On March 15, the Trump administration launched preemptive airstrikes against Houthi rebels in Yemen, whose escalating attacks on shipping, including piracy, violence, and terrorism, have been disrupting the Red Sea. This region is crucial, as it handles nearly 15% of global seaborne trade. The Suez Canal, a vital maritime route linking Asia and Europe, plays a particularly significant role in the transportation of oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG).^[1] Shortly after, Israel resumed its bombing campaign in Gaza, effectively ending the ceasefire that had been in effect since January 19. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu cited the hostage situation and emphasized the need for continued military pressure, stating, "This is only the beginning." ^[2] On March 22, Israel also carried out airstrikes in Lebanon, targeting Hezbollah. ^[3] Both the U.S. and Israel appear to be focussed on weakening Iran's axis of resistance. Meanwhile, Donald Trump has been urging Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei to reach an agreement on Tehran's nuclear programme.

The election of Donald Trump and the potential collapse of the Assad government have made the Islamic Republic of Iran more vulnerable than at any point since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, both of which have worked in favour of Israel.^[4] With Trump's support, Netanyahu faces no concern about international pressure. While European nations condemn the attacks and Arab countries accuse Israel of violating the ceasefire, a U.S. diplomat at the United Nations Security Council holds Hamas responsible for failing to adhere to previous agreements between the two nations. ^[5] The question now is whether Trump will target Iran’s nuclear facilities, but bombing them would not resolve the issue, as Iran would still retain the technical knowledge to rebuild the facility. Moreover, a full-scale regime change, similar to what occurred in Iraq, appears highly improbable—particularly since Trump stated during the final phase of his election campaign in September that it wasn't part of his agenda, a position he has consistently maintained.

Iran's influence in the region is waning. With the potential collapse of the Assad government, Iran is losing its primary ally in the West Asian region, which also served as a land corridor to Hezbollah in Lebanon via Iraq. This connection has been crucial as Iran has supported and helped rebuild Hezbollah through it. ^[6] Weakening Hezbollah would reduce Iran's influence in Lebanon, cutting off its access to the Mediterranean Sea. Additionally, Iran had access to the Red Sea through its support of the Yemeni Houthi movement. The Red Sea holds significant geopolitical importance due to its vital role in global trade, energy transportation, military strategy, and proximity to regional conflicts. Control over key shipping routes, like the Suez Canal and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, grants significant geopolitical leverage to the nations that dominate or influence the area.^[7]

Turkey Ascends While Iran Recedes

It’s worth noting that while Iran is increasingly being cornered, Turkey is gradually expanding its influence in the region. Turkey had supported the rebel factions against the Assad government in an effort to establish influence and ensure a Sunni-led nation remained in power. The historical rivalry between Turkey and Iran dates back to their roles as the Ottoman Empire and the Safavid Empire, respectively. The Persian Empire, led by the Safavids, was one of the few powers that posed a significant challenge to the once-dominant Ottoman Empire. The conflict between the Sunni Ottoman Empire and the Shia Safavid Empire was a longstanding struggle for dominance and influence over the region—a rivalry that continues to shape relations today.

To understand the U.S. preference for Turkey over Iran, we need to go back to the post-Second World War period. Iran's democratically elected government under Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh was overthrown by the U.S., citing concerns over its potential shift towards communist influence. The U.S. then supported the installation of a monarch, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, whose influence domestically was seen as waning. His reign, which was largely seen as doing the U.S.'s bidding, eventually led to the 1979 Iranian Revolution, which didn’t align with U.S. expectations. In contrast, Turkey had already undergone a significant transformation following the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk after the First World War hence, making Turkey a republic. By the time of the Second World War, Turkey had aligned with the West and became a member of NATO, solidifying its position in the U.S. sphere of influence.

