The latest India-Pakistan military conflict has given a reality check to the religiously inclined ideologue Army Chief/Field Marshal of Pakistan, General Syed Asim Munir, that his “hardline” approach and continued use of ‘non-state actors’ to foment terrorism in India will have serious military, diplomatic, and economic consequences for Islamabad. India’s retaliation through ‘Operation Sindoor’ accomplished the intended strategic military and counter-terrorism objectives by destroying key terror infrastructure linked to the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), and Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) not only in Pakistan Occupied Jammu & Kashmir (PoJK) but also in Pakistani hinterland; targeting at least 11 key Pakistani airbases in retaliatory “precision” strikes with clarity and purpose. This challenged Pakistan’s so-called ‘Quid Pro Quo Plus’ military strategy and exposed significant gaps in its air defence system, which the Indian military exploited.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi outlined the new Pakistan policy of his government, underlining that there will be a dialogue only on cross-border terrorism and PoJK, with no tolerance of any Pakistani “nuclear blackmail”. New Delhi will also continue to hold in “abeyance” the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) until Islamabad puts an end to cross-border terrorism against India. The ‘new normal’ is significant considering that New Delhi has lowered its conventional threshold by declaring that any Pakistan-sponsored act of terrorism against India will be seen as an ‘act of war’. In other words, in any future act of cross-border terror on Indian soil, New Delhi will not hesitate to expand its conventional response to terrorist hideouts alone, but to key Pakistani military installations deeper in Pakistani territory.

By targeting strategic airbases in Pakistan, including Nur Khan (Chaklala, Rawalpindi), Murid (Chakwal), Sargodha, and Rafiqui (Shorkot, Jhang district), Jacobabad, etc., India demonstrated its military superiority in the conventional domain. These strikes confirmed that all crucial Pakistani military installations, including those in Tier One cities like Rawalpindi, Lahore, Karachi, among others, are within India’s reach and can be targeted in the next conflict. Since Pakistan cannot afford an extended conflict with India, given its precarious economic situation, military capabilities and strategic reserves of POL and ammunition, it resorts to short-term conflicts to achieve tactical “victories”. Even in the recent conflict, Pakistan has claimed victory by allegedly hitting “more than” 26 targets in India, including air force and aviation bases from Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) to Gujarat, through a barrage of drones and missiles during the so-called ‘Marka-e-Haq’ (Battle for Truth) and ‘Operation Bunyan ul Marsoos’ (Impregnable Wall). However, the Pakistani retaliatory airstrikes were largely ineffective and were mostly intercepted by Indian air defence systems. Furthermore, unlike India, Pakistan has not yet provided any credible evidence of the alleged “major damage” inflicted on the Indian military installations.

Moreover, in the prevailing circumstances with the hybrid government facing issues of political legitimacy, sharp attacks by the PTI against the Establishment, deep economic crisis, spiralling terrorist violence across the country, and growing internal instability, the Pakistani Army is confronted with a homegrown imbroglio affecting its credibility and standing. The anti-India narrative keeps the Pakistani nation united, and the Pakistani deep state has never shied away from exploiting it to its advantage and to maintaining its position as first among equals in the country’s political firmament, too, the weaknesses of political leaders and parties notwithstanding. In fact, Field Marshal Munir has not hesitated to use religious symbolism to highlight differences between Hindus and Muslims and reassert the two-nation theory, averring that they were two separate peoples and can be seen as a precursor to the April 22 Pahalgam incident, where Hindu men were picked out and killed in cold blood. The above bears testimony to the fact that Pakistan pays lip service to ending terror groups active on its territory, and contrary to its commitments to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to proscribe all such groups and stem all support to financing of terror. In this context, the Pakistani military command announced its operation against India as a big success in terms of targeting.

Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, too, declared “victory” against India in his address to the nation. In an unprecedented and rare move, the Shahbaz Sharif cabinet promoted General Munir to the rank of Field Marshal. The Pahalgam attack, the declaring of victory and the promotion of the Army Chief to the rank of a five-star General must be seen as links in the effort to rally the people in support of the nation and the army and provide additional support given its eroding legitimacy and dent in its credibility as the protector of the nation. The Shehbaz Sharif-led coalition government has been rendered even more powerless in the current scenario. Within two and a half years of his tenure as the Army Chief, Munir has succeeded in asserting significant control over the country’s executive, legislature, judiciary, media, and civil society. Thus, his unprecedented powers domestically and religiously motivated approach, especially against India, are likely to weaken Pakistan’s dwindling democratic institutions further and possibly radicalize an entire generation along the lines of General Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamization policy in the 1980s.

