives. Under the International Rule of Law, the procurement and deployment of SALWs, UASs, and UAVs are central to the commission of state-sponsored terrorist acts. Pakistan’s military-state sponsorship fusion constitutes a grave breach of its obligations under the various UNSC resolutions on counter-terrorism, warranting legal accountability and international sanctions.
Pakistan’s untrammelled proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) and the nuclear stockpiles, in conjunction with documented evidence of funding terrorism, politicising of international organisations, and misuse of International Law, render its posture glaringly disconcerting. [11] With a declared non-adherence to ‘no-first-use’ (NFU) nuclear doctrine, as co-sponsor of the UNGA and UNSC resolutions, Pakistan’s diplomatic overtures are at most understood as disingenuous and lacking any legitimacy. A concerning interpretation of the contradiction in its regional posture and rhetoric suggests that Pakistan aims to undermine the credibility of international proliferation norms while utilising terrorism as the means and end to singularly orient coercive nuclear posture against India.
Pakistan’s fiscal mismanagement at home is strategically aimed at facilitating aid laundering diplomacy to secure assistance from international organisations, including the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. Pakistan’s population continues to face environmental vulnerability and climate change-induced crises, leading to a depreciation in human rights and standards of living. However, despite the ostensible rationale of climate resilience, the lack of good governance and capture by military and political elites, Pakistan’s defence expenditure has exceeded the total value of IMF assistance. The repeated appeals to the IMF masked in the language of climate change-related risks reveal a chronic pattern of fiscal mismanagement and geopolitical choice. Pakistan diverts funds and facilitates aid laundering to terrorist organisations over climate-resilient infrastructural investment. In an analysis by Bhowmik and Shekhar, it is argued, “In 2024, Pakistan received US$ 1 billion as part of a US$ 7 billion EFF from the IMF, spread over 37 months. Yet, in the same year, it spent a staggering US$ 10.2 billion on defence—more than ten times the bailout tranche, raising serious questions about whether international financial support inadvertently sustains militarised priorities rather than economic reform. [12]” Pakistan’s conduct severely undermines global efforts to respond to climate-focussed challenges with direct implications for regional peace and security.
India must offer global leadership in reforming the international legal frameworks on state-sponsored terrorism. Pakistan has assailed the international norms underpinning international security with misleading narratives and diplomatic feints. In a conscious choice between state responsibility and terrorism, Pakistan has persistently downplayed the credibility of international organisations, including the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, to serve the ends of terrorism and organised crime. India is the frontline nation affected by cross-border terrorism. India, as a responsible major power, can bridge the normative vacuum to prevent state-sponsored terrorism. Pakistan’s hybrid warfare has exposed critical challenges in the implementation of the international rule of Law. India must utilise multilateral forums to draw awareness about State Responsibility and Pakistan’s tactful evasion of established norms. State-sponsored terrorism is an international crime, and it remains pertinent to remove the sovereign immunity veil on Pakistan’s cowardly acts.
[1] International Legal Instruments | Office of Counter-Terrorism. (n.d.). https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/international-legal-instruments
[2] Kimberley N Trapp, K. (2020). Research Handbook on International law and Terrorism. Edward Elgar Publishing. Retrieved June 10, 2025, from https://www.e-elgar.com/shop/gbp/research-handbook-on-international-law-and-terrorism-9781788972215.html?srsltid=AfmBOooCMhrA_t3u2jZn3Z_pQF2_CNRjihxSTF7hO5HX7CVTZTrmhpas
[3] Trapp, Kimberley N., 'Introduction', State Responsibility for International Terrorism, Oxford Monographs in International Law (Oxford, 2011; online edn, Oxford Academic, 22 Sept. 2011), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199592999.003.0001, accessed 10 June 2025.
[4] United Nations Security Council & Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate. (2024). A COMMENTARY ON THE CODIFICATION OF THE TERRORISM OFFENCE. https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ctc/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil.ctc/files/un_cted_-_analytical_brief_-_criminalization_of_terrorist_offences_1.pdf
[5] Becker, T. (2006). Terrorism and the State : Rethinking the rules of state responsibility. https://doi.org/10.5040/9781472563606
[6] United Nations. (2001). Resolution 1373 (2001). In Security Council.https://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/terrorism/res_1373_english.pdf
[7] UNSC Ministerial Meeting 20th Anniversary of Security Council Resolution 1373 (2020) and the establishment of the Counter Terrorism Committee : Achievements in international cooperation, challenges and opportunities Statement by External Affairs Minister of India H.E. Dr. S. Jaishankar. (n.d.). PMI New York. https://pminewyork.gov.in/IndiaatUNSC?id=NDEzNw,,#:~:text=There%20must%20be%20no%20ifs,double%20standards%20in%20this%20battle.
[8] Vivek Chadha (2014): Terrorism Finance: Sources and Trends in India, Journal of Defence Studies, Vol. 8, No. 3, July–September 2014, pp. 57–100 URL http://idsa.in/jds/8_3_2014_TerrorismFinance.html
[9] Combating Terrorism: Evolving an Asian response. (2017). In the 19th Asian Security Conference 2017, 19th Asian Security Conference 2017. https://idsa.in/system/files/events/asc2017-booklet.pdf
[10] United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact Working Group on Border Management and Law Enforcement. (n.d.). Preventing Terrorists from Acquiring Weapons. In Technical Guidelines to Facilitate the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2370 (2017) and Related International Standards and Good Practices on Preventing Terrorists From Acquiring Weapons.https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ctc/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil.ctc/files/files/documents/2022/Mar/technical_guidelines_to_facilitate_the_implementation_of_security_council_resolution_2370_2017_and_related_international_standards_and_good_practices_on_preventing_terrorists_from_acquiring_weapons.pdf
[11] SIPRI Yearbook 2024. (n.d.). SIPRI. https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2024
[12] Bhowmick, S. (2025, May 30). Crisis on repeat: the IMF, Pakistan, and failed reform. orfonline.org. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/crisis-on-repeat-the-imf-pakistan-and-failed-reform
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