While the U.S. may favour Turkey over Iran and remains determined to diminish Iran’s strategic influence in the region, India certainly has more at stake in this situation. In his Arthashastra, Chanakya suggests that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend," a strategy that can be applied for survival and gaining an advantage in political and military contexts. In this case, Iran serves as that friend when it comes to Pakistan. As Pakistan deepens its ties with China and Turkey, there is a need for a counterbalance on India’s side. India’s ambitious project to develop and operate the Chabahar Port, a civilian facility in Iran to sustain an influence in the region, has encountered significant setbacks and may never be completed. Chabahar Port is crucial for India as it provides access to Afghanistan and Central Asia, bypassing Pakistan. A 10-year MOU was signed between India and Iran in 2015 by Minister for Road Transport and Shipping Shri Gadkari Ji for Indian participation in the development of Chabahar port. This was followed next year by the signing of a 10-year contract between the two countries during the visit of Hon’ble PM Shri Modi Ji in 2016. A modified contract was signed last year. The US, however, has withdrawn the earlier exemption and threatened sanctions. ^[8]

Given the shift in the balance of power, we can anticipate that other issues in the region will escalate. Nagorno-Karabakh may be the next flashpoint, as Turkey has consistently sought to limit Iran’s influence in the South Caucasus and surrounding areas. By backing Azerbaijan, Turkey bolsters its own position in the region, counteracting Iran’s influence, especially considering Azerbaijan shares a border with Iran. Despite Armenia being a Christian-majority country and Iran being predominantly Muslim, Armenia plays an important role for Iran as a counterbalance to Azerbaijan and Turkey’s sway in the region. The two countries also engage in trade, with Armenia serving as a gateway for Iran to access European markets despite international sanctions.

Azerbaijan, a key energy player in the Caspian Sea, provides valuable oil and natural gas resources that benefit Turkey. The Southern Gas Corridor, which transports Azerbaijani gas to Europe via Turkey, is a pivotal energy project for Turkey, helping to reduce Europe's reliance on Russian energy. Turkey and Azerbaijan maintain close military ties, engaging in joint exercises, arms deals, and coordinated defense strategies. Turkey’s military support was crucial to Azerbaijan's success in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, enabling Azerbaijan to reclaim territories previously controlled by Armenia. Turkey’s support for Azerbaijan is also part of its broader goal to assert itself as the dominant military power in the region and to further its strategic interests as it seeks to cement its role as a regional leader and advocate for the Turkic-speaking world through the proposed Zangezur corridor. This move would enhance its influence in Central Asia, even though Armenia will need to relinquish part of its territory to make way for the corridor. ^[9]

Recent Nuclear Discussions

The second round of nuclear negotiations between the United States and Iran regarding Iran's nuclear programme has wrapped up in Rome, marked by a tone of cautious optimism as they are expected to reunite again for the third session of talks. However, despite describing the initial round as constructive too, both sides had since adopted more rigid negotiating stances. It's important to highlight that these talks represent the most substantial engagement between the two nations since former President Trump withdrew the U.S. from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal during his first term.

Netanyahu has advocated for a 'Libya-style agreement,' referencing the 2003 deal in which Libya fully dismantled its weapons program in coordination with Western powers—an approach Iran finds entirely unacceptable. ^[10] Meanwhile, Trump has threatened the use of military force if no agreement is reached, while Iran has consistently maintained that it will not engage in negotiations under pressure. A high-ranking Iranian official cautioned that Iran might expel International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors and halt its cooperation with the agency if “external threats” continue. ^[11]

If the discussions were to fail, the oil market would be severely impacted, with prices likely to surge—hitting China the hardest, as it is the largest importer of Iranian oil, which it obtains at discounted rates. Despite sanctions imposed during Trump’s first term, Iran continued exporting oil to China during the Biden administration through Chinese “shadow fleets”. Therefore, China may be inclined to support Iran if things go down south, as it has also borne the brunt of Trump’s tariffs more than any other country. ^[12]

Since the United States withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018, Iran has responded by violating several of the agreement’s key terms, primarily in retaliation for the re-imposition of sanctions. While both the U.S. and Israel have the military capability to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities, such an operation would be highly complex, risky, and its success uncertain. Many of Iran’s critical nuclear sites are located deep underground, requiring advanced bunker-busting munitions—arms that the U.S. possesses, but Israel is not believed to have. ^[13]