Following Pakistan’s declaration of the so-called victory against India in the recent conflict, multiple rallies and parades have been held in support of the military establishment. Pakistan military’s existence depends on confronting India covertly and overtly. To prove India’s point of Pakistani state’s undeniable support to terrorism, it must be highlighted that senior officers of the Pakistan Army, local political representatives, and government officials attended the funerals of terrorists killed in the Indian strikes on the intervening night of May 6-7, along with other evidence. Such clear evidence of close cohesion between terrorist organizations and the security establishment notwithstanding, Pakistan opted to go up the escalation ladder vis-à-vis India, only to use the nuclear threat and solicit immediate US intervention for a “ceasefire” to hide its military losses.

On the other hand, New Delhi has denied any US involvement behind the ceasefire understanding, claiming that the Director General of Military Operations of Pakistan called his Indian counterpart seeking the cessation of all “firing and military action.” As it is still early days of the ceasefire, India has already warned of military actions if Pakistan engages in any cross-border misadventure. Therefore, the risk of another military conflagration remains high, given the current state of military tensions, limited bilateral engagement, threats of cross-border terror attacks, and India’s new red lines for Pakistan, including holding in “abeyance” the suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT).

Way Forward

In the wake of the Pahalgam attack and Operation Sindoor, India will have to revisit its Pakistan and neighbourhood policies to sustain pressure on Islamabad and curb the cyclical cross-border terror attacks and ensure it is not deflected from its goals of ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’ by 2047. New Delhi does have several strategic options, i.e., in the diplomatic, military, economic, and covert spheres, to maintain sustained pressure on Pakistan. Each option has pros and cons, and New Delhi will have to jettison the cautious, risk-averse approach. Prime Minister Modi, in his speech on May 13, clarified that India would not only target the perpetrators but also the sponsors of terror outfits in Pakistan; in other words, there is no political tolerance of terrorism. Additionally, he warned that India would not tolerate Pakistan’s “nuclear blackmail” and any future act of terror would be seen as an act of war. These are major policy statements to consider when predicting India’s future military response against Pakistan in the event of a Pahalgam-like terror incident in J&K or elsewhere in the hinterland. India targeted nine terror hideouts in Pakistan on the night of May 6-7 in response to the Pahalgam attack, ensuring a certain restraint by avoiding military infrastructure to avoid prevent further escalation. It was only after Islamabad retaliated that India hit Pakistani military installations and air bases.

However, this restraint may not be feasible in a future response. India’s military successes during Operation Sindoor is likely to have emboldened New Delhi’s risk-taking appetite in the conventional domain against Pakistan. Precision airstrikes on critical Pakistani airbases and air defence systems demonstrated India’s military reach and have laid the framework for future precision operations. Yet, India would have to factor in that Pakistan is no pushover and China, as its chief weapons purveyor, is key to its ability to defend itself. The PAF’s Chinese hardware along with training and exercises with the Chinese Air Force have led to assimilation and adaption of military strategies and doctrine, something Indian policy makers need to monitor and study. Islamabad would now be privy to top end technology from China adding an edge to its arsenal.

In addition to the kinetic options, on the diplomatic front, India has shown its unwillingness to continue normal relations with Pakistan by completely downgrading ties, leaving little scope for any conversation, underpinning the fact that terror and talks cannot go hand in hand. The ‘hotline’ between the two DGMOs is currently the only limited connecting channel between the two nuclear-powered neighbours. Here, it is crucial to recognize the dominance of the Army in Pakistani internal and foreign affairs and its utility for foreign powers in realpolitik. Islamabad has built a nexus with China, Turkey, and Azerbaijan to avoid international isolation and to secure supplies of weapons and technology.

In a significant move, New Delhi has placed the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) in abeyance, which India has been unsuccessful in seeking to renegotiate bilaterally with Pakistan. Consequently, the Modi government has decided that water and terrorism cannot go together. Unless Pakistan acts against anti-India terrorist outfits operating on its soil, the treaty will remain in abeyance. With this decision, India will have to expand its diplomatic outreach to persuade the international community of the reasons behind the IWT being held in abeyance and isolate Pakistan on account of its steadfast support for non-state actors to foment cross-border terror in India with plausible deniability. It should also push to renegotiate the treaty on more equal terms and in keeping with the changed demographic, agricultural patterns, climate change, and other parameters to meet the requirements of the times.

