This year’s IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, held in Singapore came at a time of heightening US-China contestation and strategic rivalry. Framed against this backdrop, the forum discussed a plethora of issues focussed on the region’s most pressing security challenges – ensuring security cooperation and stability in a competitive world, managing proliferation risks, cyber, undersea and outer space defence challenges, and cross-regional security interlinkages. Special sessions included issues such as defence innovation solutions for future challenges, regional crisis-management mechanisms and cooperative maritime security.

Conceptualised with the objective of engaging in important bilateral talks and coming up with fresh approaches together – the forum, unfortunately, also served as a theatre for high-stakes signalling. This was exacerbated by the notable absence of China's Defence Minister, Admiral Dong Jun – which stripped the forum from its opportunity of being a platform to conduct defence diplomacy and explain China’s security positions to other countries and delegates. During a press briefing by China’s Ministry of National Defense, the spokesperson stated that “Delegation members are selected based on operational needs, and regardless of rank or title, all participants represent the Chinese military in communicating China’s vision for a shared future and its three global initiatives, as well as its foreign and defense policies and core interests.” ^[1]

French President Emmanuel Macron delivered the keynote address and warned that the world was at a risk of being forced into binary alignment between the US and China. His comments came at a time when the regional actors are facing underlying structural pressure of contemporary great power rivalry, often caught between strategic engagements and economic dependency.

In a stark contrast to the trend Beijing has followed since 2019, China’s formal representation at the dialogue was significantly muted. The absence of Defence Minister Dong Jun was interpreted by many as a strategic choice - an act of diplomatic withdrawal that denied the US optics of a face-to-face confrontation. Instead, Rear Admiral Hu Gangfeng, Vice President of China’s National Defense University headed the delegation.

Despite the Defence Minister’s absence, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s plenary address did little to blunt the confrontational edge of bilateral competition, particularly in the Indo-Pacific security architecture. Hegseth’s plenary address showcased a marked departure from the previous year’s emphasis on risk management and de-escalation. ^[2] In a rhetorically charged speech that mentioned China nearly 30 times, Hegseth outlined a strategic vision grounded in “peace through strength”, signalling an explicit return to the rhetoric of deterrence maximalism. Interestingly, this approach mirrored a broader ideological pivot within the current US defence establishment - linking military modernisation to the “warrior ethos” and recentring the Indo-Pacific as the “priority theatre” of American military calculus. ^[3]

Hegseth’s messaging was explosive and targeted. He framed China’s actions not as revisionist but as hegemonic, involving the use of grey-zone tactics, hybrid warfare, and intimidation in contested maritime spaces. He further described Beijing’s cyber capabilities as a direct threat to critical infrastructure across both the United States and its allies. Hegseth warned of devastating consequences if China resorts to using force against Taiwan, however not explicitly mentioning the nature of US’ role in deterring such an escalation.

In his address, Hegseth laid out US’ new defence vision, one that includes a new layer of economic-security nexus. He warned against “entanglement” through economic dependency on China, arguing that it will force nations to make strategic decisions during crises, which, more often than not, might not be in their best interests. In this regard, Hegseth’s comments echoed the US establishment’s recent rhetoric of increasingly securitising trade and technology interdependence, and calls for “decoupling”.

In response to US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s allegations, Hu delivered a defensive yet ideologically assertive address. He accused Western actors of "fabricating reverse black and white" and provoking instability, instigating confrontations, stirring up the region – all of which are against the trend and the people’s will - under the garb of collective security.

Beijing invoked the principles of "dialogue and negotiation" in what it termed the “civilisation of the twenty-first century.” These appeals, however, were juxtaposed against accusations of military encirclement, unacceptable freedom of navigation operations, and destabilising cross-Strait relations – thereby coming at the risk of sounding ironic.

In contrast to US’ approach - which while framed as a call for collective deterrence, was underpinned by pressure on Indo-Pacific countries to increase defence spending and buy more American arms – Beijing’s strategy appeared to be reinforcing its previously stated ethos: promoting regional autonomy, denouncing exclusive cliques and advocating for a maritime community with a shared future. However, China did warn against supporting Taiwan independence forces and invoked the principle of maritime sovereignty. This development underscores how both the nations anchor their Indo-Pacific strategy on territorial integrity, sovereignty, and exclusive legitimacy.

China's public diplomacy, however, took an unorthodox route. China’s Singapore embassy, through its social media arm, called Hegseth’s speech as “steeped in provocations and instigation”. But, in a broader scheme of things, China’s engagement with the media through briefings and interactive sessions was significantly muted this year, as compared to last year when, to elaborate on China’s position on Taiwan, Lt. Gen. Jing Jianfeng, Deputy Chief of the Central Military Commission Joint Staff Department, held a press conference, just a few hours after US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin’s speech at the Dialogue in 2024. ^[4]

Against this backdrop, the asymmetry in narrative projection at Shangri-La this year, with an aggressive US and a relatively muted China, highlights the erosion of the legacy and efficacy of multilateral institutions in enforcing norms and resolving conflicts effectively. The US–China confrontation at the dialogue showcases how traditional multilateral institutions have become increasingly entangled in big-power rivalries, failing to foster consensus and deliver tangible outcomes. This was particularly true and evident at the Shangri-La Dialogue, whose very premise is to act as a platform for deliberative and constructive engagement – significantly undermined by such a war of words. It only focussed on narrative capturing, and not on making an honest effort to resolve the broader crisis of trust deficit and rising strategic ambiguity in the region.

Washington used the platform to solidify its position, consolidate allies, and amplify the ‘China threat’, whereas Beijing’s muted presence pointed towards an unwillingness to seek validation in what it perceives as an ideologically hostile space. Such a strategic choice can have far reaching consequences for the region – escalation of tensions while erosion of lines of communication.

Regional actors are also taking cognisance. Notably, Japan is doubling down on its US alliance and forming new minilateral arrangements. The US–China contestation is reshaping regional security dynamics – moving beyond the economic space and making its way into the militarised narrative space, with technological interdependence emerging as a vulnerability.

References

^[1] Yuandan, G. (2025, May 30). Why didn’t China send higher-ranking officials to attend 22nd Shangri-La Dialogue? Global Times. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202505/1335141.shtml
^[2] Austin, L. J., III. (2024, June 1). “The New Convergence in the Indo-Pacific”: Remarks by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III at the 2024 Shangri-La Dialogue (As Delivered). US Department of Defence. https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/3793580/the-new-convergence-in-the-indo-pacific-remarks-by-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j/
^[3] US Department of Defence. (2025, May 1). Secretary of Defense Directed Review of Army Transformation and Acquisition Reform. US Department of Defence. https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/4171008/secretary-of-defense-directed-review-of-army-transformation-and-acquisition-ref/#:~:text=Copy%20Link,and%20modernize%20inefficient%20defense%20contracts
^[4] Aixin, L., & Yuandan, G. (2024, June 1). ‘Taiwan independence’ means war: Chinese lieutenant general. Global Times. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202406/1313443.shtml

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