A shift in the regional balance of power appears likely, as any military strike could trigger a significant Iranian retaliation, possibly involving missile attacks on Israel and assaults on U.S. assets in the region. Iran’s current military strength cannot be underestimated. While U.S. efforts have long focused on curbing Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the country has steadily built up its conventional capabilities—enabling it to influence regional dynamics through proxy conflicts. A large-scale operation against Iran would almost certainly require U.S. reliance on Gulf-based military installations and naval assets, including aircraft carriers. However, regional allies such as Qatar—home to the largest U.S. airbase—may hesitate to participate, wary of Iranian reprisals. In light of these risks, Gulf Arab states have attempted to assure Tehran of their neutrality in its standoff with Israel, concerned that any escalation could threaten their critical oil infrastructure. Though Iran has not explicitly targeted Gulf oil facilities, it has cautioned that any direct involvement by "supporters of Israel" could make their interests vulnerable. ^[14]

In summary, normalisation of U.S.-Iran relations would contribute significantly to maintaining stability across the Gulf region. It remains to be seen how much their relationship can normalize, especially given the strong influence of the Jewish lobby in the United States. However, for India, this shift would not only bolster its geopolitical standing but also strengthen ties with a key regional player, offering added security for the small Indian diaspora living near Iran’s border with Pakistan. On the other hand, rising tensions could compel India to initiate evacuation efforts to protect its citizens in the area.

References

^[1] Cursino, M. (2025, March 16). US launches wave of air strikes on Yemen’s Houthis. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c05mvr3j3yro
^[2] Humayun, H. (2025, March 18). Gaza Israel Hamas strikes live updates. CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/world/live-news/gaza-israel-hamas-strikes-03-18-25/index.html
^[3] Yosef,E. (2025, March 23). Israel strikes Hezbollah in Lebanon, ending ceasefire. CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2025/03/22/middleeast/israel-hezbollah-lebanon-attacks-ceasefire-intl/index.html
^[4] Sharifi, K. (2025, January 10). Iran vulnerable to Trump’s return, analysts say. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-vulnerable-trump-return/33268767.html
^[5] Humayun, H. (2025, March 18). Gaza Israel Hamas strikes live updates. CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/world/live-news/gaza-israel-hamas-strikes-03-18-25/index.html
^[6] Grajewski, N. (2024, December 9). Why did Iran allow Assad’s downfall? Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/diwan/2024/12/why-did-iran-allow-assads-downfall?lang=en
^[7] Qiao, J., Li, Y., & Huang, M. The geopolitical importance of Bab el-Mandeb Strait: A strategic gateway to global trade. Middle East Political and Economic Institute. https://mepei.com/the-geopolitical-importance-of-bab-el-mandeb-strait-a-strategic-gateway-to-global-trade/
^[8] BBC News. (2016, May 23). India and Iran sign ‘historic’ Chabahar port deal. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-36356163
^[9] Spancerska, A.M. (2023, October 23). Türkiye strengthens influence in South Caucasus after fall of Nagorno-Karabakh. Polish Institute of International Affairs. https://www.pism.pl/publications/t%C3%BCrkiye-strengthens-influence-in-south-caucasus-after-fall-of-nagorno-karabakh
^[10] Doucet, L., & Tasch, B. (2025, April 14). US and Iran hold 'constructive' first round of nuclear talks. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4g2eggzvjgo
^[11] Mehdi, S. Z. (2025, April 10). Iran says IAEA inspectors could be expelled if threats continue. Anadolu Agency. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/iran-says-iaea-inspectors-could-be-expelled-if-threats-continue/3534050
^[12] Reuters. (2025, April 16). US issues new sanctions targeting Chinese importers of Iranian oil. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/us-issues-new-sanctions-targeting-chinese-importers-iranian-oil-2025-04-16/
^[13] Berg, R. (2025, April 14). What is Iran's nuclear programme and what does the US want? BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/crlddd02w9jo
^[14] El Dahan, M., & Magid, P. (2024, October 3). Exclusive-Gulf states sought to reassure Iran of their neutrality in Iran-Israel conflict, sources say. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/gulf-states-sought-reassure-iran-their-neutrality-iran-israel-conflict-sources-2024-10-03/

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