To further raise the costs of such acts of terror, India needs to build a coalition of the willing against terrorism and sponsors of terrorism, including state sponsors, to sanction them and pay a heavy economic price for acts of omission and commission through sanctions on trade and access to global financial institutions. Pakistan’s economy is facing a growth crisis and needs financial infusions to meet the needs of its people. It has sought international loans from friendly Arab countries and China, apart from the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Asian Development Bank, etc, including rollover of its earlier loans. Presently, it is being supported by the IMF through a USD 7 billion Extended Fund Facility (EFF) agreement. India could take the diplomatic lead to expose the complicity of Pakistan in state-sponsored terrorism through such a coalition and force a change of track in Pakistani policy, or be estranged from the global financial system and the concomitant costs. This approach would require India not to ignore but closely monitor political, social, economic, and security developments in Pakistan and build a body of evidence of Pakistani perfidy.

A similar approach should be taken to expose Pakistan’s state support to terrorism at the FATF Plenary with the help of like-minded countries, especially its support to terrorist outfits like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). Representatives of political parties and the Army, in uniform, have attended funerals of militants killed in Operation Sindoor. Moreover, Pakistan Markazi Muslim League, a political front of the LeT, organized (May 28) rallies across the country to mark the Yaum-e-Takbeer on the anniversary of the 1998 nuclear tests by Pakistan in contravention of FATF commitments. These actions clearly violate Islamabad’s obligations to the FATF for being taken off the ‘Grey List’. A re-listing of Pakistan on the ‘Grey List’ would inflict serious damage upon the country’s economy and convince like-minded nations to avoid investments in Pakistan because it sponsors terrorism in the neighbouring countries and beyond. This would no doubt be a complicated and challenging task.

In its diplomatic offensive, New Delhi should emphasize the futility of investing in Pakistan given its persistent political instability, economic crisis, and inability to ensure internal security due to the Baloch and Pashtuns fighting for their rights, along with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) on the rampage with daily attacks targeting law enforcement personnel and the army, which causes significant disruptions. Secondly, the persistent internal instability in the country creates impediments to the completion of big investment projects such as the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), making it an unreliable business destination. India could use multilateral forums like the United Nations, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), G-20, BRICS, the Global South, among others, to lay bare Pakistan’s role in aiding and abetting terrorism. This could also be a signal to Beijing, which faces a threat from Islamic radicalism in Xinjiang, that supporting Islamabad on this matter makes it complicit in backing terrorism, which would have reputational consequences. Therefore, any country doing business with Pakistan inadvertently helps their ability to foment terrorism.

As India looks for new and bold measures to punish Pakistan in the aftermath of the Pahalgam attack, it could explore ways to have sanctions imposed on selected Pakistani government and military representatives directly involved in helping terror outfits like LeT, JeM, HM, etc. While it is a tricky proposition, New Delhi could discern responses from the US, EU, and other Western nations. It may be recalled that overseas supporters of Imran Khan in the West, mainly in the US, have been trying to sanction Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir and other army officials in Pakistan under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act of 2017, which Washington has used to sanction foreign officials. New Delhi could explore ways to create a case against Munir and other military officials for fomenting religion-based terrorism in India based on his controversial statements and Techint inputs. If no sanctions emerge, at least the very act would put pressure on the Pakistan military establishment and discredit their image globally.

A new and crucial development that requires immediate incorporation in Indian military strategy is information warfare. It needs to be institutionalized to counter aggressive misinformation campaigns by the adversary, especially during a military crisis. In the recent confrontation, Pakistan disseminated unrestrained false information through both official and unofficial channels, with the use of social media tools, deep fake, and AI-generated videos, to divert the international media’s attention and create confusion and incite communal tensions in India and pressure policymakers to take escalatory military action. For example, during the crisis, Director-General ISPR, Lieutenant General Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry made highly provocative claims that India had lost several fighter jets, pilots, air defence systems, and had targeted dams in Pakistan and used drones and missiles in Afghanistan with a dangerous intent to spread the conflict to other parts of the region. While India responded professionally to Pakistan’s fierce misinformation campaign with facts and transparency, it could have been more proactive in countering the barrage of fake narratives regarding Operation Sindoor from day one of the conflict. The rather slow response provided Pakistan with the opportunity to disseminate false information and, oddly, persuaded some international media organizations to accept its narrative until India substantiated its claims with credible evidence.

Therefore, despite military successes during Operation Sindoor, the narrative-building faced initial setbacks, and the global attention was diverted from the issue of cross-border terrorism in India. India needs to take a whole-of-government approach to hold dominance in the information warfare space against its adversaries. It should establish an institutionalized framework, including responsible government ministries and agencies, to counter fake online propaganda, particularly on X/Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube, and proactive engagement with mainstream local and international media channels, think tanks, and diplomatic representatives to timely share facts-based data and information, especially during critical times in an agile manner and ensure dominance in the sphere. Secondly, India needs to further enhance its cyber warfare strategy to pre-empt cyber-attacks on sensitive infrastructure, such as power grids, nuclear power plants, key government and defence force websites, and private sector companies. An aggressive and lethal cyber response that deflects the adversary from any misadventure and inflicting economic damage, needs to be embedded in Indian defence strategy.

On the counter-terrorism front, the Modi government’s ‘zero tolerance against terrorism’ policy has played a pivotal role in stemming and destroying local terror links. It should be further intensified in impacted areas, such as J&K, with the continued focus on targeting financial networks of terror outfits and Over Ground Workers (OGWs).

More importantly, Indian security agencies need to expose the links between foreign-based Khalistani groups and Pakistan-sponsored terror outfits in J&K through the “K-2 terror nexus”. During the recent Indo-Pak military conflict, the Pakistan army attempted to stir communal tensions in Punjab by spreading well-planned and coordinated fake news and sharing AI-generated images and videos on social media handles. Some known Khalistani “activists,” based in Western countries, shared Pakistani propaganda and ran fake stories that India had targeted the local population and holy sites for Sikhs in Punjab with missiles. While Pakistan’s attempt failed miserably, Indian security agencies must investigate the matter thoroughly to prevent future efforts to disrupt communal peace in Punjab.

The national Counter Terrorism Grid should be further strengthened not only in J&K but also in the hinterland to foil Pakistani efforts to exploit any communal faultline, set up sleeper cells, recruit assets, and radicalize youth. Furthermore, New Delhi needs to closely follow the activities of LeT, JeM, Hijbul Mujahideen, Al Qaeda in Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), as the Pakistan Establishment will incite them to conduct cross-border terror attacks to retaliate for the targeting of Bahawalpur and Muridke not only in border states but beyond, possibly targeting key military installations, Hindu religious sites, tourist spots, or critical economic infrastructure. A new phase of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism in the aftermath of Operation Sindoor cannot be ruled out. It must be remembered that while we may have hit Muridke and Bahawalpur, the terror apparatus may not have been majorly damaged.

Above all, New Delhi must build on the response of the people of Kashmir, openly rejecting terrorism and any efforts to create a communal divide, as well as Pakistani statements that it will never compromise on the Kashmiri issue, notwithstanding. The Kashmiris stood firmly with the nation after the Pahalgam terror attack. This should be fostered and reinforced in all respects and given wide publicity at every forum and opportunity, and must not slip through the cracks. The Indian parliamentary delegations sent abroad to explain India’s military response following the Pahalgam attack should have included some representatives from Kashmir. This would have provided them with a deeper sense of participation on issues of national importance.

Another option is the backchannel dialogue approach to send a stern and direct message to Pakistan. A few days after the Pahalgam terror attack, Pakistan appointed Lieutenant General Asim Malik, the Director General ISI, as the new National Security Advisor (NSA), hinting that Islamabad could foresee interaction between the two NSAs in the aftermath of the recent military conflict. The same backchannel was used in the past to maintain the status quo on the borders, along with the DGMO’s hotline. With India’s decision to put IWT in abeyance, the resounding success of Operation Sindoor, multiple fault lines within Pakistan, and India’s new aggressive Counter Terrorism policy may force Islamabad to approach New Delhi with an olive branch. India could, from a position of strength, set the tone and tenor and the terms of future bilateral negotiations with Pakistan, as Prime Minister Narendra Modi has articulated in his recent speeches.

(The paper is the author’s individual scholastic articulation. The author certifies that the article/paper is original in content, unpublished and it has not been submitted for publication/web upload elsewhere, and that the facts and figures quoted are duly referenced, as needed, and are believed to be correct). (The paper does not necessarily represent the organisational stance... More >>